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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction 
As legal persons have entered into transnational trade, national legislators have become less 
capable to provide rules to control the conduct of these persons beyond their territory, and 
national legislators and courts may not be familiar with the needs and preferences of 
international actors. These developments necessitate the development of transnational rules. 
Consequently, more actors have become involved in the development of private law in the 
European Union. Accordingly, the European legislator1 has increasingly harmonised parts of 
private law, i.e. the area of material2 law3 that stipulates transactions between legal persons.4 
Thus, the development of private law in the European Union entails the involvement 
of multiple actors, and increasingly complex processes through which private law is 
developed. Unfortunately, various problems have become visible: the implementation of the 
private law acquis has led to difficulties,5 the revision of the private law acquis has proven to 
be a lenghty process 6  and shortcomings in the debate preceding harmonisation at the 
European level have become visible.7 Do these problems mean that the involvement of 
multiple actors is problematic, or can it also be beneficial?    
The coexistence of actors in the European Union serves as a starting point for the 
debate on multilevel governance, further discussed in paragraph 1.2. Paragraph 1.3. will 
consider the main research question and the sub-questions in more detail. Paragraph 1.4. 
will outline limitations in this book, and paragraph 1.5. will turn to the methodology.   
 
1.2. Multilevel governance 
                                               
1
 This book will focus on the coexistence of European and national state and non-state actors involved in the development of 
European private law. See further on this limitation, par.1.4. 
2
 This definition entails that the focus is not on ‘procedural’ law. See for a definition L. Del Duca, ‘Developing global transnational 
harmonization procedures for the twenty-first centruy: The accelerating pace of common and civil law convergence’, 42 Texas 
International Law Journal  2006-2007, p. 658.   
3
 “Law” includes both ‘hard law’, and other rules, referred to as alternative regulation (comp. I. Giesen, ‘Alternatieve regelgeving 
in privaatrechtelijke verhoudingen’, in: Alternatieve regelgeving (Handelingen Nederlandse juristen vereniging 2007-I, p. 73: all 
rules that are not ‘normal’ rules, i.e. rules that are established by the legislator. In this book, alternative regulation will also 
include rules developed through delegation). Accordingly, alternative regulation including soft law (norms without legally binding 
force which may affect parties’ behaviour: Comp. L. Senden, Soft law in European Community law (diss. Tilburg), Hart: Portland 
2004, p. 111-112), co-regulation, which involves both the cooperation between public and private actors in the making of new 
rules, and the reinforcement of rules negotiated by stakeholders with ‘hard law’, while these forms cannot be characterised as 
‘traditional’ legislation from the state. Comp. also for a definition of co-regulation Ph. Eijlander, ‘Possibilities and constraints in 
the use of self-regulation and co-regulation in legislative policy: Experiences in the Netherlands – Lessons to be learned for the 
EU?’, Electric Journal of Comparative Law 2005, p. 3, available at http://www.ejcl.org/91/art91-1.html, and self-regulation, which 
can be understood as the making of rules and norms by both by contract parties or a group of persons or bodies binding 
contract parties or this group, and often, but not necessarily, other private actors that choose to be bound by the rules made 
through self-regulation.   
4
 In this volume, European private law, or private law in the European Union, refers to law that stipulates the rights and duties of 
parties in transactions developed at the international, European and national level. The book focusses particularly on private law 
in the Dutch and German legal order, including relevant European law and treaties. 
5
 For example, the implementation of Directives may lead to inconsistencies in natonal codifications, see W.H. Roth, 
‘Transposing “pointillist” EC guidelinesinto national systematic codes – Problems and consequences’, ERPL 2002, p. 761.   
6
 The revision of the acquis can be traced to COM (2001) 398 final. More than ten years later, important measures – including 
Directive 99/44 on consumer sales, Directives 93/13 on unfair contract terms and Directive 90/314 on package travel – still need 
to be revised.  It is not clear if and when these measures will be revised.   
7
 W. Doralt, ‘Strukturelle Schwäche in der Europäisierung des Privatrechts’, RabelsZ 2011, p. 260. 
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In political science, the debate on multilevel governance has emphasised the coexistence of 
actors, and the interaction and interdependence between actors, as becomes clear from the 
well-established definition of multilevel governance by Marks:8 
 
‘a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers – 
supranational, national, regional, and local – as the result of a broad process of institutional 
creation and decisional reallocation that has pulled some previously centralized functions of the 
state up to the supranational level’ 
 
According to this description, the authority of the state has been fragmented: upwards, 
especially to the European Union, as well as international actors, downwards, to sub-national 
actors, and sideways, to non-governmental actors.9 Multilevel governance thus emphasises 
developments in which the roles of governments across levels change and become more 
interdependent.  
This book focusses on the European legal order, which refers to the competences of 
and relations between Member States and the Union, as well as international organisations 
and non-state actors,  based on national constitutions, the TFEU and the TEU, treaties, and 
the law, in particular European private law, established in accordance with these 
constitutions and Treaties. The European legal order has both been characterised as a 
confederation, i.e. an organisation based on agreements between states, which however has 
increasing characteristics of a federation,10 and as a federation, particularly ‘a constitutional 
order that strives at unity in diversity among previously independent or confederally related 
component entities’, which may have characteristics of a confederation.11  
The European legal order as a whole can be characterised as a legal order that 
consists of various levels. Accordingly, an international, European and national layer can be 
distinguished. Van Gerven and Lierman 12  have held that there is no sharp distinction 
between these legal orders; they overlap and may conflict with one another, or inspire one 
another. 
According to the discourse on multilevel governance, this multilevel legal order is 
characterised by interdependence and interaction. The increasing interdependence between 
actors necessitates interaction between actors.13 This interdependence and interaction for 
example becomes visible in the prejudicial procedure, where the CJEU and national courts 
need to interact with one another to ensure the correct interpretation of the acquis. Similarly, 
the interdependence between state actors and non-state actors 14  also leads to more 
interaction, as becomes visible in the interaction between non-state actors and the European 
legislator in the development and review of Directives.15 The increased role of non-state 
                                               
8
 G. Marks, ‘Structural policy and multilevel governance in the EC’, in: A. Cafruny, G. Rosenthal (eds.), The state of the 
European Community Vol. 2: The Maastricht debates and beyond, Rienner: Boulder 1993, p. 392 
9
 L. Hooghe, G. Marks, “Unravelling the central state, but how? Types of multi-level governance”,
 
(2003) Am Polit Sci Rev
 
 233.  
This thesis willfocus on the reallocation of competences to the European level and to non-state actors rather than the allocation 
of competences to sub-national actors, see further paragraph 1.4. 
10
 W. van Gerven, S. Lierman, Algemeen Deel, Veertig jaar later, Kluwer: Mechelen 2010, p. 49-54.   
11
 K. Lenearts, ‘Constitutionalism and the many faces of federalism’, Am Journ of Comp Law 1990, p. 205-206. 
12
 W. van Gerven, S. Lierman, Algemeen Deel, Veertig jaar later, Kluwer: Mechelen 2010, p. 33-39, similarly, L. Miller, The 
emergence of EU contract law: Exploring Europeanization, OUP: Oxford 2011, p. 155. 
13
 Comp. J. Neyer, ‘Discourse and order in the EU: A deliberative approach to multi-level governance’, JCMS 2003, p. 689, who 
points to the interdependence between the European institutions as well as the interdependence between Member States 
seeking to affect European Union policies.  
14 
I. Bache, M. V. Flinders, ‘Themes and issues in multilevel governance’, in: I. Bache, M. V. Flinders (eds), Multi-level 
governance, Oxford: OUP 2004, p. 3. 
15
 For example the involvement of the ISDA and its 2000 report on collateral arrangements in the European financial market, 




actors is also visible in the development of co-regulation and self-regulation at the European 
level.16 These developments are sometimes characterised as “governance”, in contrast to 
“government”, denoting the development of “hard law”.17 However, this contrast has been 
criticised18 and there is wide disagreement on the definition of governance.19 In this book, 
“governance” can be defined as ‘rules, procedures and behaviour, that affect the way in 
which powers are exercised’.20 
The interdependence between state actors from different levels and between state 
actors and non-state actors in the multilevel legal order has been recognised by the Study 
Group on Social Justice in European private law:21  
 
‘Law production in the European Union’s multi-level system results from the continuous interaction 
between semi-autonomous actors comprising legislators, the judiciary, and non-governmental 
organisations, at different levels – European, national, and regional. Law making can neither be 
monopolised nor achieved in isolation by just one branch of government or a single institution.’ 
 
Interdependence becomes visible in the decreased ability of national legislators to safeguard 
the consistent, predictable and accessible development of European private law, for example 
through codifications22 such as the Dutch Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek (herafter: ‘BW’) or the 
German Bürgerlich Gesetzbuch (hereafter: ‘BGB’), as the private law acquis continues to 
develop. Similarly, European actors do not have sufficient insight in national practices and 
legal views on justice within Member States, and consequently have to rely on Member 
States’ and non-state actors’ insights if they wish to develop private law in accordance with 
these views and practices. Equally, when actors promote the development of alternative 
regulation, they should take into account relevant non-state actors and their initiatives.  
Thus, interdependence between actors entails high standards for the process through 
which private law is developed. In particular, sufficient interaction between actors is important.  
As will become apparent later in this book, interaction may entail many forms of contact 
between actors, but mere contact will generally not suffice. Instead, the quality of interaction 
should enable actors to profit from one another’s insights. Therefore, this volume will refer to 
the concept of deliberation.23 Deliberation is interaction between actors based on arguments 
trying to reach consensus, and actors participating in debate have to be able to put 
themselves in the position of other actors.   
Deliberation has also been defended for European decision-making. Neyer24 argues 
that deliberation is superior to other modes of negotiation when it comes to problem-solving. 
Although deliberation may not necessarily achieve consensus on future action – i.e. the way 
                                               
16
 For example in the involvement of the IASB in the development of international accounting standards under Regulation 
1606/2002, see further par. 4.4.1.1.   
17
 J. Scott, D. Trubek, ‘Mind the gap: Law and new approaches to governance’, ELJ 2002, p. 1. 
18
 Ch. Mollers, ‘European governance, meaning and value of a concept’, CMLR 2006, p. 313. 
19
 See on the potential meanings of governance F. Möslein, K. Riesenhuber, ‘Contract governance – A draft research agenda’, 
ERCL 2009, p. 251, with further references.  
20
 Comp. European Commission, European governance, A white paper, COM (2001) 428 final. 
21
 Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, ‘Social justice in European contract law: A manifesto’, ELJ 2004, p. 
670. See also on European private law and multilevel governance E.A.G. van Schagen, ‘The Draft Common Frame of 
Reference and multilevel governance’, Edinburgh Student Law Review 2010. 
22
 This book will consider the use of “codifications” in the multilevel legal order, which refers to traditional codifications such as 
the BW and the BGB. Codifications, in this sense, may appear more prone to problems when multiple actors develop private law, 
but of course it is also possible to codify the law through revising and replacing various statutes by one statute on a particular 
part of private law. These codifications may or may not seek to describe the law at a specific point in time, but they may also 
seek to initiate changes in the law. Codifications in this sense are similarly less capable of providing a consistent and predictable 
set of rules if the European legislator subsequently introduces harmonization, and the use of blanket clauses in these statutes 
may similarly be affected. Thus, the questions considered in this book should also be of interest for codifications in this sense.  
23
 J. Habermas, Between facts and norms,Cambridge: MIT 1996. See further on this concept par. 8.2. 
24
 J. Neyer, ‘Discourse and order in the EU: A deliberative approach to multi-level governance’, JMCS 2003, p. 697-698. 
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in which European private law should be developed – deliberation generally limits the 
number of options for future action, and also contributes to the quality of those options. 
These options can subsequently be taken as a starting point in decision-making and facilitate 
political compromise. 
Often, arguments for deliberative discourse presume that democratically drafted 
legislation should play a central role. Arguably, if legislation is developed through deliberative 
discourse, this would be, and often is, a lengthy process, but deliberation provides legislative 
processes with a clearly added value, which, in turn, may prompt a preference for legislation. 
However, possibly, deliberative discourse could also point to the use of alternative regulation, 
especially in rapidly developing areas, to which law, if drafted through lengthy deliberative 
processes, may not adequately respond. Moreover, deliberation may take place in the 
development of alternative regulation. Accordingly, Neyer25 and Joerges26 have defended 
deliberation especially in comitology.27 
 
1.3. The main research question and sub-questions 
From the perspective of private lawyers, the coexistence of national and European state 
actors developing European private law is perhaps the most noticeable difference between 
the “traditional” nation state28 and the multilevel legal order. Therefore, the main research 
question asks to what extent the development of European private law by multiple actors is 
problematic or beneficial for the quality of European private law.  
 This question will be answered through the following sub-questions: 
 
i) Which benchmarks can be defended to evaluate the quality of European private law? 
 
Benchmarks of predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness will be defended as 
private law should facilitate transactions between legal persons.
29
 That does not mean private law may 
not impose restrictions on the freedom of parties to enter into transactions; mandatory law may be in 
accordance with society’s legal views on justice, for example when restrictions are imposed because 
one party is not capable of sufficiently protecting his interests. Notably, compliance with the 
benchmarks in this research is not a binary question but rather a matter of degree.  
The perspective of private parties will be decisive for determining whether private law meets 
the benchmarks in this book. “Private parties” is a large, diverse group that consists of parties who are 
directly or indirectly involved in entering into transactions through private law.
 30
 This perspective will 
                                               
25
 J. Neyer, ‘Discourse and order in the EU: A deliberative approach to multi-level governance’, JMCS 2003, p. 690-691. 
26
 Ch. Joerges, ‘On the legitimacy of Europeanising private law: Considerations on a justice-making law for the EU multi-level 
system’, vol 7.3 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 2003, available at http://www.ejcl.org/ejcl/73/art73-3.html. C. de la Porte, 
P. Nanz, ‘The OMC – a deliberative-democratic mode of governance? The cases of employment and pensions’, JEPP 2004, p. 
270-271 distinguish the argument of Joerges and Neyer for deliberative supranationalism from deliberative democracy defended 
by Habermas. They argue that Joerges and Neyer focus on comitology, where experts involve in evidence-based deliberative 
discourse. Notably, deliberative discourse ideally takes place within a limited circle of people with sufficient expertise, as is the 
case in comitology.     
27
 Comitology entails that the European legislator, under articles 290 et seq TFEU, delegates further decisions on technical 
matters to expert committees, see further par. 4.4.1.1.  
28
 This does not refer to a historically correct picture of a particular traditional nation state but rather to an idea that implicitly 
underpins the development of European private law. See further N. Jansen, Legal pluralism in Europe’, in: L. Niglia (ed.), 
Pluralism in Europe, forthcoming, via www.ssrn.com, as well as P. Oestmann, ‘Rechtsvielfalt’, in: N. Jansen, P. Oestmann (eds.), 
Gewohnheit, Gebot, Gesetz, Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen 2011, p. 99 et seq. This has also been argued for the Dutch legal order, 
as the Dutch Civil Code dates back from 1809 while the role of contract parties in private law dates from before 1809. Comp. 
W.J. Zwalve, ‘Regelgeving in het vermogensrecht’, RM Themis 2009, p. 20. See further on the idea of the nation state and the 
differences between this idea and the  multilevel legal order chapter 2. 
29
 That does not mean this thesis is limited to contract law. Parties may also enter into transactions when because a tortfeasor is 
paying damages to a victim. See further on the benchmarks chapter 2.  
30
Private parties are an extensive group, including contracting parties, tortfeasors and their victims, owners, tenants, employers 
and employees, but also third parties whose rights are affected by other parties’ transactions. Private parties realistically include 
legal practitioners advising and representing them. In addition, private parties may also be represented by stakeholder 
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be decisive because private law primarily addresses private parties. Private parties need to rely upon 
private law, and therefore, their interests are directly affected by private law. Moreover, private law 
traditionally depends upon private parties for enforcement. This characteristic gives private parties and 
their representatives a prominent role.    
 
The more European private law is in accordance with these benchmarks, the easier it will be 
for private parties and practitioners to comprehend European private law. Therefore, this 
book will also allude to the quality of material European private law by referring to the 
comprehensibility of European private law, which refers to the understanding of European 
private law by private parties and practitioners.  
Before considering what actors are involved in the development of European private 
law, it is important to sketch differences between nation states and the multilevel legal order, 
to make clear in what respects the development of European private law differs from the 
development of private law in nation states.   
 This sub-question will be addressed in chapter 2, after which chapter 3 will provide an 
introduction to chapters 4-6 on the next sub-question. 
 
ii) What actors develop European private law in the German and Dutch legal order? 
 
The actors considered in this book can be divided into state actors, including national legislators and 
courts, as well as the European legislator, the European Commission and the CJEU,
31
 international 
organisations, and non-state actors, including private parties (contract parties and other parties relying 
on private law), stakeholder groups, and academics. 
 
Moreover, chapter 4 on the German legal order will also provide starting points for a 
normative framework to determine which actors should be involved in the development of 
European private law. The principles underlying this framework will also be considered in 
chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 6 will compare the involvement of actors in the development of 
private law in respectively the German and Dutch legal order and ask whether the 
involvement of different actors in the development of European private law affects the quality 
of European private law.  
 
iii) Have actors, in the development of European private law through national techniques, 
adequately taken into account that other actors develop private law, which can 
limit the extent to which these techniques can contribute to benchmarks of 
predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness, and how has this 
affected the quality of European private law?  
 
“Techniques” is a broad, collective term for codifications, blanket clauses, soft law, general principles 
and other means through which private law may be developed.  
‘National’ techniques refer to techniques the use of which is modelled on the assumption of 
the characteristics typical of the nation state.
 32
 The term does not refer to techniques that are used 
solely at a national level. National techniques are codifications,
33
 soft laws, blanket clauses, and 
general principles. Accordingly, codifications presuppose a central legislator, and blanket clauses 
typically require the existence of a hierarchical, well-developed judicial system that consistently 
                                                                                                                                                   
associations. Typically, these stakeholder groups enable private parties to inform themselves of ongoing developments and 
organise themselves, trying to influence the formation of private law by legislators. 
31
 This research will refer to the CJEU, which, before the TFEU was known as the ECJ, for the sake of consistency. 
32
 See further below, par. 2.6.1. 
33
 In this book, ‘codification’ refers to traditional codifications such as the BW or the BGB, see previously footnote 22. 
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interprets these blanket clauses, as well as an adequate system of enforcement. Also, general 
principles may play an important part in the development of coherent national private law, especially if 
national private law is codified.  
Furthermore, soft laws such as the PECL and the DCFR will be considered as national 
techniques, as they are are typically based on models of national legislation, containing black letter 
rules and providing extensive rules in the area of private law. Often, these sets of soft law are based 
on national codes and seek to provide a model for a European code.
34
    
This volume focusses on these techniques because they have played and will continue to play 
a central role in the development of European private law. Because they have been designed to 
function within nation states, at first sight, they are likely to be most affected by the coexistence of 




The use of national techniques will be considered in chapter 7. 
 
iv) What techniques could be used in addition to or instead of currently used national 
techniques? 
 
Notably, actors typically use multiple techniques, simultaneously, as one technique may compensate 
for the weaknesses of another technique. Accordingly, the use of techniques should not be considered 
in isolation from one another, especially as actors use techniques alongside one another. 
 
The use of additional or alternative techniques will be considered in chapter 8.  
 
v) Can the extent to which a particular area of law meets benchmarks of predictability, 
consistency, accessibility and responsiveness be traced to actors’ recognition of 
other actors’ initiatives and the interaction between these actors? 
 
If multiple actors have been involved in the development of a particular area of law, this decreases the 
extent to which a single actor is capable of ensuring that that area of law meets benchmarks of 
predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness. Thus, interdependence develops. As 
actors have become increasingly interdependent and need to interact, this may have consequences 
for the actors that are involved in the development of European priovate law and for the way in which 
European private law should be developed. Is this apparent from the quality of respectively the 
German and Dutch law on standard contract terms (hereafter ‘STC’s)?  
 
Chapter 9 is an introduction to the case studies in chapters 10 and 11. Chapter 12 will ask 
what more general conclusions can be drawn from the case study that are also more 
generally of interest for the development of European private law. 
Chapter 13 will draw conclusions and answer the main research question: Is the 
coexistence of actors beneficial or detrimental to the quality of European private law? 
 
1.4. Limitations 
The question discussed in this book is very broad, and it has been necessary to establish 
some limitations.  
Firstly, to be able to sketch the role of actors in some detail, this research chooses to 
focus on two states in particular: Germany and The Netherlands. In subsequent chapters, a 
comparison between Germany and The Netherlands will take place. In the German legal 
                                               
34
 See further par. 7.3.1.  
35
 See further par. 3.4. 
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order, a constitutional framework has been developed that also provides indications for the 
development of private law through legislation or alternative regulation. Possible objections 
to the development of alternative regulation become visible in this framework, which may 
provide insight on possible objections to the development of alternative regulation in other 
Member States. The Dutch legal order provides little insight in similar objections.  
 Secondly, this overview should be seen in the light of the debate in European private 
law that portrays state legislatures and judiciary as primary actors in private law. European 
and national actors are the most active actors that develop binding private law, while the 
reallocation of legislative competences to the European level is likely to continue. Therefore, 
the research will focus on the interdependence between European and national actors. This 
also entails that the book will not pursue an in-depth analysis of the reallocation of 
competences to sub-national actors, which could also be seen against the background of 
multilevel governance.  
Thirdly, the overview will moreover focus on the role of state actors and the use of 
techniques by those state actors as these actors and techniques currently still play a primary 
role in the development of private law, while other forms of private law, particularly alternative 
regulation, are often developed within the framework established by state actors and their 
legislation and case law. Yet eventually, non-state actors may gain a more prominent role, 
especially as matters that legislators have to cope with become more complex and require 
considerable expertise. Accordingly, this research does not overlook the possible role of non-
state actors.  
  Fourthly, this research will study the development of private law in the Dutch and 
German legal order, and consider the initiatives from European actors where relevant. The 
overviews will show that European initiatives are increasingly relevant, but the primary level 
where private law is developed remains the national level. That does not mean that this 
might not change – but it is not yet sufficiently likely that the role of European actors, 
notwithstanding a considerable amount of new initiatives and proposals for harmonisation, 
will increase to the extent that the European level will become the central level where private 
law is developed. Essential parts of national private law, for example property law, remain 
applicable.   
  
1.5. Methodology 
This book started out from a traditional, national perspective on private law and it primarily 
uses the traditional legal research method by researching legislation, case law and legal 
literature, as well as other relevant documents.  
However, political science, specifically the discourse on multilevel governance, adds 
an important insight to the development of European private law. Multilevel governance 
stresses the coexistence of actors in the European multilevel legal order and draws attention 
to the interdependence between actors and the need for interaction, a perspective that has 
generally not been considered in the debate on European private law.  
The answer to the question whether the coexistence of actors in the development of 
European private law is problematic or beneficial depends on the definition of the “quality” of 
European private law, as well as the question what interaction is necessary to safeguard the 
quality of private law. Insights from jurisprudence, or legal theory, proved especially valuable 
in two respects. Insights from jurisprudence were useful for determining the benchmarks for 
the quality of European private law that were in accordance with views on benchmarks for 
European private law by private lawyers. Also, jurisprudence provides insights on the 
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interaction that is required in decision-making, thereby providing further clarification on the 
need for interaction between actors in accordance with the discourse on multilevel 
governance.   
This volume also contains comparative legal research. The volume does not directly 
compare legal rules as such, but instead aims to analyse and compare the roles of actors in 
the Dutch and German legal order. However, some comparative remarks have been made in 
chapter 6 and comparative insights have served as interesting alternative or additional 
perspectives in chapters 2, 10, 11 and 12 as well. 
Chapters 10 and 11 also contain an analysis of the German and Dutch law on 
standard contract terms. This part of the book does not however aim to compare differences 
and similarities between German and Dutch law, but rather, the way in which these rules 
have been developed, in particular, the interaction between actors involved in the 
development of these ruies. For both chapters 4 and 5 and chapters 10 and 11, this volume 
has made extensive use of European, German and Dutch legislation, case law, 




Chapter 2: Benchmarks for European private law  
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses benchmarks for the quality of European private law. As this research 
takes the perspective of private parties as a starting point, this chapter asks which 
benchmarks ensure that private parties may unproblematically rely on private law. 
Accordingly, this chapter will discuss predictability, accessibility, consistency and 
responsiveness as benchmarks.  
If European private law is predictable, accessible and consistent, as well as in 
accordance with society’s legal views on justice and the needs and preferences of legal 
practice, it will be easier to comprehend private law. If private law is responsive to society’s 
legal views on justice, it will be more easily understood and accepted by private parties. If 
private law is aware of the needs of businesses, it might be less complicated to make a 
translation from the law in the books to legal practice. To the contrary, if European private 
law is not predictable, consistent or accessible, or if it does not develop in accordance with 
the needs of legal practice and legal views on justice, parties will have more difficulty relying 
upon private law as it will be difficult to comprehend private law.  
These benchmarks have been widely recognised in national private law, and they 
have already frequently served implicitly as a starting point for criticism on European private 
law.36  
However, the analysis from multilevel governance indicates that the multilevel legal 
order differs from the traditional nation state. This chapter will ask what these differences 
mean for the development of European private law in accordance with the benchmarks.    
The approach of this chapter will be as follows. Paragraph 2.2. will discuss 
predictability, accessibility and consistency, and paragraph 2.3. will turn to the 
responsiveness of private law to society’s legal views on justice and to the needs and 
preferences of legal practice. Paragraph 2.4. will discuss why coherence and legal equality 
are not considered as separate benchmarks. Paragraph 2.5. will argue that developing 
European private law in accordance with these requirements becomes more complicated in 
the multilevel legal order. Paragraph 2.6. will draw conclusions and provide an outlook to the 
subsequent thesis. 
 
2.2. Benchmarks for good law  
This chapter will look at well-known requirements that become apparent when looking at 
national private law and emphasise the perspective of private parties as a starting point. This 
research benefits from previous, well-known attempts to determine common benchmarks for 
law. Bacon 37  already developed “laws of good lawmaking” that coincide with the 
requirements developed by Fuller:38  
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 For example H.-W. Micklitz, N. Reich, ‘Der Kommissionsvorschlag vom 8. 10. 2008 für eine Richtlinie über „Rechte der 
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similarities between Bacon and Fuller W.J. Witteveen, ‘Laws of lawmaking’, in: W.J. Witteveen, W. Van der Burg (eds.) 
Rediscovering Fuller, Amsterdam University Press: Amsterdam 1999, p. 328. 
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 L.L. Fuller, The morality of law, Yale University Press: London 1973, 9
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1) The generality of laws 
2) The public promulgation of laws 
3) Laws should not be developed or applied retroactively if possible 
4) The comprehensibility of laws 
5) The consistency of laws 
6) The enforceability of laws that should not prescribe impossible results 
7) The stability of laws 
8) Convergence between laws as they are announced and applied 
 
In Fuller’s view, rules had to comply with these requirements in order to qualify as “law”. 
Moreover, the parable of King Rex outlines that legislation that does not meet these 
benchmarks it not likely to affect behaviour.  
Other authors, who criticised Fuller, in particular Hart, 39  have not rejected these 
requirements outright. Bentham, 40  to whom Hart 41  referred, developed conditions that 
legislation – in particular codifications – had to meet in order to achieve the aims that were 
pursued. Bentham emphasises that legislation needs to be developed in accordance with 
utility, but also refers to more generally accepted criteria, such as the public availability of 
laws and their consistency.  
 
2.3. The comprehensibility of European private law 
The quality of European private law has become a subject of debate as national private law 
that does not meet these requirements may prompt harmonisation or amendment of the law 
in accordance with regulatory competition, or, if possible, circumvention of these rules 
through choice of law. 
The benchmarks of good lawmaking have been considered in recent discussions on 
the quality of European private law.42 Yet this research does not follow these benchmarks for 
several reasons. Firstly, the focus of this research is not the rule of law, or the legality of legal 
systems, but the quality of material private law. Secondly, benchmarks of good lawmaking 
have not been developed for private law, but more generally for law as such. Therefore, 
characteristics of private law, in particular the important role of private parties in the 
enforcement of private law, have not been considered as such. This also entails that the 
benchmarks for good lawmaking do not specifically take the perspective from private parties.  
Accordingly, some benchmarks of good lawmaking are less relevant for private law. Thus, 
the enforceability of private law depends on private parties, and this requirement does not 
stand in the way of vague provisions that leave room for discretion for the judiciary to enforce 
the law in accordance with the needs of legal practice and legal views on justice. These 
provisions have moreover evidently not stood in the way of the development of a 
considerable amount of case law, as becomes visible in both the Dutch and the German 
legal order. Thirdly, the definition of European private law in this research is broader than the 
                                               
39
 See further on this argument J. Waldon, ‘Positivism and legality: Hart’s equivocal response to Fuller’, New York University 
Law Review 2008, p. 1135. 
40
 J. Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, in: J. Bowring (ed.), The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 1 (Principles of Morals and 
Legislation, Fragment on Government, Civil Code, Penal Law), Chapter XIVV, available at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php?person=172&Itemid=99999999.  
41
 H.L.A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the separation of law and morals’, Harvard Law Review 1958, p. 594 et seq.    
42
 Comp. recently M. Safjan, Why a European Law Institute?, Speech held at the ELI Founding Congress, Paris 1 June 2011, 
text available at  http://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/p_eli/_17__Marek_Safjan.pdf, comp. also S. 
Worthington, ‘The unique charm of the common law’, ERPL 2011, p. 348, who finds that ‘[a] legal system is regarded as just 
only if its rules are reasonable, general, equal, predictable, and certain.’  
24 
 
understanding of law that becomes apparent from Fuller. Whereas the benchmarks and 
allegory from Fuller focus on legislation, this research also includes rules other than 
legislation, developed through self-regulation and co-regulation. Moreover, Fuller 43  has 
developed benchmarks for a good system of law, not for the quality of a particular area of 
material law.  
Which benchmarks enable private parties to enter into transactions with one another, 
in accordance with the general44 aims of private law?45  For private parties, the importance of 
legal certainty has often been emphasised and this benchmark accordingly plays a central 
role in debate on the quality of European private law. Benchmarks of good lawmaking largely 
coincide with legal certainty that requires that private law is: 
 
i) Predictable   
In turn, this benchmark entails that private law is not retroactively developed (in accordance 
with requirement 3), as well as the stability of of laws (requirement 7). In addition, for private 
law, the reliability of private law and the clear woridng of the law will be discussed. 
 
ii) Accessible 
In turn, this benchmark requires that private law is publicly promulgated (requirement 1). The 
accessibility of private law is  specifically concerned with parties’ ability to identify relevant 
sources of law, which may be particularly complicated if it concerns unwritten law or 
unpublished binding alternative regulation. In particular, accessibility of private law requires 
that parties – or rather their lawyers – can understand laws (requirement 4) which is essential 
for the enforcement of private law. This further entails the convergence between the wording 




This benchmark is in accordance with the consistency of laws (requirement 5). Also, the 
generality of laws (requirement 1) diminishes the chance that laws develop in isolation from 
one another, which in turn decreases the chance that inconsistencies develop. 
  
Thus, the requirements of legal certainty may roughly be divided in benchmarks of 
predictability, accessibility and consistency. These benchmarks may well overlap, and they 
may also influence and be influenced by benchmarks of responsiveness discussed in 
paragraph 2.4.   
The subsequent paragraphs wll discuss requirements important for legal certainty.  
Paragraph 2.3.1. will discuss predictability, paragraph 2.3.2 will turn to accessibility and 
paragraph 2.3.3. will consider consistency. Paragraph 2.3.4. will consider the overlaps 
between these benchmarks.  
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 L.L. Fuller, The morality of law, New Haven: Yale University Press 1969, revised edition, p. 43. 
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 This does not mean that by facilitating private parties’ transactions with one another, other, more specific aims may not also 
be pursued. 
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Predictability requires that parties can use private law as guidance in determining their own 
behaviour and avoiding conflicts, which entails that European private law needs to meet 
requirements of (1) clarity, (2) reliability, and (3) stable development.  
Firstly, private law should preferably contain key concepts and rules with a clear, 
predictable meaning. In trade, it is important to be able to assess one’s risks and act upon 
that assessment; private law is important for this assessment as it allows parties to assess, 
for example, what duties arise out of a contract, or whether an exclusion clause is valid. This 
idea is recognised, for example, in the DCFR, where Von Bar46 notes that the predictable 
outcome of a case in some areas is more important than the substance of the rules under 
which the case is determined. Dutch law, 47  German law, 48  and English law49  and have 
similarly recognised the need for clarity. Hondius50 has pointed out that in several states, 
clarity can be a constitutional requirement of law. At a European level, the ECHR51 has held 
that article 6 ECHR means that citizens must be able ‘to foresee, to a degree that is 
reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail’.  
This does not mean that rules have to be very precise52 – a blanket clause in statutory 
law may also contribute to the predictability of private law, depending on its interpretation. 
Using ambiguous terms and blanket clauses may also be a way to leave adequate room to 
allow for legal changes, in order to be able to also provide foreseeable and clear solutions to 
new developments.53 
Secondly, predictability entails that if parties have justifiably relied on the statement of 
behaviour of another party, and acted upon their reliance, in accordance with the law, their 
reliance should not be disappointed. 54  Predictability may therefore mean giving an 
enforceable claim to the person who justifiably relied on someone’s behaviour; for example, if 
a party has relied on an offer and his reliance was reasonable, this may entail that an offer is 
held to be irrevocable, under article 2:202 PECL.  
Thirdly, predictability requires that private law is developed and applied predictably, 
which includes that parties should also be able to enforce their claims. Thus, the 
development of private law should be logical and predictable. Arbitrarily amending private 
law decreases the predictable development of private law, 55  as well as continuously 
amending private law. Also, changes should not take effect retroactively, as this may make it 
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 Von Bar et al (eds), Principles, Defi nitions and Model Rules of European Private Law. Draft Common Frame of Reference  
Outline Edition 2009, p. 83. 
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 For example L.D. Pels Rijcken, ‘ Rechtszekerheid, Assepoester vanrechtsvindingstheorieén’, in: P. Abas et al (eds.), Non sine 
causa,  Tjeenk Willink: Zwolle 1979, p. 310. 
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 H. Wiedemann, ‘Rechtssicherheit – ein absoluter Wert?’ in: G. Paulus, U. Diederichsen, C.-W. Canaris (eds.), Festschrift  für 
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 Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenberg AG [1975] AC 591, 638, more generally Lord Bingham 
of Cornhill, ‘The rule of law’, Sir David Williams Lecture, Cambridge 2006, p. 6.   
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 E.H. Hondius, Sense and nonsense in the law. Towards clarity and plain meaning, Lecture Utrecht. 2007, p.19.  
51
 ECHR 26 April 1979 (Sunday Times v United Kingdom), application number 6538/74, par. 49. 
52
 See for example J.de Mot, G. de Geest, ‘De toekomst van het Europees privaatrecht na het Groenboek’, NJB 2002/18, 
pleading for an extremely detailed European Civil Code.   
53
 R. Zimmerman, ‘Codification: History and present significance of an idea’, ERPL 1995, p. 114, refers to W. Lorenz, ‘On the 
“calling” of our time for civil legislation’, in: A. Harmathy, A. Nemeth (eds.), Questions of civil law codification, Budapest: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 1990, p. 128, who states: ‘The reason why in Countries with old Civil Codes the courts are still 
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law’, MLR 1985, p. 5.   
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overeenkomstenrecht’, in: Vertrouwensbeginsel en rechtszekerheid in Nederland, Deventer: Tjeenk Willink 1997, par. 3.  
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 Comp. for example J.M. Smits, ‘European private law: A plea for a spontaneous legal order’,  in: D.M. Curtin et al (eds.), 
European integration and law, Intersentia: Antwerp 2006, par. 6. 
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Accessibility requires that parties have sufficient access to private law, in order to determine 
their legal position. This entails, in particular, access to sources that impose binding rules on 
these parties.57   
 The accessibility of sources of private law does not only mean that they should be 
publicly accessible. If sources are publicly accessible, parties may still face severe difficulties 
in determining their legal position by looking up publicly accessible legislation or case law.  
Firstly, even if sources are publicly accessible, determining one’s legal position also 
requires that one knows which sources are relevant for determining that position. This was 
already recognised by Bentham,58  who emphasised the “cognosibility” of private law in a 
codification. Codifications significantly enhance the access to private law by providing private 
parties with one source of private law in which private law is systematically ordered, 
especially compared to private law that can be deduced various coexisting statutes, case law, 
and self-regulation, or unwritten law. Van Caenegem,59 who also refers to “cognoscibility”, 
points out that this does not mean that private law cannot be accessible if it is not codified. It 
is very well possible to simultaneously support the accessibility of private law and reject 
codification; for example, the accessibility of private law may be increased by overviews and 
handbooks. 60  
Secondly, even if parties manage to discover the relevant sources, they will still be 
confronted with specialised legal terms. Accordingly, it has been suggested that ‘plain 
language’ should be used in the drafting of legislation.61 It is submitted that efforts to make 
provisions in, for example, Civil Codes, more intelligible for private parties themselves may 
not necessarily lead to clearer or more predictable private law; even if, for example, very 
simple rules are formulated, these ‘simple’ rules will subsequently also have to be applied to 
complex cases.62 Furthermore, plain language in legislation should not be used when that 
would lead to inconsistencies with, for example, case law, and the use of plain language can 
also be compromised by the need for political compromise. At the European level, the use of 
‘plain language’ is made more difficult by the need to cope with different languages and the 
arguments against using a concept that at first sight may have a clear meaning, but that 
already have meaning in national private laws.63 Moreover, when arguing that legislation 
should be comprehensible to laymen, it should be noted that the layman may not necessarily 
always read legislation relevant for assessing his legal position – possibly, he may instead 
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 Comp. CJEU 22 January 1997 (Opel Austria GmbH v Council of the European Union), T-115/94, [1997] ECR, p. II-39, par. 
124.  
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 Comp. ECHR 26 April 1979 (Sunday Times v United Kingdom), application number 6538/74, par. 49. 
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 J. Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, Chapter XIVV, available at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php?person=172&Itemid=99999999.  
59
 R. van Caenegem, Judges, legislators, and professors, CUP: Cambridge 1987, p. 161. 
60
 Comp. Lord Goff, ‘The search for principle’, Maccabean lecture on Jurisprudence, Proceedings of the British Academy 1984, 
p. 174. 
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 In The Netherlands, this has for example led to the project in which the Dutch Constitution is ‘translated’ in plain language: L. 
van Almelo (ed.), Onze Grondwet: de rechtsstaat en de grondrechten verklaard voor nieuwe Nederlandse burgers, VNG: The 
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 Comp. for the Dutch debate J.B.M. Vranken, ‘Niets in het recht is blijvend, behalve verandering’, WPNR 6560 (2004), note 17. 
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 See G. Danneman, S. Ferreri, M. Graziadei, ‘Language and terminology’, in: Ch. Twigg-Flessner (ed.), Cambridge companion 
to European Union private law, 2010, p. 70.   
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rely on advice by lawyers, or free advice from organisations providing free legal advice.64 
Therefore, ‘plain language’ should not be a criterion for assessing the accessibility of private 
law.   
 
2.3.3.  Consistency 
Inconsistency is problematic because it is irreconcilable with the rational character of the law: 
how can the law logically decide that behaviour is both lawful as well as giving rise to 
damages for tort? As law establishes order and gives commands, it cannot be contradictory: 
orders that contradict each other cancel each other out, and law that contradicts itself does 
not create order but the opposite. Accordingly, consistency has been widely recognised as a 
benchmark throughout the Union: in English law,65 as well as in Dutch law66 and German 
law.67 At the European level, consistency is similarly recognised.68 
Consistency requires that rules do not contradict one another. Yet that does not mean 
that provisions may not provide rules for different situations, and these rules may, at first 
sight, contradict one another. Inconsistencies become problematic once  parties are obliged 
to comply with conflicting, contradictory rules, which undermine legal certainty. Thus, 
inconsistency becomes problematic if it leads to contrdictory rules that are simultaneously 
applicable.  
Inconsistency can arise if legislation contains provisions that contradict themselves, 
but alternative regulation, which may similarly impose duties on private parties, may also 
contradict itself. Notably, alternative regulation is not developed by one legislator but by 
multiple actors which do not necessarily have similar aims, which increases the chance that 
provisions in multiple sets of alternative regulation that are simultaneously applicable may 
not be in accordance with one another. However, the scope of alternative regulation is 
smaller than legislation and the binding effect of alternative regulation is limited to particular 
sectors or to parties who have subjected themselves to rules developed through alternative 
regulation, and collective labour agreements, standard contract terms, or model contracts will 
not be very successful if they impose conflicting duties on parties or contradict themselves.  
The development of the private law acquis and the incorrect implementation of the 
acquis may also give rise to inconsistencies. Yet if private parties rely on implemented 
provisions, while not challenging the implementation of a particular Directive, the question 
arises whether inconsistency between a Directive and national implementation law is 
problematic. Moreover, Directives themselves are typically not directly applicable between 
parties, which leads to the conclusion that inconsistencies between a Directive and national 
law are not inconsistencies between simultaneously applicable rules. However, this 
inconsistency may be problematic for another reason: incorrect implementation law may be 
more likely to be amended or reformed, especially if Member States are held liable by the 
CJEU, which reduces the reliability of incorrectly implemented rules.  
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2.3.4. Overlaps between predictability, accessibility and consistency  
Thus, predictability, consistency and accessibility can be established as benchmarks for 
European private law. Moreover, predictability, accessibility and consistency show significant 
overlap, and consequently, complying with one requirement may facilitate compliance with 
another requirement. For example, increasing consistency may well improve predictability, 
and improving predictability may well improve the accessibility of private law. Similarly, a 
clear overview of relevant sources may well increase parties’ ability to adequately determine 
their legal position. Also, accessibility of private law may in turn facilitate understanding 
private law, which enables more rational debate on the development of private law, and a 
stable development of private law.  
In contrast, if private law is not in accordance with one requirement, this also 
negatively affects the other requirements. For example, inconsistencies in private law also 
seriously undermine the predictability and accessibility of private law. Likewise, 
inaccessibility makes it more difficult for parties to adequately determine their legal position, 
and retroactive or continuous amendments will undermine the accessibility of private law.  
 
2.4. Responsiveness  
Whilst legal certainty is important for private parties, more benchmarks should be set for 
private law. Parties require more of private law than predictability, accessibility, and 
consistency. Private law should not develop in isolation from its surroundings. Rather, private 
law should be responsive. In this respect, two requirements are essential for responsive 
private law: private parties should perceive the law as just and as effective.69  
Notably, private law does not merely provide neutral rules, although that may happen; 
law provides normative rules, especially through mandatory law. Accordingly, if private 
parties make an agreement that enables them to exploit a third party, or if parties agree on 
something distinctly immoral, private law should not facilitate these endeavours. 
Consequently, these normative rules are imposed on private parties and should therefore be 
in accordance with ideas of justice, which has been recognised more generally.70    
 
For example, if the legislature establishes that murderers can inherit the property of their victims, 
because this exception is in accordance with the principle of ne bis in idem, society may consider this 
unacceptable, for example because murderers are “rewarded” with the property of their victims. This 
rule could be avoided in several ways. Firstly, the people will try to prompt the legislator to reconsider 
the exception. Secondly, people could change their wills, providing, insofar as that is permitted by 
national law, that whomsoever murders them shall not inherit their property. If that clause would not be 
permitted by the law, it is not unthinkable that testators would try to avoid having to apply that 
particular piece of law, for example by a choice of law, or in whatever other way they could. Thirdly, 
the scope of the rule could be limited by the judiciary. Fourthly, if individual cases in which murders are 
allowed to inherit lead to public outrage, this could moreover re-prompt the legislator to amend the law.  
 
Moreover, private parties, in particular businesses entering into contracts with one another, 
also want private law to take into account these practices. Everyday practice develops 
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continuously, and private law should be able to cope with existing and developing practices.71 
If private parties establish a new business, or start using a new technology, or construct their 
business in a new manner, it is important that private law allows parties to determine their 
legal position, even if the law was not designed with the new practice or the technology in 
mind. If private law is not in accordance with legal practice, this may also inhibit parties’ 
ability to rely on private law. Arguably, if private law is easily outdated, it is likely to become 
obsolete. Outdated law may also hinder private parties in entering into agreements and 
increase parties’ ability to circumvent national law. If private law cannot adequately 
accommodate the transactions that they have entered into, this may also complicate rather 
than facilitate entering into transactions.  
Thus, private parties do not want private law to develop in isolation; rather, private law 
should be responsive to ideas on justice and the needs of parties entering into transactions 
with another.   
Nonet and Selznick72 distinguish responsive law from authoritarian or repressive law73 
and autonomous law.74  Nonet and Selznick75  define ‘responsive law’ as law that has ‘a 
capacity for responsible, and hence discriminate and selective, adaptation’. Without following 
all of society’s views on justice, responsive law perceives ‘social pressures’ as sources of 
knowledge and opportunities for ‘self-correction’. Thus, a theory for legal change is 
developed that recognises societal pressures as an external factor that may affect change,76 
emphasising participation and purpose in changing the law. Witteveen77 notes that the idea 
of responsive law is likely in accordance with Fuller’s ideas on the inner morality of law, as it 
emphasises the development of the law in accordance with ethical principles closely 
interrelated with the development of rules, rather than focussing on the origin of rules. More 
generally, Fuller, in developing his criteria, recognises that law is developed in a social 
context, and his criteria are in accordance with the idea that if law is to be complied with, 
interaction between the legislator and the citizens on what the law is to achieve is necessary. 
Interaction of this sort is more generally important if private law is to facilitate transactions 
between private parties. Arguably, the idea of responsive law is in accordance with the idea 
that the question whether private law is of good quality also depends what it expected of 
private law, which in turn is closely interrelated with normative ideas on justice as well as 
practical requirements. The need for interaction is particularly important in pluralistic legal 
orders and accordingly pays attention to the need for developing private law involving 
different views.78 Similarly, the importance of developing private laws in accordance with 
society’s views on justice79 and developing private law in accordance with the needs and 
preferences of legal practices80 has been emphasised.  
Accordingly, paragraph 2.4.1. will consider the responsiveness of private law to 
society’s legal views on justice, and paragraph 2.4.2. will discuss the responsiveness of 
private law to practice. Paragraph 2.4.3. will discuss the connection between responsiveness 
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 print, p. 336, on domination 
based on ‘rational rules’.  
75
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to society’s legal views on justice and legal practice, and the overlap with requirements 
facilitating legal certainty. 
 
2.4.1. Private law should be responsive to society’s views on justice  
The relationship between private law and normative views in society has been characterised 
as continuously interactive: on the one hand, views on just and appropriate behaviour 
continuously develop in society, and eventually find their way into private law. On the other 
hand, private law provides a framework for transactions between private parties and affects 
society’s views. 81 Accordingly, private law refers to views held in society, for example article 
3:12, article 6:162 Dutch Civil Code, par. 151 BGB or, in the case of the current UK Supreme 
Court, to the views of commuters in the Underground.82  
By referring to views in society, private law imports that society’s ideas on what is just. 
These views concern basic ideas about justice, such as compliance with human rights and 
the rule of law, as well as more controversial political points of view, such as allowing 
surrogate motherhood. Arguably, the support of those ideas by a democratic majority does 
not ensure, in itself, that private law is just, only that it is in accordance with views held in 
society. Unfortunately, such views can be unjust.83 In other words, the responsiveness of 
private law does not ensure that private law itself is just, nor is it just because it converges 
with societal views and developments.84 Accordingly, in the Dutch Civil Code, the legislator 
did not want blanket clauses such as article 3:12 Dutch Civil Code to be interpreted too 
subjectively; this article refers not to ‘opinion’ but ‘legal opinion’ (‘rechtsovertuiging’)85 which 
is not determined by democratic majority.86 Typically, the influence of majority’s views on 
what is just is mitigated as national constitutions and treaties may also reflect society’s views 
on what is just and appropriate. Private law cannot go against these laws, and therefore 
private law should not be able to facilitate manifest injustice. Consequently, judges are not 
obliged to undertake a survey of the actual views on a matter held in parts of society. Rather, 
the judge must determine whether society will tolerate his interpretation of that view or 
whether it will reject that view as manifestly unjust.  
Thus, while responsiveness of private law in itself does not ensure that private law is 
‘just’, responsiveness does ensure that private law takes into account the legal views of the 
people bound by it, which is just.  
Of  what ideas may society’s views may consist of, and where can these ideas be 
found? Firstly, the constitutional ideas of a legal order, such as respect for human rights, can 
be seen as society’s legal views on justice.87 Secondly, arguably, ideas on justice relevant for 
private law can not only be found in national constitutions, but also in treaties, or other areas 
of law, such as administrative law. Thirdly, it is submitted that general principles as 
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recognised by Dworkin,88 such as the idea that nobody may profit from his own wrongdoing,89 
but also more general ideas on party autonomy and freedom of contract, also constitute 
ideas on justice as recognised in private law.90 Fourthly, ideas on justice can be found in 
unwritten law. In Dutch law, liability for tort can also be established if an act is contrary to 
society’s views (‘verkeersopvatting’) in accordance with unwritten law, as stipulated in article 
6:162 par. 3 BW. Similarly, in German law, article 346 HGB recognises customary law as a 
source of law that affect the interpretation of contracts.91  Fifthly, those views may also be 
found in political discourse. Accordingly, views on distributive justice can be seen as 
underlying choices made in private law.92 The ideas found in these sources may well overlap 
– for example, the principle of legal equality can both be guaranteed in national constitutions 
and be recognised as a principle in private law.93  
Do ideas on justice converge between the Member States, and consequently, do 
common ideas on justice underpin European private law?94 At an abstract level, the ideas on 
justice may well converge – consider, for example, respect for human rights or principles 
such as freedom of contract. Yet abstract ideas on justice may well be considered differently 
when choices between the different ideas become necessary. Dworkin95 convincingly argued 
that general principles, such as ‘pacta sunt servanda’, or ‘legal equality’ do not by 
themselves decide the outcome in a specific case, and a choice for a solution that is in 
accordance with principle A rather than principle B does not mean that principle B is not a 
recognised principle underpinning private law anymore. Rather, general principles may give 
weight to a particular argument. In the absence of a hierarchy of principles or a permanent 
choice between principles, legal opinion on how individual cases should be decided may well 
differ.  
 
For example, in wrongful birth cases, the Hoge Raad indicated that damages for wrongful birth 
included the costs of raising the child, and could also include compensation for loss of income of the 
mother.
96
 In contrast, the House of Lords in MacFarlane v Tayside Health Board
97
 decided that the 
mother should be compensated for ‘general damages’ that included the ‘pain and suffering’ of 
pregnancy and birth, while the claim for compensation of the costs of upbringing was rejected. Lord 
Steyn stated that it would not be in accordance with generally held views that parents should be able 
to claim compensation for the upbringing of a healthy child, considering the amount of couples not 
able to have children or caring for disabled children, and the possibility that parents would have to 
argue in court that the unwanted child ‘is more trouble than it is worth’. Accordingly, the House of 
Lords held that awarding pure economic loss in this case would not be ‘fair, just, and reasonable’.  
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These different outcomes do not mean that one of the solutions is unjust. In other words, the 
outcome of one case cannot serve as a requirement that should be applied in the other case, 
as that would overlook the necessity of responsiveness to the different views on justice in the 
different societies. Instead, this research asks whether a particular solution is responsive, 
focussing on the reasoning used to decide especially controversial cases.  
 
2.4.2. Private law should be responsive to practice 
If parties enter into transaction with one another, private law should be adequately aware of 
everyday practice in which parties do so and accordingly accomodate practice. Thus, the 
practicality (‘hanteerbaarheid’) of private law has been emphasised for Dutch private law.98  
Traditionally, the need for pragmatic private law has been widely recognised. Especially in 
English law, pragmatism has been emphasised.99 Although references to pragmatic law are 
primarily visible in English law that should not be taken to mean that Dutch100 or German101  
law does not seek to pragmatically respond to business practices.  
If private law is to provide an efficient framework for private parties, it should take an 
adequate starting point and not close its eyes to existing business practices or technological 
developments. Consequently, if private law is responsive, this will contribute to the efficiency 
of private law.102 Notably, if the private law acquis is to effectively enhance the internal 
market, it arguably needs to adequately assess existing and developing practices in order to 
correctly identify problems and barriers to the internal market. It follows that the need for 
responsiveness to legal practice has increased as private law has been used as an 
instrument to further policy aims at a European level and in some cases also at a national 
level. This need is apparently also recognised by the European legislator.103 
 
2.4.3. Relations between responsiveness and legal certainty 
This paragraph will consider the connection between the responsiveness of private law to 
society’s legal views on justice and legal practice, and secondly consider possible conflicts 
between the requirements that European private law is responsive and requirements that 
facilitate legal certainty. 
Firstly, the connection between responsiveness to society’s legal views on justice has 
been sketched especially clearly by the Dutch Professor Nieuwenhuis,104 who sketches how 
the responsiveness to the requirements of legal practice (‘realia’) and the responsiveness to 
ideas on justice (‘idealia’) both influence private law and in turn are influenced by private law; 
there is interaction between the demands of legal practice, ideas on justice and private law. 
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Firstly, rules may be accepted in private law because practice demands that 
acceptance. Secondly, ideas on justice are not neutral; they prescribe certain behaviour and 
people should strive to fulfil these ideas. If ideas on justice grow prominent enough, this can 
be reflected by adopting rules of private law prescribing that behaviour in general, or it can 
for example be reflected in the interpretation of blanket clauses. As Nieuwenhuis rightly 
points out, there is interaction between on the one hand the demands of legal practice and 
on the other hand ideas on justice. If ideas on justice are unattainable, this will lessen their 
chance of acceptance in private law, and conversely, if demands of legal practice lead to 
injustice, they will not be accepted. 
The requirements of responsiveness and legal certainty may in some cases not be 
easily reconciled. The possible conflict between complying with requirements facilitating 
responsiveness to society’s legal views on justice – or, more abstractly, justice – and legal 
certainty has been widely debated. In particular Radbruch105 has argued that requirements of 
legal certainty may contradict principles of justice. This is especially the case where the law 
prescribes injustice in a predictable, consistent and accessible manner.106  
In other cases, the need for responsiveness and the need for legal certainty may also 
clash. Responsiveness to legal practice may undermine legal certainty if it means that law 
develops too rapidly. Actors seeking to develop European private law in accordance with 
requirements of predictability, accessibility and consistency will generally exercise restraint 
when adapting, introducing or revoking parts of private law, rather than opportunistically or 
randomly. Accordingly, Nonet and Selznick107 find that in order to avoid opportunistic change, 
law must have a specific purpose. Theoretically, the aim of the private law acquis – to 
improve the internal market and to protect consumers – should inhibit the unstable 
development of the private law acquis.108 Alternatively, although national private laws may 
not pursue a specific objective, the coherence of private law also imposes some restraint on 
actors developing the law. The ideas underlying private law may serve as starting points for 
amending the law.109  
Thirdly, complying with requirements of responsiveness to society’s legal views on 
justice and requirements of predictability may also overlap. Even Radbruch,110 pointing to the 
possible conflict between legal certainty and justice, simultaneously recognised that legal 
certainty and justice can also not be seen separately from one another. Arguably, 
requirements of predictability, accessibility and consistency are also in accordance with the 
idea of justice: if private law is binding on private parties, private law should comply with 
requirements that facilitate legal certainty. It is unfair to hold a private party liable for failure to 
comply with one of multiple contradictory rules, as he cannot comply with both rules, or to 
expect parties to comply with rules that they cannot have been aware of, because these 
rules have gone into effect retroactively or were not publicly accessible. Also, the 
convergence between private law and views in society plays an important role in the ability of 
private parties to know what the law is, without possessing specific expertise on private law. 
Lack of clarity, inconsistencies, and inaccessibility affect some parties more than others: 
when bringing a successful claim becomes more difficult, especially actors with little 
expertise and financial resources may be discouraged from bringing a claim. In this way, 
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weak parties protected by the legislator can be denied their protection, which will generally 
be considered unfair.   
Also, responsiveness may require that private law is predictable. Chalmers111 already 
indicated that the common law has developed predictably, because English commercial 
practice expressed the need for predictability. In Dutch law, some authors have even 
understood legal certainty and practicality as synomnyms.112   
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2.5. Benchmarks of justice, coherence and legal equality  
Should justice, coherence and legality equality also be benchmarks to evaluate the quality of 
European private law? Paragraph 2.5.1. will consider justice, and paragraph 2.5.2. will 
discuss coherence. Subsequently, paragraph 2.5.3. will turn to legal equality. 
2.5.1. Justice  
The criticism of Hart113 on the “inner morality” defended by Fuller indicates that Fuller’s 
requirements overlook an essential benchmark of law. Hart found that referring to the “inner 
morality of law” was confusing, and argued that similar requirements could also, for example, 
justify the “inner morality” of poisoning. In other words, the development of private law in 
accordance with Fuller’s criteria does not necessarily mean that the law is also moral.114  
It has been debated whether private law at a European level should be just - the 
drafters of the DCFR have indicated that “justice” is one of the fundamental principles 
underlying European private law and go on to discuss principles of private law, as ‘aspects’ 
of justice.115  However, simultaneously, in developing the private law acquis, the Commission 
is bound to the competences conferred upon it and has therefore sought to develop the 
private law acquis as a means to advance the internal market, rather than advancing justice.   
According to the definition of “just” in the Oxford English dictionary, law is well-
founded, upright and impartial, or in accordance with principles of fairness. These definitions 
arguably do not exclude one another. This argument indicates that the development of a 
“just” private law entails the development of material law that is morally right. These 
definitions indicate views on justice are normative views on both the content of the law and 
the outcome of individual cases in accordance with the law. Moreover, these are not 
individual views; as Dworkin116 points out, they are views shared by the community – which 
perhaps is a reason why there is disagreement on the question whether the rules in the 
private law acquis should be the result of considerations on justice, given the different views 
between Member States. As the law purports to say something about wrong and right, its 
views are subjected to the question whether this view of the law on wrong and right is correct.  
It has been defended that private law is especially concerned with questions of 
corrective justice, rather than distributive justice.117 Private law, in this view, is concerned 
with corrective justice as it protects the status quo and provides remedies for breaches of 
that status, such as tort, for breach of the status quo (good X belongs to Y). However, as the 
distinction between public and private law becomes less clear, the distinction between 
private law as a means for corrective justice also become less convincing. Thus, in European 
private law, according to arguments for ‘social justice’, private law should compensate for 
unequal positions between parties and provide protection to weak parties such as 
consumers.118 Thus, questions whether private law is “just” do not only concern corrective 
justice  but also distibutive justice.  
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Nevertheless, “justice” as a benchmark is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it is 
difficult to determine in which cases private law is in accordance with justice. Of course one 
can hardly argue that the content of law, including private law, should be just, but the 
question: “what is justice?” is not so easily answered. Are there absolute requirements of 
“justice” and if so, how can we know them? And how would an “absolute” requirement be 
applied in specific cases? Arguably, justice, or a just solution in a particular case, also 
depends upon the circumstances specific to that case, and the meaning of “justice” becomes 
clear in those specific situations.119 Alternatively, the view of what is just may also vary with 
the perspective that one takes: justice from the perspective of consumers, businesses, 
international organisations, philosophers? Views on what is “just” may already differ within 
states; in the European Union, these views are divided even more. Is it then possible to 
formulate requirements of justice with which the contents of private law have to comply, 
which could be imposed on private laws? It seems not really in accordance with the idea of, 
for example, democracy, to impose such absolute requirements on private laws. In contrast, 
if justice does not provide an “absolute” requirement, how can it serve as an “objective” 
requirement?  
Secondly, “justice” is not considered as a separate benchmark in this research as the 
idea that private law should be just is already expressed in the idea that private law should 
be in accordance with society’s legal views on justice. This benchmark also avoids the 
difficulties involved in specifying what justice requires in individual cases, while recognising 
that private law cannot isolate itself from legal views on what is just. Thus, the idea of 
responsive law offers a convincing alternative to “justice” as a benchmark. 
 
2.5.2. Coherence 
If private law is coherent, it can be derived from general ideas on justice, and these 
underlying ideas and principles ‘allow one to make sense of the law’. 120  It follows that 
coherence goes beyond consistency that merely requires that the law does not contradict 
itself. Specifically, if private law consists of a collection of detailed provisions that do not 
contradict one another, it is consistent. Yet if private law is consistent but incoherent, it is not 
clear why a statute or regulation contains this collection of provisions and not others.  
Improving coherence need not necessarily mean codification or placing all of (an area) 
of private law in a rigid system, although the assumption that private law should be coherent 
lies at the basis of efforts for systematisation. Instead, coherence may be improved in many 
ways and in many degrees. For example, actors may make private law more coherent by 
reforming the law, but coherence may also be improved by establishing academic overviews 
of (areas of) private law.  
The coherent development of law depends on the sufficient relation between areas of 
law.121 The question whether there is sufficient relation between areas of law depends on 
one’s perspective; thus, actors taking a functional approach to the development of law may 
find areas of public law and private law should be developed coherently, whereas state 
actors emphasise the coherent development of (areas of) private law.  
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Coherence is not a factual characteristic of private law. According to Soriano,122 ‘[t]he 
legal system is made up of precedents and legislative acts which share neither a single 
author, nor the same socio-political (and moral) context. Moreover, its values and principles 
are in a state of continuous tension.‘ 
Coherence is interrelated with ideas of justice and equality. Canaris123 finds that the 
idea of justice – in particular legal equality – requires generalisation to the point that specific 
rules can be seen as specifications from general ideas on justice. This view is not specific to 
the German legal order. For Dutch private law, Scholten124 has similarly held that coherence, 
for private law, can be considered as the internal systemic unity of private law in which rules 
of private law are tuned in to one another, as they can be deduced from a limited number of 
general principles, while the development of new law can also be based on those general 
principles.  
However, coherence cannot serve as a separate benchmark for the following reasons. 
Firstly, the development of coherent private law already follows from benchmarks of 
responsiveness and accessibility. Developing European private law in accordance with 
society’s legal views on justice implies the development of coherent private law. If private law 
consists of an arbitrary collection of rules, it is hard to imagine how that would respond to 
societal views on justice. 125 If private law should take into account those views, how can it be 
arbitrary? Views on justice may change over time, and they may not be absolute, but as 
private law takes these views into account, it ceases to be arbitrary and starts to make sense 
– there are reasons underlying choices made in private law. Also, frequently, actors 
developing private law coherently do so because they find this is in accordance with 
developing private law in accordance with requirements of accessibility. as coherence will 
allow one to make sense of private law by providing insight in ideas of justice, in the form of 
principles that underpin private law,126 which will increase the accessibility of private law.127  
It may be concluded that coherence is not a separate requirement, although actors 
may pursue the coherent development of law in order to ensure the stable development of 
private law. Actors who find that coherence is a separate requirement will agree with these 
efforts, and even see it as a necessity. Accordingly, this research recognises that techniques 
that emphasise the coherent development of private law, in particular codification, are a well-
established and widely recognised manner of developing the law in accordance with 
requirements of accessibility, predictability, consistency and responsiveness and may 
effectively contribute to those requirements.  
 
2.5.3. Legal equality  
Legal equality firstly requires that private law is developed in such a way that equal cases be 
decided equally, and secondly prohibits discrimination.128 
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Legal equality is an important principle that reflects a basic notion of justice. It has 
however also been considered as a controversial principle, as it raises the question in which 
respects parties are equal. Thus, if parties are equal, they should be treated equally, but if 
that is not the case, parties should not be treated equally. Aristotle 129  particularly 
distinguished between these views on equality:  
 
‘it is thought that justice is equality, and so it is, though not for everybody but only for those 
who are equals; and it is thought that inequality is just, for so indeed it is, though not for 
everybody, but for those who are unequal’ 
 
Therefore, equality does not mean that private law should provide the same rules for all 
private parties. Rather, equality demands that private law provides rules that adequately 
distinguish between private parties. However, the grounds of distinction between private 
parties, and the consequences for distinctions in private law, may vary throughout the Union.  
Legal equality has affected the development of private law in two respects.  
Firstly, Canaris130 has pointed out that the systematic unity introduced by Civil Codes 
is based on legal equality as legal equality requires consistency and coherence. This idea 
has also been recognised in the Dutch legal order.131 In the English legal order, the isolated 
development of specialised fields of private law has similarly been held to frustrate legal 
equality. 132  More generally, the principle of stare decisis emphasises the importance of 
deciding cases equally. Legal equality has similarly been recognised at the European level, 
and hamronised law especially seeks to promote equality between parties from different legal 
orders.   
Secondly, the prohibition on discrimination has increasingly invaded private law, 
which has become particularly apparent as provisions in Civil Codes, for example 7:646 
Dutch Civil Code, directly emphasise equal treatment. Notably, article 7: 646 Civil Code is an 
implementation of Directive 2000/78, which considers in its preamble133 that the European 
Union is founded upon respect for human rights and the rule of law. Additionally, 
predictability, accessibility and consistency can be severely undermined if rules are applied 
differently for groups of people on the basis of characteristics often falling within the sphere 
of human rights.  
However, legal equality should not serve as a separate requirement. Firstly, legal 
equality already follows from developing European private law in accordance with society’s 
legal views on justice. This becomes particularly apparent when considering article 7:646 BW. 
This provision does not establish a new norm, but it specifies the requirements of legal 
equality in labour contracts and gives private parties a direct claim when an employer makes 
a distinction that violates article 7:646 BW.134 Thus, women who, for example, enjoy less 
fringe benefits than their male colleagues, can base their claim on this specific article and do 
not have to base their claim on blanket clauses or unwritten law.135 The increasing referral to 
legal equality, as legislators develop rules compensating for unequal bargaining positions, 
may similarly be sought in changing views on what groups are equal to one another and the 
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insight that the inequality between parties in some cases necessitates unequal treatment.136 
This tendency could also be defended on the basis of fairness: as private law addresses 
private parties as equal, they should be treated equally, and as groups of people, for 
example consumers, employees or tenants, are found to be in a weaker position than 
contract parties that are on an equal footing with their contract party, they should not be 
treated equally.  
 Secondly, legal equality is as such also an unsuitable benchmark as it is too abstract 
to enable determining whether private parties are treated equally as European private law is 
developed. This becomes clear when asking in what cases equal treatment would be 
established. Considering the infinite amount of differences between individual cases, 
absolute equality would be difficult to achieve - and moreover, the law tends to differentiate 
between groups of people (such as businesses and consumers) that should be considered 
equal. Also, determining whether private parties are treated equally may well be a politically 
sensitive issue – for example, the question whether the equal treatment of same-sex couples 
and heterosexual couples requires that states enable same-sex couples to marry is a political 
one, and the views of Member States differ widely on this and other questions. Even within 
Member States, these questions may be controversial, and there are different views on 
whether and how legal equality affects private law, and different approaches are visible in 
Member States.137 The lack of agreement on this topic among states, as well as ongoing 
societal, ethic, and scientific developments have led the European Court of Human Rights to 
consider that states have a wide margin of appreciation on this topic. 138  From this 
perspective, different treatment need not necessarily be unequal treatment. Consequently, 
imposing one’s views on legal orders that do or do not recognise same-sex marriage may 
entail that private law is no longer developed in accordance with society’s legal views on 
justice, which is clearly undesirable.  
For these reasons, the research will not use legal equality as a separate requirement; 
however, evidently, private law should be in conformity with constitutional requirements, 
including legal equality, and actors developing private law in accordance with society’s legal 
views on justice should comply with legal equality, as a generally accepted legal principle of 
private law. 
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2.6. Developing private law in a national or multilevel legal order 
Contrary to Fuller’s example of King Rex, the development of European private law takes 
place in a multilevel legal order. Rather than one king, subjects as well as multiple “kings” 
simultaneously develop European private law. What does this mean for developing European 
private law in accordance with requirements facilitating legal certainty and responsiveness?  
Paragraph 2.6.1. will consider the development of private law in a “traditional” national 
legal order. Paragraph 2.6.2. will discuss how the increasing role of non-state actors 
complicates the development of European private law, and paragraph 2.6.3. will analyse how 
the coexistence of both state actors and non-state actors at different levels affects the 
development of European private law.  
 
2.6.1. Developing private law in the nation state  
One legislator has a central, clearly delineated competence to initiate legislation, either in the 
form of a codification or in the form of statutes. These statutes or codes are promulgated 
publicly, in the official language(s), so that the people can become aware of them. The 
legislature, or part of the legislature, is democratically elected, and if the legislator passes 
legislation that is unsatisfactory, either because it undermines legal certainty or 
responsiveness, this may become an issue in future elections. In this manner, the legislature 
can be pressured in developing private law in accordance with legal certainty and society’s 
needs and preferences. Legislation is preceded by debate in which stakeholders, academics, 
and legal practitioners can participate. Typically, the discussion of representative actors 
ensures that individuals are adequately represented in democratic debate, even if they do 
not participate. This discussion is based on rational arguments between actors that 
recognise the validity of one anothers’ arguments, in accordance with the ideal of 
deliberation.139   
Legislation is subsequently interpreted further by a hierarchically organised judiciary. 
If the constitution permits, the judiciary may set aside legislation to protect constitutionally 
recognised rights. The court highest in the hierarchy safeguards the uniform interpretation of 
the law. Even if its decisions are not binding, the task of that highest court and principles of 
legal equality generally ensure that lower courts follow the decisions of the highest court. In 
addition, the legislator, the courts, or academics will have developed rules for the consistent 
use of interpretation methods used by the judiciary. Which methods are prominent may also 
depend on the relation between the legislator and the judiciary; if the legislator has a 
particularly prominent role, judiciaries may pay more attention to legislative history, while 
judiciaries in other legal orders may adopt more restraint towards the intentions of the 
legislator and instead take the text of legislation as starting point. However, this does not 
mean that judiciaries will only select one method of interpretation, and methods of 
interpretation also depend on other circumstances. The decisions of the judiciary can 
subsequently be enforced, if necessary with the help of the executive power. The decisions 
of courts as well as legislation are generally also available in (possible online) databases.     
Legislation and case law form starting points for discussions in academic studies and 
journals that the judiciary or legislator in turn take as a starting point in confirming or 
overruling previous cases or amending or maintaining the law. Legislation and case law 
moreover form starting points for the education of law students. Academics and practitioners, 
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as well as judges, are generally organised in networks – that may also admit students – that 
provide these actors with education opportunities, makes actors aware of upcoming 
amendments and interesting other networks or databases, and more generally relevant 
information. The legislator may in turn consult these expert and practitioner networks. In 
some legal orders, these networks may also choose to provide information for decisions in 
particularly important judicial decisions, often in the form of amicus curiae letters. In time, 
some networks may become particularly prominent, and actors become accustomed to 
interacting with one another. Over time, these actors gain considerable experience in 
negotiating and insight in political networks. Also, the role of actors in this traditional 
background is clear: the legislator develops the law, the judiciary interprets it, private actors 
rely on it, and experts and academics support the development of private law by making 
available their experience and expertise.   
The clearly delineated role of actors and well-organised interaction between relevant 
actors in nation states facilitates the development of private law of good private law in 
various ways. 
Firstly, the development of private law within a clear framework, established either by 
case law or codifications, benefits the stable and accessible development of law. National 
legislation or case law also provides a framework for the development of self-regulation or 
co-regulation.  
Secondly, the participation of practitioners in the legislative process ensures that 
legislation does not overlook relevant practices. Also, debate preceding legislation and 
subsequent elections make clear if legislation is contrary to society’s views on justice.  
Thirdly, a hierarchical judiciary prevents inconsistent decisions between lower courts 
and increases the predictable and consistent development of the law. If the law contains 
numerous blanket clauses, a hierarchically organised judiciary needs to take an active 
approach to ensure the consistent and predictable as well as responsive interpretation of 
private law. The more a consistent, predictable interpretation of blanket clauses is ensured, 
the more a legislator may be inclined to use them, which may benefit private law as they 
provide sufficient flexibility to ensure that private law is in accordance with legal practices. 
Fourthly, the existence of networks and education opportunities for practitioners, and 
possible expert advice, helps to minimise the chance that decisions contradict one another, 
which also contributes to predictability and accessibility. The contacts forged between 
organisations and different stakeholder groups increase the possibilities for rational and 
ongoing debate, also on controversial topics. Additionally, the debate following the 
introduction of the law, and the case law developed on legislation may moreover indicate 
whether legislation gives rise to problems in practice or not.   
 
2.6.2. Developing comprehensible European private law in a multilevel 
legal order: the role of non-state actors 
Especially since codifications have been established, the development of private law has 
taken place within nation states. However, this picture needs readjustment, in particular in 
the light of the increased interdependence between actors, which should affect the role of 
actors and the use of techniques. 
Paragraph 2.6.2.1 will consider the increasing role of non-state actors. Paragraph 
2.6.2.2. will argue that the increasing role of non-state actors in the development of 
European private law may diminish the quality of European private law. Paragraph 2.6.2.3. 
will defend that the increasing role of non-state actors in the development of European 
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private law may also improve European private law. Paragraph 2.6.2.4 will conclude that that 
the positive or negative effects of the increasing role of non-state actors depend on the 
approach towards the increasing role of non-state actors.  
 
2.6.2.1. The increasing role of non-state actors  
In the face of societal developments, the view that non-state actors are passive parties that 
mainly rely upon private law, needs to be corrected. As legislators and judiciaries have had 
to address increasingly complex issues – for example because they need to cope with 
ongoing technical developments – they increasingly need to rely upon the expertise and 
experience of private actors. In other words, interdependence between state actors and non-
state actors has increased. The more prominent role of non-state actors also becomes 
apparent as non-state actors, rather than merely participating in legislative processes, more 
and more develop self-regulation or participate in the development of co-regulation as a way 
to prevent legislative intervention. In turn, as these instances of alternative regulation 140 
developed, the role of non-state actors becomes more prominent, and abandoning a well-
established form of alternative regulation or rejecting non-state actors’ insights becomes 
considerably more difficult.   
The increasing role of non-state actors has been reinforced by ongoing 
Europeanization:   
 
1) In advancing the internal market or consumer protection, European actors need to 
develop private law in accordance with existing and developing practices, and 
increasingly need to rely on private actors that are better aware of existing and 
developing practices.  
 
2) Actors at the European level may expressly encourage the development of alternative 
regulation and may organise private actors to organise themselves, as this increases 
the organisations that can enforce especially consumer rights on behalf of their 
members.  
 
3) The preferences of parties become more important as they are increasingly able to 
circumvent private law that they find insufficient through choice of law, or choices of 
jurisdiction. As Europeanization continues and pressures for harmonisation of 
mandatory law that parties cannot diverge from, these possibilities are not likely to 
decrease.  
 
4) Non-state actors operating at the international level may have better insight in foreign 
and transnational practices and they may also be more familiar with relevant foreign 
and international actors than national state actors that seek to provide rules for 
matters wiht an inherent cross-border aspect. 
 
5) Non-state actors more and more seek to participate not only in the drafting of 
legislation but also in drafting self-regulation, thereby taking a more active approahc 
than in Fuller’s legal order. 
 
                                               
140
 Alternative regulation refers to initiatives other than legislation. See for a further definition chapter 1, footnote 3.  
43 
 
Consequently, the larger role for non-state actors, and the increased interdependence 
between state actors and non-state actors set the development of private law in a multilevel 
legal order apart from the development of private law in nation states.  
 
2.6.2.2. Detriments 
The increasing role of non-state actors may have detrimental effects on legal certainty and 
responsiveness for three reasons. Firstly, problems may arise because more sources of 
private law become relevant and because the increasing functional development of private 
law. Secondly, problems may arise because the perspectives of actors differ, and thirdly, 
problems may arise because state and non-state actors’ priorities may not converge.  
Firstly, the larger role of non-state actors may lead to the development of more 
sources of private law and a more functional development of private law, thereby increasing 
the chance that private law will develop inconsistently and therefore unpredictability. 
Additionally, as these initiatives and instances develop at a European level, the development 
of private law may progressively take place beyond the national legal framework, which may 
diminish the stable development of law. This is particularly the case if non-state actors, 
inspired by initiatives in other legal orders, try to introduce forms of self-regulation or co-
regulation in a legal order that is not familiar with those new forms, or if non-state actors and 
state actors jointly decide to “experiment” with novel approaches. Also, the rules developed 
in alternative regulation may not be available to parties, even if they may later become bound 
by alternative regulation, which may inhibit the accessibility of private law.  
 Secondly, the perspectives of non-state actors and state actors on how a more 
comprehensible private law can best be pursued may differ. Private actors may consider that 
accessibility and responsiveness is best pursued by ensuring that private law is developed 
by private actors themselves. In contrast, state actors may seek to improve the public 
availability of rules developed through alternative regulation. Non-state actors may consider 
that consistency between national law and international initiatives should be improved, while 
national legislators may reject these international initiatives and emphasise that rules in 
various areas of national private law should be developed consistently with one another.   
Thirdly, the priorities of state actors and non-state actors may diverge. Private actors 
do not form a uniform group and private actors may contradict one another – consumer 
organisations prefer developing accessible private law, businesses emphasise predictability 
and argue for harmonisation, while state actors may be less inclined towards harmonisation. 
Stakeholders may also seek to “circumvent” the national level, by supporting European 
initiatives that are rejected by the national legislator, especially if a particular group of 
stakeholders has a strong position because of its expertise or organisational resources. 
Moreover, state actors and non-state actors may have different interests. In particular, 
stakeholder groups with clearly delineated interests seek to develop European private law in 
accordance with their interests, while the interests of other parties are overlooked. Of course, 
state actors may be similarly biased and pursue a particular political aim, which is especially 
problematic as state actors develop “hard” law, but it is more likely that national legislatures 
can be held democratically accountable.   
 
2.6.2.3. Benefits 
The increased participation of private actors may also contribute to the quality of European 
private law in various ways. Firstly, an active role of non-state actors may reinforce 
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legislation and indicate self-regulation or co-regulation where non-state actors are sufficiently 
capable or indicate legislation where alternative regulation has failed. Secondly, the 
perspective of state actors and non-state actors in developing a consistent approach towards 
alternative regulation converges.   
Firstly, if private actors have participated actively in the development of rules, they are 
likely better aware of rules and of new developments. A better understanding of these rules 
in turn enhances the insight of private parties in the future application of rules, and as private 
parties understand the logic underlying private law, their insight in potential future reform and 
accessibility improves. Private actors may moreover emphasise the need for clearly worded 
provisions, which also enhances predictability, while it is also more likely that private actors 
will recognise the need to amend the rules. New initiatives may also turn out to advance the 
consistent development of private law, for example by establishing particularly effective 
patterns for collective negotiations that may be used consistently in various areas of private 
law. Thus, the use of alternative regulation may also in accordance with responsiveness. 
Nonet and Selznick141 have argued that actors should develop rules in accordance with their 
institutional background: ‘Responsive law aims at enablement and facilitation’, emphasising 
the need to pay more attention to institutional design. It follows that if private parties are well-
organised and have sufficient expertise, they may be more capable to develop rules through 
self-regulation than the legislator, and non-state actors’ initiatives should accordingly be 
accommodated. Of course, that does not mean that alternative regulation should necessarily 
be pursued – if self-regulation, or co-regulation has failed, the development of legislation is 
indicated.  However, this model allows for experimentation that enables developing practices 
in accordance with requirements of legal certainty and responsiveness. 
Secondly, both state actors and non-state actors have a clear interest in developing a 
consistent approach towards the increasing role of non-state actors by both state actors and 
non-state actors may contribute to the quality of initiatives established by non-state actors. 
Importantly, not only state actors play an important role in developing a consistent approach 
towards instances of alternative regulation. As non-state actors gain a more prominent role, 
they also gain the responsibility to avoid developing unpredictable, inaccessible, inconsistent, 
or irresponsive private law. Non-state actors also have a clear interest in preventing failures 
that could become a cogent argument against the future development of alternative 
regulation. However, state actors do play an important role in safeguarding the quality of 
alternative regulation. Thus, arguably, state actors need to gain more insight in the question 
in which areas where alternative regulation will be successful and in what areas it will be a 
failure, while they also need to ensure that the development of alternative regulation will not 
mean that rules are developed primarily by parties with a lot of expertise, experience and 
financial and organisational resources, at the expense of actors with less expertise and 
resources. Additionally, state actors need to decide whether they will enforce these rules in a 
consistent manner.  
 
2.6.2.4. Conclusion on the increasing role of non-state actors 
Non-state actors play an important role in the development of European private law. 
Differently from the legal order, they may play an active role in the development of private 
law, and especially if non-state actors are not based at a national level, this may not take 
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place within a clear legal framework. Non-state actors may pursue various aims that do not 
necessarily coincide with the aims pursued by national state actors. As the role of non-state 
actors increases, the role of state actors change and questions whether state actors and 
non-state actors should develop rules and how the quality of alternative regulation should be 
safeguarded.  
These differences may affect the development of legislation and lead to the 
development of more alternative regulation. This in turn draws attention to the question in 
what ways private law could and should be developed, in particular the question whether 
private law should be developed through legislation or another option, in the form of self-
regulation or co-regulation. The increasing role of non-state actors may have both 
detrimental and beneficial effects on European private law. A consistent approach towards 
the development, evaluation and enforcement of alternative regulation may contribute to the 
predictability, accessibility, consistency, and responsiveness of private law. If such an 
approach is not developed, problems may arise in the form of the fragmented and functional 
development of alternative regulation that may undermine consistency, the lack of 
accessibility of alternative regulation to third parties, the development of alternative 
regulation solely by parties with strong positions, and a lack of predictability on the 
enforcement of alternative regulation.   
 
2.6.3. Multiple actors developing European private law 
An increasing amount of state and non-state actors from different levels simultaneously 
develop European private law and interdependence between these actors has developed.  
Paragraph 2.6.3.1. will consider the increasing amount of actors. Paragraph 2.6.3.2. 
will argue that the simultaneous development of European private law by multiple actors may 
have a detrimental effect on the quality of European private law. Paragraph 2.6.3.3. will 
defend that the simultaneous development of European private law by multiple actors may 
also have a beneficial effect on the the quality of European private law. Paragraph 2.6.3.4. 
will conclude that taking into account the initiatives of other actors requires more attention for 
“techniques” and possibilities for interaction. 
 
2.6.3.1. More state actors 
National legislators as well as the European legislator may initiate legislation, which is 
interpreted by the CJEU and Member States’ courts. The competences between state actors 
at the European and national level are generally not clearly delineated, and may change as 
the private law acquis develops. If the European legislator develops legislation, this may 
have direct effect – if it concern Regulations – or legislation has to be implemented by 
Member States – if it concerns Directives, as is largely the case for the private law acquis. 
Member States are free to decide in which way they implement Directives, as long as the 
rights conferred upon private parties in Directives are sufficiently clear and precise, enabling 
private parties to rely upon them. Accordingly, Member States have adopted diverging 
approaches to the implementation of Directives in their national laws. Their strategies also 
depend upon the development of national law – in particular, whether private law was or 
should be codified, or whether private law had mainly developed through case law, 
complemented by statutory law and regulations.  
Directives cannot be directly relied upon before the courts by individuals. Instead, 
private parties rely on national legislation implementing Directives. The legislation developed 
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by the European and national legislature, including implementation legislation, is preceded 
by democratic debate.  Directives as well as Regulations are publicly promulgated in all the 
official languages of the European Union, and implementation laws are promulgated in the 
official language of the legal order of that implementation law, which means that it is not 
necessarily accessible to private parties in other legal orders that do not have a proper 
command of this language, although they may have to rely upon it if they enter into cross-
border transactions.  
In addition, treaties have been established by international actors. Treaties may have 
direct effect, depending on their content. The question whether treaties, even if their content 
aims to directly bind private parties, needs to be implemented in order to have effect, differs 
between legal orders. Treaties have to be implemented in the European and German legal 
order, but they do not necessarily have to be implemented in the Dutch legal order. The 
implementation or ratification of treaties is publicly promulgated in the official languages of 
the legal order ratifying and implementing that treaty, which means that this ratification or 
implementation is not necessarily accessible to private parties that do not have a proper 
command of the official languages of that legal order. However, for treaties, an overview of 
states that have acceded to and ratified that treaty is usually provided. The absence of a 
central legislator means that private law is not developed within a  framework. Although 
frameworks still exist at the national level, the private law acquis and treaties do not develop 
within the framework provided by the national legislator or judiciary.  
The judiciary in the multilevel legal order is only partially hierarchically organised. The 
CJEU is competent to interpret European law and determine whether actors have adequately 
implemented the acquis. However, it is only competent to interpret European law, not 
national private law. The bulk of case law is therefore still developed by national courts. In 
addition, the adjudication of disputes on the basis of the private law acquis takes place at a 
national level, and lower courts are not obliged to refer questions to the CJEU. Only the 
highest courts are obliged to do so, but they themselves decide whether a case needs to be 
referred to the CJEU. The private law acquis has developed in a fragmented manner and 
although the CJEU provides binding decisions, and lower courts need to comply with it, the 
CJEU has not developed a body of case law similar to national courts that provide a starting 
point for the development of a consistent body of private law. If the European Union has 
acceded to treaties, the CJEU is competent to interpret these treaties. If this is not the case, 
there is generally no supranational court to guarantee the consistent interpretation of 
international law throughout the Union. Courts in different Member States do not necessarily 
refer to one another and do not take case law established by one another’s highest courts as 
starting points. Unless it concerns harmonised or international law, they do not need to so, 
either. As national private laws differ from one another, the decisions of foreign courts do not 
provide guidance, but merely a source of inspiration.   
Although decisions of the CJEU are public and freely available, there are no general 
databases collecting decisions on the acquis from Member States’ courts throughout the 
Union, although some databases on decisions on treaties have been developed. These 
decisions are not a starting point for debate and education for academics, practitioners, and 
students in the way that national legislation and case law serve as a starting point for debate 
in nation states. Instead, national case law and legislation form the starting point for 
academics, practitioners and students, although practitioners, academics and educators may 
well consider European legislation and CJEU case law relevant and therefore, selectively, 
discuss and study these materials. Education is still organised nationally. Similarly, despite 
the establishment of the European Law Institute and the establishment of European networks, 
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practitioners and judges are mainly organised nationally. Thus, the European legislator, 
when considering reform or new legislation, needs to rely upon national networks for 
consultations that may provide insight in national – not European – practices. It may not be 
easy for European actors to adequately identify relevant actors and to ensure that debates at 
the European level sufficiently include all relevant actors. European actors depend on 
national state actors in this respect. Actors trying to increase their influence may participate 
in the debate at both the national and European level.  
The dependence of European actors on national actors may also mean that a limited 
amount of actors gain sufficient experience and expertise to negotiate with one another. This 
may be reflected in the limited participation in the legislative process at the European level, 
especially when compared to participation at the national level.  
As the role of non-state actors increases, they can contribute to more participation, 
particularly by establishing and participating in networks and by establishing and maintaining 
databases. However, even if such databases are established, especially linguistic problems 
may arise that inhibit the accessibility of materials to all interested actors. Moreover, although 
foreign legislation and case law are interesting materials for policymakers, the immediate 
interest of these materials for private parties is less clear, especially if they do not have 
insight in foreign law. 
 
2.6.3.2. Detriments 
The increased number of state actors and non-state actors may be problematic for several 
reasons. Firstly, a larger amount of state and non-state actors leads to more sources of 
private law. Secondly, the perspectives of state actors at different level on developing 
European private law in accordance with legal certainty and responsiveness may diverge. 
Thirdly, the emphasis on requirements may differ between actors.  
Firstly, the larger number of actors may be detrimental for the quality of European 
private law. Especially accessibility and consistency are at risk when more private law 
sources become relevant. Not only is it more difficult to gain an overview of relevant law 
sources for private parties, the risk that provisions in these sources contradict one another 
logically increases. If areas of private law are developed separately, the risk of 
inconsistencies may increase. Europeanization reinforces an increasingly functional 
approach that does not take place within a clear legal framework. These developments may 
decrease the consistency and accessibility of private law, which in turn makes it more difficult 
for parties to adequately assess their legal position and adapt their behaviour accordingly.  
Secondly, actors at different levels may define predictability, accessibility and 
consistency and responsiveness differently, which also entails that the ways in which these 
benchmarks will be pursued differs. Thus, predictability for the European legislator entails 
predictability in cross-border cases, and the harmonisation of national law, whereas 
predictability, for national legislators and judges, entails the stable development of private 
law within a clear framework. Similarly, inconsistency for European actors concerns the 
consistency between private laws, which can be increased through harmonisation, while for 
national legislators, consistency concerns the consistent development of private law within 
codifications.142 Also, accessibility, for European actors, alludes to the accessibility of private 
law, which can be improved by the clear implementation of law. In contrast, accessibility for 
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Member States may allude to the involvement of national stakeholder groups in the provision 
of information and education to their members. Likewise, responsiveness towards society’s 
views at a European level may well be understood differently from responsiveness to these 
views at a national level, if only because the question arises which actors are to be included 
in the concept of a “European” society, or indeed, whether such a society is not merely the 
sum of the societies found in the Member States.143 Responsiveness towards legal practice 
may also differ: whereas national states may be better aware of national practices and seek 
to stimulate national trade and export, the aim of the European Union is not to ensure the 
trade in a particular state but to ensure that the measures of states – which may have been 
taken to stimulate national trade – do not pose obstacles to the internal market. 
Thirdly, the emphasis on benchmarks may differ between actors, which increases the 
chance that actors’ initiatives may contradict and undermine one another. Thus, while one 
actor seeks to develop a predictable private law, another actor simultaneously developing 
related rules instead tries to develop responsive private law. These simultaneous 
contradictory initiatives may undermine one another, so that the pursuit of both a predictable 
and a responsive private law is hindered. Moreover, actors may weigh requirements 
differently; some actors may consider arguments to safeguard an accessible private law 
more compelling than other actors, and the approach of these actors may differ as a result. 
Simultaneously, actors do not necessarily consistently pursue one requirement over the 
other. Instead, they may develop private law for political reasons rather especially as other 
arguments may also play a role in the development of European private law. Prominent 
Dutch authors144 have rightly doubted the usefulness of establishing a hierarchical order 
between these requirements.  
 
2.6.3.3. Benefits 
The development of private law by state and non-state actors at different levels may also 
contribute to legal certainty and responsiveness in various ways. Firstly, Europeanization and 
the possibility that other actors develop private law may prompt actors to develop private law 
in a more predictable, accessible, consistent or responsive manner. Secondly, actors’ pursuit 
of various requirements may reinforce one another and actors may benefit from one 
another’s insights.   
Firstly, regulatory competition may prompt legislators to develop the law in 
accordance with benchmarks facilitating legal certainty. Thus, if legislators perceive that 
private parties opt for the law of state X that provides predictable outcomes, legislators may 
try to develop their law similarly to the law of state X. Consistency may also be increased if 
the “threat” of harmonisation prompts national legislators to reform inconsistent national laws. 
Also, consistency with foreign laws may increase if judges or legislators are inspired by the 
reasoning of foreign judges or legislators. Moreover, harmonisation may force Member 
States to increase the accessibility of private law by codifying rules previously developed in 
case law. Furthermore, if states reconsider outdated law under the “threat” of harmonisation, 
this will contribute to the responsiveness of private law to legal practice. Moreover, actors 
may reallocate legislative competences to actors at levels that are best placed to deal with 
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 For a collection or relatively recent research on this question see M. Góra, Z. Mach (eds.), Collective identity and democracy, 
The impact of EU enlargement, RECON Report 12, Oslo: October 2010, available at 
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particular practices. In particular, state actors may conclude that the Union or international 
organisations are best placed to deal with matters that have an inherently cross-border 
element, which is particularly clear in matters of timeshare or package travel, but also for 
private international law or transport law.   
 Secondly, actors’ initiatives may also reinforce one another. Notably, the multitude of 
legal sources may prompt actors to ensure accessibility in various ways. State actors can 
choose to (re)codify private law, or to provide an overview of relevant sources in a different 
manner – for example through providing an overview of relevant sources at publicly 
accessible websites, databases, or in handbooks. Also, if actors take into account the 
experiences of other actors in dealing with the implementation of the acquis, they may 
choose similar implementation methods, which in turn may enhance consistency. Taking into 
account experiences in the implementation of the acquis may also increase the chance that 
actors carefully consider the advantages and disadvantages of particular strategies towards 
implementation, and compensate for potential disadvantages. The coexistence of actors may 
also contribute to the responsiveness of private law, for example if national actors, faced with 
the continuing development of the acquis, consider the increased or more consistent use of 
consultations and impact assessments in the drafting of harmonisation measures as well as 
the implementation of Directives. Furthermore, the responsiveness of European measures 
can be improved if national states, before harmonisation becomes binding, develop similar 
legislation, which may indicate how these measures will affect legal practice.  
 
2.6.3.4. Conclusion on the coexistence of more state actors 
developing European private law 
The multilevel legal order shows clear differences from the “traditional” nation state in various 
respects. The increasing amount of actors entails that private law is also developed beyond 
legal frameworks, and not only through traditional legislation. The roles of actors are 
moreover subject to change; especially the legislative competences of state actors to 
develop private law may be reallocated as the private law acquis develops further. Also, the 
judiciary is partially hierarchical, while the legislation and case law produced at the European 
level does not necessarily form a starting point for actors that remain primarily nationally 
organised. These developments may have both detrimental and beneficial effects on 
European private law.  
The larger number of actors draws attention to the question which actors should develop 
European private law and how actors should cope with the increasing amount of initiatives 
from other actors. In particular, the question how national and European actors should avoid 
problems and benefit from one another’s experience arises.  
 
2.7.  Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness 
towards society’s legal views on justice and responsiveness to the needs and preferences of 
legal practice should be used as benchmarks, or requirements, to evaluate the quality of 
European private law. These requirements have been widely recognised, both at the national 
level and at the European level.   
Requirements of predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness should 
not be seen in isolation. Instead, pursuing one requirement will often contribute to other 
requirements. In some cases, however, developing European private law in accordance with 
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society’s legal views on justice has been contrasted to the development of European private 
law in accordance with requirements facilitating legal certainty. Importantly, no clear 
hierarchy in these requirements has been recognised.  
The involvement of more non-state actors, reinforced by ongoing Europeanization, 
affects the role of non-state actors and has consequences for the way in which European 
private law is developed. As non-state actors possess more expertise and more 
organisational resources, they may play a more important and influentual role in legislative 
processes, both at the national and European level, and they may also suggest developing 
alternative regulation rather than legislation, thereby offering alternatives for legislation. This 
development may both detrimentally and beneficially affect the development of European 
private law.  
The involvement of more state actors leads to interdependence between actors from 
different levels, but this involvement is not similarly organised and facilitated as is the case in 
the nation state. The involvement of more state actors and non-state actors may both 
improve and lessn the quality of European private law. 
Thus, these characteristics of the multilevel legal order make the development of 




Chapter 3: Outlook 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In the multilevel legal order, more non-state actors and more state actors have become 
involved in the development of European private law, which has led to interdependence, 
which, in turn, should affect the use of techniques in the development of European private 
law.  
The subsequent chapters will consider what this means for the development of 
European private law in accordance with the benchmarks. Paragraph 3.2. will consider the 
question what actors are involved in the development of European private law. Paragraph 
3.3. will consider the differences and similarities in the roles of actors in the German and 
Dutch legal order. Paragraph 3.4. will discuss what interdependence means for the use of 
national techniques. Paragraph 3.5. will turn to the use of techniques in addition or instead of 
national techniques and paragraph 3.6. will discuss the case studies.  
 
 
3.2. What actors are involved in the development of European private law? 
More actors have become competent to develop private law, and the role of actors is subject 
to change: in particular, European state actors and non-state actors have gained a more 
prominent role.   
As the role of European actors becomes more prominent, more questions of 
competence are likely to arise. Similarly, the role of non-state actors grows, and they 
correspondingly gain more responsibility in ensuring that alternative regulation – especially 
binding forms of alternative regulation – is developed in accordance with requirements of 
predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness. The weaknesses of alternative 
regulation should prompt state actors to limit the competence of non-state actors to establish 
binding alternative regulation, while the strengths of alternative regulation should move state 
state actors to take advantage of non-state actors’ initiatives. What is the role of non-state 
actors, and how do state actors compensate for weaknesses while benefitting from strengths, 
and do they do so satisfactorily? 
Chapters 4 and 5 will consider the role of actors in the development of European 
private law in respectively the German and the Dutch legal order.   
As a framework for determining the role of actors has developed in the German legal 
order, chapter 4 will turn to the actors developing European private law in the German legal 
order and the underlying framework. Notably, the framework developed in the German legal 
order is closely interrelated with German constitutional law, and cannot simply be transposed 
to the Dutch legal order, let alone the European level. Consequently, chapter 5 will attempt to 
develop a normative framework for the Dutch legal order, based on the concepts underlying 
the German normative framework.  
 
3.3. Comparing the role of actors 
Does a comparison between the German and Dutch legal order reveal differences or 
similarities between the role of the different actors involved in the development of private law? 
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And if that is the case, wat does that mean for the way in which European private law is 
developed and the quality of European private law?  
Accordingly, chapter 6 will compare the role of actors in the different legal orders and 
ask what consequences the differences and similarities in the roles of actors may have for 
the way in which private law is developed and the quality of private law.  
 
3.4. Interdepedendence, interaction, and the use of techniques 
Since more actors have become involved in the development of private law, interdependence 
has developed. Interdependence between state actors at the national and European level 
already follows from the shared competence of Member States and the European Union in 
various areas of European private law. 145  Consequently, actors are less able to 
independently pursue developing European private law in accordance with the benchmarks, 
which should affect the use of techniques. Accordingly, it has been argued that the multilevel 
legal order may have far-reaching consequences for the use of techniques in the 
development of private law throughout the Union.146   
Firstly, the interdependence between actors may affect the extent to which 
techniques may contribute to benchmarks of predictability, consistency, accessibility, and 
responsiveness.  
The need for interaction between state actors at the national and the European level 
is already recognised in private law – for example, taking into account insights from 
comparative and international law in the drafting of codifications. Arguably, in these cases, 
lack of interaction may already entail that national legislators may overlook interesting 
developments in foreign law that could be valuable for national law. 147  The need for 
interaction however increases if interdependence develops. This does not mean that as 
many actors as possible should interact with one another as often as possible – instead, 
interaction should be more in accordance with the idea of deliberation  
It follows that increasingly interdependent actors developing European private law 
need to interact; they need to be aware that other actors also develop private law, which may 
influence the extent to which techniques used by these actors safeguard benchmarks of 
predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness.  
Accordingly, interdependence should affect the development of private law through 
codifications: the need to maintain the predictable and accessible development of private law 
through codifications should prompt national legislators to develop a consistent strategy 
towards implementing the acquis within or outside of codifications, while the need to 
safeguard the predictability of private law through these codes should prompt national actors 
to foresee which areas of private law are to be harmonised. In turn, the European legislator 
and the CJEU should leave Member States sufficient room for implementing the acquis 
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within their codes in a manner that does not undermine the consistency and the 
responsiveness of private law in codes. More generally, the extent to which national 
legislators safeguard the quality of private law in codifications should give the European 
legislator pause in intervening with these codes.  
Equally, interdependence should affect the use of blanket clauses. National 
legislators and courts should take into account blanket clauses in the acquis. In turn, 
European actors should carefully consider the importance of blanket clauses in codifications 
for the responsiveness of private law and take care not to undermine the consistent 
interpretation of blanket clauses in codifications.   
Likewise, European actors should not undermine the development of private law at a 
national level in accordance with principles that reflect national legal views on justice. Rather, 
general principles should serve as a starting point for interaction. 
 
The need for interaction in this sense entails two things: 
 
1) Not interacting may undermine predictability, accessibility, consistency and 
responsiveness. 
 
Thus, the lack of attention of the European Commission for relevant national initiatives in the drafting 
of the EU code for online consumer rights diminishes the chance that it wil adequately take into 
account existing practices while overlooking valuable sources of information and actors with 
considerable expertise in national self-regulation. Thus, the lack of interaction inhibits the 
responsiveness of a future code and, arguably, thereby also its success. If it is not binding, it is not 
likely that businesses will choose to comply with a code while they already comply with well-
established codes of conduct. Moreover, the development of a code of conduct in addition to already 
existing codes, both at the national and the European level, is likely to lessen the accessibility of the 
law.  
More generally, as the European legislators and the CJEU play a more important role in the 
development of private law, national state actors should be familiar with these initiatives as well as 
future initiatives that may be important for the stable development of the law in codifications. Thus, if 
national actors take a Regulation or a Directive as a source of inspiration in reforming national law, 
they should take into account future reforms of these measures. If this is not the case, this increases 
the chance that future national law will be modelled after European measures that were reformed to 
address weaknesses arising from previously valid measures. Moreover, especially if it concerns 
measures that have to be implemented in national law, inconsistencies within national codes and the 
need for too frequent amendments may arise.  
 
2) Interaction may reinforce attempts to advance predictability, accessibility, 
consistency and responsiveness   
 
Thus, interaction between the European and the national legislator may make the European legislator 
more aware of national initiatives that seem particularly well-suited to cope with a problem which is 
also visible in cross-border situations. Moreover, if a national rule has already been established, this 
provides more information about how a rule is enforced and applied in practice. 
If national legislators are aware that the European legislator is likely to look at successful 
national rules as a source of inspiration, this may prompt them to make these rules more easily 
available, which in turn is beneficial for the accessibility of the law.   
 
In areas where interdependence has developed, insufficient interaction may not only lead 
actors to ignore interesting insights, thus not making use of benefits that may arise from the 
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coexistence of actors. Instead, problems may arise, for example the incorrect implementation 
of Directives, or implementation that leaves room for unpredictability.  
It may become more complex for actors to interact effectively if more actors are 
involved in the development of European private law, as it takes more effort to identify 
relevant state and non-state actors and keep track of their initiatives. Importantly, interaction 
between actors from different levels and different legal orders is not as well organised as 
interaction in nation states. 
This need for interaction means that if interaction does not take place, it may indicate 
that problems for European private law will arise or have already arisen.  
Notably, the interdependence between actors not only points to the need for 
interaction between actors, it also means that the development of private law by one actor 
can affect the development of private law by another actor. Notably, problems of 
unpredictability, inaccessibility, inconsistency or unresponsiveness of private law at one level 
may in turn affect private law from another actor, at the same level or at another level.   
Thus, more interdependence and the corresponding increased need for deliberation 
entails higher standards for the process through which European private law is developed. 
Processes not meeting these standards will undermine the quality of European private law, 
while processes meeting these standards will contribute to the quality of European private 
law.   
Chapter 7 will ask whether actors in the use of national techniques, have adequately 
taken into account that other actors develop private law, which can limit the extent to which 
these techniques can contribute to benchmarks of predictability, accessibility, consistency 
and responsiveness, and how the use of techniques affects the quality of European private 
law.  
 
3.5. Techniques in addition or instead of currently used techniques 
In the multilevel legal order, multiple techniques have not been developed by one actor 
competent to develop European private law. Rather, the use of techniques is less 
coordinated while there is more need of coordination, especially as interdependence is not 
likely to decrease. 
Currently, top-down techniques play a central role in the development of private law, 
and actors usually overlook that techniques are typically used in combination with another. 
Specifically, the additional use of bottom-up techniques has been neglected. 
Bottom-up techniques presuppose a prominent role of non-state actors. The extent to 
which techniques increase predictability, consistency, accessibility, and responsiveness may 
be undermined if state actors do not sufficiently address non-state actors: for example, if 
consultations ignore input from expert non-state actors, or if consultations do not adequately 
identify stakeholders. As problems become more complex – for example because of 
Europeanisation – the role of non-state actors also increases because of the increasing need 
for non-state actors’ expertise and their organisational and financial resources.  
Also, whereas the use of techniques at the national level may not be changed, more 
flexibility exists at the European level. The use of alternative techniques should therefore be 
considered.   
Techniques that will not be separately considered in the case study include the 
Lamfalussy procedure, the use of which seems confined to financial law. In the light of 
existing national private law, it is difficult to imagine what a Lamfalussy procedure, extended 
to private law more generally, would look like. Further techniques that have not been 
55 
 
discussed include education. This is not to deny the benefits that wider education that makes 
lawyers more aware of foreign and European developments, nor does this thesis deny the 
role that education plays in facilitating interaction between actors in nation states. However, 
the effects of education are long-term and hard to assess, and it is wrong to simply consider 
education as a means to an end rather than an end in itself. Moreover, academic research 
and scholarly writing may also support the development of private law. Although academic 
research and scholarly writing may fulfill an important role, it is difficult to pinpoint how 
academic research in general supports the comprehensibility of private law, especially as 
academic research need not necessarily lead to developments and the long-terms effects of 
scholarly writing may be visible only in the long term. Moreover, the question arises whether 
describing research as a “technique” is accurate, while it may also coincide with the 
development of soft laws and the development of networks and databases. Therefore, 
academic research will not be considered separately. Other techniques may have been 
overlooked; however, the possible alternative techniques that could be used in the 
development of private law seems a fruitful subject for further research. 
 Thus, chapter 8 will ask what additional and alternative techniques could contribute to 
benchmarks of predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness.  
 
3.6. Case study 
According to this thesis, the extent to which national techniques may contribute to 
benchmarks of predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness has become 
limited as other actors also develop private law. Thus, interdependence has developed.  
 The case study will look at the law on STC’s and consider the quality of the law and 
the interdependence that has developed in this area. Can problems in the law on STC’s or 
success stories be traced to the recognition of interdependence and sufficient interaction 
between actors?   
 
Interestingly, the AGB-Gesetz and subsequent articles 305 -310 BGB are considered a success story 
in Germany; while interdependence has developed also for this area. Has interdependence 
undermined this success or did the interaction between actors safeguard the quality of this area of law? 
If not, does that mean that actors do not have to interact? 
 
Could actors use additional or alternative techniques in order to further ensure the 
comprehensiveness of the law on STC’s? What is the optimal combination of techniques in 
this area and do more specific indications on the use of additional and alternative techniques 
become visible when suggested for a particular area rather than being considered generally? 
Notably, an optimal use of techniques does not only depend on strengths and weaknesses of 
techniques, and the weight that different actors attach to these strengths and weaknesses, 
but also on the characteristics of an area of law. Perhaps, in the study of a specific area of 
law, more indications for the successful use of techniques can be found. 
 
Perhaps, the case study will show that an optimal use of techniques lead to a set of rules on STC’s 
that are the object of admiration and delight amongst both scholars and practitioners – or, conversely, 
that a problematic use of techniques lead to problems and criticism from either legal practice or 
scholars, or both.  
It may even be the case that despite an optimal use of techniques, material private law 
remains criticised, for example because the law on STC’s has developed rapidly and by many actors, 
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which national legislators did not initially take into account. Conversely, it is possible that the 
problematic use of techniques does not, as such, directly lead to problems for private parties. 
 
Thus, considering the roles of actors and the use of techniques, is the coexistence of actors 
problematic or beneficial for the quality of the law on STC’s? 
 Chapter 9 will introduce the case study, explain why this area of law was selected, 
and outline interdependence in this area.  
 Chapter 10 will look at the development of the law on STC’s in the German legal 
order, and chapter 11 will consider the development of the law on STC’s in the Dutch legal 
order. Chapter 12 will summarise the more general conclusions that become apparent from 







Chapter 4: Actors developing private law in the German 
legal order  
 
 
4.1. Introduction  
What actors develop private law in the German legal order, and what is the role of those 
actors in the German constutional framework and the European framework? 
In particular, this chapter will look at the role of non-state actors under the German 
constitutional framework and the competence of non-state actors under the TFEU.  On the 
one hand, in the German consitutional framework, the role of especially non-state actors in 
the development of private law is based on the one hand on the idea of private autonomy 
(‘Selbstbestimmung’), the ability of parties to develop themselves through entering into 
transactions with one another, in accordance with article 2 Grundgesetz (‘GG’), and the 
concept of Fremdbestimmung, that has also been translated as ‘hetero-determination’,148 in 
Dutch: heteronomie.  
This concept is the opposite of party autonomy. Rather than deciding for oneself to 
which rules one is bound, by entering into contracts, becoming a member of assoiciations, or 
adhering to self-regulation, and rather than indirectly deciding by which rules one is bound by 
democratically electing actors who develop binding rules or participate in the democratic 
process, Fremdbestimmung refers to the stiuation where other, often non-democratically 
elected actors, decide for an individual who thereby has little or no autonomy to decide to 
which rules that individual will be bound. Thus, Fremdbestimmung refers to being bound to 
non-democratically legitimised rules one has also not contracted over.149 On the other hand, 
the competence of state actors and non-state actors is much less clear and much less 
developed under European law, which will also be considered.  
The framework to assess the role of actors is closely intertwined with the GG, and it 
cannot simply be transposed or applied to other legal orders. Yet the concept of private 
autonomy is widely recognised, while the idea of Fremdbestimmung as such is recognised 
as problematic in other legal orders as well.150 Therefore, this chapter will argue that  the use 
of private autonomy and Fremdbestimmung as analytical concepts to decide whether 
especially non-state actors should play a role in the development of private law may be 
interesting for other legal orders.   
On the other hand, the competence of state actors and non-state actors is much less 
clear and much less developed under European law, which will also be considered.  
Moreover, as multiple actors participate in the development of European private law, 
the description of the role in some cases makes apparent that interdependence has 
developed, in accordance with the analysis of multilevel governance. In turn, this might make 
it more complicated for actors to develop European private law in accordance with 
benchmarks of predictability, accessibility, consistency, and responsiveness, while it may 
also make it more complicated for actors to adequately identify the actor most suited or 
responsible for the development of European private law in accordance with these 
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benchmarks.  Therefore, if interdependence develops between actors, this chapter will draw 
attention to it. Chapters 7 will analyse in more detail how the interdependence between 
actors affects the extent to which actors are able to develop private law in accordance with 
these benchmarks through national techniques.  
This chapter will introduce the German consitutional framework in paragraph 4.2, and 
contrast this framework with the role of actors under European law. Paragraph 4.3. will 
discuss the development of private law by state actors. Subsequently, paragraph 4.4. will 
consider the role of state actors and non-state actors in instances of co-regulation, and 
paragraph 4.5. will turn to the role of  non-state actors. Paragraph 4.6. will end with 
conclusions. 
 
4.2. Central questions on the role of state actors and non-state actors   
This paragraph will consider the framework underlying the role of state and non-state actors 
in the German legal order.  
Paragraph 4.2.1. will discuss the traditional contrast between legislation 
(‘Rechtsnormen’) and contracts (‘Rechtsgeschäfte’) and go on to argue that in this basic 
model,151 alternative regulation is a hybrid. Paragraph 4.2.2. will discuss the development of 
alternative regulation and set out why the development of alternative regulation may be 
problematic, introducing the concept of Fremdbestimmung in more detail and contrasting it 
with private autonomy. Paragraph 4.2.3. will consider the development of legislation or 
alternative regulation that may affect constitutional rights. Paragraph 4.2.4. will draw attention 
to the role of actors under European law. Paragraph 4.2.5 will turn to the role of state actors 
and non-state actors in the development of European legislation or alternative regulation and 
paragraph 4.2.6 will consider the the development of European alternative regulation that 
affects constitutional rights. Paragraph 4.2.7. will compare the role of state actors and non-
state actors in the German framework and European law.152 Paragraph 4.2.8. will end with a 
conclusion. 
 
4.2.1. The distinction between law and juridical acts as a basis for binding rules 
Traditionally, individuals can either be bound by juridical acts (‘Rechtsgeschäfte’), which are 
legitimated by one’s own choice, in accordance with private autonomy, in accordance with 
article 2 GG. Alternatively, one can be bound by the law (‘Rechtsnormen’), which is 
democratically legitimated, in accordance with article 20 GG. This distinction is not unfamiliar 
in other legal orders.153  
Correlated with this distinction is a central assumption that state actors may bind 
people because state actors develop rules in the public interests. Private parties may not 
bind each other without consent because they typically pursue their own interests that do not 
necessarily coincide with third parties’ interests,154 while they are also not directly bound to 
constitutional rights. However, between these alternatives, alternative regulation has 
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On the one end of the spectrum, people decide to contract with one another, ande at the 
other end of the spectrum, people are bound by the law. Yet in this spectrum, hybrid forms 
have also developed. In these hybrids, private actors develop rules that are not only binding 
on themselves, but that may also be binding on third parties. Private actors may develop 
Rechtsnormen, for example through collective labour agreements (‘Tarifverträge’, hereafter: 
‘TV’) that contain Rechtsnormen, in accordance with article 1 par. 1 Tarifvertragsgesetz 
(‘TVG’). Generally, agreements between works councils (‘Betriebsrate’) and employers 
(‘Betriebsvereinbarungen’, hereafter: ‘BV’) are also considered Rechtsnormen. Also, the 
possible use of guidelines on fair competition (‘Wettbewerbsrichtlinien’) may be taken into 
account in the interpretation of blanket clauses,155 as they reflect stakeholders’ views on fair 
commercial practices. More generally, the view that private parties lack the perspective of the 
public interest can be questioned if various private parties cooperate to draft rules in the 
public, instead of their own, interest, as is also recognised by state actors.156 Accordingly, a 
strict division between law and contracts has been considered outdated.157 
 
4.2.2. Problems of Fremdbestimmung 
If private law is developed through hybrids, private actors that do not pursue the interests of 
third parties may nevertheless bind those third parties. Actors developing hybrids may limit 
the private autonomy of parties, if they impose rules on third parties that are not based on the 
law and that parties have not consented to. Yet problematically, non-state actors developing 
these hybrids  pursue their own interests, have not been democratically elected, and are not 
bound to the GG. The possibility that private actors pursue their own interests gives rise to 
concern with regard to one-sided rules or rules that pursue the interest of one group instead 
of the public interest that are imposed on other actors.158 Moreover, rules developed in these 
hybrids may well replace the rules that private actors would have consented to – which would 
logically be rules in the own interests of those private parties – had hybrids not developed. In 
other words, Fremdbestimmung may limit the private autonomy of parties: 
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Thus, while Fremdbestimmung does not arise if parties are bound by either the law or by 
contracts, 159  it may arise in cases of alternative regulation, where private actors have 
developed rules that may become binding on other individuals, either through co-regulation 
or through reinforced self-regulation.  
 However, abandoning the development of hybrids is neither desirable nor realistic. 
Rather, Fremdbestimmung may be compensated by control mechanisms that subject 
alternative regulation to some control and thereby  limit non-state actors’ roles. These control 
mechanisms may take various forms: extensive drafting processes, depending on the extent 
to which alternative regulation imposes rules on third parties, and constitutional requirements 
should as far as possible be met.160 These efforts may include increasing participation of 
representative actors, and making clear how their interests and comments have been taken 
into account.161 Fremdbestimmung may also be an argument for judicial control over the 
content of alternative regulation. Thus, in this perspective, alternative regulation is developed 
within the framework of the law, while additional controls would compensate for potential 
Fremdbestimmung: 
     
 
Law 
       | 
       | 
       | 
       | 
       | 
            Hybrids 
       | 
        Judiciary/participation 
       | 
          Individuals 
  
 
As the drafting process of alternative regulation becomes more inclusive and transparent, 
judicial control may become less intense, and it may be assumed that parties involved in 
alternative regulation have managed to create rules that are not unevenly to the detriment or 
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benefit of one group of stakeholders.162 These compensatory measures may however also 
decrease the flexibility of alternative regulation. 
 
 
4.2.3. German alternative regulation and constitutional rights  
The question whether private law should be developed through traditional legislation or 
alternative regulation becomes especially important if the rules that are developed affect 
constitutional rights. Importantly, the BVerfG 163  has established that all matters directly 
affecting constitutional rights should be dealt with by formal laws (the 
‘Wesentlichkleitsdoktrin’), which stands in the way of binding alternative regulation that 
interferes with third parties’ constitutional rights. However, this doctrine does not mean that 
private actors may not develop alternative regulation. Rather, possible defaults in the drafting 
process should be compensated, for example through control from the legislator or the 
judiciary.164 Notably, the development of alternative regulation may fall within the sphere of 
the freedom of association and private autonomy. Also, the Wesentlichkeitsdoktrin does not 
necessarily block private actors’ involvement in the development of private law; on the 
contrary, state actors need to make use of the best suitable instrument when pursuing a 
specific aim (the Effektivitätsgebot), which may well entail including private actors.165 The 
BVerfG166 has expressly considered the underlying reasons for the Effektivitätsgebot: 
 
‘Die Verleihung von Satzungsautonomie hat ihren guten Sinn darin, gesellschaftliche Kräfte zu 
aktivieren, den entsprechenden gesellschaftlichen Gruppen die Regelung solcher 
Angelegenheiten, die sie selbst betreffen und die sie in überschaubaren Bereichen am 
sachkundigsten beurteilen können, eigenverantwortlich zu überlassen, und dadurch den 
Abstand zwischen Normgeber und Normadressat zu verringern. Zugleich wird der 
Gesetzgeber davon entlastet, sachliche und örtliche Verschiedenheiten berücksichtigen zu 
müssen, die für ihn oft schwer erkennbar sind und auf deren Veränderungen er nicht rasch 
genug reagieren konnte.’ 
 
The BVerfG 167  has further established the ‘Stufentheorie’, which provides that imposing 
intense limitations of constitutional rights is reserved to the legislator. The question whether 
private actors may interfere with third parties’ constitutional rights depends on the intensity of 
this interference and may only take place in the public interest. Moreover, the legislator may 
not blindly delegate all his authority to non-state actors but needs to retain some level of 
control. 
 
4.2.4. The role of actors under European law   
The well-developed framework in the German legal order and its underlying principles offer a 
critical perspective on legislative practices of foreign and European actors.  
The roles of actors under European law, which has not developed a similar 
framework, are much less clearly delineated. The subsequent paragraphs will consider the 
role of state and non-state actors under Euroepan law and  
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4.2.5. The distinction between legislation and alternative regulation at the 
European level     
European law provides much less clarity on the role of actors, both state actors and non-
state actors. That does not mean that state actors do not play an important role in the 
development of European private law; the largest part of the private law acquis consists of 
legislative measures and the CJEU has also played a prominent role in interpreting these 
measures. Rather, it is not clear how the tasks in developing European private law are 
allocated between the European and the national level. As European legislative competence 
is functional and may develop as problems for the internal market within the sense of article 
114 TFEU arise, these competences are and will remain not strictly delineated.  
The role of non-state actors is less clear – no coherent view can be detected at the 
European level. Although principles of private autonomy and democracy have been 
recognised at the European level, the development of alternative regulation has not been 
problematised because of potential Fremdbestimmung. Instead, the European Commission 
has distinguished between legislation and alternative regulation, emphasising principles of 
democratic legitimacy, subsidiarity and proportionality.168  
The European Commission169 considers the use of alternative regulation as a means 
to support the “community method”, i.e. the development of European legislation. Thus, the 
initiatives of non-state actors are subjected to European policy aims. Notably, alternative 
regulation must be in accordance with European law and the principles of transparency, 
representativeness, and of ‘added value to the general interest’,170 but it is not clear when 
these requirements are satisfied. Interestingly, the White Paper on Governance171 places the 
responsibility of complying with these principles with non-state actors. 
 
4.2.6. The European view: Alternative regulation and fundamental rights?  
The Interinstitutional Agreement172 excludes the use of alternative regulation in cases where 
fundamental rights are at stake. Yet this apparent rejection is not in accordance with 
initiatives that may well affect constitutional rights – in particular the European social 
dialogue.  
Possibly, however, the development of alternative regulation at the European level is 
more difficult from a political perspective, especially if Member States are critical of the 
possibility that rules developed beyond the legislative process at the European level may 
affect constitutional rights. The existence of successful national alternative regulation may be 
another reason to exclude additional European alternative regulation.  
 
4.2.7. Comparison 
Various similarities, but especially differences, have become visible between the role of 
actors under the German framework and under European law.  
 State actors play a primary role both in the German legal framework and in European 
law, as apparent from the development of traditional legislation by both German and 
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European actors, and the role of the courts in subsequently interpreting, applying and 
developing the private law acquis.   
However, beyond the prominent role of state actors, many differences become 
apparent between the role of actors in the development of European private law.  
 
1) Whereas a framework has been carefully developed at the national level, no similar 
framework has been developed for the European level. 
 
2) The development of alternative regulation, and, correspondingly, the role of non-state 
actors, has not been problematized because of Fremdbestimmung. Therefore, 
European law has also not consistently developed control mechanisms to limit the 
role of non-state actors. As a result, non-state actors at the European level may play 
a larger role than actors at the national level, if their initiatives pursue European policy 
aims.   
 
3) Simulaneously, non-state actors have a smaller role under European law than under 
the German framework, as the GG protects the role of non-state actors. More 
particularly: 
 
a. The role of non-state actors in the German framework can be seen in the light of 
constitutional rights, whereas this view is not apparent at the European level. The 
German view is however limited, as article 19 par. 3 GG stipulates that the 
constitutional rights are applicable for domestic legal persons.173 Foreign businesses 
may invoke the provisions from international treaties. 174  Consequently, at the 
European level, the development of alternative regulation is not considered as a goal 
in itself, but as a means to support European legislative interventions in terms of 
(democratic) legitimacy, effectiveness, and transparency.175  
 
b. Non-state actors have a smaller role under European law than under German law, as 
becomes apparent from the European definition of co-regulation: ‘the mechanism 
whereby a Community legislative act entrusts the attainment of the objectives defined 
by the legislative authority to parties which are recognised in the field’. The rejection 
of alternative regulation in cases where fundamental rights are affected and these 
definitions implies a top-down approach,176  which is difficult to reconcile with the 
German view that the drafting of alternative regulation can be an exercise of 
constitutional rights. In particular, the selection of representative actors by the 
European Commission is difficult to reconcile with the pursuit of constitutional rights.  
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c. The Effektivitätsgebot implies that non-state actors develop self-regulation or co-
regulation. In contrast, the European legislator emphasises non-state actors’ role in 
strengthening legislation.177  
 
4.2.8. Conclusion on central questions 
The carefully developed German framework benefits the consistency and the clarity of the 
law on the roles of actors. It may be contrasted with the European approach that is more 
oriented towards pursuing European policy aims. Because the German framework rightly 
stresses the right to party autonomy, it is much better suited to underline the need for action 
on the part of private actors. However, it has become clear that the German approach may 
lessen the flexibility of alternative regulation. For German actors, more pragmatic 
approaches developed by foreign and European actors may draw attention to the possibility 
that developing extensive mechanisms to compensate for potential Fremdbestimmung may 
undermine some of the strengths of alternative regulation.  
 
 
4.3. State actors 
This paragraph will ask what role state actors play in the development of private law. 
Paragraph 4.3.1. will discuss the role of German state actors. Paragraph 4.3.2. will consider 
the competences of European and international state actors.178 Paragraph 4.3.3. will end with 
a conclusion that points out the different role of state actors under the GG and the TFEU and 
draw attention to the interdependence between actors and the resulting need for interaction. 
 
4.3.1.  The national legislator and the judiciary 
The legislator has played a central role in developing private law through codifications. 
General private law, codified in the Bürgerlich Gesetzbuch (‘BGB’). is applicable for all 
citizens, while private law for particular groups of parties has been developed in separate 
statutes and codes (‘Sonderprivatrecht’), such as the code on commercial law 
(‘Handelsgesetzbuch’, or ‘HGB’), but also the act on the limited liability company 
(‘Aktiengesetz’ or ‘AktG’ ).179   
Notably, the introduction of the BGB did not entail that judges were reduced to 
“mouthpieces” of the law, nor did it limit the role of scholars. 180 Instead, the inclusion of 
general principles and blanket clauses in the BGB has enabled the judiciary to develop 
private law without continuous interference from the legislator.181  
Although the BGH is the highest court competent to interpret private law, it should 
refer to the BVerG when the interpretation of private law touches upon the interpretation of 
the GG. 182  Notably, the BVerfG only determines whether the GG has been interpreted 
correctly; it is not a higher instance that looks at the correct interpretation of private law. The 
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courts have taken an active approach in interpreting private law in accordance with the 
needs of legal practice, which has included contra legem interpretation. 183  The active 
approach of the judiciary may also entail that the BGH or the BVerfG establishes a rule, if the 
legislator, despite a constitutional obligation to do so, has steadfastedly not provided rules to 
adequately cope with a specific problem.184 
Articles 3 and 20 par. 2 GG establish the limits of judiciary discretion. A relatively 
recent decision from the BverfG185 however makes clear that the judge may not replace an 
established legislative framework with his own model. The active approach of the judiciary 
has at times been subject to criticism,186 especially the reasoning in the decisions from the 
BverfG in the area of private law.187  
 
4.3.2. The development of private law beyond the national level 
This paragraph asks what role the European legislator and judiciary and international actors 
play. Paragraph 4.3.2.1. will consider therole of European actors and paragraph 4.3.2.2. will 
consider the role of international actors. Paragraph 4.3.2.3. will consider how the approach of 
national actors affects the development of private law at the European level and conversely, 
how the approach at the European level may affect the development of private law at the 
national level. 
 
4.3.2.1. European actors developing private law in the German legal order  
This paragraph will first consider the competence of European actors and go on to consider 
German constitutional law on the relation between Germany and the European legal order, 
contrasting the German view with the European view that has become apparent from CJEU 
case law. 
 
4.3.2.1.1. The competence of European actors under the TFEU 
European actors play a prominent role as European law, once established, precedes national 
law, independently of national legislation. 188  The Lisbon Treaty provides the European 
legislator with a wide range of legislative competences that also enable the European 
legislator to harmonise private law. In particular, article 81 TFEU, article 169 TFEU and 
article 352 TFEU, and most frequently, article 114 TFEU, have been used as legal bases.  
Article 4 par. 2 TFEU makes clear that these competences are competences that are 
shared between the Union and its Member States. Thus, national actors still play a role if 
harmonisation has been established. The reallocation of legislative competences to the 
European level, and the role of European and national actors, depends on the measure – a 
Directive leaves more room to Member States than a Regulation – and the degree of 
harmonisation pursued by that measure. The Directives in the private law acquis pursue both 
                                               
183
 R. Zimmerman, The new German law of obligations, Historical and comparative perspectives, OUP: Oxford 2005, p. 18-19, 
30. 
184
 See U. Diederichsen, Die Flucht des Gesetzgebers aus der politische Verantwortung im Zivilrecht, Müller: Karlsruhe 1974, p. 
44- 49. 
185
 BVerfG 25 January 2011, NJW 2011, 836, par. B 4. 
186
 See for example MunchKomm zum BGB/Säcker (2012), introduction, nr 75. Staudinger Kommntar zum BGB/Coing/Honsell 
(2011), introduction, nr. 30.  
187
 In particular U. Diederichsen, ‘Das Bundesverfassungsgericht als oberstes Zivilgericht – ein Lehrstück der juristischen 
Methodenlehre’, AcP 1998, p. 171.   
188
 CJEU 15 July 1964 (Costa v E.N.E.L.), case 6-64, [1964] ECR, p. 585. CJEU 7 March 1985 (Van Gend & Loos NV v 
Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen), case 32/84, [1985], ECR, p. 779. 
66 
 
minimum and maximum harmonisation, and a suggestion for a Regulation pursuing optional 
harmonisation – the proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law189 – has 
also been made. Also, the scope of a measure, which is often limited, is important for the 
reallocation of competences to the European level.  
In the area of private international law, article 81 TFEU has served as a basis for a 
range of measures in cross-border cases. 190  Article 169 TFEU has not served as an 
independent legal basis, but article 169 par. 2 sub a TFEU refers to article 114 TFEU and 
thereby permits the use of article 114 TFEU as a legal basis for advancing consumer 
protection. Article 352 TFEU provides the European legislator with a residual competence 
that requires unanimity.191 The majority of measures in the acquis is based on article 114 
TFEU, promoting the internal market, consumer protection, or both. This is an ambiguously 
worded competence, the limits of which are unclear, that confers a wide range of 
competences to develop private law on the European legislator.192 Because the TFEU only 
confers competences on the Union to intervene in cases where that promotes the aims of the 
Treaties, the approach of the European legislator is necessarily an instrumentalist 
approach.193 
The acquis in the area of private law mainly consists of Directives that leave the 
German legislator some leeway with regard to their implementation, mostly within the 
BGB.194 
Moreover, the role of European actors may be increased by primary European law.195 
The most visible influence in the area of private law on the basis of the Treaty has been the 
development of Member States’ liability for infringing Union law, as established in 
Francovich,196 Brasserie du Pêcheur,197 and Dillenkofer.198  
Additionally, European law may in some cases also affect contracts,199  including 
collective labour agreements and collective actions aimed at entering into a collective labour 
agreement.200  
Furthermore, the role of the European legislator increases as it enters into treaties, 
typically ratified through Regulations 201 on the basis of article 216 TFEU and in accordance 
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with the negotiations procedure prescribed under article 218 TFEU.202 The CJEU decision in 
AETR203 makes clear that the European legislator is competent to renegotiate on treaties that 
have been ratified by the European legislator if they are revised.204 It follows that if, for 
example, the Montréal Convention is to be revised, the competence to negotiate has been 
reallocated to the European legislator. 
The ratification of treaties by the European legislator also means that the CJEU 
becomes competent to interpret treaties. This means that national courts should refer 
questions on these treaties to the CJEU. Arguably, in turn, the CJEU should refer to previous 
national interpretations of the Europeanised treaty in the interests of predictability and 
consistency, which may however be difficult if those decisions are not easily available or if 
interpretations of courts in different Member States contradict one another. 
Moreover, where it concerns the interpretation of treaties that have also been ratified 
by third countries, it would be in the interest of consistency and predictability to refer to 
decisions on treaties in those third countries, provided that they are available.205 In some 
cases, competence to interpret treaties had already been referred to the CJEU, for example 
with regard to Regulation Brussels I.206  
 
4.3.2.1.2. The competence of European actors under German constitutional 
law  
German constitutional law on the reallocation of competences to the European level 
consistently emphasises the principle of democracy and the protection of constitutional rights, 
thereby putting restraints on the increasing role of European actors. 
This German constitutional framework can be described as follows. Under article 23 
GG, Germany can reallocate competences to the European level, with permission from the 
Bundesrat. Article 23 GG stipulates that to realise European integration, Germany will work 
with the European Union as it similarly recognises principles of democracy, the Rechtsstaat, 
subsidiarity, as well as social and federal principles, in articles 1 and 2 TEU, while the 
European Union also provides protection of constitutional rights similar to the GG. Article 23 
GG obliges German state actors to promote compliance of the European Union with these 
standards.207 Moreover, the protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality to the Lisbon Treaty 
has enhanced the role of national parliaments which have gained the competence to lodge a 
complaint before the CJEU if they find that a European measure violates the principle of 
subsidiarity. Accordingly, par 1a has been inserted into article 23 GG. 
The reallocation of legislative competence also increases the role of the CJEU. The 
BVerfG208 has emphasised that not referring questions to the CJEU when that is indicated, 
by highest courts, is contrary to article 101 par. 1 GG that stipulates that parties cannot be 
denied from being heard by the competent judge according to the law. However, this doctrine 
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has been applied strictly: if a case is decided apparently in accordance with a European 
measure, complaints are not upheld. This decision may constitute a breach of article 6 ECHR, 
but more importantly, it may also be difficult to reconcile with CJEU decisions under article 
267 TFEU.209  Moreover, the insistence that the BVerfG210 remains competent to evaluate 
whether European measures breach the GG may also be difficult to reconcile with the 
primacy of European law. However, the Honeywell decision shows that the BVerfG exercises 
restraint in this matter. 211  Also, despite the restraint of the BVerfG, the roles of the CJEU and 
the ECHR increase as the BVerfG frequently refers to these courts.212  
For far-going reallocation of competences from the national to the European level that 
necessitate amendments to the Treaties, the GG provides more restraints. Accordingly, 
article 79 par 2 GG requires a two-third majority in both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. 
Article 79 par 3 GG prohibits amendments that affect states’ roles in the federal state, states’ 
participation in federal legislation, or the rights recognised in articles 1-20 GG. 
Thus, the reallocation of competences to the European level is stipulated by national 
law. This is confirmed by BVerfG case law213 on article 79 par. 3 GG. The BVerfG has held 
that article 79 par. 3 GG entails that public tasks and acts of public authority should be 
sufficiently democratically legitimated by national parliaments, while the European Parliament 
additionally safeguards democratic legitimacy. Thus, the BVerfG distinguishes between 
democratic requirements at the national and at the transnational level and it has maintained 
competence to evaluate whether European measures are ultra vires. As integration 
continued, the democratic legitimation of the Union should increase, while democracy within 
Member States should also be maintained. National democratic safeguards should prevent 
that too much competence is reallocated to the European level. Specifically, legislation 
conferring competences to the transnational level should be sufficiently precise, respecting 
the principles of conferred competences, the lack of Kompetenz-Kompetenz at the European 
level. 
The BVerfG further limited the reallocation of competences on central political 
questions in the sphere of personal development and social policy, including decisions 
fundamental for forming living conditions and fundamental decisions of cultural significance, 
in particular family law. It has been argued that private law constitutes law that is important 
for shaping one’s living conditions,214 which  would mean that the European legislator not 
gain general legislative competence for private law and its role in this area would remain 
subject to consitutional limitations, leaving a central role for national legislators and courts. 
However, the assumption that especially contract law is essential for shaping one’s living 
conditions has also been challenged,215  and it is not clear whether the BVerfG will eventually 
set such a limitation.  
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4.3.2.2. The role of actors under the TFEU and the GG and 
interdependence  
More actors – especially the European legislator and the CJEU – have become involved in 
the development of law, but neither the BVerfG nor the CJEU and the European legislator 
have based their decisions on the assumption that interdependence has developed and that 
more interaction is therefore necessary. Rather, although both national actors and European 
actors have recognised the competences of other actors, they have interpreted other actors’ 
roles in a limited manner while simultaneously reasserting their own competences under 
diferent frameworks – respectively the TFEU and the GG – and the perception of actors’ 
roles from especially the CJEU and the BVerfG therefore contradict one another in the 
following respects:  
 
1) The BVerfG bases the binding effect and the priority of European law upon article 23 
GG. In contrast, the CJEU has held that the binding effect and the priority of 
European law follow from the European legal order. 
 
2) Accordingly, the role of the BVerfG and the CJEU differ under these frameworks. The 
BVerfG plays a central role in safeguarding the GG and evaluates European 
measures with the GG. However, the TFEU reserves this competence to the CJEU, 
and thereby provides the CJEU with a more prominent role.   
 
Thus, interdependence has developed: actors may undermine one another’s decisions, 
especially because the views of the CJEU and the BVerfG on the roles of actors differ.  
 
This interdependence becomes especially clear from the proposal for a Regulation establishing a 
Common European Sales Law on the basis of article 114 TFEU. This proposal may give rise not only 
to complaints to the CJEU, but also to the BVerfG. If the CJEU upholds this measure, a subsequent 
complaint before the BVerfG will open up the possibility that the BVerfG will decide that the measure is 
ultra vires. In  turn, under the TFEU, the German legislator is not competent to veto a measure under 
article 114 TFEU and a BVerfG decision holding that the CESL is ultra vires would not quash the 
CESL. Thus,  an act would be established contrary to the GG and under European law, the German 
legislator and judiciary would be bound to apply it.  However, it seems unlikely that German actors 
would in fact act in a manner contrary to the GG, and this possibility may well make private parties 
hesitate in adopting the CESL.  
German actors have however recognised interdependence. The BVerfG has exercised 
restraint in its evaluations of European measures, although it has not abandoned the possibility to do 
so. The German legislator has recognised the need to obtain approval for measures and amendments 
to the Treaty – such as the European Stability Mechanism – prior to approving amendments. Possibly, 
if it becomes clear that the use of article 114 TFEU for a CESL is problematic under the GG as it 
breaches the principle of conferred powers, it is necessary to prevent that the proposal is passed at 
the European level.  
European actors have also recognised interdependence. The European Parliament, 
recognising the lack of support of a CESL from national parliaments, has accordingly organised an 
interparliamentary meeting in which suggestions for improvement were discussed.
216
 However, the 
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Thus, although actors have recognised interdependence and initiated interaction, the role of 
other actors in interpreted narrowly and interaction remains limited. 
 
4.3.2.3. The role of international actors 
Article 59 par 2 GG makes clear that the competence of international actors to develop 
binding rules dependent on the consent or cooperation of the bodies competent to legislate 
in that particular field. International law needs to be ratified and implemented in German law 
before it can become effective. Treaties that have been implemented in German law have 
the status of ordinary legislation, which theoretically may be altered or revoked by 
subsequent legislation.218  Thus, national actors continue to play a central role.  
The role of international actors is more prominent if it concerns general rules of 
international law, including ius cogens applicable without states’ consent,219  Article 25 GG 
stipulates that these rules are part of German law and may set aside legislation and 
provisions. Article 100 par. 2 GG makes clear that the BVerfG determines whether this is the 
case.    
Importantly, the role of national actors to enter into treaties diminishes as the 
European legislator enters into treaties, which reallocates the competence to interpret and 
negotiate on these treaties partially to the European level. 220  
The role of international actors becomes smaller if the European legislator, rather 
than ratifying a treaty, initiates harmonisation in areas previously harmonised through treaties. 
Importantly, the existence of international treaties is no impediment to the competence of the 
EU under article 114 TFEU.221  
      Furthermore, international organisations have established model laws, legislative 
guides and recommendations. The extent to which these models and guides have been 
taken into account may also depend on the question whether European law leaves room for 
model laws and recommendations, for example in the case of e-commerce, where the 
Directive substantially differs from the UNIDROIT model law on e-commerce. In some cases, 
the European legislator may also take international guidelines into account. For example, 
according to Micklitz,222 the OECD Guidelines on Unfair Commercial practices that reiterate 
the necessity to coordinate the enforcement of consumer rights in cross-border cases and its 
International Consumer Protection Enforcement Network (ICPEN) has served as a basis for 
Regulation 2006/2004 that accordingly seeks to coordinate cross-border enforcement of the 
acquis. National agencies appointed or established on the basis of this Regulation may also 
address matters that do not fall within the scope of the acquis.  
These developments may well withhold national legislators from using treaties and 
international model laws that diverge from European measures. Conversely, if the European 
legislator uses a treaty or a model law as an example for European measures, this increases 
the role of international actors.  
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4.3.3. Conclusion on state actors 
State actors play a crucial role in the development of private law, both at the national and the 
European level. However, the role of actors under German constitutional law and the TFEU 
differs.  
 Whereas the GG requires that national actors continue to play a central role, 
especially on matters essential to the unity of the state, the TFEU has not imposed a similar 
limitation to the onferral of powers, nor does it confer a central role upon national actors. 
Thus, differently than under the traditional nation state, two state actors seek to provide a 
“rule of recognition” on which the validity of private law depends.223 
As interdependence between the European legislator and the CJEU and the German 
legislator and courts develops, there is more need for interaction between these actors. 
Accordingly, the BVerfG has recognised the need to submit questions to the CJEU and the 
German and European legislator also interact with one another.  
Howver, as actors become more dependent on one another, the divergences 
between the CJEU and BVerfG decisions on the role of actors increase the chance that 
European and national actors will undermine one another’s initiatives. Moreover, as actors at 
both levels interpret the role of other actors narrowly, and as the quality of interaction 
between actors at different levels can be criticised, the chance to mitigate potential problems 
diminishes.   
 
 
4.4. State actors and non-state actors: co-regulation 
State actors have frequently developed co-regulation.224 This paragraph will ask what role 
actors play in the development of alternative regulation.  
Paragraph 4.4.1. will turn to the referral to self-regulation in legislation, 225  and 
paragraph 4.4.2. will consider the development of collective labour agreements. Paragraph 
4.4.3. will end with conclusions.  
In analysing the role of actors, this paragraph will indicate in what instances non-state 
actors have developed co-regulation, and go on to describe non-state actors’ roles and the 
role of state actors in limiting non-state actors’ roles through the development of control 
mechanisms.  
 Despite this order, it should not be overlooked that non-state actors typically develop 
rules within the framework of the law as established by state actors. However, the role of 
non-state actors and the success of these initiatives is largely dependant upon non-state 
actors’ initiatives – without such initatives, state actors can provide all the framework they like, 
and they can encourage co-regulation, but to little avail. 
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This paragraph will consider instances of referral to private or non-democratically elected 
actors in legislation, what role non-state actors have played in these instances, and what role 
state actors have played in limiting the role of non-state actors through control mechanisms.   
 
4.4.1.1. Instances of referral to privately drafted rules 
The German legislator may refer to self-regulation in legislation (‘Verweisung’). The legislator 
may either make use of static referral, to an entire set of self-regulation at a particular 
moment. Dynamic referral, on the contrary, does allow for changes to be taken into account. 
Both the German and the European legislator have made use of dynamic referral 
 
Examples of dynamic referral at the national level are: 
 
 Article 310 par. 1 BGB for publicly tendered building contracts (‘VOB/B’) drafted by 
various stakeholder groups and the state, exempting these clauses from judicial 
control.226 
 
 Article 362 HGB with regard to the duties of a company on the yearly accounts 
(‘Rechnungslegung’).  
 
The Ministry for Justice has contractually recognised the German Accounting Standards Committee 
(‘Deutsches Rechnungslegungs-Standards Committee eV’, ‘DRSC’) as a private committee in the 
sense of article 342 HGB to develop recommendations for the application of principles on the 
accounting standards for chains of businesses (‘Konzern’, ‘concern’) in December 2011.
 227
 Article 342 
par. 2 HGB stipulates that compliance with these standards by a chain of business entails an 
assumption (‘Vermutung der Richtigkeit’) that the bookkeeping of that business is in accordance with 





 Article 161 AktG refers to the Corporate Governance Kodex that consists of three 
parts; one part describes positive law, the main part of the Kodex consists of 
recommendations and the last part consists of suggestions. 229  Article 161 AktG 
obliges businesses to make public with which recommendations in the Corporate 
Governance Kodex they comply and with which parts  they do not comply – and 
why.230 
 
Initially, one may get the impression that the Kodex is an example of co-regulation,
231
 where the 
legislator appoints a committee, which continues to regularly check whether amendments to the Kodex 
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are necessary, and which may call for meetings if it finds that this is the case, as well as the use of 
consultations in the drafting of the Kodex and the publication of the Kodex on the site of the ministry, 
after an evaluation of lawfulness by the ministry. However, it has been held the Kodex amounts to self-
regulation as stakeholders themselves set rules for their behaviour,
232





An example of dynamic referral at the European level is:  
 
 The role of the IASB that develops international accounting standards that, under 
Regulation 1606/2002, may be adopted by the European Commission in accordance 
with the regulatory comitology procedure set out in article 6 of the Regulation. The 
dynamic referral at the European level may limit the role of the DRSC.234 In turn, joint 
initiatives for the closer cooperation between the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (‘FASB’)235 have been developed.236  
 
Other forms of alternative regulation where competences to fill in the details of legislation are 
delegated to expert committees have been initiated at the European level. These forms are 
reminiscent of dynamic referral as competences to further develop rules are delegated to 
actors other than the legislature, including national civil servants and experts that are not 
non-state actors. These forms include: 
 
 The comitology procedure involves the delegation of filling in technical details of 
European measures to expert committees by legislative acts that can be revoked, in 
accordance with article 290 TFEU.237 The competences of these committees may 
vary, depending on the sort of committee distinguished in Decision 1999/468 on 
comitology and Regulation 182/2011, introducing a regulatory comitology with 
scrutiny from the European Parliament.  
 
The Commission may, in that task, either be assisted by committees with an advisory task, composed 
of representatives of the Member States, or by a management committee, also composed of 
representatives of member States, that may submit an opinion on the draft proposed by the 
Commission that is however not binding, or a regulatory committee that has further competences to 
consider the drafts of the Commission. If the draft regulation is not disapproved by the European 
Parliament or Council within three months, it will be adopted.  
The CJEU
238
 has approved the use of comitology, requiring however that the basic elements 
of the matter are decided in accordance with the applicable legislative procedure, while the delegation 
act should be sufficiently precise. Article 40 in the Proposal for consumer rights Directive proposed 
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establishing an unfair contract terms committee, a regulatory comitology committee with scrutiny from 
the European Parliament.  
 
 The Lamfalussy procedure239 involved the development of rules in the four stage 
rulemaking process and non-state actors play an important role it this process.  
 
The development of rules at four levels can be described as follows. Firstly, a broad, regulatory 
framework has been established in four Directives, i.e. Directive 2004/39 on markets in financial 
instruments, Directive 2003/6 on market abuse, Directive 2003/71 on the prospectus to be published 
when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and Directive 2004/109 on 
transparency requirements. At level 2, expert committees (European Banking Committee (EBC), the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee (EIOPC) and the European Securities 
Committee (ESC), that can also act as regulatory comitology committees, design more detailed, 
technical implementing measures, which are subsequently adopted by the commission, which has for 
example resulted in Regulation 1287/2006 implementing Directive 2004/39. At level 3, expert 
committees (The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), the Committee of European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS) and the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR) that have since been changed, and have been replaced by the 
European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
(EIOPA), and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) composed of members of 
national supervisory authorities, assist the Commission in the preparation of implementation measures 
and help to ensure the efficient cooperation of national supervisory bodies. Level 4 concerns the 
enforcement of the Commission of guidelines in national law. 
 
 The development of guidance on the implementation and application of Directive 
2005/29 by the Commission.240  This guidance is not binding and appears not to have 
been considered – at least not expressly – by European courts.241  
 
Thus, in these forms of dynamic referral, both at the national and the European level, non-
state actors play an important role and they may establish binding rules. Through referral, 
both German and European state actors have sought to benefit from the expertise and 
experience of non-state actors while also pursuing more flexible law that can be adapted 
more easily in accordance with the needs of legal practice. 
 
 
4.4.1.2. The role of non-state actors in instances of dynamic referral 
In forms of static referral, the role of non-state actors is limited as further developments 
fromnon-state actors are not included. Subsequent changes in self-regulation do not affect 
the interpretation of hard law, which has deterred legislators from using this form of referral, 
as it may not allow for sufficient flexibility. In cases of dynamic referral, private actors have a 
more prominent role, as they decide on further amendments. The role of the legislator 
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decreases as this actor does not decide control over these amendments: this competence 
has been reallocated to non-state actors.242  
Yet for both forms of referral, the decision to refer to self-regulation is left to the 
legislator, while referral eventually serves to strengthen legislation. However, the choice for 
referral simultaneously makes clear that state actors need to make use of non-state actors 
with more expertise and experience that can moreover not easily be reversed. Thus, in order 
to provide rules that take into account the needs of practice, cooperation with non-state 
actors becomes necessary. The attractiveness of this option for state actors should not be 
underestimated. Especially at the European level, the need to enhance the efficiency of 
decision-making and make very lengthy legislative procedures in rapdily developing fields 
has been emphasised. 243  Smultaneously, however, this may result in initiatives where 
European actors seek to circumvent the constraints of the legislative process.244    
The German legislator has similarly recognised the need to refer to privately drafted 
rules, but German actors have emphasised that dynamic referral, and thereby the role of 
non-state actors, is limited, as private rules merely entail crystallising an ambiguous rule or 
concept,245  in which cases dynamic referral is allowed.246      
 
4.4.1.3. The development of control mechanisms 
The ability of non-state actors to establish binding rules may give rise to Fremdbestimmung, 
which is a problem for German actors, 247 whereas European actors may not necessarily see 
Fremdbestimmung as a problem. However, state actors do need to retain some control over 
the development of alternative regulation. Consequently, have state actors sought to limit the 
role of non-state actors?  
Problems of Fremdbestimmung arising from rules developed by the DRSC have 
prompted the development of control mechanisms. Accordingly, the contract between the 
Ministry and the DRSC stipulates, among other things, the independence of the DRSC and 
the need for transparency in its decision-making. Moreover, in accordance with the need for 
participation of relevant stakeholders recognised in article 342 par. 1 HGB, the DRSC and its 
committees initiate consultations on drafts for standards.248 Furthermore, the effect of the 
recommendations is subject to subsequent approval and publication by the Ministry.  
Similarly, the Ministry exercises control over the corporate governance Kodex as it 
appoints the committe drafting and amending the Kodex and as it subjects the Kodex to an 
evaluation of lawfulness before publishing it on the Ministry website. 
The involvement of European state actors has been emphasised as an important 
mechanism to retain some control over alternative regulation. Accordingly, the role of the 
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IASB is subject to approval from the European Commission assisted by a regulatory 
comitology committee, while the European Parliament may also be involved. Similarly, recent 
changes have provided the European Parliament to participate in comitology procedures in 
article 5a Decision 1999/468/EC. Also, the use of comitology has been limited to “technical 
matters”. Yet the proposal for a comitology committee in the proposal for a Directive on 
consumer rights and subsequent German resistance249  show that European and national 
views on what matters are “technical matters” may well diverge.  
European limitations may detrimentally affect private law as it may lead to detailed 
measures that limits the flexibility of alternative regulation.250 Nevertheless, these limitations 
seem rather mild compared to German limitations. 
 
4.4.1.4. Comparison 
Both German and European state actors have facilitated the development of co-regulation in 
the form of referral and collective labour agreements. Interestingly, both the European and 
the German legislator have made use of dynamic referral, despite German constitutional 
objections. Yet the role of state actors and non-state actors differ at the European and the 
national level. Especially the limitations on the role of non-state actors through the 
development of control mechanisms has, logically, been less developed at the European 
level, as the development of these mechanisms has not consistently been based on 
concerns over Fremdbestimmung. These different roles of actors may lead to problems from 
a German perspective, as non-state actors enjoy considerable discretion under European 
law that elads to Fremdbestimmung, for which German actors cannot compensate.   
However, that does not mean that European procedures should be subject to national 
standards. This conclusion would overlook the distinction of the BVerfG between national 
and transnational democratic procedures. 251  Accordingly, Joerges, Schepel and Vos 252 
rejected focussing on the lack of democratic legitimacy of private standard-setting, pointing 
out that private standard setting ‘draw from a pool of relevant knowledge and expertise that 
lawmakers can only dream of’. They argued that for an approach that would make private 
standard-setting more publicly accountable, and argued for ‘deliberative supranationalism’ 
that involves redesigning rulemaking processes so that rules developed in rulemaking 
processes derive their legitimacy from the debate in which they have been developed. Thus, 
the emphasis of Joerges, Schepel and Vos is not on inclusiveness and representation but on 
‘participation’, which is reminiscent of the BVerfG distinction in its Lisbon judgment, while, 
moreover, the quality of interaction between a limited number of actors is stressed. 
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4.4.2. Collective agreements 
Collective labour agreements are an important technique in the development of employment 
contract law. This paragraph will firstly consider the use of TV’s and the European social 
dialogue and secondly what role non-state actors play in these forms, and what role state 
actors have played in imposing limitations on the role of non-state actors through the 
development of control mechanisms.    
 
4.4.2.1. Tarifverträge (‘TV’s’), Betriebsvereinbarungen (‘BV’s’) and framework 
agreements 
This paragraph will respectively describe the use of TV’s, BV’s, and framework agreements 
in the European social dialogue.  
 
 The development of TV’s  
 
The use of TV’s is stipulated by the Tarifvertragsgesetz (‘TVG’). Article 1 TVG makes clear that TV’s 
establish rules for entering into labour contracts, the rights and duties in those contracts, and the 
termination of labour contracts (these rules are characterised as ‘Arbeitsverhältnisormen’) as well as 
rules with regard to the company and its statutes (‘Betriebsnormen’).
253
 Article 2 establishes that 
contract parties are unions, employers, and employers’ organisations. A TV should not be too 
ambiguous, and the parties may not leave it to the judge to decide parties’ legal positions under a TV, 
but it may have limited retroactive effect, taking into account the justified expectations of parties 
subject to the TVG.
254
 The Arbeitsverhältnisnormen in TV’s are binding on contract parties and their 
members, which means that the TV does not have to be incorporated into individual contracts. The 
principle of the rule of law (‘Rechtsstaat’) entails that unions should be democratically elected, 
especially as the decisions of unions and employers’ organisations affect members’ constitutional 
rights, and possibly third parties rights if TV’s are declared generally binding.
255
 Betriebsnormen under 
article 3 par. 2 TVG have binding effect on the employees of businesses that are party to the TV. 
Betriebsnormen concern provisions that realistically have to be applied uniformly, for example 
throughout a company, which justifies its effects on third parties, as it would be ineffective to conclude 
these rules in individual contracts.
256
 According to article 4 TVG, individual contracts cannot set aside 
the rules in the TV, unless those contracts confer more rights on the employee or if the TV allows for 
deviations (the ‘Günstigkeitsprinzip’). Article 5 TVG establishes that TV’s can be declared generally 
binding.  
TV’s must be in accordance with supranational laws, the GG, state constitutions, federal and 
state legislation, as well as official decisions ( ‘Verordnung’, ‘AMvB’) and the statutes of public 
corporations.
257
 Mandatory provisions, which also include general principles underlying labour law and 
private law – such as the principle of good faith (‘Treu and Glauben’)
258
 – can be distinguished in 
‘mutually mandatory provisions (‘zweiseitig zwingend’) from which neither party can diverge, and 
partially mandatory (‘einseitig zwingend’) from which one party, usually to the advantage of the weaker 
party, may diverge. Moreover, some mandatory provisions in the BGB, as well as other laws are 
‘Tarifdispositives Gesetzesrecht’, which refers to mandatory rules that individual contracts or BV’s may 
not diverge from to the detriment of the employees, but where parties to a TV may diverge from, as it 
is assumed that TV’s are negotiated between parties with an equal bargaining position.
259
 Similarly, 
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case law (‘Tarifdispositives Richterrecht’) also leaves room for parties to TV’s, but not for parties to 




 The development of BV’s 
 
The use of BV’s is stipulated by the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (‘BetrVG’). Work councils 
(‘Betriebsrates’) may negotiate collectively with the employer on BV’s within a company. It has been 
held that BV’s are limited to general rules, instead of specific, individual rules,
261
 with the exception of 
clauses on vacation and employee accommodation, in accordance with article 87 pars. 5 and 9 
BetrVG.
262
 Some essential clauses are reserved to individual contracts.
263
 BV’s are modelled on TV’s, 
although they have a different basis.
264
  Importantly, the BAG has held that the Betriebsrat is assumed 




Article 77 par 4 BetrVG establishes that provisions in BV’s that meet the requirements of 
article 77 par. 2 BetrVG have direct mandatory effect for all the employees in a company entering into 
a BV’s, without having to be included in individual employment contracts.
266
 A central issue in the 
debate on BV’s is the problem of Fremdbestimmung if private parties establish binding rules for 
employees, which are moreover not always to their benefit.
267
 It has been questioned whether the 
binding effect of BV’s can in addition be justified on another basis. Notably, BV’s are not negotiated by 
unions, but by the works councils, and the role of the work councils in establishing rules with binding 
effect can thus not be justified on the basis of a previous membership.
268
 Alternatively, it has been 
held that the legitimation for the binding effect can be traced to the employment contract, as well as 
the democratic election of the works council in accordance with article 7 BetrVG. Thus, one may ask 





 has convincingly argued that neither the contract for employment 
nor the possibility to elect members of the Betriebsrat can be seen as a sole basis for the competence 
of the Betriebsrat.  
Although article 77 par. 3 BetrVG bars additional BV’s, notwithstanding the Günstigkeitsprinzip 
in article 4 par. 3 TVG,
 271
 which has also been accepted for BV’s,
272
 parties to a TV may allow for 
complementary or even diverging BV’s.
273
 If parties have not (expressly) allowed for additional BV’s, 
the question whether a BV is allowed depends on the question whether the TV seeks to provide an 
exhaustive arrangement of parties’ rights and duties on a particular subject.
274
 In the light of these 
considerations, it can be doubted whether it is possible to extend the effect of TV’s to non-member 
employees through additional BV’s, thus extending these agreements to parties who may not have 
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 The development of framework agreements276 
 
At the European level, the social dialogue finds it basis in article 155 TFEU, and is considered as an 
important manner to stimulate innovation and growth, as well as ‘better governance’ in the sense that 
the dialogue may support the responsiveness of European measures.
277
 It has been argued that 
article 155 TFEU merely sets a policy aim and cannot serve as a legal basis for European collective 
labour agreements.
278
 European social dialogue may result in framework agreements have been 
considered as an alternative to harmonisation in social policy areas. Notably, a framework agreement 
under article 155 TFEU can either be implemented in accordance with Member States practices, or it 
can, at the request of signatory parties, result in a Council Decision that is binding on the parties to 
whom it is addressed. Accordingly, the European Union Trade Confederation, in negotiation with the 
European Industry Federations, has established framework agreements on parental leave, part-time 
work and fixed-term contracts. Further sectoral agreements at a European level have also been 





 points out that so far, a refusal to enforce a framework agreement has not taken 
place. Notably, if the Commission does not accept the framework decision, an alternative agreement is 
not likely to be reached, and possible refusal or amendments may moreover be a disincentive for 
parties negotiating on framework agreements. The question may arise whether provisions in such a 
Council Decision, as European law, would aside national mandatory law aiming to protect employees. 
Article 153 par. 5 makes clear that framework agreements cannot concern the right to pay, the 
right to strike, the right to association or possible lock-outs. Also, framework agreements do not 
impose binding norms directly on their members’ members – as individual employers and employees 
are not members of the parties negotiating framework agreements at the European level.  
The European legislator has moreover provided rules for European works councils or a 
procedure for Community-scale undertakings. This Directive aimed to provide rules for cross-border 
situation, reforming and repealing Directive 94/45, the application of which was problematic.
281
 The 
Directive further aims at stimulating cross-border dialogue and accordingly consulted management 
and labour organisations in the reform of the 1994 Directive. As Müller and Platzer
282
 point out, the 
model of collective negotiations combined with works councils is reminiscent of both the German and 
the Dutch legal orders. 
 
4.4.2.2. The role of non-state actors 
What role do actors play in collective labour agreements at the national and European level?  
Firstly, the role of non-state actors falls within the scope of article 9 par 3 GG. 283  The 
BAG284 has held that the competence has been delegated from the state to unions and 
employers’ organisations, which seems however difficult to reconcile with article 9 par. 3 
GG.285   
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Arguably, the question whether the competence of unions can be derived from 
constitutional rights may affect one’s reasoning – it may for example have consequences for 
the scope of the competence of parties to alternative regulation: if parties exercise a 
constitutional right, this implies a broader competence than the exercise of a competence 
delegated by the state.286  
Regardless, the exercise of this right justifies a prominent role for private parties to 
develop binding rules that are not subsequently subject to democratic debate,287 which has 
been democratically sanctioned in the TVG. The role of non-state actors is however limited 
as the exercise of private parties’ constitutional rights does not justify Fremdbestimmung. If 
employees and employers subject themselves to rules developed in TVG’s through their 
membership of a union or employers’ organisation, this will generally not be the case.  This 
competence is reserved to the Minister who may declare TV’s generally binding, which may 
lead to Fremdbestimmung.  
Secondly, the role of non-state actors developing BV’s is less prominent as the right 
to negotiate on BV’s is not a constitutional right. The legislator is not constitutionally bound to 
prioritise TV’s over BV’s, but this priority follows from the better legitimation of TV’s over 
BV’s.288 Generally, BV’s are considered to be more prone to Fremdbestimmung as BV’s are 
negotiated by works councils and although these councils are democratically elected, 
employees cannot choose whether they will subject to the rules negotiated by the council.289  
The role of actors involved in the development of BV’s is subject to more limitations, which 
has however not prevented that BV’s play an increasingly important role, also recognised by 
negotiating parties to TV’s leaving room for additional BV’s. The question on what matters 
BV’s may be established is controversial,290 and has given rise to the development of two 
competing theories, the Vorrangtheorie, followed by the BAG, and the Zwei-Schranken-
Theorie that argues that the reservation in article 77 par. 3 BetrVG includes matters 
addressed by article 87 par. 1 BetrVG.291  
The BAG has held that, within the limits of article 77 par. 3 TVG, every matter 
addressed by article 1 TVG can be subject of a BV. 292 Thus, article 77 par. 3 BetrVG has 
been interpreted a contrario –if competences are not reserved to TV’s, they can be dealt with 
through BV’s. Notably, this is an extensive interpretation of parties’ competence and one may 
ask how this interpretation sits with the question of Fremdbestimmung by parties to a BV.293 
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Thus, Betriebsrate and employers may establish a BV regardless of the existence of a TV. 
However, if there is no codetermination for the Betriebsrat, because a particular issue is left 
to voluntary BV’s under article 88 BetrVG, TV’s will have precedence.294  
Thirdly, at the European level, the role of non-state actors is less prominent as 
constitutional rights do not play a similar role at the European level, although article 152 
TFEU stipulates that the Union recognises the roles of social partners at the European level. 
However, the Commission has taken a top-down approach to the role of unions and 
employers’ organisations, and exercises control over which non-state actors are involved in 
the development of framework agreements.295 However, within the framework set by the 
Commission, parties are free to negotiate,296 and once parties have agreed, this agreement 
cannot be modified. European law may moreover limit the role of national unions as the role 
of national unions has been subject to restrictions of free movement law. 297 
 
4.4.2.3. The development of control mechanisms 
Both at the European and at the national level, state actors have imposed limits on the role of 
non-state actors to develop rules that may become binding on third parties. At the national 
level, the possibility that private actors may impose binding rules on third parties has led to 
the development of control mechanisms.  
TV’s are generally not subjected to judicial evaluation as TV’s are established to the 
mutual benefit of both employer and employees and accordingly fall within the 
Richtigkeitsgewähr. 298. This is also recognised in article 310 par. 4 BGB that excepts TV’s 
from judicial control under articles 305-310 BGB.299  This exception gives private parties 
discretion with regard to the content of TV’s, within the scope of mandatory laws.   
Yet Fremdbestimmung can arise when TV’s are declared generally binding, a 
competence that is however reserved to state actors. Nevertheless, possible 
Fremdbestimmung remains, which has led to the development of various mechanisms to 
ensure that the declaration does not result in declaring the TV of a limited number of 
stakeholders binding, irrespective of legitimate interests of others. These compensating 
mechanisms include: 
 
1) It is only possible to declare TV’s, or parts of TV’s, generally binding when the public  
interest so requires.300 The Ministry may not suffice by merely sanctioning a TV, and 
a TV may not be declared generally binding because it is in the interest of the parties 
to a TV.  
 
2) Article 5 par. 2 TVG stipulates that the interests of employees who are not members 
of a union and who have not had the opportunity to influence the TV should be taken 
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into account in deciding whether to declare a TV generally binding or not, in 
accordance with the principle of democracy.301  
 
3) Unbound employees and employers subject to a generally binding TV may challenge 
the declaration before the court.302 
 
4) Parties to a TV who do not agree with the declaration – or the lack thereof – of their 
own TV or “competing” TV’s may in addition turn to administrative courts, in 
accordance with article 40 Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung.303 
 
5) Parties’negotiating room has been limited by mandatory law. 
 
The first four  safeguards provide third parties with a possibility to influence rules that may be 
imposed upon them, thus limiting the role of negotiating parties to a TV as well as the 
discretion of the Ministry to declare TV’s generally binding. Unfortunetaly, however, the 
possibility for parties to resist or challenge declarations under article 5 TVG has contributed 
to the decreasing use of these declarations.304 As an alternative, the legislator has created 
the possibility to issue a Verordnung in the sense of article 80 GG in specific cases, 305 
instead of a declaration, thus limiting the possibility of parties to veto declarations in the 
sense of article 5 TVG.  
The role of parties to a BV is subject to further-going limitationsin the form of judicial 
control as these agreements do not fall within the scope of the Richtigkeitsgewähr.306 The 
BAG307 has emphasised that the agreements entered into by the Betriebsrat must meet 
requirements of proportionality, stating that the judicial control on BV’s is stricter than TV’s 
because, firstly, TV’s are the result of the practice of a constitutionally protected right, and 
secondly, the binding effect of TV’s is legitimised with preceding membership.308 Richardi309 
states that the judicial control does not entail a control of the content of BV’s and courts may 
not ‘repair’ these agreements. Instead, courts evaluate whether parties to a BV have acted in 
accordance with the limits imposed by higher laws and TV’s. In some cases, BV’s have been 
subjected to judicial control,310  despite article 310 par. 4 BGB that exempts BV’s from judicial 
evaluation.  
The role of non-state actors at the European level is also subject to limitations. 
Notably, the European Commission plays a central role in the selection of actors participating 
in the development of framework agreements, in accordance with the guidelines provided by 
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the Commission.311 However, the CJEU exercises little further control with regard to the 
requirement of respresentativeness: 312  
 
It is proper to stress the importance of the obligation incumbent on the Commission and the 
Council to verify the representativity of the signatories to [a framework agreement] (…) The 
participation of the two institutions in question has the effect (…) of endowing an agreement 
between management and labour with a Community foundation of a legislative character, 
without recourse to the classic procedures provided for under the Treaty for the preparation of 
legislation, which entail the participation of the European Parliament. As case-law makes clear, 
the participation of that institution in the Community legislative procedure reflects at 
Community level the fundamental democratic principle that people must share in the exercise 
of power through a representative assembly (….) the principle of democracy on which the 
Union is founded, requires – in the absence of the participation of the European Parliament in 
the legislative process – that the participation of the people be otherwise assured, in this 
instance through the parties representative of management and labour who concluded the 
agreement which is endowed by the Council’      
 
This test is a limited one, focussing on the assessment of the Council and the Commission. 
The Court does not question the criteria of representativeness established by the 
Commission and Council. 313 Thus, this restraint provides actors that have been selected to 
participate in the development of framework agreements a wide range of discretion that ius 
subject to little additional controls.  
 
4.4.2.4. Comparison 
Thus, the role of state actors and non-state actors diverges at the European and the national 
level. Even though the right of parties to bargain collectively has been recognised at the 
European level, and the development of framework agreements falls within this right, the role 
of non-state actors is simultaneously larger and smaller: if non-state actors participate in the 
development of framework agreements, their role will be considerably more influentual than 
the role of parties involved in TV’s and BV’s that are subject to much more control 
mechanisms. Simultaneously, more collective agreements have been developed at the 
national level, but the role of these actors is subject to more limitations, whereas the role of 
non-state actors not participating in the development of TV’s is potentially more prominent. 
 Thus, German actors are less able to prevent Fremdbestimmung resulting from 
framework agreements. This may be oproblematic from a national perspective. Accordingly, 
Whittaker314 notes that collective contracts that are not in accordance with the individual 
notion of freedom of contract are likely to meet with resistance from national lawyers that find 
that the rights of weaker parties are limited through collectively bargained contracts, which in 
the UAPME decision has clearly been the case. 
 
4.4.3. Conclusion on state actors and non-state actors 
State actors have enabled non-state actors to develop rules that have subsequently been 
reinforced by state actors. Simultaneously, both German and European state actors have 
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imposed limits on the role of non-state actors through the development of control 
mechanisms. German actors have developed a wide range of control mechanisms, often 
used in combination with one another: control of the substance of co-regulation such as the 
Kodex, TV’s to be declared generally binding, and the judicial control over BV’s; the 
appointment or control over actors developing co-regulation, such as the DRSC and the 
Kodex, the organisation of extensive decision-making processes, visible in the development 
of the Kodex and the DRSC, and the development of mandatory law, for TV’s and BV’s. 
The European legislator has sought to limit the role of non-state actors through much 
less varied control mechanisms: by imposing restraints on comitology and by participation of 
state actors in the development of co-regulation. The European legislator does not consider 
the organisation of extensive drafting processes as a way to compensate for 
Fremdbestimmung, if only because of the potential length of such procedures if all 
representative and interested parties are involved. Quite the opposite view is apparent: the 
decision-making processes preceding European co-regulation in some cases are the 
opposite of open and inclusive. Control over the substance of co-regulation is equally 
problematic considering the difficulties of parties at the European level to reach consensus. 
Differences have become apparent between the limitations of non-state actors’ roles 
at the European and the national level. Because of these difference, interdependence 
between European and German actors becomes visible. On the one hand, German actors 
are less able to determine the role of non-state actors. As fewer restrictions have been 
imposed on the role of non-state actors at the European level, potentially, more 
Fremdbestimmung may develop that German state actors cannot compensate. Importantly, 
potential Fremdbestimmung may provoke resistance against the development of co-
regulation developed at the European level.   
Interdependence, however, may also be the cause for for the increasing visibility of 
the role of non-state actors. Particularly, national and especially European state actors 
increasingly depend on the expertise of non-state actors.  
 
4.5.  Non-state actors 
This paragraph will ask what role non-state actors actors play in the development of private 
law.         
Non-state actors, including private parties, form a diverse group, who are generally 
not competent to establish binding rules. Instead, they may create rules through self-
regulation.315  
        Generally, the success of self-regulation varies,316 and it is still considered critically, 
also in cases where successful self-regulation has been established: 317  
 
‘Deutlich wird (...) das die Selbstregulierung unter dauerndem Erfolgsdruck steht. Darbei gilt 
es darzutun, dass die schneller, beweglicher und wirksamer ist al seine gesetzliche Lösung. 
Schieβlich wird die Praxis der Selbstregulierung sehr viel intensiever und argwöhnischer 
beobachtet al seine gesetzliche Regelung, so dass jeder Fall, bei dem sich Mängel des 
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However, increasing the chance of successful self-regulation by enabling private actors to 
establish binding rules meets with problems of Fremdbestimmung.   
Notably, the German legal order distinguishes between contractual self-regulation, 
discussed in paragraph 4.5.1. Instances of contractual self-regulation need to be considered 
in the light of the Richtigkeitsgewähr, which considers the extent to which parties realise their 
own aims in accordance with private autonomy and article 2 GG, and upholds or limits the 
effect of contracts accordingly.  Other forms of self-regulation are the drafting of rules by 
organisations which can be enforced on the basis of the articles of association (‘Satzung’, 
‘statuten’) of those organisations, analysed in paragraph 4.5.2., and self-regulation 
established by non-binding one-sided juridical acts, considered in paragraph 4.5.3. 
Paragraph 4.5.4. will end with a conclusion. 
 
4.5.1. Contractual self-regulation 
Paragraph 4.5.1.1. will consider the idea of the Richtigkeitsgewähr and the effect of individual 
contracts. Paragraph 4.5.1.2. will discuss collectively negotiated contracts. Paragraph 4.5.1.3. 
will turn to model contracts and paragraph 4.5.1.4. will discuss STC’s. Paragraph 4.5.1.5. will 
end with a conclusion. 
 In discussing the instances of self-regulation and the roles of actors, the paragraph 
will look at the role of non-state actors that becomes apparent from these instances, the role 
of state actors in the reinforcement of self-regulation, and the subsequent role of state actors 
in the limitation of non-state actors roles.  
 Despite this order, it should not be overlooked that non-state actors typically develop 
self-regulation within the framework of the law as established by state actors. However, the 
role of non-state actors and the success of these initiatives is largely dependant upon non-
state actors initiatives – without such initatives, state actors can provide all the framework 
they like, and they can encourage self-regulation, but to little avail. 
 
4.5.1.1. The role of individual contract parties  
What role do actors play in the development of private laws through contracts? The 
distinction between the law and juridical acts as a source of binding rules for parties does not 
mean that all contractual agreements are binding – this depends on the extent to which 
paties can realise their own aims through negotiating a contract. The view on the binding 
effects of contracts are in accordance with the more general principled view and notions of 
Fremdbestimmung. 
      A central concept underlying the binding force of contracts is the concept of the 
Richtigkeitsgewähr319 defended by Schmidt-Rimpler:  
 
‘Der Vertrag ist ein Mechanismus, um ohne hoheitliche Gestaltung in begrenztem Rahmen 
eine richtige Regelung auch gegen unrichtigen Willen herbeizuführen, weil immer der durch 
die Unrichtigkeit Betroffene zustimmen muβ.’
320
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Linguistically, the Richtigkeitsgewähr refers to the safeguard (‘Gewähr’) of just and effective  
agreements (‘Richtigkeit’). 321 That does not mean that the law as such assumes that all 
parties negotiations are correct; merely, it respects the outcome of parties negotiations as an 
expression of mutual party autonomy. Some authors 322  have argued that it is more 
convincing to speak of ‘Richtigkeitschance’ - the chance, rather than the warranty, that 
parties will come to just and effective agreements. 
Thus, the Richtigkeitsgewähr explains why contracts should be binding, and 
moreover, why it should be binding on contact parties and not on others. This question has 
been discussed extensively in contact theory. However, other legal orders have come up 
with diverging suggestions.323 Accordingly, the binding force of contracts has been justified 
on the basis of utilitarian principles, society’s legal views on justice, and the mutual 
beneficiality of mutual executory promises,324 while other explanations base the binding force 
of contracts on party autonomy. 325  The concept of Richtigkeitsgewähr, at first sight, is 
reminiscent of the concent of “contract as bargain”, visible in the English and U.S. legal order, 
expressed, for example, in the requirement of consideration.326  Especially the emphasis on 
parties bargaining for consideration is reminiscent of the Richtigkeitsgewähr.327 However, 
differently from the German perspective, the process-based explanation of the requirement 
of consideration still requires that something of value in the eyes of the law is exchanged. 
This theory does not look sufficiently critically at the quality of the bargaining process and the 
actors in that process. Therefore, this theory fails to explain why agreements between some 
parties (such as financial arrangements between family members) are not meant to be 
binding, whereas some business agreements that have not expressly been negotiated 
should be binding.328 In contrast, the Richtigkeitsgewähr has no trouble in the circumstance 
that there may be cases in which negotiations will not necessarily lead to results that should 
be upheld.329 
Moreover, the process-based explanation of consideration overlooks implicit 
negotiations between parties. Of course the assumption that parties negotiate before 
entering into a contract may not always be realistic, yet even if parties are not inclined to 
negotiate everyday contracts, they may still choose with whom to do business, based on, for 
example, the pricing and quality of products offered for sale.  
These justifications differ from the justification provided by the Richtigkeitsgewähr that 
should not, according to Schmidt-Rimpler,330 be traced to parties’ wills, as those wills are not 
necessarily laudable, and consequently, the main basis of the Richtigkeitsgewähr is not the 
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idea that contracts are a way for individual parties to realise Selbstbestimmung. Instead, the 
Richtigkeitsgewähr emphasises contract parties’ negotiations with one another. 
Consequently, contracts will usually also contain an element of Fremdbestimmung for each 
party, as the result of the contract is a compromise between parties and the terms of the 
contract are influenced by both parties. If and insofar as both parties are able to establish 
their own rules through contracting with one another, there is Selbstbestimmung for both 
parties.331 The positive Richtigkeitsgewähr entails that negotiations lead to a contract where 
that is in both parties’ interests, while the negative Richtigkeitsgewähr entails that if during 
negotiations parties find that a contract is not in their mutual interest, there will be no 
contract.332  
Schmidt-Rimpler333  has emphasised that the idea of Richtigkeitsgewähr does not 
mean that contracts should be seen as a source of law, 334  and the principle of party 
autonomy does, accordingly, not mean that parties are competent to develop private law. 
This argument can be traced to the distinction between Rechtnormen and Rechtsgeschäfte, 
and the underlying assumption that private parties act mainly in their own interests. This line 
of reasoning also limits the effect of contracts: contracts binding on third parties would bind 
third parties to rules that would be in the interest of contract parties but not of third parties, 
and problems of Fremdbestimmung would arise. Consequently, differently from other 
theories on the binding force of contract, the Richtigkeitsgewähr, and the Fremdbestimmung 
that arises in the absence of Richtigkeitsgewähr, also offers an explanantion for limiting the 
binding force of contracts negotiated between parties.  
Accordingly, it indicates that limits should be imposed on the role of private parties 
where that is not the case. Particularly, in cases of mistake, where the will of parties in 
negotiations is defective,335 or if parties do not have a of choice of contract parties.336 Also, 
negotiations will not necessarily result in an outcome representing both parties’ interests if 
parties are not in equal bargaining positions.337 Importantly, however, the Richtigkeitsgewähr 
itself will not indicate in which cases parties are unequal to such an extent that contracts 
between them should not be upheld – the decision to, for example, protect weaker parties by 
imposing limits on what parties can negotiate by establishing mandatory consumer protection, 
is the outcome of the political process. 338  
Thus, the Richtigkeitsgewähr is not based on a formal view of contract parties 
negotiations, nor can it be said that the law simply assumes that because parties negotiate, 
the outcome needs to be respected. The law goes further and looks at the quality of the 
bargaining process. Therefore, differently from justifications for the binding force of contracts 
in other legal orders,339 the justification of the binding force of contracts on contract parties 
remains the negotiation process between parties, and the limitation of parties’ negotiation 
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room, or the development of doctrines of mistake and duress, do not displace parties’ mutual 
autonomy as a basis for the binding force of contracts.  
If contracts do not fall within the scope of the Richtigkeitsgewähr, the role of parties 
can be limited through various means. Inequality of parties and the lack of a bargaining 
process may be a reason for judicial control of STC’s.340 It is also possible that the executive 
encourages stakeholder organisations to provide guidelines and other instruments that 
improve weaker parties’ bargaining position.341 The problem of Fremdbestimmung may also 
trigger constitutional protection, for example if the weaker party’s lack of choice of contract 
parties leads to breach of the right to free personal development in article 2 GG. 342  In 
addition, the role of contract parties may be restricted by mandatory law.  
Thus, the Richtigkeitsgewähr also explains when contracts should not be binding, or 
when the binding force of contracts should be subject to contract mechansims- in other 
words, when the role of contract parties, or, more particularly, one contract party, should be 
limited. Other legal orders have not developed similar jusitifications that consistently justify 
the development of control mechanisms. 
      The role of actors entering into contracts falling under the scope of the private law 
acquis differs as the acquis is fragmented and the European legislator has not emphasised 
the quality of the negotiating process. Also, it has been argued that the view that private 
parties mainly pursue their own interests rather than the public interest has not been 
defended as such at the European level.343  
Does the acquis limits the role of strong parties because stronger parties, in the 
pursuit of their own interests, will otherwise impose their terms on weaker parties? Arguably, 
the position and therefore the potential role of consumers is strengthened by cooling off 
periods and information duties in the acquis as they enable consumers to enter into a 
contract on the basis of sufficient information. Importantly, the acquis has not recognised, as 
such, a general principle to protect parties with weak bargaining positions, nor has the acquis 
or soft laws expressly considered the negotiation process preceding a contract. The acquis 
has accordingly also not developed rules in the area of mistake and other defects in consent. 
Although the acquis and soft law emphasise that in order to conclude a contract, parties 
need to agree, the way in which they come to this agreement has not been subject to further 
consideration. Thus, the role of weak parties is not consistently subject to restrictions at the 
European level, but national mandatory law and case law may nevertheless limit the role of 
foreign strong parties entering into contracts with weaker German parties. 
Even if the protection of consumers may be interpreted in accordance with the 
Richtigkeitsgewähr, it does not offer a reliable basis for assessing in what direction the 
private law acquis will develop. Also, a European Richtigkeitsgewähr would not necessarily 
lead to similar limitations to the binding effect of contracts, as the views on when negotiating 
processes are defect or absent may differ. Consequently, the role of contract parties might 
still be subject to different restrictions. 
 
                                               
340
 This option was rejected by Schmidt-Rimpler, 1941, p. 157, 167. Arguably, judicial control does not “restore” private parties’ 
autonomy. Instead, altering the contract puts the judge in the position of contract parties.  
341
 For example, the the Bundesministerium (BMELV) has advocated the development of such instruments, which has resulted 




 See for example  BVerfG 27 August 2005, NJW 2006, 598, par. 2 b aa. 
343




4.5.1.2. Collective contracts 
What role have actors played in the development of private law through collectively 
negotiated contracts?344  Firstly, instances of collective contracts will be considered, and 
secondly, the role of non-state actors in the development of collective contracts will be 
considered. Thirdly, the paragraph will ask what limitations are placed on the roles of non-
state actors through the development of control mechanisms.   
 
4.5.1.2.1. The use of collective contracts 
The German legislator has recognised the use of collective contracts in various areas.345 
Prominent examples are  
 
 Article 36 Urhebergesetz (‘UrhG’) stipulates that associations of proprietors of 
intellectual property rights may negotiate with associations of users346 to determine 
the reasonable compensation in the meaning of article 32 UrhG, in accordance with 
the circumstances in that branche.347  
 
 Article 12 Urheberrechtswahrnehmungsgesetz (‘UhrWG’) obliges copyright collectives 
(‘Verwertungsgesellschaft‘) that manage copyrights in trust for owners of copyrighted 
works,  to enter into collective agreements with associations representing users with 
regard to the rights managed by the collective. In these cases, there is an obligation 
to enter into an agreement, unless this cannot be asked from the copyright collective 
as the association of users has too few members.  
 
 Articles 558c and 558d BGB enable municipalities to establish simple (558c) or 
qualified (558d) ‘Mietspiegels’, an instrument to establish the height of rents in that 
municipality that are established by municipalities or through negotiations between 
stakeholder organisations. Additionally, qualified Mietspiegels are established in 
accordance with scientific principles, 348  which may improve the chance that a 
Mietspiegel adequately reflects the market for accommodation in a particular 
municipality. This is important because article 558d par. 3 BGB stipulates that a 
qualified Mietspiegel will be assumed to reflect the height of rents usual in a particular 
area.  
 
In addition, private parties have also recognised the benefits of collective contracts. This may 
take various forms. Some of these contracts seem to be based on the idea that collective 
contracts may be in accordance with the Richtigkeitsgewähr more than individual contracts. 
Collective contracts in accordance wit this idea are 
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 Collective contracts such as insurance contracts negotiated between third parties to 
the collective contract – such as employers – on behalf of weaker parties – such as 
employees. 
 
 Contracts concluded via platforms such as Groupon,349  that are in accordance with 
the idea that as the amount of consumers grows, consumers – as a group – can 
negotiate better terms for themselves, in accordance with the idea of 
Richtigkeitsgewähr. In these cases, the lack of the possibility to individually 
(re)negotiate the terms of the contracts offered to groups is compensated by the 
choice to opt in or opt out of the contract, if that is in the interests of potential contract 
parties. 350  Interestingly, the fora for complaints for collective contracts such as 
Groupon indicate that complaints may in some cases lead to compensation.351  
 
In some collective contracts, it is not clear whether parties negotiate on behalf of, or in the 
interests of future contract parties, which may theoretically make a balanced collective 
contract to the benefit of all contract parties less likely, and in some cases, the 
Richtigkeitsgewähr is clearly absent. This is the case when parties may choose to enter into 
agreements drafted as an alternative to a TV or a BV, for example because these 
agreements are more flexible, or, possibly, to circumvent the inclusion of unions and works 
councils that have more expertise, experience and a stronger position when it comes to 
negotiating on employment matters. Agreements in accordance with this idea include  
 
 Guidelines (‘Richtlinienverträge’) or recommendations that go beyond stipulating 
employment contracts and address a wide range of social issues.352 
 
 Agreements with businesses – especially hospitals – and unions (‘Gestellungsvertrag’) 
in order for their members to work for those hospitals. Although an employment 
contract is not established between the hospitals and the members, the hospital may 
have some duties similar to an employer, and members can elect and be elected for 
the works councils.353  
 
The European legislator has generally not made use of collective contracts, with the 
exception of framework agreements that are subsequently turned into law. Additionally, the 
Commission has frequently attempted to encourage ‘dialogue’ between stakeholders at the 
European level,354 which has also been used in the drafting of legislation.355 A prominent 
example is:  
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nr 6 et seq. 
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 See for example COM (2000) 248 final, p. 9-10 and more recently the European Parliament resolution of 20 May 2008 on EU 




The 2001  Recommendation
356
 that contained a substantive code of conduct on mortgage loans, 
which provides two standards form of information that is to be provided to the consumer. The 
information requirements are the result of negotiations between consumer organisations and 




The Commission has sought to facilitate dialogue between stakeholders at the European level, in 
order to improve the STC’s used in travel package contracts. To evaluate the willingness of 
stakeholders, the Commission – not the BEUC – consulted the Consumer Committee
358
 while the 
European Confederation of Travel Agencies (‘ECTA’) consulted its members, after which the 
Commission set up a group consisting of stakeholders and national experts.  
 
4.5.1.2.2. The role of non-state actors  
What role do non-state actors play in the development of collective contracts? Firstly, in 
some cases, the national legislator has provided a framework for collective contracts, 
providing non-state actors with the possibility to negotiate agreements that are subsequently 
presumed to be in accordance with the law. This presumption provides negotiating parties 
with a prominent role that may give rise to Fremdbestimmung, thereby limiting the role of 
third parties subjected to these agreements. Fremdbestimmung is visible in collective 
contracts on intellectual property rights under article 32 UrhG, and Mietspiegels. 
 
Fremdbestimmung may arise from the collective agreements on the use intellectual property rights, 
which may bind members if members negotiating on the contract have been authorised to negotiate 
on behalf of their members.
359
 Otherwise, the agreement on compensation will be considered 
reasonable, and parties cannot rebut this assumption, as article 32 par. 2 UrhG makes clear.
360
 
Including provisions negotiated under this article may also indicate that they are commonly used in a 
particular branche,
361
  which may affect the height of compensation in third parties’ cases, especially if 
they do not agree on a specific price. In this respect, Hertin
362
 finds the lack of publicity problematic 
considering the normative character (‘Normcharakter’) of these agreements. For the development of 
collective agreements under article 36 UrhG, the efficiency of the bargaining processes could be an 
assumption that justifies providing a framework for collective negotiations.  
‘Simple’ Mietspiegels have also gained a considerable role in challenging the raise of rents 
that is not in accordance with the Mietspiegel.
363
 Mietspiegels are well-established and considered to 
be in the interests of both tenants and landlords.
364
 Thus, it seems as if the outcome of negotiations, 
as well as municipal decisions, is considered ‘correct’, reminiscent of the Richtigkeitsgewähr.  Both for 
simple and qualified Mietspiegels, questions of Fremdbestimmung may also arise, because of the 
assumption under article 558d par. BGB and the role of simple Mietspiegels in indicating the usual 
height of rents in a municipality. For qualified Mietspiegels, more questions of Fremdbestimmung may 
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 U.P. Börstinghaus, ‘Der qualifizierte Mietspiegel - Die Geschichte einer „Verschlimmbesserung”’, NZM 2000, p. 1088. 
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arise as the drafting of third parties is not infrequently left to third parties.
365
 Moreover, article 558a par. 
2 BGB establishes that landlords will refer to Mietspiegels when establishing or raising the rent, even 
when they diverge from Mietspiegel, which may well trigger challenges from tenants. Although a 
Mietspiegel can thus affect third parties’ disputes, citizens cannot challenge a Mietspiegel before 
administrative courts; instead, civil courts have been indicated as competent to evaluate the 
correctness of qualified Mietspiegel.
366  
 
The role of non-state actors in other collective contracts depends on the question whether 
contracts fall within the scope of the Richtigkeitsgewähr or whether they give rise to 
Fremdbestimmung. Notably, various collective contracts are concluded on the behalf of third 
parties by stronger parties, but they frequently lack binding force. Therefore, third parties are 
only bound if they opt into these contracts, which makes it more likely that these contracts fall 
within the scope of the Richtigkeitsgewähr. Notably, this provides stronger parties negotiating 
on the behalf of weaker parties with a considerable role, whereas it provides weaker parties 
with more possibilities to enter into contracts that they consider to their benefit. 
 
For example, agreements drafted as an alternative to TV’s (‘Koalitonsvereinbarungen’) do not have a 
binding force similar to TV’s.
367
 Moreover, in cases where unions or other associations have 
negotiated on behalf of their members, problems of Fremdbestimmung will generally not arise, as the 
effect of these agreements will generally be limited to members, who will have subjected themselves 
to these collectively negotiated rules. Similarly, collective contracts such as collective insurance 
contracts or Groupon contracts do not become binding on third parties, and Fremdbestimmung will not 
arise. 
  
The role of actors in European dialogues differs, as these dialogues have been organised by 
European state actors. Thus, non-state actors have less choice to enter into these dialogues; 
they mus be invited. However, if non-state actors have been invited, their negotiations can 
have considerable influence, as the outcome of these negotiations has generally been used 
as a basis for legislation. Thus, so far, the European legislator considers collective 
negotiations as a suitable way to further responsive lawmaking.  
  
4.5.1.2.3. Limitations to the role of non-state actors 
How have state actors limited the role of non-state actors through collective contracts? At the 
national level, the possibility of Fremdbestimmung has prompted the development of control 
mechanisms that limit non-state actors’ roles:  
 
 For some collective contracts, especially collectively negotiated STC’s, judicial 
evaluation may be exercised.  
 
 Mandatory law may limit non-state actors’ roles.  
 
Accordingly, article 32 UrhG provides mandatory protection of weaker parties – artists – against users 
in article 36 UrhG that provides a framework for collective negotiation. Furthermore, article 32 par. 4 
stipulates that parties to this agreement cannot diverge from the agreement to the detriment of the 
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proprietor. Also, article 32a UrhG establishes the possibility to renegotiate if there is a clear imbalance 
(‘auffälliges Missverhältnis’) between the compensation and the benefit from the use of the 
intellectually protected works.
368
 Moreover, the emphasis on the representativeness, independence (of 
potential contract parties) involved in negotiations under article 36 UrhG,
369
 and competence can also 
be seen in this light.
370
 
For collective contracts with for example consumers or policyholders, the legislator has 
recognised that the Richtigkeitsgewähr may be absent because of the unequal bargaining position 
between parties and has established mandatory protection for weaker parties. Accordingly, for 
insurance contracts, articles 6 and 7 Versicherungsvertragsgesetz establish information and advise 
duties for insurers.
371
 If contracts concluded via Groupon fall within the scope of articles 312b et seq 
BGB, which implement Directive 97/7 for contracts and which will be amended for the implementation 
of Directive 2011/ 83 on consumer rights, article 312c BGB establishing information duties is 
applicable, while, if contracts are concluded solely via internet, the information duties under articles 
312b BGB may – also – become applicable. However, these duties do not become relevant because it 
concerns a “collective” contract – if consumers opt into Groupon contracts, they enter into individual 
contracts.  
 
At the European level, the role of non-state actors is limited as state actors play a central role 
in the selection of negotiating parties. Also, the decision whether the outcome of negotiations 
will be used in legislation is reserved to the European legislator, who may also seek to 
establish Recommendations rather than binding rules.  
 
4.5.1.2.4. Conclusion on collective contracts 
Non-state actors play a considerable role in the development of collective contracts, 
especially if the legislator has reinforced the outcome of parties’ negotiations, which is likely 
to lead to Fremdbestimmung. Notably, this possibility has in turn given rise to control 
mechanisms that confine the role of contract parties to establish rules that may become 
binding on third parties. Contract parties may also play a considerable role at the European 
level, once they have been selected to participate in collective dialogues.  
 
4.5.1.3. Model contracts 
This paragraph will ask what role contract parties play in the development of private law 
through model contracts and how actors have approached the use of model contracts. Firstly, 
the paragraph will turn instances of model contracts, and consider the role of non-state 
actors through model contracts. Subsequently, limitations to the role of non-state actors 
through the development of control mechanisms will be considered.  
The use of model contracts (‘Formulare’, ‘Musterverträge’, ‘Standardverträge’) 
enables parties to draft (parts of) contracts in advance, and they are widely used.372 Beyond 
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the national level, stakeholders 373  and international organisations 374  have provided their 
members with model contracts.  
The role of non-state actors through model contracts can be considerable, especially 
if drafted by international organisations or stakeholder groups with many members using 
these models. In this way, drafters may influence the rights and obligations of many third 
parties. This does not mean that model contracts are binding, as parties must opt for the use 
of these models.  
In these cases, notably, principles of private autonomy and the doctrine of the 
Richtigkeitsgewähr also offer a justification for the binding force of model contracts and 
limitations to the binding force of model contracts. Accordingly, the role of contract parties is 
limited as the use of predrafted model contracts, to be used in multiple contracts,375 entails 
that the bargaining of contract parties, on which the Richtigkeitsgewähr is based, is limited.376 
This limitation justifies judicial control under article 305-310 BGB.  
This judicial control of has been criticised. Firstly, as Coester-Waltjen377 has pointed 
out, Fremdbestimmung will not necessarily arise as predrafted agreements need not point to 
contracts favourable to the user of the model contract. Typically, notaries are considered 
neutral third parties,378 and it has been argued that subjecting these model contracts to 
judicial control may undermine the predictability of contracts drafted and approved by 
notaries.379  Also, if, for example a stakeholder organisation enables its members to do 
business with one another, it does not follow that a model is necessarily to the advantage of 
one of the contract parties. However, the current regime does not seem to distinguish 
between model contracts drafted by neutral third parties or by users themselves, to their own 
benefit, as it still concerns contracts that will, to contract parties, appear to be correct without 
being negotiated. 380  Thus, regardless of drafters’ interests, their roles remain limited. 
Secondly, even if model contracts do benefit one contract party over the other, 381  the 
question arises whether judicial control is still necessary in cases where a model contract 
has been explained to contract parties, in accordance with, for example, a notary’s duty of 
care (‘Belehrungspflicht’) under article 17 Beurkundungsgesetz. Although explaining the 
consequences of model contracts may not simultaneously entail negotiating about these 
terms, the question arises whether this duty may for example cause a contract party to 
reconsider entering into an agreement. Thus, can neutral non-state actors not similarly 
mitigate Fremdbestimmung, or should this be left to state actors?  
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The European legislator is not similarly concerned with potential Fremdbestimmung 
and has not limited the role of non-state actors through judicial control. To the contrary, 
because the use of model contracts may facilitate cross-border trade, the European Union 
has encouraged the use of models in its Directives – both Directive 2008/48 on consumer 
credit and the proposal for a Directive on mortgages contain standardised information forms. 
Through the use of these forms, businesses may more easily fulfil their information duties to 
consumers. However, the role of non-state actors drafting model forms is subject to approval 
from the European legislator as the choice to include these forms remains with the European 
legislator. 
Thus, the roles of contract parties through model contracts under German law and 
European law diverge. However, these differences may not necessarily lead to problems as 
German law permits a larger role for private parties in several cases:  
 
1) The involvement of state actors in model forms in Directives may be a reason to 
exempt these forms from judicial control, similar to the exemption of VOB/B clauses in 
article 310 BGB.  
 
2) Model contracts may be exempt from judicial control if they reflect well-established 
customs in international trade or between parties, in accordance with articles 346 
HGB and article 307 par. 3 BGB. 
 
3) If both parties opt for well-established model contracts, contracts will not be subject to 
judicial evaluation as clauses have not been presented (‘gestellt’) by one of the 
parties to the contract in the sense of article 305 BGB.  
 
4) Thus, contract parties drafting model contracts at the European level have a more 
prominent role than at the national level, but German law may well allow more room 
for contract parties if that does not lead to Fremdbestimmung. 
 
 
4.5.1.4. Standard contract terms (STC’s) 
What role do actors play in the development of private law through STC’s?  Firstly, the 
paragraph will consider instances of often-used STC’s. Secondly, the paragraph will sketch 
the role of non-state actors through STC’s and thirdly, the limitations to the role of non-state 
actors through the development of control mechanisms will be discussed.  
STC’s are widely used: 
 
 Several branch organizations have developed uniform STC’s for their members.382  
 
 Also, the STC’s in some specific contracts can be established by Verordung.383  
 
 The guidelines established in the articles of association of the Deutsche Börse may 
be considered a special case.384  
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 STC’s may also be collectively negotiated. Even if STC’s are negotiated collectively, 
this does not mean that they are negotiated by (representatives of) future contract 
parties, and consequently they do not fall within the Richtigkeitsgewähr. 385 Moreover, 
collectively negotiated STC’s, although they may theoretically be less likely to overly 
benefit one contract party, still fall under the definition of STC’s as they are a part of 
contracts that is unlikely to be negotiated further between parties.  
 
 Similarly, beyond the national level, actors have sought to provide their members with 
model STC’s.386   
 
Contract parties drafting STC’s may affect the rights and duties of both third parties and 
potential contract parties. Especially stakeholder groups and international organisations 
providing their members with model STC’s that can be used in contracts with third parties 
affect the rights of these third parties. Also, the party drafting STC’s may have a distinct 
advantage over his contract party, as his STC’s, likely strengthening his legal position, form a 
starting point for negotiations.    
However, the use of STC’s does not fall within the scope of the Richtigkeitsgewähr, 
but gives rise to problems of Fremdbestimmung, which has prompted the German legislator 
and judiciary to develop control mechanisms that subject the role of users of STC’s to 
limitations.  
Specifically, Fremdbestimmung may arise  as STC’s will usually not be the result of 
negotiations.387 Parties entering into a contract may not understand STC’s, but even if they 
do, they may not have the time to evaluate STC’s and negotiate terms that are to their 
detriment.388 Potential contract parties may also not have the time to compare the STC’s of 
different potential contract parties. Consequently, the use of STC’s is typically neither based 
on negotiations nor on the competition of different parties’ STC’s,389 which, in turn, may 
induce users of STC’s to draft STC’s that benefit their legal position towards future contract 
parties.390  
The lack of Richtigkeitsgewähr justifies judicial control over STC’s under article 307 
BGB. Articles 308 and 309 BGB respectively provide a list of grey and black clauses. Notably, 
STC’s may be subjected to judicial control before a contract is concluded, for example if 
STC’s become a part of negotiations between parties, as article 305 BGB requires that 
STC’s are presented, which does not require the conclusion of a contract. If STC’s are 
‘unfair’, they will be ineffective.  
The Injunctions Act (‘Unterlassensklagengesetz’, ‘UklaG’) provides organisations in 
the sense of articles 3 and 3a UklaG with the possibility to claim an injunction stipulated in 
articles 1 and 2 UklaG. Article 7 UklaG stipulates that if a claim is upheld, this can also be 
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published. Not many claims have been brought under these provisions, which can be traced 
to the well-established and more successful injunction under article 8 Act against Unfair 
Competition (‘Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb’, ‘UWG’).391  
The European legislator has similarly subjected the role of businesses entering into 
contracts with consumers to restrictions. To protect consumers, judicial evaluation under 
Directive 93/13 on unfair contract terms has been established. Accordingly, the role of 
stronger parties under the Directive may be subject to more limitations than is the case under 
German as, as Member States may extend the regime of the Directive to the main terms of 
the contract. 392   In contrast, German law leaves open the possibility for consumers to 
negotiate on STC’s – which is not likely – that will accordingly fall within the 
Richtigkeitsgewähr and therefore not be subject to judicial evaluation.  
More generally, the use of STC’s generally is not considered problematic at the 
European level and contract parties are accoridngly left considerable considerable freedom 
under European law. Instead, the development of STC’s that can be used across borders 
has been encouraged as uniform STC’s may facilitate cross-border trade.393 However, the 
development of cross-border trade through these means has proven to be problematic.394  
Thus, non-state actors may play a considerable role through the development of 
STC’s, but both German and European actors have imposed considerable restraints on this 
role.      
   
4.5.1.5. Conclusion on contractual self-regulation 
Both under German law and European law, contract parties enjoy freedom of contract, and 
parties have considerable discretion to negotiate on the terms of their contracts. German and 
European law have equally recognised possibilities to strengthen the role of weaker parties 
in entering into contracts have been recognised, through information duties, withdrawal rights, 
and collective negotiations. 
As German law has developed in accordance with the Richtigkeitsgewähr, German 
law has more consistently and frequently subjected the role of contract parties likely to 
impose their terms on either contract parties or third parties to limitations, both in individual 
contracts, collective contracts, model contracts, and STC’s.  
German actors have established various control mechanisms – mandatory law, 
judicial evaluation, participation of state actors in model contracts, model lists for unfair 
clauses and default law that may provide an indication of fairness. A control mechanism that 
does not limit the role of non-state actors as such is the development of collective 
enforcement mechanisms. However, the development of collective enforcement should, if 
frequently used, limit the role of users of STC’s while providing potentially interested parties 
with a way to influence STC’s.   
European actors have developed similar mechanisms, but these mechanisms are not 
based on concerns of Fremdbestimmung and have not been consistently developed, and 
only for contracts between businesses to consumers.  
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4.5.2.  Self-regulation through articles of association 
What role have organisations played in the development of private law through self-
regulation based on articles of association?395 
      Paragraphs 4.5.2.1-4.5.2.3. will describe the use of self regulation based on articles 
association, respectively internal codes of conduct, sports associations’ codes, and 
professional conduct codes, insofar as they are based on organisations’ articles of 
association. 396  Paragraph 4.5.2.4. and 4.5.2.5. will also turn to the Pressekodex and 
Werbekodex. These codes have been developed through articles of association, but they are 
not binding on this basis. Nevertheless, these codes seem rather successful. Paragraph 
4.5.2.6 will consider the role of non-state actors and paragraph 4.5.2.7. will address the 
limitations on the role of non-state actors through the development of control mechanisms. 
Paragraph 4.5.2.8. will compare the role of non-state actors and the limitation of non-state 
actors’ roles and paragraph 4.5.2.9. will end with a conclusion.  
 
4.5.2.1. Internally binding codes of conduct 
Businesses may provide for an internal code of conduct in their articles of association. For 
limited liability companies (‘Aktiengesellschaft’, ‘naamloze vennootschap’), article 77 par. 2 
AktG enables the board of commissioners to establish a code of conduct for the business in 
its internal rules and regulation (‘Geschäftsordnung’), in accordance with guideline 4.1.3 of 
the corporate governance Kodex. If the board chooses not to do so, the executive board can 
establish such rules. Notably, if the business chooses to comply with the corporate 
governance Kodex and issues a declaration in the meaning of article 161 Aktiengesetz 
(‘AktG’), this may require implementation of the Kodex within contracts of employment of 
board members and implementation of parts of the Kodex in the articles of association.397 If 
codes of conduct are based on articles of association, decisions from businesses 
inconsistent with this declaration may in some cases be void.398 Moreover, the question has 
arisen whether the Kodex that is valid within the company may be relevant for the 
interpretation of article 93 AktG that establishes a duty of care for the director, referring to the 
careful director (‘ordentliche und gewissenhaften Gesellschaftsleiter’).399  Furthermore, the 
question has arisen whether the guidelines in the Kodex can be used in the interpretation of 
blanket clauses such as articles 93 and 116 AktG.400  
Thus, the development of codes has been explicitly encouraged. Alternatively, 
businesses may also take widely developed codes such as the code on corporate social 
responsibility (‘Nachhaltigkeitskodex’)401 or the corporate governance Kodex as a starting 
point for these internal codes, but they are not obliged to do so. According to Ringleb,402 
many businesses do not do so because of the need for frequent amendments to enable the 
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 Self-regulation on the basis of articles of association has been considered as a separate category in German literature, see 
further below par. 4.2.5.6 and 4.2.5.7.  
396
 These codes do not include binding codes of conduct developed by sub-national actors  representing, for example, 
professional organisations (‘Kammern’)  trhat have not been included in this chapter.  
397
 MunchKomm zum AktG/Semler (2003), article 161, nr 99. 
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 BGH 21.09.2009 - II ZR 174/08, NZG 2009, 1270. 
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 Buck-Heeb & Dieckmann 2010, p. 102. 
400
 P. Hommelhoff, A. Schwab, ‘Regelungsquellen und Regelungsebenen der Corporate Governance’, in: P. Hommelhoff, K.J. 
Hopt, A. Von Werder (eds.), Handbuch Corporate Governance, Schmidt: Köln 2009, 2
nd
 ed., p. 79 point out this can only be the 
case if guidelines reflect established practice.  
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 See further below par. 4.5.3.1. 
402
 Ringleb, ‘Die Umsetzung des Kodex in der Praxis’, in: Ringleb et al (eds.), Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex, 4th ed., 
2010, III, nr. 1543.  
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Kodex to deal with developing business practices.  In addition, businesses can establish best 
practices, ‘Grundsätze ordnungsgemäβer Unternehmungsführung’.  
 
4.5.2.2. Sports’ associations 
Sports’ associations, considered as non-economical associations in the meaning of article 21 
BGB, may impose and enforce various sorts of rules against members that can be divided in 
rules with regard to the association (requirements for membership, contributions etc), and 
sports’ rules (composition, constitution of teams etc) that are typically internally directed at 
members practicing a particular sport.  
 Typically, sports’ associations are members of continental and international 
organisations, while individuals, as a rule, are members of regional or local organisations. In 
accordance with the Ein-Platz-Prinzip, only one association can become a member of the 
overarching organisation, per sport.403 Buck-Heeb and Dieckman404 explain the pyramid-like 
structure of sports’ organisations by pointing to the necessity to establish uniform rules for 
international competitions. Members of local or regional associations may be bound to the 
internationally established rules on the basis of the articles of association of their association, 
stipulating that the association and its members are bound to the rules established by the 
overarching organisation, which in turn stipulates that it is bound to the rules established by 
its overarching organisation.  
 
4.5.2.3. Internally binding codes for professionals 
Notably, the binding force and the scope of professional codes may vary. This paragraph will 
first turn to the guidelines for insolvency administrators and the professional rules for public 
auditors, which seem well-developed. Subsequently, the paragraph will turn to other codes, 
established in the financial sector, that seem less well-developed or that pose less clear 
sanctions for unprofessional behaviour. Well-developed codes are: 
 
 The codes established by the Association of Professional Insolvency Administrators 
of Germany (‘Verband Insolvenzverwalters Deutschlands e.V’, ‘VID’), 405  after 
insolvency administration was recognised as an independent profession in the 
meaning of article 12 GG.406  
 
This self-regulation includes the Principles of Proper Insolvency Administration (‘Grundsätze 
ordnungsgemäßer Insolvenzverwaltung’, ‘GOI’)
407
 as well as professional standards 
(‘Berufsgrundsätze’).
408
 Article 4 of the articles of association
409
 requires that persons wishing to 
become a member must explicitly and in writing recognition the professional standards as well as the 
GOI. Thus, even if members would not be bound on the basis of the articles of association, they would 
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 See for example article 8 par. 2 of the articles of association of the German Soccer Association (‘Deutscher Fussball-Bund’, 
‘DFB’), available at http://www.dfb.de/uploads/media/02_Satzung_02.pdf, or article 9 par. 2 of the articles association of the 
German Tennis Association (‘Deutscher Tennis Bund’, ‘DTB’), available at http://www.dtb-
tennis.de/downloads/Satzung_2012.pdf.   
404
 Buck-Heeb & Dieckman 2010, p. 67. 
405
 Insolvenzurdnung/Braun (2012) article 56 nr 18 points to the possible overlap between the BRAO, when non-specialised 
lawyers act as insolvency administrators, and the GOI and the Berufsgrundsätzen. 
406






 Available at http://www.vid.de/images/stories/pdf_fuer_einzelseiten/vid-berufsgrundsaetze.pdf.  
409
 Available at http://www.vid.de/images/stories/pdf_fuer_einzelseiten/vid-satzung_vom_5.5.2012.pdf.  
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be bound contractually, by their declaration. In addition, article 6 of the articles of association explicitly 
requires that members comply with professional standards and the GOI, while articles 8 and 9 of the 
articles of association enables the VID to impose a reprimand or exclusion for breach of these duties, 
as well as exclusion from the VID, summed up in article 13 of the articles of association. Furthermore, 
the VID refers to the recommendations of Prof. Uhlenbruck (‘Uhlenbruck-Kriterien’)
410
 and the 




 states that the principles 
developed by the VID are directed internally, but he also finds that these principles have proved very 
useful for the interpretation of the Insolvency regulation (‘Insolvenzordnung’, ‘InsO’), even though 
these principles offer minimum standards only, which may lead to the petrification of these standards 
at only a minimum level. However, Frind also notes that the GOI and the Berufsgrundsätze can only 
be useful if they provide clear rules, which is not always the case.   
 
 Uniform principles 413  established by the Institute of Public Auditors in Germany 
(‘Institut der Witschaftsprüfer in Deutschland e.V., ‘IDW’), 414  in addition to self-
regulation established by the Wirtschaftprüferkammer. 
 
Article 4 pars. 8 and 9 of the articles of association establish that members have a duty to comply with 
these principles. Article 5 sub 4 makes clear that this breach can result in the exclusion of members, 
after a decision from the honorary council (‘Ehrengericht’), in accordance with article 11 par. 3, which 
also enables the Ehrengericht to disapprove of behaviour. Moreover, criminal procedures for breach of 
professional duties can also lead to suspension and exclusion, in accordance with article 5 sub 5 of 
the articles of association.  
 
Many organisations in the financial sector have also sought to establish codes of conduct, 
but these codes do generally not pose clear sanctions for breaching professional codes of 
conduct, or sanctions that go barely beyond the minimum that is required. Codes established 
in this area are: 
 
 The Verhaltenkodex 415  as well as  the DGFR (‘Deutsche Grundsätze für Finanz 
Research’),416 established by the DVFA (‘Deutsche Vereinigung für Finanzanalyse 
und Asset Management e.V.’).417  
 
Article 3 of the DVFA’s articles of association stipulates that members have to recognise the 
professional rules (‘Standesrichtlinien’). The articles of association of the DVFA enable to association 
to punish breaches of the rules by the Ehrengericht, which can impose fines up to € 5000 as well as 
exclusion from the association. Augsberg
418
 points out that previously, these rules have been criticised 
as confusing and hardly going beyond the existing standards set by the law, which have led to reforms 
of the rules.  
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 Available at http://vid.de/images/stories/pdf_fuer_einzelseiten/uhlenbruck-empfehlungen.pdf.  
411
 See http://vid.de/de/qualitaet/kontenrahmen-qskr-insoq.html.  
412
 F. Frind, ‘Der Einfluss von Selbstregularien der Insolvenzverwalter-Zusammenschlüsse bei der Auswahl, Aufsicht über und 
der Entlassung von Insolvenzverwaltern’, NZI 2011, p. 785-786.  
413
 Both the articles of association and the principles are available at http://www.idw.de/idw/portal/d589242/index.jsp.  
414
 The IDW is also a member of several international organisations, which include the International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC), the Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens (FEE). The IDW is also involved in the International Auditing and 
Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), and the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA). Augsberg 2001, p. 
238 notes that its activities at the international level, where harmonisation has been ongoing, may accelerate the compliance of 
the German profession with international standards. 
415
 Available at http://www.dvfa.de/mitgliedschaft/dok/35293.php.   
416
 In turn, these guidelines consist of consisting of Grundsätzen ordnungsmäβiger Finanz Research (GoFR) and 
Mindestandards fuer Finanz Reserach (MSFR). See further Buck-Heeb & Dieckmann 2010, p. 110 
417
 The DVFA is a member of the European Federation of Financial Analysts Societies (EFFAS, http://effas.net/) and the 
Association of Certified International Investment Analysts (ACIIA, http://www.aciia.org/pages/home.asp). 
418
 Augsberg 2001, p. 240. 
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 The professional rules on advice on financial planning drafted by the Financial 
Planning Standards Board Deutschland.  
 
The articles of association enable an Ehrengericht to impose sanctions on the breach of those rules, 
from suspension of the certificate to a duty to follow courses and exclusion from the association. The 
preamble to the rules state that if the behaviour of a member has been sanctioned by the judiciary, the 
Ehrengericht will subsequently evaluate whether that behaviour was in accordance with the 
professional code of conduct. Somewhat confusingly, however, article 18.2 of the articles of 





 The professional rules  established by the advisory committee of the BVFF 
(‘Bundesverband für den Fachhandel Finanzdienstleistungen e.V.’), 420  breach of 
which can be disciplined with exclusion.421  
 
 The code of ethics and the standards of professional conduct established by the 
German CFA Society, that can be traced to the CFA institute, the international 
organisation that it is a member of. Augsberg422 notes that as the rules come from a 
foreign party, members are not bound by the statutes of the association but from their 
own recognition of the code of conduct, which members have to reaffirm yearly, in 
writing.423 
 
 The code of conduct424  of the association for independent consultancy experts on 
renumeration (‘Vereinigung unabhängiger Vergütungsberater’, ‘VUVB’), on the basis 
of article 2 of its articles of association.425 Although neither the code nor the articles of 
association impose sanctions for the breach of the code, the code aims to provide 
guidelines for compliance with article 4.2.2. of the corporate governance Kodex, 
which entails that businesses may issue a statement of compliance or non-
compliance under article 161 AktG.426  
 
 The criteria established by the association and the International Centre for 
Franchising und Cooperation required by the German Franchise Association, 
Deutscher Franchise-Verband e. V (‘DFV’).427 
 
 The codes of conduct of the Resort Development Organisation (‘RDO’).428 Its code of 
ethics provides that members may be excluded for breach of the code. However, the 
duties imposed by the code are very general and do not go beyond the legal 
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 Available at http://www.fpsb.de/files/documents/Satzung_FPSB110617_formatiert1.pdf.  
420
 See http://www.fifa.de/ - this website seems currently under construction (June 2012).  
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 Buck-Heeb & Dieckmann 2010, p. 111. 
422
 Augsberg 2001, p. 249. 
423
 See http://www.gcfas.de/about/. Unfortunately, the code of conduct does not seem to be publicly available.  
424
 Available at http://www.vuvb.de/assets/Uploads/Kodex-fuer-unabhaengige-Verguetungsberatung.pdf.  
425
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426
 See further par. ...  
427
 See further http://www.franchiseverband.com/deutscher-franchise-verband-ev.html. The German Franchise Association is a 
member of the European Franchise Federation (EFF) has established a European code of ethics for franchising, available at 
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 See http://www.rdo.org/public_files/rdo_code_adr_scheme_09.pdf. The RDO used to be the Organisation for Timeshare in 
Europe (‘OTE’).   
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obligations. It does have a German ‘chapter’,429 but there do not seem to be German 
members.430  
 
 The fractional & shared ownership431  trade association (‘FSOTA’) apparently also 
requires that members comply with its code of conduct,432 the text of which however 
currently does not seem to be publicly available. It is also unclear whether this 
association has German members.  
 
 The codes of conduct from the federal association for German auctioneers 
(‘Bundesverband deutschen Kunstversteigerer’, ‘BDK’) and the separate code for 
international trade in art,433 stating that its members recognise these codes as binding, 
and that ‘serious’ breaches of the code,434 if sufficiently proven, will be considered as  
breaches of decisions from the association under article 2 par. 7 of the articles of 
association, which may justify exclusion. At first sight, the codes do not seem to go far 
beyond what is already contractually, if not legally required.435  
 
 The code of conduct, 436  of the federal association for German trade in art and 
antiquity (‘Bundesverband des deutschen Kunst- und Antiqitätenhandelns e.V.’, 
‘BDKA’) has also established a which partially overlaps with the code of conduct for 
international trade of the BDK. Although article 7 of the code stipulates that member 
associations will impose the code on their members, it is not clear whether the code is 
established on the basis of the articles of association of the BDKA and the code itself 
imposes no sanction on breaches of the code. 
 
Thus, various codes on professional conduct have been established, but the strictness of 
these rules and their enforcement depend on the drafters of the codes. Accordingly, the code 
for insolvency administrators and auditors are more strict than codes for organisations in the 
financial sector, the timeshare business and art trade.   
 
4.5.2.4. The Pressekodex 
The Pressekodex has been drafted by the German Press Council (‘Deutscher Presserat’) in 
1972, after a two-year consultation period to ensure that the code was in accordance with the 
views of relevant stakeholders, and it reflects professional ethical standards, which may be 
complemented and amended by guidelines.437 Article 9 of the articles of association438 makes 
clear that the Presserat is competent to decide on complaints in general, without a 
declaration of compliance and article 10 par. 2 adds that members shall be bound to the 
Pressekodex and promote compliance with the Kodex. However, it can be doubted whether 
sanctions can be directly enforced on the basis of the Presserat’s articles of association. 
                                               
429
 See http://www.rdo.org/Chapters/Germany.htm.  
430
 See http://www.rdo.org/Members/Members-List.htm.  
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 See http://www.rdo.org/news-items/83.aspx. 
433
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437
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Notably, the federal associations in this area are members of the Presserat, the publishing 
houses and journalists against whom the complaints can be directed are not. Indirectly, they 
are members of the state organizations and unions, which, in turn, are members of these 
federal associations that are members of the Presserat. However, the possibility of these 
federal organizations to enforce sanctions of the Presserat requires an explicit provision in 
the articles of association of those organisations,439 which is lacking.440 Dietrich441 finds that 
sanctions can also not be based on the obligation of loyalty of members towards the 
association (‘Treuepflicht’). She finds that in this respect, the obligation to print a reprimand 
can only be enforced if not doing so would make pursuing the aim of the association 
pointless, which will hardly be the case. Also, the aim of the federal associations should be 
distinguished from the aims of the Presserat, which means that members’ duty to cooperate 
does not necessarily entail cooperation to publish a complaint. Article 10 of the articles of 
association of the Presserat seems to recognize this lack to enforce sanctions on the basis of 
the articles of association by requiring a declaration of compliance by publishing houses in 
the area of the press that they comply with the code. It has been estimated that around 90 % 
of relevant stakeholders has issued a declaration of compliance. 442  Consequently, the 
declaration of compliance may entail a contractual duty of publishing houses to comply with 
the Kodex.    
 
4.5.2.5. The Werbekodex 
The German Advertising Standards Council (‘Deutscher Werberat’), consisting of members 
of the German framework organisation for advertising branches (‘Zentralverband der 
deutschen Werbewirtschaft’, ‘ZAW’), has developed a code of conduct443 that enables it to 
cope with undesirable practices and so-called ‘grey areas’ before the legislator intervenes. 
The sanctions that can be imposed by the Werberat range from withdrawal or amendments 
to advertising or a public reprimand. 444  Ruess445  points out that the Werberat does not 
involve determining whether advertising is in accordance with the law – for example whether 
it is misleading – but rather whether advertising is in accordance with generally accepted 
standards in society.446 This code is in accordance with article 2 of the articles of association 
of the ZAW. However, the ZAW is an overarching organisation, and the organisations that 
should comply with the code are not directly bound on the basis of their membership. It is 
unclear whether they are indirectly bound, or whether an express possibility to impose 
sanctions is included in the articles of association of organisations that they are a member 
of.447 According to the Werberat, compliance with its judgments is generally high,448 while it 
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states that its standards are also more strict than generally applied by the judiciary.449 Since 
2010, the Werberat offers a confidential procedure in which businesses and agencies have 
the possibility to submit a commercial to the Werberat before it is made public.450  
 
4.5.2.6. The role of non-state actors  
Generally, the role of non-state actors is prominent as the autonomy of associations 
(‘Vereinsautonomie’) is protected under article 9 GG and article 40 BGB,451 and it entails that 
members have the freedom to form the association in accordance with their preferences, 
within the confines of the law. Accordingly, organisations may bind their members through 
their articles of association. The Vereinsautonomie does however not justify the binding 
effects of rules established on the basis of the articles of association on non-members.452  
 Moreover, codes may also concern members’ consitutional rights: the Pressekodex 
may affect the right to free speech under article 5 GG, and the freedom of profession under 
article 12 GG. Similarly, professional codes of conduct and sports’ codes may affect 
member’s rights under article 12 GG. These constitutional rights have prompted the German 
legislator to exercise restraint,453  which was maintained in the implementation of Directive 
95/46 on data protection, which in article 27 explicitly refers to self-regulation,454 Directive 
2003/6 on market abuse,455 and Directive 2003/125.456 
The role of non-actors depends on the content of the code, and the scope and 
influence of these rules. Whereas the scope of internally binding codes may be limited, 
especially if it concerns small businesses, the scope and influence of sports’ organisations’ 
codes and professional codes may be considerable.  
Sports’ associations are generally considered socially influential. 457 The special 
expertise of sports’ associations provides these associations with a considerable amount of 
discretion in the evaluation of the behaviour of athletes that should be taken into account by 
the judiciary. Accordingly, sports’ associations’ rules can be used for the interpretation of 
blanket clauses.458  Non-members who have not submitted to sports’ rules may also be 
bound to sports’ rules as they have implicitly agreed to sports’ rules.459 Moreover, most 
states, including Germany, leave substantial room for a choice of law and forum in these 
matters. Consequently, these matters are subject to the lex sportiva and supervised by 
international arbitration.460  
Typically, professional codes have a wide scope, affecting particular gorups of 
professionals. Codes may also affect the view of third parties of a particular profession and 
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accordingly affect rules for contracting with third parties. More generally, the rights of third 
parties may be influenced as professional behaviour is more clearly outlined. The public 
interest in the proper functioning of officials is clearly recognised in areas where Kammern 
have been established or where membership of a particular organisation, or adherence to a 
particular code, is not really optional.  
 The European legislator has left less room to private actors as it has shown less 
restraint in replacing self-regulation with legislation. Accordingly, the European legislator 
rejected self-regulation on market practices as it did not provide a viable alternative to 
“traditional” Directives.461 Particularly, the European legislator sought to establish mandatory 
standard.462 Although a possibility for co-regulation was considered, it remains unclear to 
what extent the rules established by self-regulation have played a role in the drafting of 
Directive 2005/29.463  
Also, the CJEU has clearly indicated that the use of self-regulation to implement 
Directives is problematic, because it has no binding effect. 464  Accordingly, questions of 
sufficient enforcement have arisen with regard to the implementation of Directive 2003/125 
through the additional guideline 7.4 for the coverage of money market reports of 24 March 
2006.465 The normal sanctions of breach of the Pressekodex may entail a reprimand, which 
can be published, the disapproval of the Presserat or an instruction.466 Notably, the Presserat 
is not competent to impose compensation and cannot prohibit publication or order 
rectification.467 However, an upheld complaint – especially a published reprimand – may 
have further consequences for journalists acting against professional ethics if associations at 
the state or regional level of which journalists are a member, or their employers, may take 
the decisions of the Presserat into account.468 In addition, the rules provided by the Presserat 
may serve as a realization of blanket clauses.469 
Thus, the role of non-state actors at the national level is protected by constitutional 
rights. Especially sports’ organisations and organisations that provide strict professional rules 
have an influentual role. 
 
4.5.2.7. Limitations to non-state actors’ roles  
Articles of associations are a mixed form of self-regulation:470 on the one hand, the founders 
establish an organisation through a contract; on the other hand, once the organisation has 
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been established, it is considered a legal person that can create rights and duties for other 
legal persons. Taupitz471 emphasises the difference between a contract and membership of 
an association; by becoming a member of an association, that member enters a community 
where rules have already been established (‘fertige Rechtsordnung’). As articles of 
association impose rules on private parties that have typically not been an object of 
negotiations between parties, Fremdbestimmung may arise. Importantly, however, this 
problem does not arise if codes do not have binding force or if sanctions on the breach of 
codes have not been established. Thus, agreements to establish associations and articles of 
associations may not fall within the scope of the Richtigkeitsgewähr, although this need not 
be absent in all cases.472  
The possibility of Fremdbestimmung does not necessarily give rise to control 
mechanisms as these mechanisms simultaneously limit parties’ constitutional rights. 
Generally, judicial control may be difficult to reconcile with the Vereinsautonomie. Judicial 
control should thus be considered as an exception, which may only take place with regard to 
rules established by associations that are irreconcilable with general principles 
(‘Körperschäftlichen Prinzipien’),473 or where organisations have a socially or economically 
influential role.474 The standard established by article 242 BGB is taken as a starting point to 
evaluate whether the rules established by the association are unfairly to the advantage of the 
association.475  
Similarly, professional codes of conduct are developed against the background of 
article 12 GG and may simultaneously lead to Fremdbestimmung. It is unclear whether 
judicial evaluation would be problematic under article 12 GG. In the area of advertising, 
article 1 UWG provides a clear basis for judicial evaluation. However, when determining 
whether advertising is unfair in the sense of article 1 UWG, restraint should be adopted in 
limiting advertisers’ freedom of speech by banning advertising.476  
However, self-regulation developed against the background of drafters’ constitutional 
rights may simultaneously affect third parties’ constitutional rights. Organisations must be 
careful that they do not infringe on third parties’ rights to freely decide their profession, in 
accordance with the Stufentheorie established by the BVerfG. The controversy of self-
regulation in areas affecting constitutional rights becomes clear when considering the area of 
advertising, where it has been argued that these issues should be dealt with by the law, 477 
especially as advertising may fall within the scope of article 5 GG.478 
German state actors have imposed limitations on the role of respectively adverisers, 
but especially sports’ organisations.  
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In the area of advertising, the UWG and blanket clauses in the BGB may well 
contribute to limiting unfair or misleading advertising. 479  and courts have accordingly 
subjected advertising to judicial evaluation. 480 
 The role of sports associations have also been subjected to limitations: 
 
1) Sports’ associations rules against members with regard to the association 
(requirements for membership, contributions etc) are subject to judicial evaluation.481 
Similarly, penalty clauses in employment contracts with athletes are subjected to 
evaluation under articles 305-310 BGB.482  
 
2) The binding effect of rules developed by transnational sports’ organisations is limited 
by objections to dynamic referral to these transnational organisations in the articles or 
association. Dynamic referral is not reconcilable with article 71 BGB that sets 
requirements for the amendments of articles of association, and as it entails an 
unacceptable delegation of members’ decision-making to other institutions.483   
 
3) As the BGH 484  has rejected dynamic referral of sports’ associations’ articles of 
associations, which was previously much used, 485  associations have to limit 
themselves to static referral, necessitating regular updates as articles of associations 
are revised. Heerman486 points out that this option may be problematic, especially as 
the number of sports supervised by an association continues, as it is difficult for 
overarching organisations to respond adequately to developing practices and to 
ensure that the rules developed as a response to these practices are adequately 
implemented by local organisations, which is a requirements for their binding force on 
individual members.  
 
4) Rules that may bind third parties who have implicitly agreed on these rules are 
subjected to judicial evaluation under article 242 BGB.487  
 
European actors have shown less restraint in limiting the role of non-state actors, and  
consistent control mechanisms to limit the role the effects of self-regulation based on articles 
of association have not developed for that reason. However, the role of non-state actors may 
be limited by European law as self-regulation has not withheld the European legislator from 
establishing legislation. Yet simultaneously, the European legislator has sought to reinforce 
existing self-regulation.   
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Various similarities but especially differenfes become apparent in the development of self-
regulation on the basis of articles of association at the national and European level.  
Non-state actors have developed self-regulation both at the national level and beyond 
the national level, but self-regulation is much more developed at the national level. Possibly, 
this development can be attributed to the development of this form of self-regulation within 
the law on articles of association, often company law. Possibly, as European forms of 
organisations are established, more self-regulation on the basis of articles of association will 
be established at the European level.  
The development of control mechanisms that limit potential Fremdbestimmung is less 
visible at the European level as this form of self-regulation is generally not recognised as a 
separate category that may give rise to Fremdbestimmung.  
Also, the development of this form of self-regulation is not seen against the 
background of constitutional rights at the European level and the European legislator has 
shown less restraint in establishing legislation in areas where well-established, apparently 
successful self-regulation already exists. 
 
4.5.2.9. Conclusion on self-regulation on the basis of articles of association 
Especially at the national level, extensive amounts of self-regulation have been developed, 
and non-state actors may play an important role, depending on the content of codes and the 
scope and influence of the rules, which varies considerably. German actors have used 
various control mechanisms to limit potential Fremdbestimmung. Judicial evaluation has 
been prominently used, while the extent to which actors can develop rules that interfere with 
constitutional rights has been expressly limited and the possibility to make use of dynamic 
referral has been banned. Moreover, mandatory law has been established. 
The role of non-state actors is subject to limitations established by both national and 
European state actors. However, European actors have not developed control mechanisms 
to limit the role of non-state actors that have developed self-regulation on the basis of articles 
of association; instead, European actors have shown less restraint in interfering in areas 
where self-regulation has already been established. This development may draw attention to 
the diminished ability of German actors to independently ensure that self-regulation that has 
been developed in the context of constitutional rights will not be replaced by legislation. Thus, 
interdependence has developed.   
 
4.5.3. One-sided juridical acts 
What role have non-state actors played in the development of private law through self-
regulation based on non-binding one-sided juridical acts?  
Paragraphs 4.5.3.1.-4.5.3.4. will consider instances of various forms of voluntary self-
regulation, 488  ranging from instances of self-regulation sanctioned by the legislator (the 
Nachhaltigkeitskodex and the BVI-Verhaltensregeln), self-regulation that may or may not be 
binding on a contractual basis (the initiative to establish a simple payment account for 
everyone, ‘Ein Girokonto für jedermann!’), and codes of conduct that are one-sided juridical 
acts (codes and trustmarks for consumer sales).  Paragraph 4.5.3.5. will discuss the role of 
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non-state actors and paragraph 4.5.3.6. will consider limitations to the role of non-state 
actors through the development of control mechanisms. Paragraph 4.5.3.7. will provide a 
comparison and paragraph 4.5.3.8. will end with a conclusion. 
 
4.5.3.1. Encouraging codes to complement hard law: corporate social 
responsibility 
The German code on social corporate responsibility (‘Nachhaltigkeitskodex’) 489  was 
developed by the council for sustainable development (‘Rat für Nachhaltige Entwicklung’, 
‘RNE’), which was appointed by the government to work on “sustainability”.490 Initially, the 
idea was to model the Nachhaltigkeitskodex after the corporate governance Kodex, including 
a provision similar to article 161 AktG, which would oblige businesses to make a declaration 
on their compliance with the code which subsequently could be a basis for liability. The code 
was developed in cooperation with relevant stakeholders,491 and it provides businesses with 
uniform standards on providing information with regard to sustainability, which should 
increase the credibility of businesses’ statements in this regard. Interestingly, the RNE 
wishes to play a leading role on the development of codes in the area of sustainability at the 
European and international level, and has accordingly addressed international organisations 
and provided translations of the code.492 The RNE has collected declarations of compliance 
with the code,493 which shall be evaluated in 2013.494   
  
4.5.3.2. Lack of interference because of self-regulation: the BVI-Verhaltensregeln  
The BVI-Verhaltensregeln495 were drafted in 2002 and entered into force 2003, drafted by 
Bundesverband Investment und Asset Management e.V. (‘BVI’). In 2005, an expert group 
developed the Corporate Governance-Kodex für Asset Management Gesellschaften, which 
has been merged in the Verhaltensregeln. 496 Attempts to establish an independent expert 
commission to establish a code, taking into account the Verhaltensregeln while also 
expressing more strongly the interests of investors failed because of resistance of the BVI.497 
The BaFin498 has stated that in the interpretation of article 9 par 5 law on investments, 
(Investmentgesetz, ‘InvG’), it will take the newly developed rules by the BVI as a starting 
point.499 An additional part of the code aims to reinforce the responsibility of professionals, 
beyond legal requirements. The competence of the BVI to establish codes of conduct has not 
been expressly established in the articles of association of the BVI,500 but article 3 par. 1 sub 
4 of the articles of association stipulates that the BVI aims to provide information on private 
equity and asset management. The question arises whether the code can be seen in this 
light, and what this would mean for the effect of the code – may it impose binding rules on 
members under this article or not? In addition, the Verhaltensregeln do not provide for a 
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 Interestingly, the BVI characterises this use of the code as a ‘Allgemeinverbindlichkeitserklärung’.  
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sanction of the breach of the code. The articles of association similarly do not provide for the 
possibility to impose sanctions, although article 5, par. 1 sub 2 of the articles stipulate that 
members can be excluded from the BVI if they have acted against the interests of the BVI, 
and have not ceased their behaviour despite repeated warnings from the BVI. It can however 
be doubted whether breach of the Verhaltensregeln will necessarily amount to behaviour 
against the interests of the BVI – only behaviour that breaches the code and that also 
damages the reputation of private equity and asset management to such an extent that  
pursuing the aim of the BVI becomes pointless. However, since July 2011, arbitration boards 
have been established for the settlement of disputes in consumer cases, which has been 
delegated to the the Ombudsstelle für Investmentfonds des BVI, under article 134c par. 6 
InvG and the Investmentschlichtungstelleverordnung established under this article.501 
 
4.5.3.3. Border cases: Binding one-sided declarations? 
The German Association of Creditors (‘Deutsche Kreditwirtschaft’, ‘DK’, previously ‘Zentrale 
Kreditauschuss’),502 which represents associations for banks and other institutions extending 
credit, has established a recommendation to provide a simple payment account for everyone 
(‘Girokonto für Jedermann’).503        
It has been doubted whether the recommendation has any binding force, either 
externally or internally.504 It is unclear whether the articles of association of the DK contain 
the competence to establish a recommendation, and the recommendation itself establishes 
no sanction for acting against it. However, even if this recommendation would be based on 
the articles of association, it would only be binding upon the members of the DK, which in 
turn are representatives of banks and other institutions providing credit.505  
      The question arises the recommendation amounts to an offer in the sense of article 
145 BGB, or a recognition of an obligation for the benefit of third parties (‘Schuldversprechen’ 
or ‘Vertrag zugunsten Dritter’) in the sense of articles 780 and 328 BGB. There is some 
confusion on this question. The OLG Bremen506 followed by the LG Berlin,507 has held that 
the recommendation is made by the DK, who is not competent to enter into contracts, or to 
offer to do so, on behalf of its members. 508 Moreover, it concerns a recommendation, which 
has been established to avoid a legal obligation to contract, and can thus not be held to 
constitute an offer, as there is no intention to be legally bound. Thus, an average client could 
not interpret this recommendation as an offer. It was moreover also held that the offer was 
too abstract to constitute a valid offer. In a 2008 decision,509 which was not followed in a 
subsequent decision in 2008,510 the LG Berlin held that without a simple payment account, 
participation in trade was not possible. Consequently, article 2 GG would entail an obligation 
to contract. Interestingly, a clear statement of compliance with the recommendation to a 
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senate may also give a customer a direct claim for a simple payment account. 511  
Alternatively, Bachmann512 has held that in rare cases, non-compliance with the promise to 
provide all individuals with a bank account may lead to liability under article 242 BGB, if 
expectations have been created that the code would be complied with (‘Erwirkung’).513 
  
4.5.3.4. General declarations: consumer services 
Trustmarks or certificates with regard to consumer services have been established. 514 
Various trustmarks, accompanied by quality standards, have been established in the area of 
consumer sales. Prominent trustmarks515 are  
 
 The trustmark ‘Geprüfter online shop – Bundesverband des Deutschen 
versandhandlers’,516  established by the German e-commerce and distance selling 
trade association (‘Bundesverband des Deutschen Versandhandlers’), 517  in 
cooperation with EHI Retail Institute,518  
 
 The trust mark for online shopping519 established by S@fer Shopping,520  
 
 The trust mark for online shopping521 established by Trusted Shops.522  
 
Interestingly, Trusted Shops has established contracts with its and participants, and the 
question arises whether these contracts can be qualified as contracts to the benefit of third 
parties in the sense of article 328 BGB, which would also provide consumers with a direct 
remedy in cases of breach of this contract.523 Article 7 in this contract provides that if there is 
no direct contract between Trusted Shops and the consumer, but Trusted Shops is involved 
in the conclusion of the contract as an intermediary, it will ensure that the contract party of 
the consumer complies with articles 2-5 of his contract with Trusted Shops. However, in 
cases where Trusted Shops is not involved as an intermediary, the question arises whether 
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the contract can be interpreted as a contract for the benefit of third parties, in accordance 
with article 328 par. 2 BGB, which stipulates that this should be derived from the 
circumstances and the aim of the contract. In this case, it seems that the aim of the contract 
is to increase consumers’ trust in a particular seller by the use of a trust mark by ensuring 
correct behaviour towards consumers.  
In turn, these trust marks have been recognised as meeting the requirements 524 
established by Initiative D21, 525  a cooperation between selling associations. Although 
statements of compliance constitute a non-binding, one-sided juridical act, the associations 
recognised by D21 typically enforce compliance with these codes through contracts with 
members.526  
 
Initiatives have also been established at the European level: 
 
 The Euro-Label, a European-wide internet trust mark, awarded to members who 
comply with the accompanying European code of conduct, developed by 
stakeholders with support from the European Commission, does however not refer to 
D21 but to the EHI-Retail Institute. 527  
 
 The European Trade Association representing e-commerce and mail-order (EMOTA) 
which has developed a the European convention on cross-border mail order and 
distance selling528 that members are required to recognise.  The BVH is a member of 
EMOTA. 
 
 The Federation for direct selling in Europe (‘FEDSA’)529  that has established codes of 
conduct both towards consumers and towards other direct sellers. It states that 
members are not directly bound by the codes; instead, the code is provided to 
(national) direct selling associations, which may, in turn, require members to comply 
to the code. 
 
Thus, non-state actors have made liberal use of possibilities to establish voluntary self-
regulation. 
 
4.5.3.5. The roles of non-state actors   
Article 2 GG and default law leave non-state actors with a large amount of freedom to 
establish trustmarks if they choose, and to enter into contracts to ensure that these codes 
are complied with. If private actors have therefore sought to reinforce self-regulation on the 
basis of contracts, especially in the area of consumer sales, the binding effect of self-
regulation should fall within the scope of the Richtigkeitsgewähr. 
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Notwithstanding this freedom, the role of non-state actors is at first sight rather limited 
as one-sided juridical acts are not binding. Bachmann 530  points out that voluntary self-
regulation (‘Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle’) is often based on, for example, ethics and relies on 
informal sanctions administered out of court, such as ‘naming and shaming’ on the one hand, 
and ‘rewards’ in the form of trustmarks (‘Gütesiegel’) on the other hand. It can be doubted 
whether business will be contractually bound to their statements of compliance with voluntary 
codes, as the statement is a juridical act without a contract partner. Notably, article 311 par. 
1 BGB requires a contractual partner, which entails that one-sided declarations may often not 
have binding effect (‘Konsensprinzip’).531 
A statement of compliance may under some circumstances constitute an offer in the 
sense of article 145 BGB, or a recognition of an obligation for the benefit of third parties 
(‘Schuldversprechen’ or ‘Vertrag zugunsten Dritter’) in the sense of articles 780 and  328 
BGB – which also results in an obligation enforceable by the consumer. This will also depend 
on whether actors stating compliance intend to be legally bound. The answer to this question 
depends on various factors. 532  Firstly, the question arises whether a code of conduct 
expressly targets a specific group, instead of addressing, for example, the legislator, in order 
to prevent legislative intervention. Secondly, if a code sets out clear rules, requires specific 
declarations of compliance or is clearly to the benefit of a clearly delineated group, this may 
more easily be assumed to have intended legal effect.  
However, the impression that private actors play a small role as self-regulation is not 
binding may be misleading. State actors have played an important role in reinforcing these 
codes in the following ways:   
 
1) Both German and European state actors have frequently enhanced the role of non-
state actors by encouraging and reinforcing non-binding self-regulation. German state 
actors have encouraged the development of self-regulation encouraging ‘fair’ 
behaviour that goes beyond legal obligations, especially in areas where drafters’ 
constitutional rights are at stake, in accordance with the Effektivitätsgebot.  
 
2) The BVerfG533 has emphasised that privately drafted rules may serve to indicate that 
business practices are established. They do not necessarily establish a normative 
rules.  
 
3) Codes of conduct can also gain binding force indirectly, if they are used in the 
interpretation of blanket clauses.534  
 
4) If businesses state that they comply with a code, 535  article 3 par. 3 UWG that 
implements article 6 par. 2 Directive 2005/29 on unfair commercial practices 
stipulates that misleadingly giving a consumer the impression that one meets the 
requirements of a trust mark constitutes a tort.536  
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5) Misleading statements of compliance may  make the contract avoidable for mistake or 
fraud. 
 
6) Using a trustmark which is not independently monitored by third parties for a financial 
compensation, or which is not based on independent and public requirements, 
constitutes a misleading practice in the sense of article 5 UWG.537  
 
4.5.3.6. Limitations to non-state actors’ roles 
The lack of success of self-regulation may give rise to two reactions.  
Firstly, in cases where the lack of binding force (and success) entails that 
Fremdbestimmung does not often arise, actors have sought to replace self-regulation with 
legislation rather than developing control mechanisms, which may similarly limit the role of 
non-state actors. 
 
The committee on financial affairs in the Bundestag has passed a motion emphasising the importance 
of the availability of a simple payment account to citizens, and has required the government to decide 
accordingly, at a European level. Simultaneously, the committee has called for a proposal for providing 
the alternative dispute resolution possibilities in disputes with regard to the refusal or termination of a 
bank account with binding force.
538
 Yet even if the available ADR systems gain binding force, this does 
not mean that banks will be obliged to choose to comply with the code, while they may also choose to 
not subject themselves to ADR. Interestingly, Geschwandtener and Bornemann
539
 have suggested a 
solution modelled after article 161 AktG, which would oblige banks to state compliance with the 
recommendation – this is however different from article 161 AktG that does not, as such, oblige 
businesses to state compliance – but under this model, banks can also explain non-compliance. 
 
Secondly, the lack of binding effect and the critical approach to self-regulation has prompted 
state actors to reinforce self-regulation. In turn, Fremdbestimmung arising from reinforced 
self-regulation has been compensated in various ways: organising extensive drafting 
processes involving academics, that are considered more neutral than private actors, 
especially in the drafting of the Nachhaltigkeitskodex.  
If the drafting process of a code has been transparent and representative, and 
independent actors have participated in the drafting of a code, the chance that compliance 
with this code is in the interest of a limited group of individuals decreases. In turn, this may 
be a reason for the judiciary to recognise or refer to privately drafted rules more easily: as the 
drafting process is of better quality, the problem of Fremdbestimmung may become 
smaller.540  
In some areas, the emphasis on Fremdbestimmung and compensating 
Fremdbestimmung are curiously absent; this is the case for the BVI-Verhaltensregeln that 
have been encouraged, and that are in accordance with recent EU initiatives promoting ADR. 
The question arises whether these rules should be seen against the background of article 12 
GG. Initiatives to revise the rules established by the BVI have already been established, but 
rejected. Although the Effektivitätsgebot does oblige German state actors to leave 
rulemaking to actors best placed to develop these rules, the current rules may arguably lead 
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to Fremdbestimmung, especially as they have been reinforced by the judiciary.  However, 
the judiciary also has the possibility to critically evaluate these rules before reinforcing them. 
 At the European level, state actors have exercised control over the participation of 
actors in the development of European initiatives, and state actors have participated in the 
drafting of self-regulation.  
 
4.5.3.7. Comparison 
Some similarities and differences have become visible in the development of self-regulation 
and the role of actors at the national and European level. Self-regulation has been 
encouraged and developed both at the national and the European level. Both European 
actors and national actors have subsequently reinforced self-regulation.  
However, German actors have more critically looked at the independence of actors 
developing self-regulation and the drafting process, which may also be a way to limit 
potential Fremdbestimmung arising from the reinforcement of self-regulation. The European 
Commission has also exercised control over the drafting of self-regulation. However, possibly, 
this control is not based on concerns over potential Fremdbestimmung, but on the emphasis 
that self-regulation is a suitable means to support European policy aims, by supporting, for 
example, the development of legislation in accordance with some actors’ needs and 
preferences. Accordingly, similarly extensive drafting processes have not been organised at 
the European level.  
 
4.5.3.8. Conclusion on one-sided self-regulation 
Because of both German and European state actors’ interventions, non-state actors 
developing self-regulation on the basis of one-sided juridical acts may play an important role, 
and they may also affect the rights of third parties, especially if self-regulation is reinforced by 
state actors, which is frequently the case. 
German state actors have subsequently developed control mechanisms, particularly 
the involvement of state actors, academics, and the organisation of extensive drafting 
processes, to remedy potential Fremdbestimmung. This development has, as such, not been 
mirrored by European state actors, though they have participated in the development of self-
regulation. Possibly, this may result in the development of forms of reinforced self-regulation 
in the form of models accompanying European legislative proposals or Recommendations 
that may give rise to Fremdbestimmung.  
Thus, in these cases, German state actors seem less able to independently prevent 
Fremdbestimmung. In other words, interdependence between German and European state 
actors has developed.   
 
4.5.4. Conclusion on non-state actors 
Non-state actors play an important role in the development of self-regulation, either on the 
basis of the basis of contracts, articles of association or one-sided juridical acts. Legislators 
have provided private actors with ample opportunity to enforce self-regulation. 
Simultaneously, the role of private actors is limited as they may not impose rules on third 
parties, especially not rules that interfere with third parties’ rights. Contractual regulation has 
been enforced or limited in accordance with the idea of Richtigkeitsgewähr and the closely 
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related notion of Fremdbestimmung that arises if contractual self-regulation does not fall 
under the scope of the Richtigkeitsgewähr.  
Potential Fremdbestimmung has prompted German state actors to develop control 
mechanisms that mitigate the effect of binding self-regulation and that thereby limit non-state 
actors’ role. Control mechanisms particularly frequently used are judicial control, the 
organisation of extensive drafting processes and mandatory law.   
European actors developed less control mechanisms and use them less extensively, 
and less frequently in combination with one another. Especially the organisation of extensive 
drafting processes and the emphasis on the independence of actors is less visible, and less 
suited for, the European level. To a limited extent, European actors have developed judicial 
control and mandatory law. Forms that are however much more present are the participation 
in the development of self-regulation, which is necessary as there is no “European” demos 
that develops self-regulatory initiatives in a manner similar to the development of self-
regulation at the national level within a legal framework. German actors participate less 
intensely in the development of self-regulation developed in the contect of constitutional 
rights. Also, European actors have limited the role of non-state actors by (partially) replacing 
self-regulation by legislation.  
 The initiatives from European actors and the difference between actors roles under 
German and European law make clear that interdependence has developed between 
European and national actors. On the one hand, European actors have demonstrated that 
they may not be aware of successful self-regulation, and accordingly have to rely on national 
actors to become familiar with relevant initiatives. On the other hand, national actors become 
less capable of independently subjecting non-state actors’ roles to restrictions. 
Similarly, interdependence between state actors and non-state actors is visible. Non-
state actors’ roles are limited if state actors establish legislation in fields where self-regulation 
was previously established, or where control mechanisms are developed. Yet at the same 
time, non-state actors’ initiatives may be important to encourage fair behaviour beyond legal 
requirements, while the success of initiatives for European self-regulation depends on the 





This chapter has asked what role actors play in the development of private law. Paragraph 
4.6.1. will discuss the role of actors in the German framework, and paragraph 4.6.2. will 
summarise the role of actors under European law. Paragraph 4.6.3. will argue that the 
development of a European framework may also be beneficial. Paragraph 4.6.4. will 
compare the roles of actors under German and European law, and paragraph 4.6.5. will turn 
to question under which law the role of actors should be determined.   
 
4.6.1. The role of actors under the German framework 
The framework, closely interrelated with the GG, allows a central role for state actors. 
Legislative intervention follows from the obligation of the legislator to protect constitutional 
rights (‘the Untermaβverbot’),541 and a lack of intervention can therefore be problematic.542 
Moreover, the GG emphasises that national actors continue to play a central role 
notwithstanding the continuing reallocation of competences to the European level. 
Nevertheless, non-state actors may play an important role in the development of 
private law as the GG and the BGB provide private actors with considerable freedom. 
German state actors have accordingly recognised the usefulness of including actors in the 
development of private law. 543  German state actors have frequently encouraged the 
development of alternative regulation and enhanced non-state actors’ roles. 
However, German state actors have also imposed restraints on the roles of non-state 
actors if Fremdbestimmung develops, through mandatory law, participation from state actors, 
extensive drafting processes and judicial evaluation.   
 
4.6.2. The role of actors under European law 
European law provides a much less developed framework to determine the role of actors. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that European state actors play a central role in the development of 
the private law acquis and other, non-binding initiatives. The allocation of competences 
between the Union and its Member States is determined by the TFEU.  
Simultaneously, non-state actors may be allowed to play an influentual role if that is 
likely to promote European policy aims. The notion of Fremdbestimmung has not (yet) been 
developed as such at the European level and has therefore not given rise to control 
mechanisms limiting the role of non-state actors.  
The roles of non-state actors are subject to restraint as the participation of actors is 
subject to the approval of European state actors, who may also play an active role in the 
development of European alternative regulation. The German regime has moreover inspired 
the European legislator to establish judicial evaluation in the area of STC’s. At the same time, 
the role of non-state actors is less protected as the development of alternative regulation 
does not fall within the scope of fundamental rights.  
The encouragement of the development of alternative regulation by European actors 
makes apparent that European actors clearly perceive the advantages of alternative 
regulation. Yet in some cases, national alternative regulation has also been replaced by 
Europena legislation. It may be concluded that although the European Commission often 
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prefers to develop the private law acquis through legislative intervention, it does not have 
fundamental objections to the development of alternative regulation as such. Instead, 
possible objections seem mainly directed at to divergent national alternative regulation. 
 
4.6.3. Developing a European framework 
The need for developing a consistent European framework on the role of actors has also 
been indicated. Thus, Svilpaite 544  notes that the development of the Interinstitutional 
agreement and the subsequent use of alternative regulation raises questions as to how the 
development of law (including private law) can best be integrated within the European legal 
framework. The approach developed by the EU moreover shows gaps as some well-
established forms of alternative regulation that do not meet the requirements set in the 
Interinstitutional Agreement on better lawmaking and are therefore neglected.  
A framework would be beneficial because, firstly, it would provide more clarity on the 
way in which the private law acquis will be developed, and how forms of new governance 
relate to the private law acquis. Secondly, a framework would invite more careful 
consideration of which actors are best suited to develop private law, which in turn may 
prompt more debate on the question in what way European private law should be developed. 
if Member States adopt frameworks for determining the role of actors on the basis of similar 
principles, this may offer common points that may provide a starting point for debate on the 
role of actors and the use of techniques in the development of private law. 
A European framework could not sharply delineate the role of actors. Rather, 
principles of private autonomy and Fremdbestimmung could form a starting point for 
European actors to consider the role of state actors and non-state actors. Even though the 
flexibility of alternative regulation and the difficulty to reach consensus at the transnational 
level have been reiterated, it is necessary to develop more control mechanisms and to take 
more note of objections of national actors. Overlooking national objections may eventually 
undermine the use or extension of new governance techniques to private law, 
notwithstanding the potential of these techniques, as national actors oppose these initiatives.  
Currently, some starting points for developing a cohesive framework may alreayd be 
discovered.  
 Firstly, at the European level, the principle of private autonomy has been recognised, 
as becomes clear from the DCFR and the proposal for a CESL. Similarly, the opposite 
concept of Fremdbestimmung and the problematicness of this possibility should be 
acknowledged as well.     
  Secondly, European actors have recognised the weaknesses of alternative 
regulation and have sought to improve alternative regulation accordingly. Criticism on 
comitology and the role of the IASB have accordingly prompted improvement, primarily in the 
form of more democratic control in the form of increased participation by the European 
Parliament.  
 
4.6.4. Differences between the roles of actors under German and European law 
Notwithstanding the suggestion to develop a European framework on the basis of principles 
of private autonomy and Fremdbestimmung, differences between the German framework 
and European law remain. Particularly, European and national state actors and non-state 
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actors have different roles of actors under the GG and the TFEU. The following differences 
are important: 
 
1) The German framework has been clearly developed, and the role of European and 
national state actors, as well as non-state actors, is clearly delineated, on the basis of 
principles of democracy, private autonomy and Fremdbestimmung. European law 
does not have a similarly well-developed coherent framework but rather takes a 
functional approach, and the role of actors is accordingly less clearly delineated and 
more flexible than is the case under the German framework. 
 
2) Under the GG, national actors retain a central role, and the reallocation of 
competences to the European level should be in line with the GG. In contrast, the 
CJEU has emphasised the hierarchy and the binding effect of European law 
independent of national law.  
 
3) An Untermaβverbot at the European level would be difficult to reconcile with the 
principle of conferral of powers. 
 
4) At the national level, non-state actors have a limited role in the development of 
legislation, but the role of non-state actors in the development of alternative 
regulation falls within the sphere of consitutional rights. To the contrary, non-state 
actors may play an essential role in the drafting of European legislation, while the 
development of alternative regulation is generally not considered in the light of 
fundamental rights. There is also no European equivalent of the Wesentlichkeitsgebot 
 
5) In the private law acquis, the role of private parties has been less consistently limited 
than in German private law, which consistently bases parties’ freedom and control 
mechanisms limiting non-state actors’ influence on the Richtigkeitsgewähr and 
Fremdbestimmung. 
 
These differences also follow from the differences between the European Union and the 
national legal order. Accordingly, the Union does not have to meet requirements of 
representative democracy in the way that national legislators should; instead, the emphasis 
of the BVerfG has been on participative democracy, unfortunately without clarifying which 
requirements this entails. Similarly, subjecting comitology processes, as well as the 
Lamfalussy process, to national standards has been criticised. Also, developing similarly 
extensive drafting processes and judicial control is problematic at the European level. 
 
 
4.6.5. The German or European framework? The role of actors in the multilevel 
legal order 
As the roles of actors under German and European law differs, what role do actors actually 
play? At first sight, European law takes precedence over national law, which theoretically 
entails that the roles of actors should be determined under European law. Notably, however, 
European law has taken a functional approach and has not clearly outlined actors’ roles. 
Because most of private law, including self-regulation, is still developed at the national level, 
the well-developed German framework will usually determine the role of actors developing 
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private law in the German legal order, unless European law indicates otherwise. Furthermore, 
the German legal order is likely to adopt a more consistent, and therefore more predictable, 
approach to the development of co-regulation and self-regulation. 
Thus, the role of actors should be determined taking into account both frameworks, 
as well as the changing role of actors and the increasing interdependence between actors. 
 
4.6.5.1.  Actors’ changing roles 
The initiatives from European initiatives and the role of European, national and non-state 
actors make clear that the role of European and national state actors as well as the roles of 
non-state actors is subject to change: 
 
1) The roles of European, international and national state actors change as European 
actors become competent to enter into treaties. The ratification of treaties by 
European actors should fortify the influence of international actors as treaties are not 
ratified in separate Member States but throughout the Union, while treaties are 
moreover more likely to be interpreted uniformly throughout the Union by the CJEU.  
 
2) The role of European actors increases as harmonisation continues. Yet national 
courts and legislator continue to play an essential role in the application and 
enforcement of harmonised law. 
 
3) The changing roles of national, European and international actors are interrelated. 
The increasing role of the European legislator and the CJEU may both increase or 
decrease the role of international actors, whereas the competence of national actors 
diminishes.  
 
4) Thus, the role of international actors may diminish if European actors harmonise an 
area despite successful treaties or model laws, as Member States will be less inclined 
or competent to ratify these treaties or make use of these model laws.  
 
5) The role of national non-state actors may diminish as European actors have 
encouraged the development of alternative regulation (such as the standards 
developed by the ISBA or framework agreements), limiting the role of national actors 
developing alternative regulation in overlapping areas (such as the standards of the 
DRSC and TV’s or BV’s). 
 
6) National and European non-state actors may also gain a more prominent role as they 
participate in the development of European alternative regulation, European 
legislation or national alternative regulation. Non-state actors at the national level 




As the roles of actors has changed, interdependence has developed. Consequently, 
European and national actors may undermine or strengthen one another’s initiatives, which 
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becomes particularly visible as the roles of actors under German and European law may 
differ. Firstly, interdependence between state actors has developed:  
 
1) The CJEU may approve of European measures that could subsequently be held ultra 
vires by the BVerfG, which could considerably decrease the success of European 
measures such as a Common European Sales Law. Simultaneously, the position of 
German state actors would be rather complicated as European law obliges them to 
enforce the CESL, while the GG prohibits these actors to do so.  
 
2) As competence to enter into treaties and interpret treaties is reallocated to the 
European level, national actors remain only partially competent to renegotiate treaties, 
while questions on treaties will have to be referred to the CJEU. Consequently, both 
European and national actors are less able to independently ratify and interpret 
treaties.   
 
3) Non-state actors can circumvent national limitations if they participate in the 
development of alternative regulation at the European level. Thus, national state 
actors are less able to limit non-state actors roles to prevent or limit 
Fremdbestimmung.    
 
4) National actors may simultaneously be more hard-pressed to guarantee non-state 
actors’ constitutionally protected roles. Particularly, the development of European 
alternative regulation may set aside well-established national alternative regulation. 
 
5) European actors depend on national actors to develop successful European “self”-
regulation, as they are unsufficiently familiar with succesfull national self-regulation 
and the frameworks within which it has developed. 
 
Both national and European actors have interpreted the role of other actors narrowly. Are 
actors thus more likely to undermine one another’s initiatives?  
Equally, interdependence between state actors and non-state actors has developed:   
 
1) Non-state actors at the transnational level have to take into account national state 
actors’ restrictions, particularly restrictions on dynamic referral, which may restrict 
their influence. 
 
2) Non-state actors have better insight in existing and developing business practices, 
which has been a reason for German and European actors to encourage the 
development of alternative regulation, as well as the participation of non-state actors’  
participation in the development of legislation.  
 
3) Alternative regulation should be better able to cope with rapidly developing practices 
as it is more flexible than legislation. 
 
4) The success of these initiatives depends on the participation of all relevant actors, 




Thus, the role of actors should be determined under both the European and German 
framework, neither of which pays sufficient attention to the interdependence between actors 
and the corresponding need for interaction, even though both national and European actors  












What actors develop private law in the Dutch legal order? Moreover, what would a framework 
deduced from the Dutch legal order look like and what is the role of actors in this framework 
and under the European law? 
This chapter consider a Dutch framework in paragraph 5.2, and compare this 
framework with the role of actors under European law. Paragraph 5.3. will discuss the 
development of private law by state actors. Subsequently, paragraph 5.4. will consider the 
role of state actors and non-state actors in instances of co-regulation, and paragraph 5.5. will 
turn to the role of  non-state actors in the development of self-regulation. Paragraph 5.6. will 
end with a conclusion. 
 
5.2. Central questions on the role of state actors and non-state actors  
The legislator and the courts clearly play a central role in the development of Dutch private 
law. Accordingly, the Burgerlijk Wetboek, other legislation, and case law play a central role in 
the development of Dutch private law. Yet while state actors clearly play a central role, they 
have also developed co-regulation, in cooperation with non-state actors, and encouraged the 
development of self-regulation. Nevertheless, the role of non-state actors is not clearly 
delineated. Thus, a framework to assess which role state actors and non-state actors should 
play in the development of private law is desirable. Giesen545 finds that guidelines would 
moreover enhance the quality of alternative regulation. Furthermore, a framework enables a 
more consistent, predictable approach to the development of alternative regulation. Also, if 
alternative regulation is developed in sufficiently open and inclusive procedures, this may in 
turn increase the responsiveness of alternative regulation, and theoretically diminish the 
chance that contradictory sets of overlapping alternative regulation develop. What would 
such a framework look like?  
 Paragraph 5.2.1. will consider the German constitutional framework, as the German 
framework has inspired the question whether a framework can also be developed to assess 
the role of actors developing private law in the Dutch legal order. Because of the differences 
between the German and the Dutch legal order, the German framework cannot simply be 
transposed to the Dutch legal order, and therefore, this chapter will seek to develop a 
framework based on principles underlying the German legal framework. Paragraph 5.2.2. will 
consider the contrast between legal norms and juridical acts and the role of state actors and 
non-state actors and paragraph 5.2.3. will consider the idea of alternative regulation as a 
hybrid form between legal norms and juridical acts that may lead to Fremdbestimmung and 
corresponding control mechanisms. Paragraph 5.2.4. will end with an argument for the 
development of a framework in the Dutch legal order. 
 
5.2.1. The German constitutional framework as a starting point?  
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Although the notions underlying the German framework could serve as a starting point for a 
Dutch legal framework, private autonomy and Fremdbestimmung have a constitutional 
connotation that may diverge from the connotation of private autonomy in the Dutch legal 
order. Unlike the German legal order, where private autonomy is protected under article 2 
GG, the Dutch Constitution, the Grondwet (hereafter: ‘Gw’) has not expressly recognised 
private autonomy as a constitutional right, 546  and there has been very little theory on the 
idea of Fremdbestimmung, in Dutch: heteronomie. 547  Thus, the prevention of 
Fremdbestimmung has not played as important a role in the Dutch legal order as is the case 
in the German legal order. Moreover, the development of self-regulation is not necessarily an 
exercise of constitutional rights. Furthermore, the Dutch legal order has not developed a 
doctrine equivalent to the Wesentlichkeitsdoktrin, while article 120 Gw stipulates more 
generally that the judiciary may not set aside legislation established in accordance with 
articles 81 et seq Gw that violates Dutch constitutionally protected rights protection. Notably, 
this prohibition does not extend to the ECHR, but it does entail a different relation between 
the legislator and the judiciary which may also entail a less critical approach towards the 
development of legislation, especially as the Gw does not include an equivalent of article 20 
GG. Although articles 50 et seq Gw do refer to the representation of the Dutch people and 
elections, the Gw does not expressly refer to democratic principles. Interestingly, 
Kortmann548 finds that a prominent role of stakeholder groups, media, and other interest that 
undermine the role of parliament are sociological problems rather than problems of positive 
constitutional law.  
It follows from these differences that the role of actors differs. Therefore, the German  
framework cannot simply be transposed towards the Dutch legal order. Particularly, a Dutch 
framework will have to take into account that the judiciary may take a less active approach as 
it is not competent to set aside legislation. Meanwhile, the Gw imposes less restraints on the 
role of non-state actors in the legislative process, whose roles are however not considered in 
the light of constitutional rights. The different role of non-state actors also raises the question 
whether a Dutch framework should also take the distinction between state actors who pursue 
the public interest and non-state actors who pursue their own interests as a starting point.      
 
5.2.2. The distinction between legal norms and juridical acts 
What would a Dutch framework look like? Importantly, a framework should be based on 
ideas generally recognised in the Dutch legal order. Notably, the distinction between legal 
norms and juridical acts is not unfamiliar in the Dutch legal order. State actors are the source 
of binding rules, for private law especially legislation in the sense of article 81 Gw. 
This prominent role of state actors, especially the legislator, is recognised in article 
6:1 BW, that stipulates that the basis for legal obligations (‘verbintenis’) should follow from 
the law. In other words: state actors are competent to establish rules that can form the basis 
for obligations, private parties cannot establish similarly binding rules on third parties that 
have not consented to these rules. Previously, the traditional distinction between the law and 
juridical acts was more prominent in article 1269 Old BW, which stipulated that all obligations 
are based on the law or on contracts.549 Van Dunné550 finds that this distinction can be traced 
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to Roman law. Neither of these provisions entails that the law has to precisely and 
exhaustively stipulate all sorts of obligations – the system of the law leaves room for 
‘discovering’ new obligations.551  
It has been questioned whether article 6:1 BW establishes a ‘closed’ system that only 
allows for an obligation on these bases, or whether this classifcation is more ‘open’ and 
leaves room for obligation on other grounds, for example quasi-contract. The decisions of the 
Hoge Raad already indicate that neither article 6:1 BW nor article 1269 Old BW led to 
extensive considerations on the question whether an obligation was based on the law or on 
contract, and Dutch law has accordingly been charatcerised as a partially open system, 
where article 6:1 BW leaves the judiciary with sufficient room to establish obligations that are 
in accordance with the systme of the law.  
Nevertheless, obligations on parties require a specific justification for that 
obligation.552 It is undesirable to abandon this principle, as this rule enables parties to foresee 
on what basis they may be bound, which should mitigate inaccessibility as well as 
unpredictability that may arise from the development of rules by a large amount of actors.  
Thus, state actors retain a central role in the development of private law as they 
establish binding norms, but private law also leaves considerable freedom for parties to 
develop binding rules in relations between them. 
This role of public actors may be traced to the view that public state actors pursue the 
puiblic interest, which may not always be the case for private, non-state actors. Accordingly, 
a too prominent role of non-state actors and their intiatives may lead to corporatism, where 
groups of non-state actors, particularly stakeholders, pursue their own interests rather than 
the public interest.553 Thus, the competence of non-state actors to develop binding rules 
depends on state actors.    
 
5.2.3. Alternative regulation as a hybrid between law and contract? 
Even though legislation establishes binding rules and private parties cannot establish 
similarly binding rules, Dutch law often assumes that alternative regulation can become 
binding, at least for parties involved in alternative regulation.554 Accordingly, Van Driel555 has 
considered self-regulation as ‘law’, albeit in a particular societal circle. Interestingly, however, 
alternative regulation is therefore not generally seen as a hybrid form, embodying both 
elements of law, as it is binding on third parties, and contract, as it is based on negotiating 
parties’ consent. Instead, the binding force of alternative regulation has been based on the 
consent of parties or the law.556 The emphasis in discussions on alternative regulation in 
private law is therefore not on potential Fremdbestimmung.   
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This perspective should be reconsidered. Rather than assuming that the binding force 
is sanctioned by the legislator or judiciary, or can be legitimised by consent, the chance that 
both these bases are absent as binding rules develop beyond legislative procedures that are 
also not based on consent of parties should be considered more attentively, even if 
Fremdbestimmung is not a problem expressly considered in the Gw. 
 Nevertheless, as a general rule, non-state actors may not independently establish  
binding rules on third parties that have not consented to be bound.557 Thus, state actors 
retain some level of control over alternative regulation, and the law remains a source for the 
binding force of alternative regulation.558 
Because the debate on alternative regulation has not centered on notions of 
alternative regulation and Fremdbestimmung, control mechanisms have not been developed 
to prevent or mitigate Fremdbestimmung while protecting private autonomy. Nevertheless, 
the need to safeguard the quality of alternative regulation has prompted actors to develop 
benchmarks that are reminiscent of some of the measures developed in the German legal 
order to prevent Fremdbestimmung, while the idea that actors will be bound by rules that 
they have not consented to by actors that have also not been democratically elected (i.e. 
Fremdbestimmung) might also not receive enthusiastic support. 
Fremdbestimmung also draws attention to potential problems that may become more 
urgent as the role of non-state actors increases. Specifically, as alternative regulation 
develops, there is more risk that parties are confronted with rules to which they have not 
consented, which in turn may undermine the predictability and accessibility of private law.  In 
the multilevel legal order, the amount of possible sources to whcih parties may become 
bound is only likely to increase. 
Thus, mechanisms reminiscent of German control mechanisms have been defended 
and established, and should be established further. Particularly, Vranken559 has indicated 
that the support for self-regulation, as well as the representativeness of actors developing 
alternative regulation and the possibility to participate in drafting processes are starting 
points for benchmarks to evaluate the quality of alternative regulation. Giesen560 similarly 
suggests benchmarks similar to benchmarks for good law, adding that these requirements 
compensate the lack of democratic legitimation. Notably, the quality of alternative regulation 
should be evaluated by state actors that consequently retain an important role.   
 
5.2.4. Towards a framework for the role of actors developing private law in the 
Dutch legal order 
The framework developed in this chapter focusses on the role of state actors and non-state 
actors. Whereas the role of state actors in the development of legislation and case law 
seems relatively straightforward, the roles of both state actors and non-state actors is less 
clear.  
Although alternative regulation is usually not considered as a hybrid form that gives 
rise to potential Fremdbestimmung, possible corporatism has been recognised as 
problematic, and state actors have restricted non-state actors’ roles. Even though 
Fremdbestimmung has not formed a starting point to limit non-state actors’ roles, these 
principles may offer a critical perspective on Dutch practice and provide consistent guidelines 
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that are currently not sufficiently developed in the Dutch legal order. Thus, similarly to the 
previous chapter, this chapter will consider measures through which Dutch state actors have 
limited the role of non-state actors as the development of ‘control mechanisms’, i.e. 
mechanisms that control the extent to which alternative regulation leads to 
Fremdbestimmung. Notably, even if these mechanisms do not directly aim to compensate for 
Fremdbestimmung, they may nevertheless have that effect. As the idea of 
Fremdbestimmung is recognised as problematic, this chapter will consider whether Dutch 
law, in particular instances of alternative regulation and limitations to the roles of actors 
currently already offers starting points for the development of a framework based on private 
autonomy and Fremdbestimmung.  
Importantly, when developing a framework, the increasing role of European actors 
and the roles of actors under European law should be taken into account.  
While it is undesirable that the suggested framework diverges radically from 
European law, European law currently does not clearly outline the role of actors and it has 
been criticised in the previous chapter. Consequently, rather than taking the role of actors 
under European law as a starting point, the subsequent chapter will indicate the cases in 
which the suggested framework may be difficult to reconcile with European law. Possibly, 
these cases will largely converge with areas in which the German framework provides actors 
with a different role than European law.  
In the framework, state actors continue to play a central role as they remain the 
source of binding rules. The role of non-state actors is limited as they are not competent to 
develop binding rules independently of state actors. If state actors reinforce alternative 
regulation, this may lead to Fremdbestimmung, and the need for control mechanisms may  
arise. However, as the amount of state-sanctioned alternative regulation increases, as will 




5.3. State actors  
This chapter will ask what role state actors have played in the development of private law. 
Paragraph 5.3.1. will turn to the role of national state actors, and paragraph 5.3.2. will 
discuss the role of European and international actors. Paragraph 5.3.3. will end with a 
conclusion. 
 
5.3.1. The legislator and the Hoge Raad    
In the Netherlands, the legislator has played a central role in the development of private law 
through the Burgerlijk Wetboek (hereafter: ‘BW’) as well as  codes in other areas of law. 
Notably, a distinction between general private law and Sonderprivatrecht visible in the 
Germna legal order, has not, as such, been discussed in the Dutch legal order.   
The BW leaves a considerable role for the judiciary. Notably, the relationship between 
the legislator and the Hoge Raad has been subject to debate,561 as well as the competence 
of the Hoge Raad to develop, rather than ‘merely’ interpret, private law. Some authors562 
object that the Gw does not provide the Hoge Raad with the competence to develop private 
law, while it is also contrary to the trias politica. Most authors563 do not dispute this role of the 
Hoge Raad – to the contrary, the report ‘Versterking van de cassatierechtspraak’ 564 
suggested emphasising this role. The report has met with approval by the legislature565 and 
the Hoge Raad566 and has since become law, thus providing the role of the Hoge Raad in the 
development of private law with a democratic basis.  
 
5.3.2. The development of private law beyond the state 
This paragraph asks what role European state actors and international actors play in the 
development of European private law. Paragraph 5.3.2.1. will consider the role of European 
actors and paragraph 5.3.2.2. will turn to the role of international actors. Paragraph 5.3.2.3. 
will end with a conclusion.  
 
5.3.2.1. European actors  
Paragraph 5.3.2.1.1. will consider the role of European actors under European law and 
paragraoh 5.3.2.1.2. will consider the role of actors under Dutch constitutional law. 
Paragraph 5.3.2.1. will compare the role of actors under the TFEU and the Gw and 
interdependence between actors.  
 
5.3.2.1.1. The role of European actors under the TFEU 
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European actors play a prominent role as European law as European law may precede 
national law. 567 The private law acquis consists mostly of Directives and has been based 
primarily on article 114 TFEU. 568 The private law acquis consists mostly of Directives that 
have generally been implemented in the BW. However, the role of European actors remains 
limited as the acquis only harmonises fragmented parts of private law and as various 
Directives pursue minimum harmonisaiton, levaing additional competence to the national 
legislator. 
Moreover, European primary law may contain rules in the area of private law, 
particularly rules on non-contractual liability, as stiupulated in article 340 TFEU. In addition, 
primary law, such as competition law, may affect contracts. Also, the role of the European 
legislator and the CJEU increases as the Union ratifies treaties.  
 
5.3.2.1.2. The role of European actors under Dutch constitutional law   
Dutch actors have not maintained that they remain competent to determine the role of 
European actors under the Gw. Quite the reverse - it has been argued that European law 
has binding effect apart from articles 93 and 94 Gw.569 This has also been recognised by the 
Hoge Raad.570 
Thus, on the basis of European law, national private law may be challenged if, for 
example, it breaches free movement guaranteed in the Treaty.   
 
5.3.2.1.3. The role of European actors under the Gw and the TFEU 
Whereas the BVerfG has maintained a central role for the GG, this is not the case inthe 
Dutch legal order. The Dutch view that European law is directly applicable not on the basis of 
article 93 and 94 Gw is in accordance with CJEU decisions. Thus, European actors have an 
important role both under the TFEU and the Gw. The convergence between the TFEU and 
the Dutch view in this respect means that the Dutch judiciary does not have the competence 
to subject the reallocation of competences to the European level or the legality of European 
measures to evaluation. Consequently, Dutch courts are less able to undermine CJEU 
decisions on the competence of the European legislator.  
Thus, less interdependence has become visible. It follows that the Hoge Raad does 
not have a similar need to exercise restraint in its decisions on the legality of European 
measures. Moreover, the position of the Dutch legislator is less complicated, and the Dutch 
legislator need not ensure that amendments to the treaties or proposed European measures 
are in accordance with the Gw. Nevertheless, interaction between national parliaments and 
the European Parliament to discuss proposed measures, especially if national parliaments 
have lodged a complaint that a measure is not in accordance with subsidiarity, seems useful 
for both actors at the national level and actors at the European level.  
 
 
5.3.2.2. The role of international actors in the development of private law 
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International actors play an important role in the Dutch legal order as articles 93 and 94 Gw 
stipulate that depending on their content, treaties such as the ECHR are directly binding and 
set aside national law. Consequently, the role of the Dutch legislator, who does not have to 
implemented treaties into Dutch law, is smaller than the German legislator. International 
instruments may however not set aside mandatory law that is applicable as ordre public.  
The Dutch legislator has ratified various treaties in the area of private law. 571 An 
important treaty and well-known example of treaties in the area of private law is the CISG. 
Other relevant treaties have been concluded on cultural heritage, international law on 
security interests,572 transport,573 and intellectual property.574 Prominent treaties in the area of 
international private law have since been ratified by the EU who on the basis of articles 81 et 
seq TFEU is competent to further develop the law in this area.  
Moreover, international organisations have established model laws, legislative guides 
and recommendations. These sources are not directly binding and the extent to which 
national actors make use of these sources also depends on te extent to which European 
actors have chosen to use or disregard these sources. 
 
5.3.2.3. Conclusion on the development of private law beyond the state 
European actors may play an important role in the development of private law. Even though 
international law may have direct effect in Dutch law, this is not the case for European law, 
whcih requires that international law is implemented before it can become effective. Thus, as 
European actors increasingly enter into treaties, these treaties become effective after 
implementation into European law that has a direct effect, not on the basis of articles 93 and 
94 Gw, but on the basis of European law.  
 
5.3.3. Conclusion on state actors 
State actors continue to play a central role in the development of private law. National state 
actors play a more prominent role as they have provided general rules in most areas of 
private law. European actors play a prominent role as European law may set aside national 
law, but their role remains limited as the acquis takes a fragmented approach. 
The role of European actors under the national framework and the TFEU is largely 
similar as the priority and direct effect of European law find their basis in European law rather 
than the Gw. However, the role of international actors is more prominent under the Gw than 
is the case under the TFEU, under which international measures have to be implemented in 
European law before they become binding. Yet as European actors have precedence on the 
basis of European law, under the Dutch framework, European law will precede international 
law. Thus, no conflict arises. Moreover, the role of European actors may also influence the 
role of international actors, as international law does not stand in the way of harmonisation. 
Because the roles of actors under European law and under Dutch law largely coincide, 
interdependence has become less pronounced than is the case in the German legal order. 
Nevertheless, interaction between actors at the national and European law remains 
beneficial.  
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5.4. State actors and non-state actors: co-regulation 
This paragraph will ask what role state actors and non-state actors have played in the 
development of European private law. 
 Paragraph 5.4.1. will turn to the referral to private actors in legislation, and paragraph 
5.4.2. will consider reinforced codes of conduct. Paragraph 5.4.3. will discuss the 
development of reinforced collective negotiations. Paragraph 5.4.4. will end with a conclusion.  
This paragraph will not elaborately reconsider instances of co-regulation that have 
already been considered in the previous chapter. Instead, this chapter will merely mention 
these instances and refer back to the previous chapter for further details. Only if Dutch actors 
have for example developed additional rules, more attention will be paid to already 
considered European forms of referral.  
 
5.4.1. Referral to private actors and new governance  
What role do actors play if the legislator refer to self-regulation in legislation? Referral is 
rarely used by the Dutch legislator, but increasingly used by the European legislator.  
Paragraph 5.4.1.1. will turn to instances of referral and paragraph 5.4.1.2. will ask 
what role non-state actors have played in these instances. Paragraph 5.4.1.3. will consider 
the lack of limitations on non-state actors’ roles by the dveelopment of control mechanisms. 
Paragraph 5.4.1.4. will end with an argument to develop more control mechanisms on the 
basis of concepts of private autonomy and Fremdbestimmung. 
 
5.4.1.1. Instances of referral  
In the Dutch legal order, instances of referral  are rare.  
 
 A rare example of “dynamic” referral, can be found in article 6: 214 BW on the 
development of STC’s by state and non-state actors, which has turned out to be a 
dead letter as STC’s have been developed in collective negotiations between 
stakeholder groups.  
 
At the European level, referral to non-state actors is more commonly found: 
 
 In Regulation 1606/2002, referral is made to the IASB.575  
 
Forms that are reminiscent of referral have also been developed at the European level:  
 
 Comitology.576  
 
 The Lamfalussy process.577   
 
These Directives have been implemented in Dutch administrative law,
 
but they are also relevant for 
determining appropriate behaviour for financial institutions towards consumers, imposing information 
                                               
575
 See more elaborately previously par. 4.4.1.1. 
576
 See more elaborately previously par. 4.4.1.1. 
577
 See more elaborately previously par. 4.4.1.1. 
132 
 





 has argued that as the maximum harmonisation approach in the MiFiD 
Directive leaves less room to develop diverging standards in contract law. The approach of the MiFiD 
Directive is visible in Directive 2008/48 that introduces the ‘know-you-client principle’. 
 These harmonised rules have not withheld actors from developing codes of conduct in this 
field.
580
  Instead, existing initiatives, especially the Bureau on Credit Registration (‘Bureau Krediet 
Registratie’, ‘BKR’),
581
 that manages a central credit information system, are in line with the principle of 
‘know your client’. Despite these initiatives, a common standard for assessing the creditworthiness of 
consumers has not developed. The Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets  (‘Autoriteit 
Financiële Markten’, ‘AFM’)
582
  has criticised the lacuna between the codes of conduct from the Dutch 
Banking Association (‘Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken’, ‘NVB’) and the Association of Financing 
Companies (‘Vereniging van Financieringsondernemingen in Nederland’, ‘VNF’).
583
 In response, the 
NVB has suggested cooperation between interested parties.
584
  
The development of administrative law has moreover rendered the effect of some codes of 
conduct unclear. The Dutch association of insurers (‘Verbond van Verzekeraars’) has decided to 
withdraw the code of conduct on the information provided by intermediaries (‘Gedragscode 
informatieverstrekking dienstverlening intermediair’, ‘GIDI’) and the code of conduct on the return of 
commissions. They are considered outdated with the law on financial supervision (‘Wet financieel 
toezicht’) on financial services (‘Wet financiële dienstverlening’).
585
 Confusingly, associations and 
individual companies have adapted GIDI for their members and specific fields and still announce the 
applicability of this code of conduct.
586
 In addition, the code of conduct on the provision of information 
to consumers on the returns and the risks of life insurance and insurance on investments with profit 
sharing (‘Code rendement en risico’),
587
 has been revised and integrated with the ‘Financiële bijsluiter’, 
a manual for complex financial products.  
 
5.4.1.2. The role of non-state actors 
As referral has barely taken place at the national level, the role of non-state actors in referral 
is limited, especially as article 6:214 BW is generally not used. 
 
5.4.1.3. Limitations on the role of non-state actors  
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At the national level, few control mechanisms have been developed, and the role of non-
state actors is therefore subect to little restraints. The lack of control mechanisms is in 
accordance with the restraint of the legislator in establishing legislation, emphasising the 
capability of private actors to develop adequate rules. Accordingly, the legislator consistently 
considers whether, instead of legislation, alternative regulation can be established.588 This 
leaves a considerable role for non-state actors, despite the absence of the 
Wesentlichkeitsgebot. 
Notwithstanding its usual restraint, the Dutch legislator has held that if the law refers 
to privately drafted rules, this will typically concern static, rather than dynamic referral.589 
While this may be the reason for the scarcity of instances in which the Dutch legislator has 
made use of dynamic referral, this has not limited the role of non-state actors involved in 
dynamic referral at the European level. Even though the introduction of the Regulation has 
resulted in a reallocation of competence that has put the decision-making in this area out of 
Dutch democratic control, the Dutch legislator supported dynamic referral to the IASB.590  
Similarly, the Dutch government has not sought to limit the roles of non-state actors in 
comitology committees. In the consultation on the proposal for a Directive on consumer 
rights, the Dutch government, Dutch academics and Dutch stakeholders591 did not take a 
position on a possible comitology procedure. This is in line with the pragmatic approach 
towards the delegation of competences towards lower levels of government that does not 
show a particular emphasis on parliamentary involvement.592 However, this approach is not 
in line with more general criticism of alternative regulation.593  
 
5.4.1.4. A plea for a framework on the basis of private autonomy and 
Fremdbestimmung 
A framework to determine the role of actors more consistently and predictably is deisrable. 
Can starting points be found for the development of a framework on the role of state actors 
and non-state actors in the development of private law?  
Some starting points can be found in criticism on the lenience of Dutch and European 
actors, pointing out that the prominent involvement of private actors may be detrimental to 
the quality of private law. Accordingly, Hijink 594  finds that the current development of 
standards by the IASB undermines the stable development of the law, as well as sufficient 
accessibility of the law, while the development of binding law should moreover have a legal 
basis. The use of comitology has also been criticised as it might undermine democracy, while 
it is also not a very transparent process; it meets with similar criticism of ‘skeleton legislation’ 
(‘kaderwetgeving’) at a national level.595 Specifically, the propused use of comitology in draft 
article 40 of the proposal for a Directive on consumer rights may similarly give rise to 
problems. The development of the black and grey list of unfair contract terms by private 
parties may result in situations where contract parties are confronted with rules that are 
contrary to society’s legal views on justice, especially as actors in comitology committees 
may not have sufficient insight in these views or in business practices. Consequently, the 
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accessibility and the responsiveness of the law may be undermined. Generally, criticism on 
alternative regulation refers to potential corporatism and the question how alternative 
regulation fits with the traditional trias politica, especially with regard to the role of the 
judiciary, as well as the question whether alternative regulation will contribute to accessibility 
and predictability. A more critical approach towards the development of referral would also 
be in line with more general criticism of alternative regulation. 
 Private autonomy and Fremdbestimmung could provide a starting point critically 
considering the desirability of extending the scope of existing alternative regulation such as 
dynamic referral to the IASB, comitology, the Lamfalussy process, and developing new forms 
of alternative regulation.  
Notably, concepts of private autonomy and Fremdbestimmung do not stand in the 
way of the development of alternative regulation, but indicate the need to develop control 
mechanisms. The question which mechanisms should be developed in turn depends on the 
question how state actors want to mitigate potential Fremdbestimmung and when they 
consider that potential Fremdbestimmung has been sufficiently limited. Suggestions of Dutch 
actors596 point towards ensuring the quality of the drafting process of alternative regulation, in 
accordance with requirements of transparency, inclusiveness and responsiveness. Notably, 
these suggestions do not take national democratic procedures as a starting point; they are 
more in line with the suggestions of participative democracy.597 
This does not mean that calls for a more open process would not meet with problems. 
Especially in the Lamfalussy process and the development of international accounting 
standards, the level of expertise needed to decide rationally would make wide participation 
difficult. However, other matters, such as the question which clauses should be on a black or 
grey list, may well be discussed in a wider circle.   
 
5.4.2. Codes of conduct: The corporate governance code and the banking code 
Paragraph 5.4.2.1. will consider instances of co-regulation where state actors have 
reinforced codes of conduct developed by private actors and paragraph 5.4.2.2. will turn to 
the role of non-state actors in these instances and paragraph 5.4.2.3. will discuss limitations 
on non-state actors’ roles through the development of control mechanisms.  
 
5.4.2.1. Reinforced codes of conduct 
In the Dutch legal order, reinforced codes have been established: 
  
 The corporate governance code establishes norms for the internal relationships within 
a company. In turn, the behaviour of these parties influences various parties, 
especially parties contracting with these companies: employees, customers, and 
suppliers.  
 
The establishment of the corporate governance code dates back to 1996, when stakeholders, pending 
the proposal for a law on protectionist constructions (‘beschermingsconstructies’), established a 
committee to investigate corporate governance.
598
 This committee published its recommendations in 
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 and expressly stated that legislation on this subject was not required. Instead, self-regulation 
would be sufficient. However, after evaluation, compliance with these recommendations was judged 
as insufficient.
600
 Therefore, in 2003, stakeholders, cooperating with the Ministries of Economic Affairs 
and Finance established a committee to form a code of conduct for corporate governance that was 
published in the same year and entered into force in 2004.
601
 The government installed a Monitoring 
Committee on the Corporate Governance Code
602
 that reports to the government. Businesses cannot 
deviate from certain principles and best practices regulated in the Code, as parts of the Code can 
reflect Dutch accepted views on corporate governance and thereby form a source of law.
603
 The 




 The new Dutch banking code from the Netherlands’ Banking Association 
(‘Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken’, ‘NVB’)605 that was established following a 
report from the Advisory Committee on the future of banks in the Netherlands606 sets 
standards for the supervisory board and the management board, risk management, 
audits, and remuneration. The Code explicitly aims to influence transactions between 
individuals: compliance with this Code is meant to improve the consumers’ trust in 
banks, and to prevent (further) collapses. Also, the behaviour of banks directly 
influences its contracting parties, whether they are consumers, businesses or states. 
 
Although state actors have not cooperated directly in creating the rules contained in the Code, the 
advisory committee expressly stated that the best practices in the first two chapters of the code were 
not meant as self-regulation and should be enforced by state legislation.
607
 The Ministry of Finance, in 
cooperation with stakeholders, will consider at what points and in what manner the Code can best be 
reinforced with ‘hard law’
608
: possibly, the banking code could be appointed as a code of conduct in 
the sense of article 2:391 par. 5 Civil Code that would oblige banks to account for compliance with 
these principles. Moreover, a monitoring committee will be established in cooperation with the Ministry 
of Finance. The banking code explicitly takes relevant national, European and international standards 
into account and can especially be seen in the light of the establishment of European supervisory 
bodies that also act as committees in the third level of the Lamfalussy process, supervising the 
enforcements of the Capital Requirements Directive.  
The simultaneous initiatives at the national, European and international level after the credit 
crunch that preceded the establishment of these supervisory bodies
609
  have led to criticism on the 
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uncoordinated multitude of approaches from various actors.
610
 Thus, these initiatives could impair the 
accessibility of the law in this area. It follows that more restraint should be exercised by various actors, 
even in the light of uniform calls for the development of rules at various levels. 
 
5.4.2.2. The role of non-state actors  
The Dutch legislator has adopted restraint where private actors can provide rules themselves, 
which has also been visible in the development of the corporate governance code. This 
prominent role can also be seen in the light of increasing need for laws that can easily be 
amended. Consequently, non-state actors have played a prominent role in the development 
of reionforced codes of conduct. The reinforcement of initial voluntary self-regulation has 
increased the influence of private actors on potential third parties.  
 
5.4.2.3. Limitations on the role of non-state actors  
Interestingly, since the credit crunch, corporate governance has been described as ‘one of 
the most important failures of the present crisis’, leading to gaps in rules and norms, for 
example for the supervision on hedge funds,611 but it is not clear whether this is due to the 
closed process in which corporate governance codes are developed, or whether this lack of 
compliance is something that cannot be enforced by the development of new rules. 612 
Generally, however, criticism on the prominent role of private actors seems rather rare.  
However, Dutch state actors have recognised the need for control mechanisms. In 
particular,  the legislator613 has recognised the potential shortcomings of self-regulation and 
the risk of Fremdbestimmung if self-regulation is established in areas where stakeholders 
have unequal bargaining positions. Thus, unequal positions of stakeholders may be a reason 
to opt for legislation rather than alternative regulation. This is the case, according to the 
Dutch government, if participation requires a level of expertise that is unlikely to be found in 
weaker parties. Corporate governance may be one of those areas and safeguards 
reminiscent of German safeguards have accordingly been developed. 
 
1) The need for transparency in the development of corporate governance standards, 
and the possibility for actors to participate through the use of consultations.  
 
However, the question arises whether the consultation provided for sufficient time to respond (it was 
opened during the summer of 2008), and whether actors participating in it were sufficiently 
representative. Interestingly, Van Solinge and Nowak
614
 criticised the lack of clarity on the question 
whether the corporate governance code, through the referral in article 3:291 par. 5 BW, became law.  
 
2) Also, transparency on the compliance with corporate governance in annual accounts 
in article 3:291 par. 5 BW has been emphasised, while corporate governance codes 
simultaneously stipulated a larger role for shareholders.  
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3) The establishment of an adequately specialised judiciary. 615   
 
4) The development of these codes takes place within the legal framework of book 2 BW 
and the proposals for the development of these rules within well-established 
structures such as the SER  
 
The criticism on corporate governance codes has not withheld the development of the 
banking code, modelled on the corporate governance code, but previous experiences with 
the corporate governance codes may be a reason for the emphasis of the banking committee 
on the reinforcement of the code.  
The development of these control mechanisms are not visible at the European level. 
However, the role of non-state actors is subject to some control as the the European 
Commission exercises control over the actors participating in selected fora, particularly  the 
European corporate governance forum.616 
 
5.4.3. Collective bargaining 
Paragraph 5.4.3.1. will consider instances of reinforced collective bargaining and paragraph 
5.4.3.2. will turn to the role of non-state actors in these instances. Paragraph 5.4.3.3. will 
consider limitations on non-state actors’ roles through the development of control 
mechanisms.  Paragraph 5.4.3.4. will end with a plea for a framework on the basis of 
principles of private autonomy and Fremdbestimmung. 
 
5.4.3.1. Instances of collective bargaining 
The reinforcement of collective bargaining, both in collective contracts on the conditions of 
employment (‘collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst’, hereafter: ‘CAO’) and collective settlements, 
is a well-established form of co-regulation. In collective bargaining, parties directly establish 
the rules in the agreement of the parties that they represent, which rules become binding 
when sanctioned by state actors (the ministry of social affairs and employment and the 
judiciary). This paragraph will first describe the development of CAO’s and the development 
of agreements with works councils. 
 
 A CAO is agreed between unions and employers’ organisations or, for large 
companies, individual employers, and it stipulates the terms and conditions of 
employment (ranging from wages to fringe benefits).617  
 
Negotiations for CAO’s take place within the framework of the ‘poldermodel’, established by the 
government and stakeholders in 1982 in the Wassenaar Agreement.
618
 Unions may, if they meet 
requirements of representativeness, require to be admitted to negotiations through the judiciary.
619
 If 
negotiations are unsuccessful, employees can try to reinforce their demands with a strike.
620
 In turn, 
employers can try to get an injunction against the strike. A CAO can be applicable within a specific 
branch, or for a specific company.
621
 These CAO’s usually have a national scope, but their range can 
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be limited to have a regional or a local scope. Provisions in the BW
622
 stipulate that in a CAO, parties 
can deviate from otherwise mandatory law. Apart from binding the contracting parties themselves, 
article 9 on the law for CAO’s (hereafter: ‘Wet CAO’) stipulates that CAO’s are also binding on the 
members of the unions that are a contracting party to the CAO. Article 12 and 13 Wet CAO stipulate 
that a clause within an individual labour contract between parties who are bound to the CAO (the 
individual employer and the employee who is a member to the union that is a contracting party to the 
CAO) is void and replaced by what the terms and conditions stipulated in the CAO. If issues are 
undecided in individual labour contracts, the terms and conditions in a CAO complement the individual 
contract. For employees who are not a member of one of the contracting unions, article 14 Wet CAO 
stipulates that the employer who is bound by the CAO is bound to comply with the CAO as regards 
contracts for employees who are not bound by the CAO. Article 10 Wet CAO stipulates that even if 
members cancel their membership, they remain bound to the CAO. However, the unbound employee 
cannot demand compliance with the CAO. The difference made between bound and unbound 
employees has been criticised, for example because an employer may not know what employees are 
members of contracting unions. Article 14 Wet CAO is often evaded by incorporating the CAO’s within 
all individual labour contracts with a bound employer.
623
 A collective agreement can be declared 
generally binding (‘algemeen verbindend’) for a sector under the Act of declaring CAO’s binding or 
non-binding (‘Wet AVV’).
624
 It has been argued that this competence should be reallocated to the 
Association for Labour (‘Stichting voor de Arbeid’) consisting of stakeholders,
625
 an advice that has 
however not been acted upon. The suggestion was rejected by the majority of members of this 
organisation, who referred to the infringement of contractual freedom of parties bound to generally 
binding CAO’s. If declared generally binding, a CAO may be considered hard law,
626
 and it is 
applicable to all individual contracts, also contracts with non-bound employees.  
 
 Article 32 par. 1 Act on Works Council (‘Wet op de Ondernemingsraden’, hereafter 
‘WOR’) stipulates that parties negotiating CAO’s and public bodies can delegate 
competences to works councils. Article 27 WOR makes clear that works councils 
need to give permission for provisions with regard to secondary terms of employment. 
Also, employers may also extend the competence of works councils through 
additional agreements, including negotiations on employment contracts, which may 
however not set aside CAO’s.627  
 
Differently than BV’s, the agreements between the employer and works’ councils are not directly 
binding for the employee, and only become binding when they have been incorporated in individual 
agreements or if CAO’s stipulate that the agreements will be directly applicable. 
 
 The collective settlement of claims the Dutch Class Action (Financial Settlement) Act 
(‘WCAM’) in 2005. 
 
Previously, article 6:240 Civil Code and article 3:305a Civil Code
628
 already established a legal action 
for interests groups.
629
 Under the Act, parties first have to reach an agreement on the collective 
financial settlement before it can be submitted to the courts. Article 7:907 BW stipulates that the court 
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can, on the joint request of parties, decide that the settlement becomes binding on an entire group of 
claimants, unless a claimants opts out of the settlement. In reaching a collective settlement, claimants 




At the European level, possibilities for collective negotiations have also been developed in 
the European Social Dialogue. 
Thus, various instances of collective bargaining can be found, especially at the 
national level. 
 
5.4.3.2. The role of non-state actors: exercising fundamental rights? 
The role of non-state actors is consitutionally protected, even though the freedom to 
collectively negotiate has not been recognised as such. However, article 8 Gw does 
recognise the freedom of association, and international treaties, especially article 11 ECHR  
and article 6 par. 4 European Social Charter that both have direct effect631 have respectively 
also recognized the right to association and the right to strike.  
The constitutionally protected role of non-state actors has however not withheld the 
Dutch legislator from pressuring the conclusion of agreements that are considered in the 
interest of the Dutch economy, as becomes apparent from the Wassenaar agreement, even 
though the freedom of contract from contract parties has been emphasized. Thus, although 
collective bargaining is seen against the background of constitutional rights, it has also been 
considered as a means to develop employment contracts in a manner beneficial for the 
public interest. Thus, the role of non-state actors may be made subject to the public interest. 
The possibility for mass settlement has generally not been considered within article 8 
GW or international provisions on the right to association. Articles 7:900 and seq BW take 
parties’ freedom to contract as a starting point. The need to take into account party autonomy 
has been emphasised, although this has not expressly been recognised as a constitutional 
right. Nevertheless, private parties have been granted an important role in initiating and 
negotiating settlements, which was in accordance with previous case law as well as article 
3:305a BW that already enabled stakeholder organisations to bring a collective claim.632  
 
5.4.3.3. Limitations on the role of non-state actors?  
At the national level, debate has not, as such, focussed on questions of 
Fremdbestimmung.633 In contrast, arguments for retroactive effect and aftereffect of generally 
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binding CAO’s have been made and recognised.634 Nevertheless, CAO’s may also meet with 
problems.635  
Differently than the German legal order, the Dutch legal order does not generally 
assume that unions are in principle better capable of defending employees’ rights, and 
CAO’s do not fall within a sort of Richtigkeitsgewähr. Consequently, mandatory law imposes 
some restraints on negotiating parties. Particularly, article 2 par. 5 Wet AVV that prohibits 
some clauses in CAO’s aimed at excluding or limiting the rights of employees.  
If CAO’s are declared generally binding, this may affect third parties’ rights and 
obligations. Notwithstanding this influence, the decision to declare a CAO generally 
applicable is not open to appeal under article 8:2 Awb. However, articles 4 and 6 Wet AVV 
note that parties can object to declaring a CAO generally binding or non-binding prior to the 
declaration. Unless parties’ objections are clearly unfounded, the decision making process 
can only be continued once a reaction to the objections have been given.  
It has been recognised that works’ councils may be less independent than unions, but 
as the agreements between employers and works’ councils are not directly binding, this will 
not generally lead to problems and the need to develop control mechanisms is not apparent. 
The Dutch legislator has acknowledged the need to guarantee third parties’ access to 
the judiciary in accordance with article 17 Gw and article 6 ECHR and the need to 
compensate for potential Fremdbestimmung, by providing parties with a possibility to opt out 
of settlements once they have been established, in accordance with article 7:908 par. 3 BW. 
Moreover, claimants may seek to influence the views of the judge by filing petitions.636  The 
possibilities for parties to challenge the declaration that a collective agreement will become 
generally binding has however been limited in article 1018 Rv. 
Additionally, the Dutch legislator637 has also sought to prevent that an increasing 
amount of organisations seeks to represent claimants solely on a commercial basis, and in 
that light approved the development of self-regulation, in particular the “claimcode” that 
includes guidelines on the tasks, transparency and governance of these organisations on the 
basis of its articles of association. 638  It is however unclear why especially commercial 
organisations would choose to comply with this code.  Also, it has been suggested to include 
a provision which enables the judge to reject claims if these claims are unlikely to be in the 
interests of claimants. A monitoring committee will monitor the enforcement of the code.   
 
5.4.3.4. A plea for a framework on the basis of principles of private 
autonomy and Fremdbestimmung  
Can starting points be found for developing a framework on the basis of principles of private 
autonomy and Fremdbestimmung?  
Current control mechanisms, including mandatory law and opt-out possibilities, as 
well as suggestions for more control mechanisms could be seen in this light. Particularly, 
suggestions to evaluate the notion of representativeness of non-state actors in the 
negotiations of CAO’s, in accordance with the Wet AVV, and in the negotiations on mass 
settlements in article 7:907 par. 3 sub f BW could provide a starting point to consider what 
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role non-state actors should play, and if they play a prominent role, what requirements can 
be made of these actors? 
Requirements of representativeness currently leave much room for discretion, of 
either the Minister declaring a CAO generally binding or non-binding, or for a judge declaring 
a mass settlement contract binding.639 Interestingly, the Dutch Association for the Judiciary640 
has argued for additional measures to guarantee representativeness, which should prevent 
that private actors seek to represent victims in mass damages cases for commercial aims. 
Los641 notes that the standard of representativeness, as well as the process through which 
the settlement is achieved are relevant for the reasonableness of the compensation in the 
settlement. Similarly, in the area of CAO’s, more clarity on the question when requests for 
declaring a CAO generally binding would in turn increase the predictability and enhance the 
chance that a visible consistent approach will be adopted towards declaring CAO’s generally 
binding will be adopted.  
Questions of private autonomy and Fremdbestimmung may arise from proposals for 
reform. With regard to CAO’s and works councils, Heerma van Voss642 notes the differences 
between the role of Dutch and German works councils and notes that the direct effect of BV’s 
should also be introduced in Dutch law, as that would be in accordance with the increasing 
use of agreements between works council and employers. Notably, this would enhance the  
role of Dutch works’ councils, which in turn raises the question whether considerations of 
Fremdbestimmung should also play a role in the Dutch legal order. In The Netherlands, the 
possibility that unions are more independent than works’ councils may moreover be a reason 
to establish control mechanisms compensating for a weaker bargaining position of works 
councils.  
This framework should not mean that the benefits of alternative regulation are 
overlooked. Accordingly, CAO’s are generally considered in the interest of employees, and 
the introduction of mass settlements especially served the reduction of the amount of 
procedures as well as predictability. The framework would however serve to critically 
consider the role of non-state actors in reinforced collective bargaining and consider points 
for improvement. The development of a framework may also prompt a more critical 
perspective on the role of non-state actors in the development of framework agreements.   
Importantly, however, the development of a Dutch framework on the basis of notions 
of private autonomy and Fremdbestimmung may lead to problems if it leads to a more critical 
approach to European forms of alternative regulation. However, such a framework may also 
be a starting point for a more consistent approach to the development of alternative 
regulation that may also prompt the European legislator to consider alternative regulation 
more carefully.  
 
5.4.4. Conclusion on state actors and non-state actors 
What is the role of state and non-state actors in the development of private law through co-
regulation? 
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Generally, non-state actors are granted a central role in the development of co-
regulation. At the national level, state actors allow a large role for non-state actors.643 Non-
state actors play a prominent role in the development of mass settlements, CAO’s, the 
corporate governance code and the banking code. At the European level, non-state actors 
play a prominent role through referral and similar forms of new governance.   
Dutch actors, like European state actors, have exercised restraint in imposing 
restraints on the role of non-state actors. However, Dutch state actors have recognised that 
private actors do not necessarily pursue the public interest but also their own interests and 
have established control mechanisms, which seem relatively mild in comparison to German 
control mechanisms, and strict in comparison with European control mechanisms.  
These mechanisms entail the development of platforms for negotiations between 
actors with unequal bargaining positions, mandatory law, opt-out possibilities, requirements 
of representativeness and inclusiveness and the development of additional self-regulation, 
but judicial control is not as visibly developed as in the German legal order. Interestingly, 
these control mechanisms are more diverse than mechanisms found in the German legal 
order, they have been established more on an ad hoc basis and not on the basis of pre-
exisitng concerns over  Fremdbestimmung. 
Comparison between the role of non-state actors at the national and the European 
level, in the previous chapter, shows that the roles of non-state actors and state actors under 
Dutch and European law do not differ as drastically as the role of actors in the German 
framework and under European law, which make the interdependence between actors at the 
national and European level less pronounced. That does however not mean that parties may 
not strengthen or weaken one another’s  initiatives.  
Interdependence has become similarly visible between state and non-state actors; 
both Dutch and European state actors have recognised the benefits of alternative regulation. 
Even though control mechanisms have not been developed to prevent or mitigate 
Fremdbestimmung as such, ideas of private autonomy and Fremdbestimmung could form a 
suitable basis for developing a more consistent and therefore predictable approach to the 
development of alternative regulation and the role of state and non-state actors, which would 
also benefit the quality of European private law. Particularly, the predictability and 
accessibility of private law could be improved by developing a framework, as these 
mechanisms draw more attention to possible rules that parties may becme bound by. 
Moreover, providing parties with an opportunity to influence rules that they will be subjected 
to is in accordance with legal views on justice. 
Such a framework should not stand in the way of developing alternative regulation, 
but rather offer a critical perspective that may be a starting point for improving alternative 
regulation, without however subjecting European forms of alternative regulation to national 
standards. The benefits of alternative regulation should moreover not be overlooked.  
The interdependence between actors leads to a corresponding need for interaction, 
both between state actors at the national and the European level and between state and 
non-state actors.  
Sufficient interaction between actors is important if private autonomy and 
Fremdbestimmung are used as underlying principles to develop a framework to determine 
actors’ roles. Sufficient interaction should prevent that a framework is developed which 
undermines European initiatives. In turn, European initiatives should not ignore national 
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objections to European forms of alternative regulation. Instead, these objections could 







5.5. Non-state actors 
This paragraph will ask what role non-state actors have played in the development of private 
law through self-regulation, and ask how actors have approached these developments, and 
how that may affect the use of self-regulation in the development of private law in the Dutch 
legal order.  
Private actors form a group that are not competent to establlish binding rules. Instead, 
they may develop self-regulation.644  
  The Dutch legal order generally distinguishes between ‘contractual’ self-regulation, 
and a much wider category of non-contractual forms of self-regulation. The Dutch legal order 
does not usually distinguish between self-regulation established on the basis of articles of 
association and one-sided juridical acts. Importantly, Dutch law does not consider one-sided 
juridical acts as non-binding. To the contrary, one-sided juridical acts may be binding under 
Dutch law, depending on the question whether actors making these declarations intend to be 
legally bound – thus constituting a juridical act by making a declaration – and whether actors 
have justifiably relied on them. 645  Consequently, although there has been distinguished 
between ‘contractual’ and other forms of self-regulation, no such distinction is apparent 
between self-regulation based on articles of association and one-sided declarations. 646 
Instead, distinctions are made between, for example, self-regulation on technical matters, 
self-regulation targeted at affecting individuals’ behaviour, such as codes of conduct, internal 
or external self-regulation, or one-sided and multilateral for of self-regulation.647  
One of the reasons for making this distinction is that in cases where self-regulation is 
incorporated in a contract, enforcement is often not problematic, but for other forms of self-
regulation, enforcement is a central problem.648 Yet this does not necessarily mean that one 
cannot make this distinction.   Forms of self-regulation that would typically be associated with 
self-regulation based on articles of association typically fall under disciplinary rules 
(‘tuchtrecht’), either voluntary or compulsory.649  Typically, voluntary disciplinary law (also 
referred to as  ‘vrijwillig verenigingstuchtrecht’) is not targeted at ensuring third parties’ (for 
example consumers’) contention or the public interest but rather at maintaining a high level of 
standards within a specific group.650 This sort of ‘tuchtrecht’651 has been considered as a 
legal area sui generis that does not fall within private law, or criminal law, or administrative 
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law, which might explain why it is not typically characterised as self-regulation or alternative 
regulation in private law. 
Accordingly, paragraph 5.5.1. will consider contractual self-regulation and paragraph 
5.5.2. will consider self-regulation on the basis of articles of association. Paragraph 5.5.3. will 
consider self-regulation based on one-sided juridical acts and paragraph 5.5.4. will consider 
the usefulness of these categories in Dutch law. Paragraph 5.5.5. will end with a conclusion. 
 
5.5.1.  Contractual self-regulation  
This paragraph will ask what role non-state actors play in the development of contractual 
self-regulation.  
Paragraph 5.5.1.1. will consider the basis of the binding force of contracts under 
Dutch law and consider the role of actors. In the German legal order, the Richtigkeitsgewär 
provides a basis for determining in which cases parties’ agreements will be enforced and 
which limtiations will be set on actors’ roles.652 If an equivalent of the Richtigkeitsgewähr can 
be discovered, this may provide more clarity on the role of actors. Notably, however, even if 
a Dutch equivalent to the Richtigkeitsgewähr can be established, it is likely that the Dutch 
legal order will evaluate this matter differently from the German legal order, where 
Fremdbestimmung in the absence of Richtigkeitsgewähr is seen against the background of 
article 2 GG. Paragraph 5.5.1.2. will turn to collective contracts, including collectively 
negotiated STC’s, and paragraph 5.5.1.3 will consider model contracts. Paragraph 5.5.1.4. 
will turn to STC’s, and paragraph 5.5.1.5. will end with a conclusion.  
 
5.5.1.1. The role of contract parties 
The Dutch legal order does not directly recognise the will of private actors as the source of 
obligations; rather, article 6:1 BW reiterates that obligations can only arise insofar as this 
follows from the law. Accordingly, article 3:33 BW stipulates that a juridical act requires an 
intention to establish a legal effect that has been made public. Article 3:35 BW stipulates that 
if parties have justifiably relied on the behaviour or statements of other parties, this may 
entail that these parties are bound. It is not clear whether the will of parties or the reliance of 
parties on that will is the source of obligation: article 3:35 BW both excludes the will as well 
as the declaration that differs from the will as the sole basis of parties’ obligations.653 The 
discussion in literature has accordingly focussed on the will and the reliance as the basis of 
obligations. 654  Notably, however, articles 3:33 and 35 BW were not drafted to resolve 
dogmatic issues; rather, they established a double basis for the binding force of contracts, 
parties’ wills and parties’ legitimate expectations, in accordance with previous case law.655  
This dual basis has been criticised by authors 656  offering a correction on the 
combination of parties’ wills and parties’ justified expectations as a basis for the binding force 
of contracts, adding that the causa-principle, the legal cause for a contract, is also a principle 
underpinning the binding force of contracts. 
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Recently, the basis for the binding force of contracts has again been subject to 
debate. Nieuwenhuis657 explains contracting as ‘égoïsme à deux’, in line with the idea that 
parties negotiate a contract in their own interests. He emphasises that aside from their own 
interests, parties have to act in accordance with good faith, taking into account the justified 
interests of their contract party. Thus, parties’ duties of care protect the autonomy of one of 
the contract parties. Similarly, Hartkamp and Sieburgh658 note that the binding force of a 
contract is based on the party autonomy of both contract parties, in accordance with article 
6:217 BW that stipulates that a contract is established by an offer that is accepted. 
Vranken659 agrees with the importance of duties of care. He finds that these duties are at the 
core of contract law.  
 
Accordingly, in a case where a consumer had traded in stock options and suffered a considerable loss, 
the Hoge Raad
660
 held that the bank, as a professional contract party with considerable expertise, has 
a far-going duty of care, which had not been fulfilled by the repeated warnings of the bank and the 
experience of the consumer with stock trading. In other words, the duty of care may mean that a bank 
should refuse to execute the orders from its client, to protect the consumer against his own rashness, 
while the bank had also breached obligations flowing from administrative law that also aim to protect 
consumers. Thus, the decision emphasises the weakness of consumers that prevents them from 
making a rational decision in their own interests, which necessitates that the bank takes his interests 
into account.  
 
These arguments do not make the importance of the negotiation process explicit.  
Arguably, the negotiating process preceding contracts and amendments to contracts 
offers an interesting addition to the current justification of the binding force of contracts. 
Arguably, the idea of the negotiating process emphasises the wills of both parties in the 
contract, in accordance with Nieuwenhuis‘ idea of ‘égoism a deux’. In the negotiation process, 
it is necessary for parties to be able to rely on one another’s behaviour – consequently, 
parties should take into account the legitimate interests of (potential) contract parties. 
Simultaneously, if negotiations show defects, because parties cannot negotiate on the same 
level as their contract partner, parties must take into account the interests of that party – a 
conclusion that is in line with the duties of care recognised in contract law. If the will of 
parties shows defects, because of mistake (article 6:228 BW), threat, deception, or abuse of 
parties’ vulnerable circumstances (article 3:44 BW), the contract will be avoidable. In both 
cases, the defects in the negotiation process – that can be traced to a defect in parties’ wills 
– entail that one party is able to impose his terms on the other party, thus breaching the 
autonomy of that party.  
The weak position of parties, and the defective negotiation process between parties, 
may be a reason for the legislator to develop mandatory rules, in order to prevent that the 
stronger position of one party leads to unacceptable social or economical consequences,661 
or, in German law, Fremdbestimmung. This conclusion however leaves open the question 
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when these consequences become unacceptable, a conclusion that will often be the result of 
poltical negotiations in the legislature.  
The idea of taking the negotiation process as a starting point is also in accordance 
with the causa principle662 as the cause of the contract is inherent in negotiations.  
In many everyday transactions, however, negotiations do not take place. Therefore, is 
a negotiation process an adequate and convincing explanation if negotiations are absent in 
everyday transactions? However, the idea of negotiation processes is not based on an 
empirical assessment of how often actual negotiations take place – in Germany, 
Richtigkeitsgewähr is also present if parties, rather than factually negotiating, focus on the 
price and quality of products, and choose to contract with the party that has the best 
combination of both. In these cases, factual negotiations need not take place – rather, the 
negotiation process is implicit. Accordingly, Du Perron663 considers that the wills of parties, 
on which the binding force of contracts has been based, does not denote the factual free will, 
but the possibility to make choices, including the choice that parties eventually make. 
This justification presupposes that the effect of the contract is limited to contract 
parties involved in negotiations, in accordance with the more general rule that contract 
parties cannot bind third parties.664  Accordingly, the principle of the relativity of contract 
(‘relativiteitsbeginsel’) has been traced to the principle of party autonomy.665 Article 1376 Old 
BW expressly stipulated that contracts are binding between parties and cannot be a source 
of obligations for third parties, either to their detriment or to their benefit, unless provided by 
article 1353 Old BW. In the drafting of the BW, the legislator has chosen not to include a 
similar provision, because it could stand in the way of the further development of the law. 
Even though the BW does not contain a similar provision, the law refers to the wills and the 
legitimate expectations of parties, which may bind a contract party to the contract – not a 
third party. Similarly, article 6:217 BW presupposes and offer and acceptance, and 
subsequent binding force, by parties. This principle is visible throughout the Union.666  
This principle of the relativity of contract has become subject to various exceptions.667 
These binding effect of contract on third parties should only be permitted where the 
reasonableness of doing so is clearly apparent.668 This reasonableness may well require that 
third parties have acted in a manner that justifies the obligation.  
 
In in Quint/Te Poel
669
, the Hoge Raad recognised unjustified enrichment as a source of obligations, 
declining a narrow interpretation of article 1269 Old BW that stipulated that the law or contracts are the 
source of obligations. In this case, Te Poel, brother of the contract party of Quint, was enriched as 
Quint had contracted to build houses on land that turned out to belong to the brother of the contract 
party. The contract party became insolvent and his brother became owner of the houses on the basis 
of accession. In cases such as these, the third party has a reason to foresee that an obligation will be 
imposed upon him. In this case, however, Quint had no claim on the basis of articles 658 and 1608 
Old BW which obligated the contractor to check the public registers to verify questions of ownership of 
the land. 
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Thus, contract parties have considerable room to enter into contracts with one another. Their 
role is in accordance with principles of party autonomy and legitimate expectations. The 
negotiation process is an interesting additional explanation. However, the role of contract 
parties may in some cases be more extensive than is the case under German law, as they 
are able to bind third parties. In German law, this may well meet with objections of 
Fremdbestimmung. However, that does not mean that Dutch law does not recognise the 
importance of parties’ autonomy and problems of Fremdbestimmung; rather, 
Fremdbestimmung may be justified if parties acted in a manner that justifies imposing 
obligations on them. 
 
 
5.5.1.2. Collective contracts 
This paragraph will consider instances of collective bargaining and ask what role actors play 
in the development of private law through collectively negotiated contracts.  
 
 The collective negotiations on STC’s in consumer contracts undoubtedly form the 
most prominent example of collective bargaining.670  
 
The STC’s established within this framework generally are applicable in contracts for the sale of 
consumer goods.
671
 STC’s established within this framework include the STC’s for mail-order 
businesses,
672
 the general banking conditions,
673
  the general conditions for individuals and the 
guarantees used by BOVAG (the representative organisation for the trade in personal transport),
674
 
the travel terms and conditions used by the Dutch Association of Travel Agents and Tour Operators 
(‘Algemene Nederlandse Vereniging van Reisondernemingen’, ‘ANVR’),
675
  standard contract terms 
used by energy producers, traders and retailers in the Netherlands (represented by EnergieNed), 
676
 
standard contract terms used by the Association for the Conciliation for real estate (representing Dutch 
real estate agents, ‘Vereniging voor de Bemiddeling van Onroerend Goed’, VBO),
677
 the relocation 
businesses (represented by the Cooperating Departments for Relocations and furniture transport, 
‘Samenwerkende Vakafdelingen Verhuizen en Meubeltransport’, ‘SAVAM’),
678
 the referential model for 
internet access,
679
  general conditions used in child care,
680
 and the general conditions used in the 
trade of non-food retail products , as agreed by the Central Branch Association for Living (‘Centrale 
Branchevereniging Wonen’, ‘CBW’).
681
   
 
 Various instances of collective bargaining, usually for specific groups of consumers 
and for specific contracts.  
 
For instance, the Vastelastenbond states that it is an organisation of consumers that bargains 
collectively to gain advantageous contracts for electricity, insurance, internet and mobile phone 
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subscriptions for its members.
682
 Another example of collective bargaining is the entering into 




 Other new examples of 
collective bargaining are online collective bargaining platforms, in which providers offer a platform for 
businesses to offer goods or services with considerable discounts, provided that enough people 
accept this offer, which ideally results in the promoting of these offers through social media. Examples 




 Although the idea is that it is advantageous for 
both consumers and sellers to give big groups of consumers reduction, the terms of these platforms 
that do not necessarily represent consumers, are not necessarily beneficial.
687





At the European level, instances of collective bargaining have also been encouraged, for 
example in the area of mortgages689  and package travel.690 
Thus, private actors have recognised the added value of collective negotiations. The 
Dutch legislator has similarly recognised the added value of these negotiations and has not 
stood in the way of collective contracts more generally, that have also been entered into by 
state actors.691  
However, as parties in negotiations may not have an equal bargaining position, the 
quesiton arises whether control echanisms should not be developed. Notably, however, the 
collectrive negotiations on STC’s take place within the framework of the Coordination Group 
on Negotiations for Self-regulation (‘Coordinatiegroep Zelfreguleringsoverleg’), 692  an 
independent organisation facilitating negotiations between branch organisations and 
consumer organisations.693 Thus, negotiations are encouraged, but take place in a controlled 
environment that allows for some overview and control. 
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 See further  http://www.groupon.nl/how-does-groupon-work.  
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5.5.1.3. Model contracts 
This paragraph will look at instances of model contracts and consider the role of actors in the 
development of private law through model contracts.  
Both at the national and international level, instances of model contracts may be 
found:  
 
 The use of model contract provided by professional associations or sector 
associations to their members dates back a considerable time.694  
 
 Model contracts may also be established by collective bargaining 
  
For example, the model contract of sale (in the form of a deed) established by the consumers’ 
association, the Dutch Association for home owners (‘Vereniging Eigen Huis’) and the Dutch 





 The International Chamber of Commerce (‘ICC’) provides a number of often-used 




 are for example the ICC Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits 
(endorsed by UNCITRAL
697
), or Uniform Rules for Contract Guarantees. De Ly
698
 describes the legal 
nature of the Incoterms as controversial; there is debate as to whether the Incoterms should be seen 
as customary international law. 
 
Van Erp699 has argued that model contracts do not fall within the definition of article 6:231 
sub a BW and thus need not be subjected to judicial evaluation imposed on STC’s, as this 
would undermine the use of model contracts aimed to further predictability. Notably, if terms 
in often-used models are subjected to articles 6:233 et seq BW, parts of the model contracts 
should be declared invalid. Yet model contracts may also contain guarantees that improve 
consumers’ position.700  
The freedom of contract parties to draft model contracts and the lack of judicial 
evaluation leave a prominent role for private actors, both at a national and international level. 
State actors have a less prominent role than is the case in the German legal order.  
Similarly, at the European, the use of model contracts is a well-established way to 
facilitate transactions across borders, and a large range of freedom is accordingly left to 
contract parties.   
                                                                                                                                                   
the judiciary; they become binding through their incorporation in contracts. Furthermore, despite the framework in which STC’s 
are negotiated, STC’s are not formed in cooperation with state actors, and the enforcement is left to private actors.   
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This paragraph will consider instances of STC’s and ask what role actors play in the 
development of private law through STC’s.  
The use of STC’s is widespread: 
 
 The use of model STC’s, provided by professional associations or sector associations 
to their members, date back a considerable time.701  
 
 At several instances,702 the European Commission has unsuccessfully called for and 
announced developments of EU-wide STC’s, including business to business (B2B) 
and business to government (B2G) contracts. 
 
 International organisations have developed STC’s. A prominent example is the ICC 




 argues that in this field, notwithstanding diverging national rules on 
hardship, self-regulation is seen as desirable as long-term contracts, in which there are large financial 
stakes, are vulnerable to unforeseen events such as war or natural calamities.  
 
Thus, both at the national and the international level, non-state actors play an important role 
in drafting STC’s. The Dutch legislator has facilitated collectively negotiated STC’s, and 
private actors accordingly play a prominent role in the drafting and negotiating STC’s.  
However, various control mechanisms have been developed that limit contract 
parties’ roles.  
 
1. Articles 6:231 et eq BW, that also implement Directive 93/13, provide that STC’s can 
be subjected to judicial evaluation 
 
The legislator has expressly pointed to the lack of negotiations in the drafting of one-sided STC’s, 
which formed a reason to provide legislation on STC’s. However, the Dutch legislator has adopted an 
especially critical approach towards the use of STC’s in consumer contracts, and is more lenient with 
regard to business contracts. Accordingly, article 6:235 BW provides that articles 6:233 and 234 BW 
are not applicable to large businesses. The Dutch legislator also adopts a lenient approach towards 
international business contracts, as article 6:247 BW stipulates that these contracts do not fall within 
the scope of articles 6:231 et seq BW. Clauses in international business contracts may still be 
subjected to judicial control under article 6:248 BW, but the Hoge Raad has generally exercised 
restraint in the evaluation of these clauses.
704
 
This control mechanism also provides stakehodlers with the possibility to challenge the 
fairness of STC’s. Article 6:240 Civil Code gives interest groups an action in case of unfair contract 
terms. This action can also be used preventively, for example if a branch organisation provides unfair 
contract terms in the model standard contract terms it provides to its members.
705
 After the adoption of 
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Directive 98/27 on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests, foreign interest groups also 
have the possibility to challenge unfair contract terms through article 6:240 Civil Code,
706
 and 
organisations like the Dutch Consumers’ Association (‘Consumentenbond’) or the Consumers’ 
authority  (‘Consumentenautoriteit’) should be able to start an action abroad. However, article 6:240 
par. 4 Civil Code limits this action: if a claimant has not given the other party the opportunity to 
negotiate on the standard terms and conditions, the claimant shall be inadmissible. Thus, private 
actors have a considerable role in the drafting and the enforcement of STC’s. 
 
 
2. Two-sided STC’s that have been negotiated collectively are considered less likely to 
be unfair, as becomes apparent from article 6:233 sub a BW that refers to the way in 
which the STC’s have been drafted in the assessment of the fairness of terms. Thus, 
collective negotiations can be seen as a control mechanism that limtis the chance of 
unfair STC’s.  
 
Thus, although the role of contract parties is subjected to restrictions, especially in business 
to consumer contracts, control mechanisms also leave a considerable role for respectively 
stakeholders challenging the fairness of STC’s and parties involved in collectively 
negotiations on STC’s. 
At the European level, the need to protect consumers from unfair contract terms has 
led to the introduction of judicial evaluation of STC’s under Directive 93/13 on unfair contract 
terms. However, the European legislator also encourages stakeholders to challenge STC’s 
and has also, through Directive 98/27 on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ 
interests, obliged national actors to enable foreign stakeholders to challenge STC’s. 
Moreover, parties to contracts that do not fall within the scope of  Directive 93/13 have 
considerable room. 
 
5.5.1.5. Conclusion on contractual self-regulation 
Both the Dutch and the European legislator leave contract parties with considerable room.  
Notably, the dual basis of binding force of contracts has led to criticism and does not provide 
a consistent, predictable view on the role of private parties in contractual self-regulation. If 
the negotiation process serves as an additional justification, this may provide more clarity, as 
this justification offers a consistent basis for upholding or not upholding contractual self-
regulation. This additional justification is in accordance with the recognition of the added 
value of collective negotiations, and the emphasis of the lack of negotiations in the use of 
STC’s.    
 
5.5.2.  Self-regulation on the basis of articles of association: ‘tuchtrecht’  
This paragraph ask what role private actors play in the development of private law through 
self-regulation based on articles of association, ‘tuchtrecht’.  
Paragraphs 5.5.2.1.-5.5.2.6. will consider instances of this sort of tuchtrecht, 
respectively internal self-regulation, sports’ codes, self-regulation that has has withheld the 
legislator from introducing legislation, and instances of other codes of conduct and self-
regulation in the absence of mandatory law. Paragraph 5.5.2.7. will discuss the role of non-
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state actors, and paragraph 5.5.2.8. will turn to limitations on non-state actors’ roles. 
Paragraph 5.5.2.9. will end with a conclusion.    
 
5.5.2.1. Internally binding codes on the basis of articles of association  
Organisations may impose rules internally, through rules (‘reglementen’). Originally, the law 
did not stipulate these rules that were developed in practice.707 Internal rules may stipulate 
various matters. However, articles of association may appoint relevant organs to develop 
rules.  
5.5.2.2. Sports associations  
The primary sports organisation in The Netherlands is the NOC*NSF. In its articles of 
association,708 it has moreover stipulated that it is solely competent to nominate candidates 
for the Olympics, and it obliges its members to comply with the rules developed by the 
International  Olympic Committee (IOC). However, these rules of NOC*NSF have not been 
systematically been integrated in the articles of association of its members, national 
associations for specific sports.709 The degree to which members impose these rules and 
their rules on their members may vary. This may entail that the rules developed by the IOC 
are not necessarily binding on the basis of national sports associations’ articles of 
association. Alternatively, rules imposed by the IOC may be enforced as associations 
provide their members with models for articles of associations, or on the basis of contracts.  
 
5.5.2.3. The encouragement of self-regulation in a national and European 
context 
The legislator 710  has approved of the Advertising Code for Alcoholic Beverages 
(‘Reclamecode voor alcoholhoudende dranken’, ‘RvA’), established by stakeholders 
organised in the Foundation for the responsible use of alcohol (‘Stichting verantwoord 
alcoholgebruik’, STIVA).711 The RvA is part of the Dutch Commercials Code (‘Nederlandse 
Reclame Code’, ‘NRC’) that is supervised by the Dutch Foundation for Commercials Code 
(‘Stichting Reclame Code’, ‘SRC’).712 Article 3.8 Mediawet obliges commercial broadcasting 
channels to participate with the NRC or a similar code supervised by the SRC. Compliance 
with the RvA is also monitored by the Foundation for Prevention of Alcohol related damage 
(‘Stichting alcoholpreventie’, ‘STAP’)713 that criticises the use of self-regulation in this area.714 
STAP participates in a European network, EUROCARE (Advocacy for the Prevention of 
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Alcohol Related Harm in Europe) that promotes the dealing with the production, distribution, 
trade and consumption of alcohol at a European level.715  
While advertising in alcohol products is stipulated through self-regulation alone, the 
SRC supervises compliance with the NRC that generally prohibits misleading and 
comparative advertising. The establishment of the NRC has taken place within the 
framework provided by article 6:162 Civil Code, and after the implementation of Directive 
2005/29 on misleading and unfair commercial practices, article 6: 193a Civil Code. The 
effectiveness of the SRC has been criticised as not being able to provide sufficient protection 
for consumers: its competence is limited and it has no possibility to enforce its decisions.716  
The European Advertising Standards Alliance (EASA), in which the SCR participates, 
was established in 1992 to show that self-regulation in the advertising area was to be 
preferred over legislation.717 Apparently, the EASA has failed to convince the EU on this 
point.718 However, the adoption of legislation does not rule out self-regulation. Accordingly, 
the EASA, also a member of international organisations, continues to promote self-regulation, 
recommending codes of conducts developed at the international level. In particular, the ICC 
Code on advertising and marketing clearly overlaps with the Directive on misleading and 
comparative advertising, as also noted by the Commission in the drafting of the Directive.719 
The ICC code and the Directive converge at some points – for example when banning the 
offers not sufficiently anticipating consumer demand – but diverge at other points – thus, the 
ICC code does not take the well-informed, reasonably circumspect consumer as a starting 
point. Arguably, Directive 2006/114 that partially aims for maximum harmonisation, as well as 
Directive 2005/29 on unfair commercial practices that pursue maximum harmonisation do not 
stand in the way of these developments, considering that both Directive expressly refer to 
self-regulation through the development of codes of conduct.    
 
5.5.2.4. Encouraging self-regulation 
Self-regulation has been encouraged in various instances, to complement legislation. 
Accordingly, the Dutch Bankers’ Association (‘Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken’, ‘NVB’), 
has established several self-regulatory instruments for the interaction between banks and 
their clients which are binding on their members. These codes specifically aim to 
complement legislation, for example the privacy code of conduct (‘Gedragscode Verwerking 
Persoonsgegevens’),720 and the Chinese walls code of conduct.721 The NVB is member of 
the European Banking Federation (‘EBF’) that has issued very generally formulated guiding 
principles.722  
In insurance laws, codes on privacy (‘Gedragscode verwerking persoonsgegevens 
financiële instellingen’),723 have similarly been established, as well as the code of conduct on 
personal examinations (‘Gedragscode persoonlijk onderzoek’). 724 More generally, self-
regulation plays a prominent role because the legislator has explicitly chosen to refrain as 
much as possible from mandatory law, even though contracts between insurers and 
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consumers have been stipulated in article 7: 925 et seq Civil Code. Accordingly, compliance 
with the insurers’ code of conduct (‘Gedragscode verzekeraars’) 725  is a requirement for 
membership. However, this code provides ambiguous, general rules that generally do not go 
beyond consumer protection legislation in this area, and which may therefore be of little 
added value in the interpretation of articles 7:925 et seq BW. In contrast, the code of conduct 
of informed renewal and contract periods for indemnity insurances to individuals 
(‘Gedragscode geïnformeerde verlenging en contractstermijnen particuliere 
schadeverzekeringen’),726 is more precise. It has gone into effect on 1 January 2010 and will 
be evaluated in 3 years. The code of conduct on expertise on motor vehicles (‘Gedragsregels 
bij expertise motorrijtuigen’) has been negotiated and the BOVAG, FOCWA, NIVRE/NIAV.727 
Moreover, according to the HIV-code of conduct (‘HIV gedragscode’)728 people with HIV may, 
under conditions, enter into life insurance contracts. According to the Netherlands HIV 
Association, the number of rejections for life insurance policies has decreased considerably 
since this advice.729 
      From January 2010, Adfiz, previously the Dutch Association representing 
independent financial and insurance agents and the Dutch Association for Insurance Agents  
which will oblige its members to sign a code on independent advice (‘Code onafhankelijk 
advies’).730   
 
5.5.2.5. Codes as conditions for membership: consumer sales  
The Dutch home shopping association, (‘Nederlandse Thuiswinkel Organisatie’)731 provides 
its members with a certificate, the ‘Thuiswinkel Waarborg’, and a code of conduct based on 
the European convention on cross-border mail order and distance selling.732 Interestingly, the 
EMOTA aims to add to international, European and national regulation and thereby further 
the European internal market. 733  The Stichting Webshop Keurmerk 734  also provides its 
members with a trustmark for online shopping.  
 
5.5.2.6. Codes as conditions for membership in the absence of mandatory 
law 
Codes of conduct in the absence of sufficient legislation. This includes codes in the area of 
franchising and debt collection.  
The European Franchise Federation (EFF) has established a European code of 
ethics for franchising.735 It particularly requires its members, national organisations, to require 
that their members comply with its code. Accordingly, the Netherlands Franchise Association 
(‘Nederlandse franchise vereniging’, ‘NVF’) requires its members to comply with this code.736 
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However, the code contains various ambiguous terms and at points does not seek to go 
beyond what is legally required.  
Additionally, self-regulation not established by stakeholders are the Unidroit Model 
Franchise Disclosure Law and the ICC Model for International Franchising Contract. 
However, the Hoge Raad737 has not used soft law on franchising for interpreting the duties of 
a franchiser to provide information to the franchisee. In contrast, the district court Zutphen 
has since referred to the code of ethics.738 
Another example of self-regulation in the absence of mandatory law is self-regulation 
in the area of debt collection. The Dutch Association for Collecting Businesses (‘Nederlandse 
Vereniging voor Incasso Ondernemingen’, hereafter: ‘NVI’)739 has claimed a lack of specific 
regulation in the area of debt collection740 and provided a code of conduct that its members 
must comply with and a corresponding quality mark. 741  At a European level, the NVI 
participates in the Federation of European National Collection Associations (‘FENCA’) that, 
apart from providing basic guidelines for contracts to its members, has established an 
overarching code of conduct for its members, against the background of members’ existing 
codes of conducts.742 The FENCA requires its members to develop a code of conduct and 
the assurance that it is complied with.  
 
5.5.2.7. The role of non-state actors 
Non-state actors play a prominent role in the development of self-regulation on the basis of 
articles of association.  
Notably, even though article 8 Gw recognises the right to association, the 
developments of rules through articles of association has generally not been considered in 
this light. Nevertheless, state actors have left actors with considerable room to develop self-
regulation and in the case of advertising for alcoholic products, insurance and banking, even 
abstained from legislation. However, where legislation has been established, this has not 
stood in the way of self-regulation.  
Accordingly, the law assumes that rules established in accordance with the articles of 
association are internally binding and decisions contrary to rules are avoidable under article 
2:15 par. 1 sub c BW.    
The compliance with codes of conduct differs across legal areas, but generally, 
compliance is also not a complete failure. Thus, organisations manage to affect the 
behaviour of members in accordance with their codes. This does not mean that self-
regulation generally is an immediate success – this also depends on the question whether 
compliance with codes is compulsory or optional, whether codes provide sufficiently clear 
rules, whether they provide clear sanctions on the breach of those rules. Various codes do 
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not oblige members to comply with codes of conduct – although they encourage it – or they 
provide ambiguous rules without clear sanctions, or they do not supervise compliance. 
Moreover, the influence of codes can extend beyond organisations even if they are 
not directly binding.  
 
For example, professional guidelines may be relevant for determining whether lawyers have behaved 
professionally.
743
 Similarly, third parties may for example complain on the lack of compliance with 




Thus, state actors have left non-state actors considerable freedom in the development of 
voluntary disciplinary law. 
 
5.5.2.8. Limitations on the role of non-state actors 
The membership of organisations has been characterised as a relation that differs from a 
contractual relationship. 745  Notwithstanding the special nature of membership, voluntary 
disciplinary law has generally not been a separately distinguished sort of self-regulation, and 
objections of Fremdbestimmung have generally not arisen. Accordingly, there is very little 
attention to the development of rules within organisations. Consequently, the adoption and 
amendment of rules is not stipulated in the law. 746  Similarly, principal objections to the 
dynamic referral to the IOC in the articles of association of the NOC*NSF have not arisen. 
 
5.5.2.9. Conclusion on ‘tuchtrecht’ 
A large variety of codes has been developed by associations. The binding force of these 
codes depends on the vagueness of codes, the sanctions imposed on breaches of the codes 
and the enforcement of the codes against members. In some cases, codes may also serve to 
determine, for example, professional behaviour. The legislator has exercised restraint in 
replacing self-regulation with legislation, which has left non-state actors with much freedom 
to develop codes as they choose.  
Codes on the basis of articles of association are not distinguished as a separate form 
of self-regulation and control mechanisms have accordingly not been developed. Thus, the 
roles of non-state actors have not generally been subjected to restrictions.  
 
5.5.3. One sided declarations 
Some forms of self-regulation are neither based on contracts nor based on articles of 
association. These codes may be the result of extensive negotiations, which are not 
especially one-sided. However, collectively negotiated self-regulation characteristically 
results in a code and one-sided recommendations or declarations of compliance.  
Paragraphs 5.5.3.1-5.5.3.5. will consider instances of self-regulation. Respectively, 
codes in the area of consumer sales and energy supply, initiatives for in the field of corporate 
social responsibility, the recommendations of the Verbond van Verzekeraars and basic 
payment services will be considered. Paragraph 5.5.3.6. will discuss the role of non-state 
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actors and paragraph 5.5.3.7. will turn limitations to the roles of these actors. Paragraph 
5.5.3.8. will end with a conclusion.  
 
5.5.3.1. Binding declarations: consumer sales 
Various initiatives for self-regulation have been developed in the area of consumer sales, 
especially online selling, both at the national and European level:   
 
 The Electronic Commerce Platform in the Netherlands (‘ECP-EPN’) has developed 
the model code of conduct on conducting business electronically.747 In turn, this code 
has been used as an example at the international level.748  
 
This code overlaps with self-regulation established by Thuiswinkel.org and Stichting Webshop 
Keurmerk. The model code provided by the ECP-EPN is a model code that clearly aims to provide 
members with tools to developed consistent self-regulation.
749
   
 
 In the eConfidence project,750 BEUC and UNICE, under supervision of the European 
Commission, established the European Trustmark Requirements for e-commerce 
between businesses and consumers. The scheme set down standards for European 
trust marks in the EU with regard to several issues, including pre-contractual 
information, language, payment and security. However, it is unclear whether these 
requirements have been implemented.  
 
 In the digital agenda for Europe, the Commission 751  has announced that it will 
develop a Code of EU Online Rights and organise a European-wide platform on trust 
marks for stakeholders.  
 
5.5.3.2. Binding declarations: contracts for the supply of energy 
Because public utility companies use uniform STC’s, collectively negotiated within the 
framework of the SER, the legislator has abstained from providing specific rules on contracts 
between public utility companies and consumers.752 Apart from these STC’s, EnergieNed, 
representing public utility companies, in cooperation with consumer organisations, has also 
established a code of conduct for consumers and providers of electricity, who can enter into 
a contract with EnergieNed that they will apply the code.753 If businesses apply the code, 
they need to develop protocols indicating how they ensure compliance with the code. Loos, 
has suggested that the Civil Code should contain provisions on the contracts between 
consumers and public utility companies.754 
 Several suppliers 755  have committed themselves to the code and presented it 
expressly to consumers. However, problems with compliance have arisen.756  
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5.5.3.3. Suggesting reinforced self-regulation: social corporate 
responsibility 
Businesses may provide a statement of “corporate social responsibility”, that they will not 
violate human rights or the environment, as is for example the case for Dutch multinationals 
such as Shell. This does however not necessarily mean that Shell can be held liable for 
environmental damage resulting from spills, which may not only be complicated under private 
international law,757 but which also requires, for example, ensuring the responsibility of Shell 
for damages arising, for example, from spills. The decisions758 on claims against Shell have 
not referred to Shell’s general statements, but evaluated the claim, based on non-contractual 
liability, under Nigerian law.  
 To increase corporate social responsibility, the legislator has proposed introducing a 
duty of transparency on Dutch multinationals in 2001. The proposal759  expressly rejects 
developing standards of social corporate responsibility in national law, as this may petrify the 
development of international rules. Also, curiously, the proposal considers that a legal 
standard may prevent that companies internalize this standard, which the legislator considers 
as the main incentive behind the dynamic development of standards. Accordingly, 
companies may decide for themselves according to which guidelines they measure their 
compliance to corporate social responsibility. The question however arises whether this will 
lead to guidelines that are more specific than a necessarily ambiguous legal standard. The 
proposal aims to add a paragraph to article 3:291 BW that obliges companies to include, in 
their annual accounts, their compliance with social corporate responsibility. The proposal 
goes on to note that the correctness of the information provided by companies depends on 
the sense of responsibility of companies themselves, but adds that additional control by 
stakeholders, especially internationally operating NGO’s, is desirable, while eventually, 
international guidelines may provide adequate staring points for evaluating whether 
companies’ policies are in accordance with social corporate responsibility. However, despite 
the lenient approach to standards, the proposed article does make clear on what topics 
companies have to at least provide a report. Currently, however, rather than passing the 
proposal, the Dutch government has supported and developed networks to support 
compliance with these guidelines.760 
The European Commission 761 has announced a legislative proposal obliging 
companies to provide information. Article 1.14 Directive 2003/51 currently already stipulates 
that companies falling under this Directive must include non-financial aspects in their yearly 
accounts, which has been implemented in article 2:391 par. 1 BW. The preamble makes 
clear that ember states can waive this obligation. At a European level, international rules 
have likewise served as a starting point.762  
 
5.5.3.4. Codes of conduct on the basis of recommendations 
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Organisations may advice their members to comply with codes of conduct. Additionally, 
members and cooperative organisations of the Verbond van Verzekeraars may recognise the 
code of conduct for expert organisations (‘Gedragscode expertiseorganisaties’),763 as well as 
the protocol on fraud (‘Fraudeprotocol 1998’).764 A recent, and well-known example of non-
binding codes of conduct adopted in the area of insurance contract law was the development 
of the the Verbond voor Verzekeraars is the Insurers’ Institute on personal injury (PIV) 765 of 
the code of conduct on the treatment of personal injuries (‘Gedragscode behandeling 
letselschade’, ‘GBL’).766  
Some of the codes of conduct used by insurers are subject to criticism and support 
for these codes is doubted. An example of a problematic area is the handling of personal 
injury claims that was severely criticised in 2003.767 In addition, the 2003 report concluded 
that the Gedragscode verzekeraars was often ignored by insurers, especially in cases with 
large financial stakes.  
The GBL was developed in response to the report, but this code is not supported by 
the Dutch association for personal injury lawyers (‘Vereniging van letselschadeadvocaten’, 
‘LSA’). The LSA 768  has pointed out that the professional code of conduct for lawyers 
(‘Gedragsregels 1992’) is not compatible with this that would oblige lawyers to aim for 
settlement, while that may not be in their clients’ best interests, while lawyers can also not 
oblige clients to comply with the code. Moreover, the LSA remarks that a duty to settle out of 
court may violate article 6 ECHR, and that the GBL differs from the previous code of conduct 
on the handling of personal injury in traffic (‘Gedragscode bij de behandeling van 
personenschade in het verkeer’).  
Since its establishment, very little has happened to develop the GBL.769 In his 2011 
report, the Ombudsman concluded that the code has hardly facilitated the handling of 
disputes of personal injury, and most victims were unfamiliar with the code,770 despite the 
wide participation of interest groups in the drafting of the code.  
 
5.5.3.5. Primary payment services: binding declarations? 
In cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, debt counselling organisations, and the Salvation 
Army, the NVB has agreed on a covenant on basic payment services (‘Convenant inzake 
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pakket primaire betaaldiensten’).771 The convenant aims to increase the access to basic 
payment accounts under strict conditions. Accordingly, a website has been established that 
outlines these conditions.772  
According to the 2004 evaluation,773 the access to basic payment services had been 
improved, although some problems, for example a lack of accessibility, were signalled. 
Notably, the legislator has adopted a proposal obliging banks to offer a basic payment 
account to all consumers. According to the draft, 774  this initiative, largely based on the 
convenant, is necessary as not all banks – especially small banks – comply with the 
convenant.   
 
5.5.3.6. The role of non-state actors   
The Dutch legislator has adopted considerable restraint that has withheld it form intervening 
in areas where private actors, or groups of stakeholders, have established self-regulation. If 
declarations of compliance may be binding, drafters of codes may exert substantial influence 
over the behaviour of other private parties.  
The question whether codes can be enforced by consumers depends on the quesiton 
whether declarations of compliance are juridical acts that consumers can justifiably rely on 
on the basis of articles 3:33 and 35 BW. The main question that should be answered is 
whether declarations are meant to have legal effect. If not, the declaration is merely a factual 
act, not a juridical act. The answer whether a declaration is meant to have legal effect 
depends on several circumstances. Nieuwenhuis775 rightly finds that societal interests may 
be an argument against the binding force of one-sided promises, for example because it may 
inhibit parties from making promises, because there is no reciprocity, or because it concerns 
promises – for example promises concerning marriage – that should not be enforceable. 
Various other circumstances may be relevant as well. Particularly, the vagueness of a 
promise a lack of further sanctions or publicity indicate that a declaration is not intended to 
have legal effect. Especially if codes do not impose sanctions on breaching the rules, the 
question whether a consumer, as a third party, has a clear interest that is financially 
measurable, can be relevant. Also, self-regulation based on an organisation’s articles of 
association may be directed internally, or externally, which may be the case if the 
simultaneous use of self-regulation on the basis of articles of association as well as one-
sided declarations makes clear that overlapping codes in for example the area of consumer 
sales may address members as well as consumers.  
Binding effects for this reason can be defended in the following cases: 
 
1. Accordingly, the code of conduct developed by Thuiswinkel.org aims to adopt ‘consumer-
friendly principles’, as adequate consumer protection is recognised as essential for the 
interests of distance sellers across Europe. The code expressly aims to increase consumers’ 
confidence, and a mere declaration that lacks binding force may not suffice. Also, the code is 
easily accessible online and provides sufficiently precise rules. It follows that businesses 
complying with this code seek to increase confidence, by binding themselves to standards, 
which may have legal effect.  
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2. The code on the supply of energy specifically aims to increase consumers’ confidence, and it 
provides sufficiently specific rules.  
 
In other cases, the binding effect of declarations of compliance is less clear:  
 
1. Insurance companies frequently do not communicate to victims that they comply with the 
code on personal injury claims,
776
 and in disputes, the code is generally not referred to. 
How can a declaration constitute a juridical act if it is – apparently – not aimed at the 
victims who should be the main beneficiaries of the code? However, the code is publicly 
accessible and provides sufficiently specific rules. Yet the declaration, although aimed at 
the Letselschaderaad, is arguably not solely internally directed, and as the Ombudsman 
rightly recognises, a code of conduct should not leave participants the option to simply 
ignore the code. Instead, the drafters of the code expressly aimed to facilitate disputes in 
this area, which however raises the question whrether drafters can be bound to settle 
disputes.  
 
2. The declarations of banks to provide basic payment accounts make clear that banks who 
participate consider this as an obligation, and it is possible that future consumers have 
accordingly relied on this. However, the declaration as such does not constitute a binding 
offer; it is not precise enough, and subject to conditions. It may moreover be doubted if 
banks can be obliged to enter into contracts with consumers who superficially meet 
criteria established within the convenant but who, for example, have outstanding debts 
that they cannot repay, who provide incorrect information, or who have been convicted for 
forgery or fraud.  
 
Declarations of compliance may moreover also be binding in the following cases: 
 
1. If parties have relied on the declaration of compliance, in accordance with article 3:35 
BW.777  
 
Accordingly, consumers may justifiably rely on the code of Thuiswinkel.org and the accompanying, 
well-known trustmark. Similarly, consumers may rely on the declarations of energy-suppliers.  
 
2. If people have relied on businesses’ declaration of compliance, non-compliance may 
constitute an unfair commercial practice.  
 
Accordingly, breach of the code on the supply of energy breaches consumer protection law, which 
may prompt administrative fines.
778
 Possibly, breach of the codes of Thuiswinkel.org may also 
constitute unfair commercial practices.  
 
3. Codes may play a role in the assessment of businesses’ behaviour.  
 
Accordingly, the district court Zutphen
779
 imposed additional damages for the way the insurer had 
handled the dispute on physical injury, contrary to the code. Likewise, the district court Leeuwarden
780
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took a code of conduct on text message services, recognised by the claimant, as a starting point for 
determining whether the consumer was liable. 
 
Thus, non-state actors may exert substantial influence on businesses who seek to comply 
with the codes, but this depends on the willingness of these actors to formulate and publish 
sufficiently clearly worded codes, and compliance with these codes depends on the 
willingness of businesses to state their compliance and behave accordingly. State actors 
have however shown themselves willing to reinforce these statements. 
 
5.5.3.7. Limitations on the role of non-state actors? 
The Dutch legislator has shown restraint even though problems with compliance with widely 
supported self-regulation have arisen. Similarly, control mechanisms to limit the role of actors 
have generally not been developed. However, problems with enforcement have prompted 
the European legislator to establish trules on corporate social responsibility, while the Dutch 
legislator has considered intervening to provide vulnerable consumers with basic payment 
accounts. It is not clear why the legislator has exercised more restraint in other areas where 
problems with compliance have also arisen, especially with regard to personal injury claims, 
social corporate responsibility and codes on the supply of energy to consumers. The current 
approach to corporate social responsibility still emphasises the expectation that Dutch 
companies will act in accordance with international guidelines. Although compliance with 
these guidelines is a requirement for receiving subsidies, multinationals are not obliged to 
report their compliance with these standards, which may not always be in companies’ 
immediate interest.781  
Other initiaves indicate that the legislator does seek to prevent problems that may 
arise from non-state actors’ initiatives, without however limiting non-state actors’ roles. 
Accordingly, because the increasing use of trust marks may increase chances of 
inaccessibility, the Ministry of Economics has provided an overview of reliable trust marks.782  
Interestingly, however, non-state actors have also developed initiatives reminiscent of 
German control mechanisms that are aimed at increasing the quality of alternative regulation. 
Accordingly, in the drafting of the insurers’ code on personal injury claims, relevant actors 
widely participated, and third parties had opportunities to influence the code. This process  
did not lead to compliance with the code, nor have policy holders and consumers become 
more aware of relevant self-regulation.  
Likewise, in the area of social corporate responsibility, various stakeholders with 
considerable expertise in collective negotiations have been involved in various platforms that 
promote social corporate responsibility. 783  Consequently, implementing social corporate 
responsibility is not wholly left to multinationals, but more independent organisations also 
play a role.  
 The European Commission has exercised less restraint than the Dutch legislator. 
Accordingly, it has suggested the EU code of online consumer rights that regrettably 
overlooks relevant Dutch initiatives. Even though the Commission does not, as such, reject 
alternative regulation or consider the possibility that private actors pursue private rather than 
                                                                                                                                                   
779
 Rb. Zutphen 7 November 2007, NJF 2007, 545. Comp. also J.B.M. Vranken in his note after NJ 2008, 241. 
780
 Rb. Leeuwarden 11 February 2009, LJN BH2709. 
781
 Letter of secretary of state of economic affairs 29 March 2012.  
782
 At http://www.consuwijzer.nl/keurmerken.  
783
See for example http://www.idhsustainabletrade.com/organization. Comp. also the report of the SER, Ontwikkeling door 
duurzaam ondernemen, 2011, available at http://www.ser.nl/~/media/DB_Adviezen/2010_2019/2011/b30143.ashx.  
163 
 
public interests, the top-down approach of the European Commission has also led to a more 
decisive approach towards the development of social corporate responsibility that however 
also leaves room for the role of non-state actors and international actors.   
 
5.5.3.8. Conclusion on one-sided declarations 
Because of the restraint of the Dutch legislator, both in intervening in areas where self-
regulation has been established and in the development of control mechanisms, non-state 
actors may play a substantial role. These non-state actors may primarily bind themselves to 
behave in accordance with self-regulation towards consumers, which has been reinforced by 
the courts. Interestingly, non-state actors have developed mechanisms that should improve 
the quality of self-regulation, rather than limiting the role of non-state actors. However, these 
mechanisms do not appear particularly successful. 
The lack of success of some forms of self-regulation also highlights potential 
weaknesses of self-regulation, especially insufficient accessibility, which has become 
apparent even if self-regulation has been developed in a transparent, inclusive process, and 
problems of enforcement. 
 
5.5.4. Reconsidering the distinction between tuchtrecht and one-sided 
declarations  
This paragraph has made a distinction between contractual self-regulation, self-regulation 
based on ‘tuchtrecht’, and one-sided declarations. The distinction between these forms of 
self-regulation is not usually made, and the division in this chapter has hopefully made clear 
for what reasons: the distinction is not a sharp one, as various forms of self-regulation may 
overlap.  
Furthermore, the distinction between self-regulation based on articles of associations 
and ‘other’ self-regulation does not pay attention to the role of surrounding legislation and the 
amount of initiatives of self-regulation, which may well affect the effectiveness and scope of 
self-regulation.  
 
Self-regulation that has replaced specific legislation is visible in the advertising on alcoholic products, 
as well as insurance contracts, where the legislator – and not the judiciary – continues to adopt 
restraint despite complaints that insurers do not comply with the code. Other self-regulation clearly 
complements legislation, in the area of advertising. The absence of specific legislation, however, does 
not necessarily mean that self-regulation will become prominent, as becomes visible in the area of 
debt collection.  
 
Also, importantly, the differences between self-regulation established on the basis of articles 
of association and one-sided declarations does not entail a difference in the enforcement of 
self-regulation. In some instances, self-regulation developed by Thuiswinkel.org and 
Stichting Webshop Keurmerk are clearly successful, which certainly should not be seen apart 
from the careful scrutiny of potential members. Also, if self-regulation has been developed by 
associations with a large number of members, it is more likely that actors have recognised 
self-regulation. Furthermore, the enforcement of organisations of these rules is important for 
the influence of codes. A lack of enforcement in other areas – for example with regard to the 
GBL – may be a reason to reconsider leaving compliance with this code to organisations that 
also represent the interests of a particular industry.  
164 
 
The binding effect of one-sided declarations can also be traced to the possibility for 
consumers to enforce compliance, either because they constitute a juridical act, or because  
consumers have justifiably relied on declarations, or because non-compliance constitutes an 
unfair commercial practice.    
Notably, the possibility to enforce these declarations has not visibly inhibited 
initiatives in The Netherlands, as has been argued in the German legal order. 
 As the distinction between voluntary disciplinary law and one-sided declarations as 
such do not entail a difference in the binding force of codes, state actors have not considered 
problems of Fremdbestimmung in either form of self-regulation. 
The involvement of the European Commission, if it presents a code in the area of 
consumer sales, is more likely to be criticised than the role of non-state actors.   
 
5.5.5. Conclusion on non-state actors 
A considerable amount of self-regulation has developed, especially at the national level, and 
non-state actors may exercise substantial influence. The Dutch legislator has shown restraint 
in intervening in unsuccessful self-regulation, but it is difficult to deduce a consistent 
approach to the role of non-state actors.  
Perhaps, the restraint of the legislator is in accordance with more general restraint 
exercised by legislatures that have established codifications – but this is not in accordance 
with recent changes in the BW.784 Alternatively, an active approach of the courts – which has 
however not consistently been established – might have justified more restraint. A more 
probable cause is the lack of political support to intervene in newly established insurance law 
and possibly, also, a more general lack of support for legislative intervention. It may however 
be doubted whether the restraint of the legislator in the area of insurances is in conformity 
with the restraint adopted by the legislator in areas where weaker parties have not been 
involved. 
Arguably, the development of a normative framework should contribute to a more 
predictable and stable approach towards self-regulation, and it would form a consistent 
starting point for the legislator to intervene in areas where the self-regulation has failed.   
The European legislator adopts less restraint, despite the development of bottom-up 
initiatives at the European level.  
Both under Dutch law and European law, non-state actors have a prominent role, but 
they have more liberty to establish self-regulation independently at the national level. State 
actors initiatives may both strengthen and weaken the position of non-state actors: 
  
1. The weaknesses of self-regulation make self-regulation an unattractive option for 
implementing Directives, thus diminishing the role of non-state actors.  
 
The Dutch legislator found the level of self-regulation and supervision in the area of consumer credit 
high enough that, apart from the general provisions, specific legislation in the Civil Code on contracts 
between banks and consumers were not considered necessary,
785
 which has changed since the 
Directive on consumer credit has been revised. 
 
2. The room left for non-state actors’ initiatives in some new instruments is not clear. 
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Self-regulation in the field of consumer sales is much less likely to be adopted for the implementation 
of a future revised Directive – which would moreover be complicated considering the suggestion for 
maximum harmonisation for a future Directive. It is also unclear what role self-regulation will play if 




Simultaneously, interdependence between state actors and non-state actors has become 
visible:  
 
1. State actors promoting particular policy aims through self-regulation have to take into 
account successful self-regulation.  
 
The success of self-regulation encouraged at the European level may, among other things,  depend 
on already existing successful initiatives, for example in the case of consumer sales, where the 
eConfidence project has apparently not been successful. This should be taken into account in the 
development of new initiatives, in particular the EU Code of online consumer rights. The absence of 
self-regulation at the national level will however not necessarily increase the chance that self-
regulation at the European level is successful, as becomes clear in the area of franchising.  
 
2. The initiatives of non-state actors may promote the aims of state actors. 
 
Thus, the development of self-regulation in the area of consumer sales as well as advertising also 
emphasises the internal market, which may strengthen corresponding initiatives from Euroean state 
actors.   
 
Interdependence has also become visible between state actors:  
 
1. If national state actors do not take into account sets of self-regulation, this may 
undermine the encouragement of these sets of self-regulation at the European level.  
 
The Hoge Raad’s decision to not take into account soft law and self-regulation on franchising may 
withhold other courts from referring to the code,
787
 perhaps with some exceptions. 
 
2. Initiatives from actors at the European level may undermine the initiatives of national 
actors. 
 
Thus, the development of European trustmarks may make it more difficult to maintain an adequate 
overview of reliable trustmarks. Moreover, the European Commission may also attempt to provide 
overviews of trustmarks at the European level, although consumers are more likely to be familiar with 
national initiatives. 
 
The interdependence between both state and non-state actors underlines the need for 
adequate interaction between actors. If actors interact with one another, they may strengthen 
rather than undermine one another’s initiatives. 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
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This chapter has asked what role actors play in the development of private law in the Dutch 
legal order.  
Paragraph 5.6.1. describes what role actors play under Dutch law and paragraph 
5.6.2. will outline what role actors play under European law, as also became apparent from 
the previous chapter. Paragraph 5.6.3. will compare the roles of actors under Dutch and 
European law, asking whether a framework could and should be developed. Paragraph 5.6.4. 
will consider interdependence and the changing role of actors.   
 
5.6.1. The role of actors under Dutch law 
Dutch state actors play a central role in the development of private law. International actors 
may establish binding norms that can set aside national law and European law sets aside 
national law on the basis of European law.  
State actors have however also cooperated with non-state actors and allowed a 
substantial role for non-state actors in the development of self-regulation. The restraint of the 
Dutch legislator should not be sought in possible constitutional rights underlying the 
development of self-regulation, as this is generally not the case, with the exception of the 
development of CAO’s. However, this has not withheld Dutch state actors from taking a 
purposeful approach to the development of CAO’s.  
 State actors have frequently reinforced contractual self-regulation.Problems with 
enforcement are considered important problems and a solution to unsuccessful self-
regulation may well be to reinforce it. Dutch state actors generally place few restraints on the 
roles of actors. However, the Dutch legislator has recognised potential difficulties between 
parties in unequal bargaining positions, and develope control mechanisms in the form of 
controlled collective negotiations, mandatory law and judicial evaluation. In some cases, 
control mechanisms take the form of more self-regulation or a prominent role for 
stakeholders with an interest in enforcing codes of conduct. 
 
5.6.2. The role of actors under European law 
State actors have played a central role in the development of the private law acquis, which 
however also leaves competences to national actors. The allocation of competences is in 
accordance with the TFEU. The role of actors under the TFEU is not clearly delineated and 
may be subject to change. 
Non-state actors may also play a prominent role in the development of alternative 
regulation, and in the development of legislation. The role of non-state actors is supervsed by 
the European Commission that carefully encourages alternative regulation that might 
strengthen European policy aims. Apart from this supervision, and the involvement of the 
European Parliament in various forms of alternative regulation, few control mechanisms have 
been established.  
 
5.6.3. Differences between the Dutch and European view? 
The role of actors under Dutch law and European law shows a number of convergences: 
 
1) The role of European actors 
Both Dutch and European actors consider that the direct effect and the priority of European law is 
based on European law rather than the Gw. Consequently, the reallocation of competences to the 
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national level is determined by the TFEU and the CJEU is recognised as the competent court to 
interpret European law, including actors’ competence. 
 
2) The role of non-state actors 
The development of alternative regulation is generally not considered as the exercise of constitutional 
rights. Nevertheless, non-state actors are left considerable room, especially at the national level, to 
develop alternative regulation. Constitutional objections have not arisen and will also not arise if rules 
previously developed by non-state actors are instead developed by state actors.   
 
However, differences in the roles of actors under Dutch and European law are also visible.  
 
1) The role of international actors 
Whereas internation law direct effect, this is not the case for European law. However, as long as 
international law does not interfere with European law, no conflicts need arise. If the European 
legislator harmonises law previously harmonised through treaties, the European background of that 
rule will likely precede the international background, unless European measures allow that treaties 
precede European law. 
 
2) The restraint of the Dutch legislator 
In the absence of a Dutch equivalent of the Untermaβverbot, the Dutch legislator has shown restraint 
in intervening in alternative regulation, including instaces where compliance with self-regulation is 
problematic.  
 
3) The development of control mechanisms 
While both actors at the national and the European level have recognised the need to exercise control 
over alternative regulation, the emphasis at the European level is on the increased involvement of 
state actors in the development of European law.  
Dutch actors have adopted a more critical approach and developed more control mechanisms, 
especially in cases where parties in collective negtiations do not have an equal bargaining position. 
Thus, collective bargaining takes place in the framework of the SER, and the representativeness and 
inclusiveness of collective negotiations has also been evaluated. Some of these mechanisms, 
however, leave a considerable amount of discretion to the judge or Minister. Interestingly, there have 
been suggestions to improve these mechanisms. 
Frequently, also, control mechanisms have been developed to improve the quality of 
alternative regulation. In some cases, the lack of enforceability is seen as the main problem, whcih has 
led to the reinforcement of alternative regulation. Interestingly, control mechanisms may also entail 
more self-regulation.  
 
5.6.4. The role of actors in a multilevel legal order 
In the light of these differences, the question arises under which framework the role of actors 
is to be determined. As neither the Dutch or the European framework has been particularly 
well-developed, the question arises whether Dutch law should determine the role of actors, 
especially as it has recognised the precedence of European law and has no principal 
objections to extending or limiting the role of actors.  
 However, European law takes a fragmented approach and the involvement of private 
actors in the development of alternative regulation may udnermine the quality of private law. 
Moreover, concerns that questions of representativeness and inclusiveness are disregarded 
have already arisen, and these questions could and should be addressed more convincingly 
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and consistently at the national and the European level. Therefore, a framework should be 
developed at the national level to assess the roles of actors.  
The argument for a framework however draws attention to the interdependence and 
the need for interaction between actors, while a framework should also take into account that 
the role of actors should not be sharply delineated but flexible and subject to change. What 
changes in actors’ roles have become visible already and in what way does interdependence 
between Dutch and European actors become apparent? 
 Paragraph 5.6.4.1. will discuss the changing role of actors and paragraph 5.6.4.2. will 
consider the interdepence between actors. Paragraph 5.6.4.3. will set out starting points for a 
Dutch framework for assessing the role of actors and paragraph 5.6.4.4. will end with a 
conclusion. 
 
5.6.4.1 Actors’ changing roles 
The role of European and national state actors as well as the roles of non-state actors is 
subject to change.   
 
1) As harmonisation replaces treaties, provisions in treaties that can become directly 
binding cease to have this effect on the basis of articles 93 and 94 Gw. Instead, the 
priority and direct effect is based on European law and European actors also 
becomes responsible for the supervision of the enforcement and application of these 
treaties.  
 
2) The priority and direct effect of international law may reinforce the role of European 
actors in the period before European measures ratifying treaties go into effect. 
 
3) The reallocation of competences to interpret treaties to the European level may limit 
the role of the highest national courts that have to refer to the CJEU for the 
interpretation of these measures. If the CJEU does not refer to national decisions on 
treaties, this may oblige courts to interpret treaties differently. 
 
4) European initiatives may oblige non-state actors to adapt codes of conduct. In some 
cases, existing self-regulation may gain a European background. 
 
This is the case for the creditors’ establishment of the BKR and the Association for the Guarantee of 
Travel Sums (‘Stichting Reisgelden’, ‘SGR’),
788
  in the area of package travel.  
Framework agreements may also limit private parties’ room to develop CAO’s. European 
initiatives may also  limit the role of actors in successful self-regulation, for example if Directive 93/13 
stands in the way of collectively negotiated STC’s that go below the protection in the Directive.   
 
5) The approach of the European legislator may also replace indecisiveness from the 
national legislator, thereby limiting non-state actors roles. Also, a more active 
approach of European actors may prompt reconsideration of unsuccessful rules. 
                                               
788
 The SGR was established after a number of bankruptcies, on the initiative of the Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
stakeholders. The SGR provides a refund if travellers have contracted with a SGR member that subsequently becomes 
insolvent. For more information see L.J.H. Mölenberg, M.L.A.M.J. Olivers, R.R.J.A. Hallmans, ‘De Stichting garantiefonds 
Reisgelden; gegarandeerd verzekerd?’, TvC 1990, p. 346 et seq. The majority of travel agents is a member of the SGR: by 
being a member, travel agents fulfil the conditions that were later made in article 7 Directive 90/314 on package travel: ‘[t]he 
organizer and/or retailer party to the contract shall provide sufficient evidence of security for the refund of money paid over and 




6) Both national and European actors may turn to alternative regulation as cross-border 
trade develops. The development of alternative regulation may not only entail a more 
prominent role for non-state actors; the roles of other actors may also be affected. For 
example, the role of the courts may be strengthened as they increasingly need to 
evaluate alternative regulation and gain competences accordingly. 789    
 
7) The prominent role of non-state actors, visible in the abundant amount of alternative 
regulation at the national level, may make the introduction of attractive European 
alternative forms more difficult, especially if non-binding initiatives overlook relevant 
Dutch initiatives.  
 
8) The large role of non-state actors may also encourage non-state actors to experiment 
in the development of alternative regulation, thereby providing European and possibly 
foreign actors with interesting examples. 
  
5.6.4.2 Interdependence 
As the roles of actors has changed, interdependence has developed. Consequently, 
European and national actors may undermine or strengthen one another’s initiatives. Firstly, 
interdependence between state actors has developed: 
 
1) Dutch state actors are less able to control the reallocation of competence 
to develop private law as this question is decided at the European level. 
 
2) Dutch state actors are less able to guarantuee the unity of the law as the 
private law acquis continues to develop. 
 
3) European state actors do not have general competence to develop private 
law but are competent to pursue Europena policy aims through developing 
fragmented parts of private law. Euroepan state actors, meanwhile, have 
neither the expertise nor the organisational capacity to develop private law 
in the manner that is has been developed at the national level, which gives 
national private law a disctinct advantage.  
 
4) Non-state actors may gain a more prominent role if European or 
international actors take Dutch alternative regulation as an example for 
drafting alternative regulation. 
 
5) Non-state actors’ roles may be restricted if European initiatives oblige 
state actors to establish legislation rather than self-regulaiton, or if 
European law itself directly limits state actors’ roles.  
 
As  interdependence develops, the need for interaction becomes more urgent. On the one 
hand, more interaction may prevent problems, particularly between European and Dutch 
state actors. The potentially large role for European actors should be carefully considered by 
                                               
789
The introduction of the WCAM also entailed a larger role of the judiciary has received little attention.  See as an exception 
Henkemans 2007, p. 30 who notes that the role of the judiciary seems to be a ‘non-issue’. 
170 
 
national state actors, thereby limiting potential unpredictability or the development of new 
forms of governance that prove detrimental for the quality of private law. Likewise, the 
degree of development of both Dutch and German private law, should be a reason for 
European actors to follow the development of private law at the national level attentively and 
to exercise restraint in intervening with national private law.  
Moreover, more interaction may be beneficial. Accordingly, European actors should 
also interact with national actors that may more easily identify relevant national actors and 
relevant self-regulation that may strengthen European initiatives. In turn, national actors 
should seek to prevent that European intiatives overlook relevant national initiatives, which 
may lead to a lack of responsiveness.  
 
5.6.4.3 Towards developing a Dutch framework? 
The development of a Dutch framework may contribute to the comprehensibility of European 
private law in various ways: 
 
1) A normative framework may encourage state actors to intervene in the development 
of self-regulation. Especially if persistent problems with legislation or self-regulation 
arise, a framework may draw attention to the question whether these rules are 
developed by the right actors.  
2) A framework would offer starting points for a more consistent approach to the role of 
actors and, correspondingly, to suggestions for extending the use of new governance 
approaches, which would also benefit the predictable development of private law.  
3) Developing a framework would also entail the development of measures to ensure 
that self-regulation is drafted by representative actors. This may in turn lead to self-
regulation that is responsive to business practices as well as other parties’ interests, 
thus striking an adequate balance between parties’ interests, 
4) As more self-regulation is developed in accordance with principles of transparency, 
openness, inclusiveness and representativeness, this will increase the chance that 
parties are alert on relevant self-regulation, which in turn theoretically would lessen 
problems of inaccessibility that are currently visible in the GBL.   
 
Thus, a framework would consistently and predictably outline the role of actors, both state 
and non-state actors, based on principles of of private autonomy and Fremdbestimmung, 
indicating the development of control mechanisms if actors likely pursue their own interests 
and develop one-sided rules accordingly. Thus, measures that help ensure transparency, 
representativeness and inclusiveness are more consistently developed. Simultaneously, as 
non-state actors gain a more prominent role, they have more responsibility to develop 
alternative regulation in accordance with benchmarks of predictability, consistency, 
accessibility and responsiveness. Accordingly, mechanisms are developed to ensure that 
alternative regulation meets these standards, These mechanisms can be developed by non-
state actors, but ultimately, especially if alternative regulation is upheld and reinforced by 
state actors, these actors play an important role in safeguarding the quality of alternative 
regulation and ensuring that individuals are not subjected to rules without a proper basis.  
The principles underlying the German framework and control mechanisms developed 
to mitigate potential Fremdbestimmung have also been recognised in the Dutch legal order. 
These starting points include article 6:1 BW, the recognition of the added value of 
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negotiations, and the development of mechanisms to mitigate one-sided rules or 
mechanisms to improve alternative regulation.  
Firstly, article 6:1 BW reflects the idea that binding parties requires sufficient 
justification. Interestingly, although Dutch law is not a closed system, alternative regulation 
as such has not been recognised as a new category that should enable private parties to 
bind third parties. It is increasingly important, and in the multilevel legal order also 
increasingly difficult, for parties to be aware of rules by which they can be bound, which 
should prompt questions how the law should deal with potential surprises.  
Secondly, the emphasis on the autonmy of both parties, the idea of égoism a deux 
and especially the appreciation for collectively negotiated CAO’s. STC’s and contracts shows 
that Dutch law recognises the added value of negotiations. These instruments are 
considered less one-sided than non-negotiated contracts. Simultaneously, the importance of 
equal bargaining positions has been recognised as mandatory law protects weaker parties.  
Thirdly, it has been recognised that in some cases, non-state actors may pursue their 
own interests rather than the public interest, although this is not a general assumtpion. 
Accordingly control mechanisms limiting the role of non-state actors have been developed, 
particularly in the form of mandatory law, judicial control, and a controlled environment for 
collective negotiations.   
Such a framework would arguably be better suited to the increasing role of non-state 
actors and the corresponding interdependence between state and non-state actors than the 
current laissez-faire approach.790  
Particularly, this also entails that the role of state actors with regard to privately 
developed rules should be reconsidered. State actors’ discretion to take privately developed 
rules as a starting point or disregard them should be reconsidered. Obliging state actors to 
take into account alternative regulation would become especially apparent in decisions 
where self-regulation has developed that has been recognised by private parties, that is 
particularly relevant for the assessments of parties’ rights and obligations. 
 If alternative regulation increasingly meets standards of participation, inclusion and 
transparency, and if it is sufficiently comprehensible and complied with, this may not only 
lead to a more prominent role for self-regulation, but it may also justify a more critical 
approach towards development of law by state actors, especially in cases where the 
legislative process seems unduly slow or when non-state actors that are likely to pursue their 
own rather than the public interest play a too prominent role. If drafting process through 
which alternative regulation is developed is faster as well as more transparent and inclusive, 
should the legislative process still be preferred ‘because it is democratic’?  
 
5.6.4.4 Conclusion 
The role of state actors and non-state actors under Dutch law shows both differences and 
similarities, which raises the question under which framework the role of actors should be 
determined. Arguably, the role of actors may be more consistently assessed at the national 
level, but European law may take precedence if European law has been established. Thus, 
both Dutch and European law may be relevant. Yet merely looking at the law may overlook 
                                               
790
 Interestingly, A.J. Akkermans, ‘Beter recht door herziening van ons beeld van de herkomst van rechtsnormen’, NTBR 2011, 
72, goes much further in recognising the increased role of non-state actors. He argues that creating a new paradigm is 
necessary. Rather than considering law as being developed by the legislator and the courts, a new paradigm should be more in 
accordance with the large diversity of groups that contribute to private law and interact with one another. Thus, the development 
of private law in the traditional sense, through the legislator and the judiciary on the one hand, and the development of private 
law through self-regulation on the other hand should no longer be a primary distinction.  
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the changes in the role of actors and the interdependence that has developed between 
actors. Therefore, this chapter has argued for the development of framework that take these 
characteristics in account, on the basis of private autonomy and Fremdbestimmung.  
A Dutch framework could provide a ‘middle road’ between the German approach and 
the European approach. The Dutch legal order recognises both potential problems in the use 
of alternative regulation and adopts a bottom-up approach, which is in accordance with the 
restraint of the German legislator to the development of alternative regulation against a 
constitutional background. Moreover, the Dutch legislator has recognised the need to 
develop control mechanisms for alternative regulation, and recognises the need to limit 
parties’ obligations to obligations based on contracts or on the law. Simultaneously, the 
Dutch approach is familiar with a pragmatic approach towards the development of alternative 
regulation. Also, the Dutch approach shows that various sorts of control mechanisms are 
possible. However, currently, a Dutch approach has not sufficiently developed to serve as an 
example for other actors. That does not mean however, that the initiatives that have been 
developed in the Dutch legal order, have not served as examples for actors from other legal 




Chapter 6: The role of actors and the development of 
European private law 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The previous chapters have asked what roles actors play in the development of European 
private law. The roles of actors under the German framework, Dutch law and European law 
show both similarities and differences. What consequences do the different roles of actors 
have for the way in which European private law is developed and the quality of private law?  
Paragraph 6.2. will compare the framework in the German legal order with the 
proposed Dutch and European frameworks. Paragraph 6.3. will compare the role of state 
actors and paragraph 6.4. will turn to the role of non-state actors. Paragraph 6.5. will discuss 
the differences and similarities in the use of techniques. Paragraph 6.6. will draw some more 
general conclusions on the similarities and differences between the roles of actors and about 
the use of techniques in the development of European private law.  
  
6.2. Frameworks for assessing the role of actors   
The German framework is closely interrelated with the GG and principles of private 
autonomy and Fremdbestimmung have played a central role. The framework still 
distinguishes between the role of state actors and non-state actors, and the assumption that 
private actors generally pursue their own interests is still visible. Accordingly, the focus of the 
debate has been on preventing or limiting Fremdbestimmung arising from alternative 
regulation, especially where alternative regulation may affect the legal position of third parties 
that have not been involved in the drafting of alternative regulation. Mechanisms to prevent 
or limit Fremdbestimmung include giving third parties a chance to influence the development 
of alternative regulation, in some cases leading to the organisation of extensive drafting 
processes in accordance with requirements such as inclusiveness and transparency. 
Alternatively, the judiciary has developed judicial control over privately drafted rules. 
 In Dutch law, no similar framework has been developed. State actors play a central 
role. Other actors may also bind one another, but binding third parties requires sufficient 
justification. The possibility that private actors pursue their own interests, and weaknesses of 
alternative regulation have led to the development of control mechanisms and for 
suggestions to improve alternative regulation. In some cases, the lack of binding force has 
been considered an important problem, and alternative regulation has accordingly been 
reinforced.  Thus, questions of party autonomy and Fremdbestimmung can serve as starting 
points for a Dutch framework while control mechanisms have also been developed.  
However, some differences between the German and Dutch legal order have also 
become apparent. Questions of Fremdbestimmung have not played a role in the debate on 
alternative regulation and non-state actors have substantial room to develop alternative 
regulation. Also, Dutch actors have adopted a pragmatic approach that has led to alternative 
regulation, especially in the area of mass settlement, that may be difficult to reconcile with 
German views. Moreover, the development of alternative regulation is not considered against 
a constitutional background. 
 Similarly, European actors have not developed a comparable framework to determine 
the role of actors. However, the views of European actors, insofar as they have been 
174 
 
developed, are in some cases contrary to the German approach. In particular, the European 
Commission has adopted an instrumental approach that is not based on principles of private 
autonomy or Fremdbestimmung, but rather on pursuing European policy aims. This 
approach highlights the way in which private actors may contribute to the development of 
legislation pursuing European policy objectives.   
 Despite these differences, some starting points to develop a framework based on 
principles of private autonomy and Fremdbestimmung have been identified.  
 Notably, the different roles of actors, which have become especially apparent under 
German law and European law, draw attention to the interdependence between actors, as 
actors are no longer able to one-sidedly determine the role of actors. Moreover, one-sidedly 
determining the role of non-state actors is considerably more difficult if non-state actors 
provide expertise and organisational resources essential for the development of private 
law.791 
 
6.3. State actors  
The previous chapters have considered the role of state actors in the development of private 
law, both at a national and a European level. This paragraph will firstly compare the role of 
state actors, and go on to consider the development of private law beyond the national level, 
asking what consequences the similar or different roles of actors have for the quality of 
private law.  
 
6.3.1. The development of private law at the national level 
Both the German and the Dutch legislator and the judiciary play an essential role in the 
development of private law. Some similarities in the development of private law can however 
also be seen. Both German and Dutch private law have relatively recently been reformed, on 
the basis of similar reasoning.792  Both the German and the Dutch legislator have extensively 
considered comparative law in the drafting of respectively the 
Schuldrechtmodernisierungsgesetz and the BW, and both codes make use of blanket 
clauses. Academics have played an important role in the drafting of both the 
Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz and the BW. Neither the Dutch nor the German 
legislator has extensively considered European initiatives in the drafting of both the BGB and 
the BW. Both the BGB and the BW leave considerable room for the judiciary.  
Notwithstanding these similarities, some differences between the role of the 
legislature and the judiciary, and the relation between these two actors, have also become 
apparent:  
 
1) Constitutional review  
 
In the German legal order, the BVerfG has the competence to uphold the GG and set aside legislation, 
as well as judicial reasoning that is not in accordance with the GG. In contrast, there is no separate 
constitutional court in the Dutch legal order. Instead, article 120 Gw stipulates that the judiciary shall 
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 The consequences for interdependence between actors for the use of techniques will be considered further in chapter 7. 
792
 See further for a comparison between the Dutch and the German project J.B.M. Vranken, ‘De hercodificatie van het 
verbintenissenrecht in de Bondsrepubliek Duitsland’, NJB 1985, p. 769. Comp. E. Kramer, ‘Konvergenz und 
Internationalisierung der juristischen Methode’, in: Meier-Schatz (ed.), Die Zukunft der Rechts, Helbing & Lichtenhahn: 
Basel/Geneva/Much 1998, p. 71, who has argued that legal methods more generally show signs of convergence.   
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not decide on the constitutionality of treaties or formal laws, that is, laws established by Parliament 
and the government under articles 81 Gw. 
At the European level, the relation between the legislator and the courts differs in some 
important respects. Although the CJEU does have the competence to rule that European measures 
have been established ultra vires, it has adopted considerably more restraint than the BVerfG in its 
decisions. In general, also, the CJEU does not show a tendency to limit the Union’s legislative 
competence in favour of Member States – quite the reverse!
793
   
 
The competence of the judiciary to evaluate the constitutionality of private law influences the 
relation between the judiciary and the legislature, as the legislature is subject to more control. 
Consequently, case law may become more important and reveal more insight in the way that 
substantial private law has developed.  
The exercise of more control over the development of private law is subject to 
limtiations, as the judiciary does not, as such, evaluate the quality of private law, but its 
constitutionality. Therefore, constitutional review may improve the quality of law, for example 
by ensuring that it is in accordance with ideas on justice found in a constitution, but it may 
also undermine predictability.  
 
2) Codification 
Article 107 Gw stipulates that private law shall be stipulated in the code. A German equivalent of this 
article cannot be found in the GG. Although parts of private law fall within the exclusive competence of 
the federal legislator
794
, article 74 GG stipulates that the competence to establish private law is a 
shared one. However, it has been argued that principles such as legal unity and the stable 
development of the law without inconsistencies may entail codification rather than ad hoc legislation. 
Inconsistencies that are more likely to arise if private law is developed on an ad hoc basis rather than 
codification may meet with constitutional objections, as they may give rise to suspicions of 
arbitrariness.
795
 In contrast with both national legal orders, at the European level, legislative 
competence to establish a code is absent; instead, the legislative competence to develop private law 




Regardless of an express “codification provision” in the constitution, many legal orders have 
developed a codification. At the European level, this is not the case. However, despite 
arguments for a European Civil Code, it may be doubted whether a codification at the 
European level would contribute to the quality of private law.797 
 
3) Legislative restraint 
Whereas the German legislator has to justify not intervening, the Dutch legislator in general adopts 
restraint in developing legislation. The restraint of the European legislator also requires less 
justification than its interference, in accordance with the principle of conferred powers and subsidiarity.  
 
Arguably, this has led to more initiatives to the development of self-regulation in the Dutch 
legal order. However, a closer look reveals that although the approach of the German 
legislator may be a more active one, the legislator and the judiciary have recognised the role 
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 See for example H. Unberath, A. Johnston, ‘The double-headed approach of the CJEU concerning consumer protection’, 44 
CMLRev 2007, p. 1283. Comp. critically S. Weatherill, ‘The limits of legislative harmonization ten years after Tobacco 
Advertising: How the Court’s case law has become a drafting guide’, German Law Journal 2011, p. 827 et seq.  
794
 For example intellectual property law, see article 73 par. 1 sub 9 GG.  
795
 M. Lieb, ‘Grundfragen einer Schuldrechtsreform’, AcP 1983, p. 347 
796
 Comp. R. Zimmerman, ‘Konturen einer Europäischen Vertragsrechts’, JZ 1995, p. 491, who finds that a codification ‘bedarf  
der ständigen Erprobung, Konkretisierung und Fortbildung ind er Praxis und die geistigen Dutchdringung durch die 
Wissenschaft.’  
797
 See further chapter 7. 
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of private actors and have considered the development of self-regulation in a constitutional 
context. Nevertheless, the German legal order is more critical of self-regulation. At the 
European level, the lack of an equivalent of the Untermaβverbot has not withheld the 
European legislator from frequently intervening in private law, while alternative regulation has 
developed much less than is the case at the national level. Likely, however, this difference 
can be traced the European societal field that differs from national societal fields. 
More legislative intervention may both contribute to the quality of private law as 
unsuccessful self-regulation is replaced, while a more pragmatic approach may also inhibit 
initiatives that may be beneficial for the responsiveness of private law. 
 
4) Competence of the courts 
The BGH has taken an active approach where the German legislator has left gaps. This difference 
could perhaps also be seen in the light of German state actors’ duty to uphold the GG, if necessary by 
intervening through legislation,
798
 or, if that is absent, through judicial decision-making.
799
  
The Hoge Raad has been characterised as an ‘assistant legislator’ even before the 
amendments meant to strengthen its role in the development of the law.
800
 Yet although case law has 
prompted legislation,
801
 the Hoge Raad cannot oblige legislative intervention. Generally, the Hoge 
Raad exercises restraint, especially in cases where the law does not offer a clear indication what rule 
should be developed, and political considerations underpin the various possible options.
802
 In 
exceptional cases, when the legislator is aware that current law leads to an unacceptable situation – 
which was moreover contrary to international law – the judiciary may provide rules.
803
 In rare cases, 
the Hoge Raad has decided contra legem,
804
 although there is some disagreement on what decisions 
are contra legem – does the Hoge Raad decide contra legem if decisions go against the wording of 
legal provisions or if decisions go against the bearing of the law?
805
 The recent changes in the role of 
the Hoge Raad, which have been inspired by the previous House of Lords,
806
 highlight the role of the 
Hoge Raad in the development of law.  
The role of the CJEU differs because it is not concerned with developing private law within the 
framework of a code. Even where the Directives in the acquis show similarities – such as the use of 
similar blanket clauses or similar wording – this does not necessarily mean that the CJEU will provide 
consistent guidelines for the interpretation of these Directives, as the interpretation of these Directives 
also depends on the aim of Directives and the degree of harmonisation. Rather, the CJEU seeks to 
uphold and develop European law, in which it has played an active role. 
 
Thus, the role of the courts may lead to divergences in the development of private law 
through blanket clauses. The constitutional role of German courts may moreover more easily 
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 This may also entail that the lack of legislative intervention may become subject to a constitutional complaint if a duty to 
intervene clearly follows from the GG; comp. Epping/Hillgruber/Bek’scher Online-Kommentar GG/Morgenthaler (2012), article 
93, nr 60. 
799
 MunchKomm zum BGB/Säcker (2012) nr 152. See for example BAG 29 March 1984 - 2 AZR 429/83, NJW 1984, 2374, 
par.III d 3 a.   
800
 J.M. Polak, M.V. Polak, ‘Faux pas ou pas de deux?’, Netherlands International Law Review 1986, p. 99. 
801
 This is also the case in German law; see for examples D. Medicus, ‘Entscheidungen des BGH als Marksteine für die 
Entwicklung des allgemeinen Zivilrechts’, NJW 2000, p. 2926. 
802
 HR 23 September 1988, NJ 1989, 740. 
803
 HR 12 May 1999, NJ 2000, 170. 
804
 Decisions that have been characterized as contra legem include for example HR 21 March 1986, NJ 1986, 585, where the 
Hoge Raad held, against the background of article 8 ECHR, that article 1:246 BW that stipulated that parental autohrity could 
only exist if parents were married did not stand in the way of joint parental authority of the parties who were not married. Comp. 
also HR 19 December 1975, NJ 1976, 537, where the Hoge Raad decided that article 1:150 BW that stipulates that divorce can 
be declared between spouses that have not been legally separated, in which case article 1:179 et seq BW are exclusively 
applicable does not stand in the way for declaring divorce in a case where one party had claimed for divorce, the decision on 
which had not yet become final while legal separation that was simultaneously claimed had been declared. 
805
 G.J. Wiarda, 3 typen van rechtsvinding, with comments from T. Koopmans, Tjeenk Willink: Zwolle 4th ed., p. 39-40. Comp. 
the definition of T.J.M. Möllers, ‘ Doppelte Rechtsfortbildung contra legem? Zur Umgestaltung des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches 
durch den EuGH und nationale Gerichte’, in: H. Schlosser (ed.), Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 1896-1996, Müller: Heidelberg 1997, 
p. 154, 181. 
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 Commissie normstellende rol Hoge Raad, Versterking van de cassatierechtspraak, The Hague, February 2008. 
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mitigate problems arising from inflexible law. Koziol807 has argued that in some cases, the 
German legislator has opted for rules that leave too little room for discretion or pragmatic 
solution. Koziol808 has found that this may be a reason for the increasing recourse of the 
German judiciary to blanket clauses, while he doubts that these blanket clauses – in 
particular articles 242 and 826 BGB are a sufficient basis for the rules that have been 
developed on the basis of good faith, which, as such, is a very broad concept that does not 
necessarily clearly indicate how individual cases should be decided. Therefore, the 
prominent role of German courts may increase the responsiveness of private law but 
decrease predictability. For foreign parties, moreover, these developments may not be 
particularly accessible. 
Furthermore, importantly, the different role of the CJEU should be a reason to show 
more restraint in the use of blanket clauses in the acquis, as it may well lead to 
inconsistencies within the acquis.809 Moreover, the quesiton arises whether the CJEU has 
similarl possibilities to mitigate inflexbility of the law or other potential problems. 
 
5) Anticipation 
The active role of the Hoge Raad has moreover meant that judges have anticipated on the 
introduction of the BW, deciding cases on the basis of rules that not yet gone into force. In some cases, 
judges have also anticipated on Directives that had not yet gone into effect.
810
  In contrast, German 
judges have not anticipated the Schuldrechtsreform, especially because the decision of the legislator 
to reform the BGB, after years of silence, came as a surprise. The German judiciary has however 
anticipated Directives if they have not been timely implemented.
811
   
The role of the CJEU differs as it cannot ‘anticipate’ Directives – even if Directives still need to 
be implemented, a complaint before the CJEU requires that the Directive has already been 
established. In the case of Directives in the process of reform, the CJEU has not been known to 
anticipate future amendments. Doing so would be difficult to reconcile with the principle of conferred 
powers, especially as proposed amendments may be controversial. This also means that the CJEU, if 
it anticipated on proposal, runs the risk of anticipating a rule that will not become law. In exceptional 
cases, however, the CJEU
812
 has obliged Member States to set aside legislation even though the 
Directive obliging Member States to do so had not yet become effective.  
 
Thus, the stable development of private law also provides the judiciary with the opportunity to 
make legislative changes more smooth, ensuring more predictability and consistency in 
cases of recodification. 
 
6) Judicial evaluation of alternative regulation 
The German judiciary have played a more important role in evaluating alternative regulation as it has 
developed an active approach in subjecting privately drafted rules to judicial evaluation to prevent 
Fremdbestimmung. The Dutch judiciary is arguably not similarly constitutionally bound to prevent 
Fremdbestimmung, and the Dutch judiciary has accordingly not developed a similar approach to 
evaluating contracts. However, the Dutch judiciary does have room to intervene in obligations as 
articles 6:2 and 6:248 BW stipulate that obligations also have consequences that follow from the law 
or from fairness, while the judiciary may also set aside obligations if that would have consequences 
that are unacceptable from the perspective of fairness. In rare cases, the Hoge Raad has allowed 
fairness in the meaning of article 6:2 BW to play a central role in decisions: thus, the claim of a young 
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811
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 CJEU 22 November 2005 (Mangold v Helm), C-144/04, [2005] ECR, p. I-9981. 
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widower who had murdered his elderly wife for the inheritance was denied on the basis of article 3:166 
par. 3 and 6:2 BW.
813
  
The role of the German and the Dutch clearly differs from the CJEU. Even though the private 
law acquis refers to good faith and fairness, as the CJEU has insufficient insight into the factual 
background of cases to come to similar decisions, which will also depend on national law.  
 
The development of judicial evaluation has resulted in a relatively consistent and predictable 
approach in the German legal order to alternative regulation that ensures that non-state 
actors cannot impose one-sided rules on third parties, in accordance with ideas on justice. 
However, judicial evaluation may also decrease the extent to which parties can rely upon 
privately drafted rules.  
 
Thus, the differences and similarities between the roles of national state actors do not 
lead to drastic differences in the way that private law is developed. A prominent role of 
the courts is visible both at the national and the European level. This role may both 
strengthen and weaken the quality of private law.  
An important difference, however, is the evaluation of alternative regulation by the 
German courts, limiting the role of non-state actors, which may both benefit and impair the 
quality of private law. 
 Another difference that has likely led to more legislation and less alternative 
regulation is the Untermaβverbot, which may both undermine and strengthen the quality of 
private law.  
 
6.3.2. The role of actors beyond the national level 
In the Dutch legal order, European law has direct effect, not on the basis of articles 93 and 
94 Gw, but on the basis of European law. International law may have direct effect on the 
basis of articles 93 and 94 Gw.  
In contrast, international and European actors have a less prominent role as 
international law, with the exception of international law falling within the scope of article 59 
GG, has no direct effect, and the direct effect and the priority of European law is based of 
European law is based on the GG, while a central role is reserved to national state actors.   
 
The influence of the ECHR makes clear that there are fundamental differences with regard to the 
effect of international law in the German and the Dutch legal order. In the Dutch legal order, the ECHR 
has direct effect and may set aside legislation – something that the judge cannot do on the basis of 
the constitution. In extreme cases, the continuous breach of international law may lead the judiciary to 
set aside its restraint and provide rules.
814
 In contrast, in the German legal order, the ECHR has no 
direct effect in the German legal order but has been ratified and implemented in German law.
815
  The 
ECHR also cannot set aside legislation as the law implementing the ECHR is “only” a formal law that 
does not stand above other laws in the way that the GG does. However, the BVerfG frequently refers 
to the ECHR, which has gained a more important role through the sheer amount of case law that it 
produces. Also, inconsistencies between formal laws allow for arbitrariness, which is undesirable from 
a constitutional point of view. Other approaches are also visible in the European Union: although 
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international law also has to be implemented in English law, the judiciary has adopted far more 




In addition, the European legislator may both support and inhibit the effect of international 
initiatives. If the European legislator has taken into account international initiatives, this will 
generally mean that this approach will subsequently also be adopted by national actors, in 
particular if the European legislator has chosen to initiate binding harmonisation that takes 
international guidelines as an example.  
In contrast, if the European legislator has not followed the approach of international 
actors, national state actors may only takes these initiatives into account insofar as that does 
not breach their obligations to correctly implement European measures.  
As both international, European, Dutch and German actors show a preference for 
legislation, the increasing role of especially European actors does not drastically affect the 
way in which private law is developed. The quality of private law may both improve and 
diminish the quality of private law. If European actors initiate harmonisation in areas falling 
within the scope of treaties, this may contribute to the consistent interpretation of treaties 
throughout the Union. However, if he CJEU does not follow previous national decisions on 
treaties, this may decrease predictability. 
 
6.4. The role of non-state actors 
The previous chapters have also looked at the role of non-state actors in the development of 
European private law. Paragraph 6.4.1. will compare the role of non-state actors in general. 
Paragraph 6.4.2. will consider the effects of the role of non-state actors on the way in whcih 
private law is developed.  
 
6.4.1. The role of non-state actors compared 
The increasing role of non-state actors has been recognised in both the German legal orders. 
Academics and stakeholder groups may play an important role in the development of private 
law.   
Interestingly, various similar non-state actors may play an important role in both the 
Dutch and German legal order, which has led to the development of alternative regulation in 
similar fields. Thus, professional organisations, unions and sports’ organisations are left with 
extensive room to develop alternative regulation.  
In addition, self-regulation in the area of consumer sales and advertising817 are well-
developed, while similar initiatives for increasing the access to basic payment accounts, 
corporate governance, and corporate social responsibility are visible. Especially in areas 
where similarities arise, it may be attractive for actors to look at corresponding developments.  
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Notwithstanding these similarities, some differences also become apparent: 
 
1) The role of private actors is more controversial in the German legal order.   
 
The German legislator or judiciary may be constitutionally obliged to intervene if alternative regulation 
leads to Fremdbestimmung. This may complicate ensuring compliance with self-regulation - especially 
problems with dynamic referral make additional measures to ensure compliance with for example 
international sports’ rules necessary. The German legislator seems unwilling to reinforce privately 
drafted rules with hard law, but rather imposes a duty on private actors to report their compliance with 
self-regulation, or expresses the expectation that compliance with privately developed rules will 
constitute good practice. Self-regulation may also be enforced on the basis of contracts, articles of 
association, or tort law, and instances in the German legal order that are not reinforced on a 
contractual or other basis seem rare, but do exist – for example the Werbekodex, or the initiative for 
basic payment account.  
The controversy on the role of non-state actors also becomes clear from the potential 
propblems surrounding the involvement of stakehodler groups in the development of 
Sonderprivatrecht, especially in highly specialised, rapidly developing areas in need of swift legislative 
intervention. The drafting of the financial market stabilising act 
(‘Finanzmarktstabilisierungsergänzungsgesetz’) by attorneys has given rise to the question whether 
the involvement of private actors was in accordance with article 33 par. 4 GG that stipulates that the 
execution of legislative competences should be left to public services.
818
 More generally, the 
involvement of private actors has been criticised, in accordance with the assumption that private 





distinguishes the involvement of stakeholders from the involvement of academics. He considers that 
academics pursue the public interest, instead of particular aims, while their broad and systematic view 
makes their participation in the drafting of codifications, in his opinion, particularly useful.  
In the Dutch legal order, similar objections have not developed and alternative regulation also 
seems more easily reinforced with hard law, and subject to less control once it has been developed. 
In the drafting of the Civil Code, practitioners and other interested parties have been involved, 
but especially experts have been given a central role in the drafting process.
821
 The involvement of 
legal experts and involved practice is currently an established practice, as shown in other important 
legislation on private law, for example, in the reform of insurance contract law
822




At the European level, the role of non-state actors is also less problematic than is the case 
under the German framework. Typically, the initiatives of non-state actors are reinforced, while these 
initiatives are subjected to relatively mild control mechanisms. 
Restraint with regard to the role of private actors is not visible at the European level, where the 
initiatives of private actors may prompt legislative measures. This was for example the case in 
Directive 98/26 on settlement finality and Directive 2002/47 on financial collateral arrangements. The 
drafting of the Settlement Finality Directive was prompted by reports from the Bank for International 
Settlements
824
 that called for minimum standards for the operation and design for cross-border multi-
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currency netting systems, as well as enhancing the finality of transfers and settlements in domestic 
markets in order to limit risks and costs arising in cross-system settlements.
825
 
The European view emphasises the added value of including private actors in the 
development measures pursuing European policy aims. In contrast to the German view, the possibility 
that private actors do not pursue the public interest but their own interests has not been considered. 
Rather, the initiatives of private actors are seen in the light of European policy aims. Consequently, the 
European view does not, as such, seem to recognise problems that may arise if private actors are very 
prominently involved in the legislative process. However, from a German perspective, the prominent 
involvement of private actors may open up the possibility that legislation is drafted one-sidedly. 
 
What consequences does this have for the quality of private law?  
The restraints on the roles of private actors have motivated state and non-state actors 
to reinforce alternative regulation, which may enhance the predictability of the law. Similarly, 
non-state actors have played a role in the drafting of legislation, although in the German legal 
order, objections may arise against a too far-going interdependence between the legislature 
and interest groups. However, Dutch actors have similarly recognised enforcement as a 
weakness and accordingly reinforced alternative regulation. German initiatives moreover 
make alternative regulation and compliance more accessible. 
 
2) The Dutch approach to alternative regulation is more bottom-up.  
This becomes visible in the failure of the standaardregeling
826
 and the corresponding success of 
collectively negotiated STC’s, as well as the development of the corporate governance codes and 
corporate social responsibility. Thus, alternative regulation is not necessarily as organised by state 
actors as German alternative regulation, which has however not limited the amount of alternative 
regulation. 
The European legislator has adopted a top-down approach, and considers the initiatives of 
private actors in the light of European policy aims. Alternative regulation that has developed beyond 
the national level is rare and if it exists – for example the EMOTA Convention – it need not necessarily 
be taken into account by European actors.  
 
What consequences does this have for the quality of private law?  
The Dutch bottom-up approach has not lessened the amount of successful alternative 
regulation, although initially, problems of enforcement arose that were tackled more 
efficiently in the German legal order. The supervision in the German legal order seems a 
better guarantuee for ensuring the inclusiveness of alternative regulation as well as the 
accessibility. In contrast, the European approach may undermine responsiveness, 
consistency, and accessibility, as it may lead to multiple sets of alternative regulation, and 
the relations between them may not be directly visible. 
 
3) The development of alternative regulation against a constitutional background.  
Dutch or European actors generally do not consider the development of alternative regulation as a 
means to exercise consitutional rights, with the exception of collective labour agreements. In the 
German legal order, private autonomy, protected by article 2 GG, and the freedom of association in 
article 9 GG leave private actors with a wide range of discretion to develop self-regulation.    
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However, the lack of constitutional background makes it less likely that the Dutch or the 
European legislator will strive to protect the role of non-state actors, making legislative intervention 
subject to less restraint. In the German legal order, the limitation of the roles of private actors may be 
problematic from a constitutional point of view. 
 
What consequences does this have for the quality of private law?  
 The constitutional background may improve the stable development of private law, as 
legislative intervention in areas where alternative regulation was established is likely to be 
better motivated. Notably, the lack of a constitutional background has however not made the 
Dutch legislator more decisive, and weak alternative regulation that does not cope well with 
business practices may more easily continue to exist in the Dutch legal order.  
 
6.4.2. The role of non-state actors and the development of private law  
The increasing role of non-state actors is role may affect the way in which private law is 
developed in various ways:   
 
1) The increasing role of non-state actors may benefit the development of legislation as 
academics, who play an important role in both legal orders, support the drafting of 
legislation.  
 
2) The involvement of non-state actors may also lead to more alternative regulation, 
while academics may also be involved in the drafting of alternative regulation.  
 
Importantly, the success of self-regulation could also be sought in the level of expertise, the support 
within a sector, the extent to which that sector is organised, the clarity of rules contained in self-





 already stated that for the effectiveness of self-regulation, it is imperative that a branch is 
sufficiently organised and is both legally and in fact able to enforce self-regulation. However, as self-
regulation is increasingly developed and private actors gain a more important role, these actors may 
more easily have the resources to develop successful self-regulation.  
 
3) Non-state actors may be more internationally oriented than state actors. Whereas 
state law often takes national concepts as a starting point, non-state actors frequently 
emphasise the relevance of international developments – they may be members of 
international organisations,829 or modelled on international organisations,830 or they 
may find that representation at a transnational level may be useful as transnational 
rules are well suited to deal with transnational practices.  
 
4) Non-state actors may seek to play a prominent role in the development of a particular 
set of rules on a particular subject and accordingly take foreign and international 
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developments into account, as was the case for the Nachhaltigkeitskodex831 and the 
corporate governance Kodex. 832  Apparently, a more prominent role of non-state 
actors does not necessarily decrease instances of regulatory competition.   
 
A particularly interesting examples for alternative regulatory competition in the German legal order is 
the development of the Nachhaltigkeitskodex. It will be interesting to see whether this initiative will be 
more successful than the Dutch initiative – the emphasis of the German approach on transparency 
and statements of compliance, as well as the evaluation of the Kodex, seem however more promising 
than the laissez faire approach of the Dutch legislator.  The cooperation developed in the area of 
consumer sales by Trusted Shops may also provide an interesting example of successful self-
regulation for other legal orders.  
Similarly, the consistent analysis for upholding or not upholding contracts and the judicial 
control of STC’s in accordance with the Richtigkeitsgewähr may provide particularly interesting starting 
points for other legal orders as well.  
Similarly, interesting Dutch examples are mass settlements on the basis of contractual 
settlements and the introduction of a national prejudicial procedure.  
Collectively negotiated STC’s are also well-established and relatively successful. However, the 
attractiveness of this option for other Member States also depends on the question whether the use of 
collectively negotiated STC’s is limited under Directive 93/13. 
Additionally, many codes of conduct have developed in the Dutch legal order. Some of these 
codes, especially in the area of consumer sales, may also be interesting for foreign businesses, but 
the accessibility of these codes of conduct and trust marks also depends on the question whether the 
codes, trust marks and collectively negotiated STC’s are sufficiently available to foreign businesses 
that may not have an extensive command of Dutch. Other codes of conduct are currently little known 
among Dutch consumers. However, if courts would choose to bind businesses who have committed 
themselves to these codes, this could change, and provide an interesting source of information to 
foreign or transnational actors. 
Currently, initiatives at the European level may be interesting for Dutch actors. Particularly, the 
development of guidelines for the interpretation of blanket clauses and committees reminiscent of 
comitology committees have been suggested.
833
   
 
5) Interestingly, however, the prominent inclusion of private actors may in turn affect the 
development of legislation, if for example interdependence between state actors and 
non-state actors develops and the “threat” of legislative intervention decreases, but 




This chapter has asked how the differences and similarities betwee the roles of actors have 
affected the way in which private law is developed and how the quality of private law is 
affected. 
Many similarities between the German, Dutch and European legal order can be found. 
These similarities include the prominent role of the legislature and judiciary, the prominent 
role of academics, and the use of alternative regulation in various functionally developed 
areas.  
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Various important differences are visible with regard to the role of European and 
international actors and the relation between the legislature and the judiciary.  Moreover, the 
role of non-state actors may differ. 
More involvement of either state or non-state actors does not diminish or enhance the 
quality of private law as such. The ideal role of actors depends on the area of law, especially 
important characteristics of that area such as the expertise needed for intervening in a 
particular field, the rapid development of an area, or the involvement of weaker parties. The 
capabilities of non-state actors – their expertise and their experience, as well as their 
organisational capacity and the support that they have from members – may also play an 
important role. Principles of private autonomy and Fremdbestimmung can provide starting 
points for a framework that can consistently determine the roles of actors. 835 Notably, such a 
framework does not stand in the way of developing alternative regulation, nor does it mean 
that actors have to overlook potential benefits of alternative regulation.  
  Importantly, also, despite the different role of actors, the way in which private law is 
developed does not differ dramatically. German, Dutch and European actors share a 
preference for legislation. Both the German and Dutch legislator have developed  
codifications and blanket clauses in those codifications leave the judiciary considerable room 
for developing private law further. Academics play a prominent role in the development of 
these codes, and European actors have chosen to prominently include academics in 
European projects.  
State actors have also recognised the use of privately drafted rules, and in many 
similar areas, alternative regulation has developed.  
The differences in the approach towards actors’ roles have also led to some 
differences in the way in which private law is developed. Thus, in the German legal order, 
there is less co-regulation than in the Dutch legal order, while European actors also 
encourage co-regulation more. Interestingly, although objections to dynamic referral have 
been emphasised in the German legal order, the legislator has made more successful use of 
this technique than the Dutch legislator. Non-state actors are left more room for 
experimentation in the Dutch legal order, which in turn has allowed for innovative alternative 
regulation that has been taken into account by other actors developing or encouraging 
alternative regulation. The less active approach of Dutch actors has however also allowed for 
more ineffective alternative regulation than is visible in the German legal order  
 More generally, the German legislator has shown more restraint than Dutch or 
European actors in allowing private actors to impose binding rules on other parties, unless 
this is the result of the law or of negotiations. Accordingly, the German judiciary has 
developed a more active and more consistent approach to the evaluation of alternative 
regulation than either the Dutch or European courts.  Moreover, only the German legal order 
has considered that the development of alternative regulation can have constitutional 
dimensions. Because of this constitutional dimension, the German legislator is more likely to 
continue to adopt restraint than is the case in the Dutch legal order or at the European level.   
What consequences do these differences and similarities have for the way in which 
private law is developed in the multilevel legal order? If the comparison of two reasonably 
similar Member States already shows differences, differences with other Member States may 
also become apparent. On the one hand, the similar way in which private law is developed 
despite differences with regard to the relation between the legislature and the judiciary, and 
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the roles of international actors, indicates that differences in the roles of actors need not 
necessarily lead to the radically different use of techniques. On the other hand, the different 
roles of non-state actors does make a difference for the development of private law through 
alternative regulation. This may in turn be important for the success of European initiatives 






Chapter 7: The use of national techiques in the 




In the multilevel legal order, state actors have become interdependent; they have become 
less able to independently guarantee the predictability, accessibility, consistency and 
responsiveness of private law. This interdependence entails higher standards for the process 
through which private law is developed. In particular, sufficient interaction between actors is 
important. Simultaneously, the development of European private law has become more 
complicated – more actors are involved and more complex, cross-border problems need to 
be resolved – making it more difficult for actors to meet these standards.  
This chapter will ask whether actors in the use of national techniques, have 
adequately taken into account that other actors develop private law, which can limit the 
extent to which national techniques can contribute to benchmarks of predictability, 
accessibility, consistency and responsiveness, and how the use of techniques affects the 
quality of European private law. According to the debate on multilevel governance, 
recognition of interdependence and interaction may enable actors to benefit from the 
existence of other actors; however, if it is not the case, problems may arise. Thus, the 
interdependence between actors and the need for interaction between actors points to a 
more careful use of techniques, that can cope with the coexistence of actors, the 
interdependence between actors, the need for interaction, and the dynamic nature of the 
European legal order.  
Yet notably, an optimal use of techniques would automatically lead to “perfect” private 
law. However, problems in the use of techniques may lead to problems for European private 
law, and improving the use of techniques, and solving those problems may benefit European 
private law. This means that: 
  
 The coexistence or actors is problematic if actors undermine one another’s 
contributions towards more comprehensible European private law. Actors need not 
purposely do this; but if actors do not take into account that other actors 
simultaneously develop European private law, the chance that they subsequently 
undermine one another’s actions increases. 
 
 The coexistence of actors is beneficial if actors reinforce one another’s contributions 
towards a more comprehensible European private law. If actors take into account the 
existence of and dependence on other actors, and interact with one another, this 
increases the chance that they will take advantage of insights from other actors and 
that their simultaneous efforts reinforce one another – although this may not 
necessarily be the case.  
 
Paragraph 7.2. will discuss the use of codifications and paragraph 7.3. will turn to the use of 
soft laws. Subsequently, paragraph 7.4. will consider blanket clauses and paragraph 7.5. will 






7.2. The use of codifications in a multilevel legal order  
Have legislators taken into account that other actors also develop private law and have they 
accordingly interacted with these actors? How has their approach affected the extent to 
which codifications increase predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness of 
European private law?  
This paragraph will focus on two instances where interaction may prove especially 
necessary. Paragraph 7.2.1. will ask whether the implementation of the private law acquis 
into codifications contributes to the stable, consistent and accessible development of 
European private law. Subsequently, paragraph 7.2.2. will ask whether the use of 
codifications in areas with inherent cross-border aspects, such as private international law or 
transport law, contributes to the accessible, consistent and stable development of European 
private law within the framework provided by the code. Paragraph 7.2.3. will end with a 
conclusion.  
 
7.2.1. The implementation of the acquis within codifications 
Why have the German and Dutch legislator emphasised the role of the codification in the 
ongoing development and implementation of the private law acquis and have legislators 
sufficiently recognised the capability of codifications to accomplish this in the light of the 
ongoing development of the private law acquis? 
 Both the German and the Dutch legislator have opted to implemented the private law 
acquis into national codifications. This strategy has a number of reasons.  
 
1) The implementation of Directives into the Civil Code furthers the accessibility of 




 adds that implementing the acquis into the Civil Code also enhances the visibility of 
consumer contract law and might lead to ‘simplification’ of private law. This argument is however not 
very convincing as implementation of consumer law within the Civil Code can simultaneously lead to 
problems of clarity and accessibility: of many provisions implemented in the Civil Code, the “European 
background” is unclear, and parties may therefore overlook relevant CJEU case law. 
 
2) The development of specific laws alongside the Civil Code, which might lead to 
fragmented development of private law, and resulting inconsistencies, is prevented.837  
 
However, in the German legal order, the aim to retain the important role of the BGB
838
 may arguably 






Moreover, the implementation within the Civil Code does not effectively inhibit the fragmented 
and inconsistent development of private law; rather, the development of fragmented, specific laws at 
the national level is prevented. The development of some private law rules take place regardless of 
                                               
836
 H. Rösler, ‘Europeanisation of private law through Directives – Determining factors and modalities of implementation’, 
European Journal of Law Reform 2010, p. 316-317.   
837
 Handelingen I, 2004/05, 28 874, nr. 17, p. 759-760.  
838
 R. Zimmerman, The new German law of obligations, Historical and comparative perspectives, OUP: Oxford 2005, p. 226.     
839
 Comp. for example the Produkthaftungsgesetz (Product Liability Act), or the Wohnungseigentumsgesetz (Act on the property 
of residences).  
840
 Zimmerman 2005, p. 198. 
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the rules within the national Civil Codes, or the subsequent implementation of those rules into the code, 
which may well lead to inconsistencies. The implementation of European concepts that are identical to 
national concepts within the Civil Code may moreover lead to the development of identical concepts 
with divergent meanings within one law.
841
 Arguably, if such concepts are to be introduced, 
implementation should preferably take place outside the Civil Code, or in a separate part of the code, 
as this could at least indicate that concepts in these laws, although identical to concepts in the Civil 
Code, may have to be interpreted differently, in accordance with European law.  
Maybe, experiences from other legislators will show that implementation within separate books 
of a code, or even separate legislation, may also ensure the interrelation between different provisions 
within the code.  
 
3) The Dutch legislator842 holds that, by implementing the private law acquis within the 
Civil Code, it becomes clear which parts of simultaneously applicable private law 
should be reconciled with the acquis.  
 
It can be doubted whether this implementation technique has been successful in this respect. For 
example, rules on the unfairness of standard contract terms and the effects of unfairness have been 
interpreted in conformity with the national principle of fairness in article 6:248 BW rather than in 
conformity with European rules.
843
 Similarly, German courts have shown restraint in referring 
questions on the interpretation of article 307 BGB to the CJEU as it concerns a central notion of 
German law.
844
 Moreover, German case law on STC’s developed on the basis of article 242 BGB, and 
the idea that STC’s should be subjected to judicial evaluation is still based on the notion that the user 
of STC’s may have misused the freedom of contract to impose rules to his advantage on his contract 




4) By implementing the acquis within the Civil Code, the coherence established by the 
Civil Code should be preserved  
 
It may be doubted whether this is possible at all, because the ongoing harmonisation of private law 
does not consider the coherence of private law at a national level.
846
 Also, implementing the acquis 
within the Civil Code may make the code vulnerable with regard to amendments as well as new 
harmonisation – as the acquis is reformed, the Civil Code will have to be amended as well, and as 
harmonisation of private law continues, the Civil Code will have to be increasingly adapted. 
Accordingly, Zimmerman,
847
 finds that incorporation did not improve the quality of the BGB, but 
instead brought with it the need for repeated amendments after 2002 reform. The need to regularly 
amend the Civil Code in accordance with the acquis, the development of which may be hard to predict, 
may in that case also undermine the stable – and thereby predictable – development of private law. 
The question whether the private law acquis should be incorporated in the BGB or not  should 
also be seen against the distinction between the BGB and Sonderprivatrecht.
848
 Whereas the BGB 
contains rules on ‘general’ private law, Sonderprivatrecht seeks to develop rules targeted at a specific 
group such as consumers, usually from a political perspective. As the development of such ‘special’ 
rules is considered to be less stable, keeping these rules outside the BGB may reduce the need to 
regularly amend the BGB – which is in accordance with the stable development of the BGB – and 
                                               
841
 W.-H. Roth, ‘Europäischer Verbraucherschutz und BGB’, JZ 2001, p. 482, speaks of ‘Begriffsinseln’ as well as 
‘Begriffsspaltungen’ within the Civil Code. 
842
 Handelingen I, 2004/05, 28 874, nr. 17, p. 760, similarly H. Rösler, ‘Europeanisation of private law through Directives – 
Determining factors and modalities of implementation’, European Journal of Law Reform 2010, p. 317. 
843
 Comp. HR 14 June 2002, NJ 2003, 112.  
844
 B. Heiderhof, ‘Die Berücksichtigung des Art. 3 Klauselrichtlinie bei der AGB-Kontrolle’, WM 2003, p. 510.  
845
 MunchKomm zum BGB/Wurmnest (2012), introduction to article 307, nr 11. 
846
 W.H. van Boom, ‘Algemene en bijzondere regelingen in het vermogensrecht’, RM Themis 2003, p. 299-300. 
847
 R. Zimmerman, The new German law of obligations, Historical and comparative perspectives, OUP: Oxford 2005, p. 201.  
848
 See also below, par. 10.3.1.1. A similar sharp distinction, and similar debate on the development of private law in a code or in 
separate legislation, is not visible in Dutch private law. 
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maintain the coherence of “general” private law. Thus, the choice whether to implement the acquis 
within the BGB also depends on the question whether one finds that the acquis provides rules of 
general private law or whether one finds that they pursue “special” rules. It is not clear on what basis 
this distinction is made – the incorporation of a large range of Directives in the area of consumer 
contract law indicates that the origin of the Directive, and the aims of Directives do not set them apart 
as Sonderprivatrecht. 
On the one hand, the incorporation of Directives into the BGB may be defended as especially 
Directive 99/44 on consumer sales contains rules that are a central part of national contract laws. 
Zimmerman
849
 approves of the incorporation of consumer law into the BGB, as it concerns general 
contract law, and pursues an end similar to general contract law, i.e. protecting parties substantive 
freedom of choice when they enter into a contract. These rules may therefore be seen in the light of 





 finds that consumer contract law should not be based on ‘loosely defined 
social concerns’.  
On the other hand, the idea that consumer contract law established by the EU pursues 
general aims of contract law in a manner comparable to German private law is not self-evident. Rather, 
looking at the Directives reveals that the acquis hardly seems to be based on maintaining the balance 
between parties – instead, it seems to be based on loosely defined economic concerns, while the 
question whether general principles underpin the private law acquis is subject to debate.
852
 In 
particular, principles of private autonomy and Fremdbestimmung were not discussed during the 
drafting of the Directive.  
 
Thus, the reasoning of the German and Dutch legislator makes clear that national legislators 
are well aware of the need to deal with ongoing harmonisation. However, their reasons for 
implementing the acquis within codifications are not based on a clear, consistent strategy 
and the aims of codifications are stressed without considering whether the development of 
the acquis makes it more difficult to achieve these aims. In other words, national legislators 
adopt a defensive approach in the implementation of the acquis in codifications. 
  
7.2.2. The use of codifications in areas of private law with a ‘cross-border’ 
aspect 
Have legislators adequately recognised the development of European and international law, 
and the capability of the code to contribute to the consistent, accessible and predictable 
development of private law with an inherent cross-border aspect?  
National legislators853  are inclined to preserve codification even in areas that have an 
inherently transnational character and that have become increasingly harmonised, as is the 
case for international private law. Accordingly, the Dutch legislator has sought to codify this 
area in an additional book in the Dutch Civil Code. Similarly, the German legislator also 
opted for codification in the EGBGB.  
 
►The German legislator has considered its approach to the development of private 
international law in the light of international and European initiatives. 
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 Zimmerman 2005, p. 224. Zimmerman noted that German academics were uncharacteristically divided on the 
Schuldrechtsmodernisierung. See for a different option for example W. Ernst, B. Gsell, ‘Kaufrechtslinie und BGB’, ZIP 2000, p. 
1410. See especially critically W. Flume, ‘Vom Beruf unserer Zeit zur Gesetzgebung’, ZIP 2000, p. 1427 (on the implementation 
of Directive 97/7). 
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 S. Symeonides, ‘Codification and flexibility in private international law’, General reports to the XVIIIth Congress of the 
International Academy of Comparative Law/ Rapports, 2011, p. 5-10, with an extensive overview of the number of codifications 




The German legislator codified private international law in articles 3 et seq EGBGB in 1986, 
as BVerfG case law necessitated reform of private international law.854 Originally, there was 
debate whether the development of private international law should be left to international 
law, which was an argument against the inclusion of private international law in the BGB.855 
Kropholler 856  held that international law had improved the quality of German private 
international law, but also found that as internationalisation increased, the codification would 
increasingly be overshadowed and replaced by relevant treaties. If international law was 
applicable, Kropholler therefore preferred referral to international law to incorporation. The 
1986 reform did not abolish private international law outside of the EGBGB that existed in 
separate laws, treaties and customary law.857  
This restraint was reconsidered. Whereas, in the 1986 reform, future EU initiatives 
were a reason for the German legislator to abstain from providing rules in the area of non-
contractual obligations,858 the German legislator took a more active approach in the 1999 
reform. The German legislator did provide rules for non-contractual obligations, 
notwithstanding simultaneous developments at the European level, apparently in an attempt 
to influence the future Regulation.859 After Regulations Rome I and II, the German legislator, 
abandoned overlapping “national” private international law. 860  The German legislator did 
retain articles 40-42 EGBGB on non-contractual obligations as Regulation Rome II did not 
provide a sufficiently comprehensive regime to jusitfy abolishing these provisions. However, 
the scope of articles 40-42 EGBGB was considerably reduced by the Regulation. 861 
Moreover, in the German legal order, concern on the lack of coherence between relevant 
Regulations (and possibly, treaties) have been raised. 
 
►Thus, the difficulties in maintaining coherence at the national level when private 
international law is developed at the European or international level has been considered, 
and the legislative approach to future European initiatives has also been considered. This 
consideration may be beneficial for private international law as it has provided the European 
legislator with a set of rules that it may take as an example in drafting European initiatives.  
 
►The Dutch legislator has not considered the possibility that the aims of codifications 
can be undermined by European or international initiatives, nor has it sought to influence 
European initiatives through reforming the law. 
 
Accordingly, in 2001, the Dutch legislator provided private international law on non-
contractual obligations, without referring to simultaneous European developments.862 These 
rules were abandoned after Regulation Rome II was established, and the Dutch legislator 
extended the rules of the Regulation to cover areas falling outside its scope.863       
Also, the Dutch legislator has emphasised the benefits of codification in the drafting of 
book 10. Particularly, the Dutch legislator maintains that the development of a code benefits 
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 See further Max Planck Institute, RabelsZ 1983, p. 595.  
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accessibility. 864 In the view of the Dutch legislator, the chance that national provisions may 
“gain” a European background865 and ongoing harmonisation strengthens the need for a 
national codification of international private law.  
However, relevant questions for the capability of codifciations to independently 
achieve accessibility, as well as predictability, consistency and responsiveness have not 
suffciently been recognised. Specifically, the question to what extent the national legislator 
can still offer a framework for international private law in the light of international and 
European initiatives has been debated in the Dutch legal order where Book 10 of the BW 
went into effect in 2012. 866  Codification cannot prevent the development of private 
international law alongside the code, which may necessitate further amendments to the 
code,867  which may undermine the predictable development of private law in the code. 
Codification does also not ensure the consistent development of international private law at 
the European level. Additionally, as the territorial scope of codifications is limited to the 
territory of a state, it may be asked whether codifications are particularly suitable to deal with 
cross-border issues such as international private law.868 Also, importantly, the aim of Book 10 
to improve accessibility has already been undermined by the development of various 
Directives869 that contain international private law provisions, which have been implemented 
in the various parts of the Civil Code 870  and other laws. 871  This is unlike the German 
approach, where article 46b EGBGB provides an overview of areas where particular conflict 
rules, following from Directives, apply.872  
 
►Thus, the Dutch legislator has not sufficiently recognised interdependence, which 
has necessitated amendments in recently reformed laws, and the accessibility, predictability 
and consistency of private international law may be diminished. 
 
7.2.3. Conclusion on the use of codifications 
Have legislators taken into account that other actors also develop private law and have they 
accordingly interacted with these actors? How has their approach affected the extent to 
                                               
864
 Similarly, M.V. Polak, ‘Oppassen – inpassen – aanpassen. Taken en bevoegdheden van wetgever en rechter bij de receptie 
van internationaal en communautair IPR in de Nederlandse rechtsorde’, in: C.A. Joustra, M.V. Polak, Internationaal, 
communautair en nationaal IPR (Mededelingen van de vereniging voor Internationaal Recht 2002), Asser Press: The Hague 
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beneficial for legal practice to oversee the rules in private international law in a particular subject, rather than categorising the 
different rules of private international law in accordance with the different actors issuing that particular set of rules. 
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 Kamerstukken II, 2009/10, 32 137, nr. 3, p. 4.  
866
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 See further MunchKomm zum BGB/Martiny (2012), article 46b EGBGB, nr 4 et seq.  
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which codifications increase predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness of 
European private law?  
 Firstly, neither the German and Dutch legislator’s choice for incorporation of the 
acquis within respectively the BGB and BW has been based on interaction with other actors; 
instead, in both legal orders, maintaining codifications played a large role. Interestingly, the 
approach of the German legislator can be contrasted with its previous approach towards 
implementation of the acquis in separate legislation. This change makes clear that even if the 
German legislator initially did not insist on incorporation, the harmonisation of central areas 
of private law makes it unattractive for legislators to implement the acquis outside the code. 
The Dutch legislator was much more focussed on retaining its codification that had just been 
established as the acquis began to develop. For both legislators, retaining the code has been 
a decisive reason to implement the acquis within the codification. 
However, legislators in other legal orders do not necessarily share that opinion. If 
codes already distinguish between consumer codes and “general” codifications, 
implementation outside of the general code is more consistent with the existing approach to 
consumer law. In short, the choice how to implement the acquis depends not only on the 
strengths and weaknesses of a codification in the multievel legal order. Instead, the choice is 
predetermined by the way in which private law has developed within a legal order, and 
legislators will therefore primarily focus on their own legal order. Nevertheless, interaction 
with European actors and other legislators may be valuable as it may indicate whether 
legislators need to take further harmonisation initiatives into account. Alternatively, the 
experience of other actors with many separate laws, or with older codifications may indicate 
whether the development of separate legislation is necessarily problematic – depending on 
the approach of the judiciary and the existence of adequate handbooks – and in which ways 
the private law acquis can be implemented within codifications.   
 Secondly, the approach of the German and Dutch legislator towards the codification 
of private international law differs. The German legislator seems more inclined to interact 
with especially European actors, which is particularly visible in its 1999 initiative on private 
international law in non-contractual obligations. Notably, the 1999 initiative provided a set of 
rules that could serve as an example, which increases the chance that developments at the 
European level that are undesirable in the German view – in particular, inconsistencies 
between European rules and national law – are prevented or amended. Yet as more 
legislators opt for this approach, the influence of individual proposals may decline. 
Importantly, however, this approach does allow for thorough debate based on various 
options, which may contribute to the eventual outcome of debate, provided that actors are 
willing to accept compromises.  
 Yet the question arises whether German private international law is more 
comprehensible because the German legislator has interacted more. Notably, it has resulted 
in less amendments in newly established law than is the case in Dutch law, while the 
Regulation also showed less inconsistencies with German law.   
The Dutch legislator has not similarly considered its approach to codification in the 
light of European and international initiatives, and has had to amend newly established law. 
Nevertheless, it is not apparent that Dutch law is less comprehensible than German law. 
Although it has taken a less active approach than the German legislator, the Dutch legislator 
does not fail to interact and it is hardly the only legislator to establish a code on private 
international law. Book 10 BW arguably is more accessible than German private international 
law, but the EGBGB provides a better overview of diverging rules following from the private 
law acquis and it is unlikely that inconsistencies between German and European law will 
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arise. Yet as considerable parts of book 10 directly refer to Regulation Rome I, the Dutch 
approach is also unlikely to lead to inconsistencies. The choice of the Dutch legislator to 
extend the scope of Rome II rather than maintain national provisions may moreover 
decrease the chance of future inconsistencies. However, as future European initiatives 
develop that differ from Rome II, inconsistencies may still arise. 
In other areas, however, both the German 873  and the Dutch 874  legislator have 
anticipated Directives. In these cases, the Union may benefit from national experiences in 
the case of ‘anticipated implementation’. If “implementation” precedes harmonisation, this  
may make visible how a Directive or Regulation works in practice.875  
More generally, the development of the acquis and harmonisation and 
internationalisation in private international law make clear that increasing accessibility, 
consistency and the predictable development of private law within the framework provided by 
the code becomes more complicated in the multilevel legal order where multiple actors – not 
just the legislator involved in codification – develop binding private law.  
These difficulties do not mean that codifications may not still contribute to accessibility, 
consistency and predictability, as well as private law’s responsiveness to both legal practice 
and society’s views on justice, especially because large parts of private law are still 
developed at the national level. However, if legislative competence is transferred to the 
European level, legislators have reasons to adopt a more active approach to harmonisation, 
in order to become aware of future initiatives for harmonisation and the corresponding need 
to adapt codes. Also, national state actors, if they participate in European legislative 
procedures, need to contribute to a consistent development of the acquis, as this will lessen 
the chance that they will subsequently have to implement inconsistent European 
measures.876 European state actors should be equalkly aware of the need to develop the law 
in a more consistent manner. If national legislators take this approach, codifications may still 
improve accessibility. Moreover, European measures are less able to develop rules that are 
responsive to society’s legal views on justice, as European actors are likely to be less aware 
of these views. It is therefore not surprising that the use of codification continues to be 
widespread and is also adopted by new European Member States. Thus, any hopes that civil 
law jurisdictions will come to consider codification as ‘superfluous’ and ‘outmoded’ may, 
fortunately, continue to be disappointed.877  
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7.3. The use of soft laws 
At the European level, various sets of soft law have developed that partially overlap.  
 
This is especially the case for contract law, where soft law rules have been developed in the PECL, 
which has also been used as a basis in the development of the DCFR. Notably, a revised version of 
the PECL has developed,
878
 as well as the UNIDROIT Principles. Furthermore, there is also the Draft 
for a European contract code, drafted by Prof. Gandolfi,
879
 which shows considerable overlap with the 
PECL. The aims of these sets of soft law seem to overlap as well: they are to function as a toolbox, an 
optional regime that parties can apply to their contract, or they are to be used for the further 
development of private law at a European level, as well as academic debate and education on 
transnational or comparative European contract law. In addition, other projects such as the Trento 
common core project,
880
 and the Ius commune casebooks
881
 may serve these aims as well. 
 
Against this background, this paragraph asks whether the drafters of soft law have taken into 
account that other actors develop private law, whether actors have interacted with each other, 
and how this approach has affected the extent to which soft laws improve the predictability, 
accessibility, consistency and responsiveness of European private law. This paragraph will 
pay particular attention to the DCFR because of its role in the reform of the private law 
acquis and the development of a proposal for a Common European Sales Law. 
  Paragraph 7.3.1. asks whether actors have considered the capability of soft law to 
contribute to a more comprehensible private law. Paragraph 7.3.2. will consider the 
development of overlapping sets of soft law and paragraph 7.3.3. will consider the 
development of the DCFR alongside the acquis. Paragraph 7.3.4. will end with a conclusion.  
 
7.3.1. Soft laws modelled on national codifications  
This paragraph asks whether the drafters of soft law have taken into account that soft laws  
are less able to effectively increase the predictability, consistency, accessibility and 
responsiveness of law and depend upon other actors for their success, and how the 
approach of actors has affected the comprehensibility of private law.    
The difficulties that traditional codifications already have in safeguarding the 
predictability, consistency and responsiveness of private law indicate that soft laws may face 
even more difficulties in upholding predictability, consistency, accessibility and 
responsiveness. Nevertheless, the choice to model soft laws on successful codifications 
does not seem to have been given much thought. Instead, the choice of the drafters of soft 
law is in line with the widespread use of codifications throughout the European Union, and 
arguments for codification at the European level. 882  Thus, the drafters of the DCFR, 
established as an instrument to support the European legislator, felt that a codification was a 
“drafting” technique which had proven successful beyond other techniques. 883  The 
impression arises that the drafters have assumed that the use of codification will significantly 
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contribute to predictability, consistency and accessibility.884 This “national” approach towards 
drafting soft law is not specific the DCFR, but is visible in other sets of soft laws as well. 
Similar to the DCFR, the soft law rules at both the European and the international level 
typically take a rather “national” approach to private law – which is especially visible in the 
Gandolfi code, which is inspired by the Italian Civil Code and a draft for an English contract 
Code. 885  Similarly, the UNIDROIT Principles have been characterised in this way. 
Michaels886 even characterises the UNIDROIT Principles as a ‘codification’ that seeks to 
make private international law superfluous by providing a set of rules summarising the 
similarities between private laws:  
 
‘Ein Hauptziel für die Formuliering der PICC war ja gerade, die angebliche Unsicherheit des 
Kollisionrechts zu überwinden (….) Das Ziel der PICC is nicht, die Zahl der 
Vertragsrechtsordnungen zu erhöhen (was für echte Rechtswahlfreiheit gut wäre), sondern 
vielmehr, die bestehenden Vertragsrechtsordnungen auf einem gemeinsamen Kern 
zusammenzuführen.’    
 
Other soft law rules, although not especially focussed on a particular national code, 887 
similarly take black-letter rules in the form of model rules and definitions as a starting point, 
and seek to “”discover” similarities between divergent law in a manner reminiscent of the 
“discovery” of general principles.888 Notably, this does not mean that sets of soft law reflect 
the “common law” of Europe: although parts of soft law do seek to discover common 
elements, other parts may be intended as an innovation.889 This approach may also have its 
benefits: legislators familiar with codifications may choose to make use of soft law drafted in 
this form rather than projects on comparative private law.890 
The question however arises whether soft laws contribute to  benchmarks of 
predictability, consistency, accessibility and responsiveness in a manner similar to national 
codifications. In particular, the ongoing development of binding private law alongside the 
DCFR not only seems possible, but likely, which necessitates that the DCFR should take the 
existence of other sources of binding private law alongside the DCFR as a starting point. 
Notably, this characteristic may make effectively pursuing the accessibility of private law in 
the DCFR especially difficult. Moreover, the DCFR needs to take as a starting point that it 
depends upon other actors for its success: it needs to be consistently used by other actors, 
such as the European legislator and judiciary, which, in turn, may be an incentive for other 
actors, at the national level, to refer to it. If European actors perceive that the DCFR has a 
clearly added value, for example because it facilitates the use of consistent terminology 
within the acquis, because it provides insights in national problems that are important in the 
reform of the acquis, or because it draws attention to the need to clarify the relation between 
overlapping European measures, this makes it more likely that European actors will 
                                               
884
 Comp. M.W. Hesselink, ‘The Common Frame of Reference as a source of European private law’, Tulane Law Review 2009, 
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Vertragsrechts’, RabelsZ 2009, p. 879. 
196 
 
consistently refer to the DCFR. Moreover, as national judiciaries are starting to refer to the 
PECL,891 the added value of the DCFR to the PECL should also be clear for these actors, 
providing them with an incentive to start referring to the DCFR rather than the PECL.  
It may be concluded that the drafters of the DCFR did not sufficiently take into 
account the decreased ability of soft laws to contribute to more comprehensible private law. 
The drafters also did not sufficiently recognise that the success of soft law instruments 
depends on the use of soft law made by other actors, which in turn depends on the added 
value of those instruments for other actors. Because drafters have not recognised this 
interdependence, the added value of the DCFR to European private law, and to the quality of 
the acquis, may remain limited.  
 
7.3.2. Overlapping sets of soft law   
This paragraph will ask whether drafters of soft laws have sufficiently taken into account the 
existence of other sets of soft law and how this may affect the predictability, consistency, 
accessibility, and responsiveness of private law.  
Typically, sets of soft law such as the DCFR, the PECL, the Gandolfi code and the 
UNIDROIT Principles are based on comparative research, and thus take the coexistence of 
national private laws as a starting point. However, these sets of soft law subsequently do not, 
equally typically, make clear how they relate to the acquis or to one another, which may be 
especially interesting when divergences become apparent.892 This may in particular diminish 
the consistency and accessibility of private law:  
Firstly, the coexistence of various sets of soft laws gives rise to doubts with regard to 
the added value of multiple sets of soft law, especially considering the overlap between the 
different sets of soft law rules. Vogenauer893 has questioned whether the aims pursued by 
the DCFR could not also be fulfilled by the UNIDROIT principles, asking whether there is a 
need for another set of soft law rules, next to the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL. The 
question arises whether soft law sets in fields where soft law has not already been 
established would be more successful.  Accordingly, Loos894 has suggested that rules on 
other contracts, such as service contracts, franchise contracts, and distribution contracts 
would have had more added value, as contract law on these topics diverges throughout the 
Union.  
 Secondly, questions of accessibility arise. Would the area of European contract law 
not be easier to overview if there were one set of soft law rules, or if the various soft law rules 
indicated how they relate to one another? Zimmerman 895  remarks that, although the 
coexistence of different sets of soft law may initially inhibit accessibility, comparison between 
the different sets reveals similarities and reflects current comparative law research. 
Differences between the sets of soft law can mainly be found in the details and may be 
overcome by further discussion. Yet the differences between the different sets of soft law 
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rules, as well as a lack of coordination, may give rise to confusion. This becomes apparent 
when considering, for example, the question how the DCFR, the revised versions of the 
PECL, as well as the proposed Common European Sales Law and the reformed Directives in 
the acquis relate to one another. It is a bit rash to conclude that the PECL has no further 
meaning now that it has served – along with other sources – as a basis for the DCFR.896 
Nevertheless, it also does not seem completely illogical if the focus shifts to the DCFR and 
especially the Optional Instrument, rather than the PECL.897 On the other hand, practitioners 
and courts may be more aware of the PECL than of more recent initiatives, and in cases 
outside of the scope of the acquis, they may not find it problematic that the PECL are not 
also based on the private law acquis.898  Practitioners and courts may also refer to the 
UNIDROIT Principles.899 
 Thus, interaction between the drafters of different sets of soft law might have formed 
a starting point for discussion, clarifying why rules in sets of soft law diverge, providing the 
European legislator with multiple soft laws and discussion on which rules in sets of soft law 
might serve as a source of inspiration for European legislation. Accordingly, European actors 
may be more inclined to make use of these sources if they make clear how they relate to the 
acquis and other measures, which may be improve accessibility.  
 
7.3.3. Soft law(s) and the private law acquis 
This paragraph will ask whether drafters of soft laws and drafters of the private law acquis 
have taken into account one another’s initiatives and how that has affected the predictability, 
accessibility, consistency and responsiveness of both the private law acquis and soft laws.  
 The drafters of soft law have not consistently referred to the private law acquis. 900 
Early sets of soft law, in particular the PECL, were developed before or during the 
development of the private law acquis, which was a reason for not including the acquis. Yet 
more modern versions have also not consistently referred to the private law acquis. In 
particular, the DCFR have taken the original version of the PECL, which did not take into 
account the private law acquis, as a starting point.901 Even though it was initially suggested 
that the drafting of the DCFR and the development of Directive 2011/83 on consumer rights 
would be closely intertwined, 902  it was not clear which, if any, coordination took place 
between the drafting of the DCFR and the simultaneous reform of the acquis.903 
However, not taking into account the private law acquis in the DCFR may be more 
problematic than was the case in earlier sets of soft law. Particularly, if drafters of more 
modern sets of soft law do not take into account the private law acquis and relevant case law, 
this may decrease the chance that legislators will follow these rules. For modern sets of soft 
law, not taking into account the private law acquis and relevant case law may be particularly 
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problematic if soft law is to play a role in the further development of the private law acquis, in 
which case a lack of interaction may increase the chance of inconsistencies, inhibit the 
predictable development of the private law acquis and give rise to confusion.904  
These potential problems become clear from various questions that can be raised 
from the future development of the DCFR and the private law acquis. Firstly, the drafters 
have occasionally diverged from existing European law,905 which may lead one to wonder 
whether the DCFR will be used as a toolbox in the continuing reform of the consumer acquis, 
as well as the interpretation of the acquis. 906  The failure of the European legislator to 
consistently take the DCFR as a starting point in the (re)formation of the acquis 907 indicates 
otherwise and may be a reason for national legislators and judiciaries to not refer to the 
DCFR in the implementation and interpretation of the acquis, as such referral may lead to the 
incorrect implementation of European law. Similarly, one may wonder to what extent the 
DCFR will play a role in the further development of the proposal for a Regulation in a 
Common European Sales Law, which stipulates in article 1 that it will be developed 
autonomously, in accordance with the (few) principles underlying it and its aim  to advance 
the internal market. Hesselink 908  states that the DCFR could still serve as a source of 
inspiration for amendment of the proposal. Notably, the legislator could be reconsidering its 
use of the DCFR; in Directive 2011/7 combating late payment, reference is made to the 
DCFR.909  
Secondly, after the reform of the acquis that limited the level of consumer protection, 
reconsideration of the DCFR, which at various points provided a wider protection than the 
“old” Directives (which in turn allowed for more protection than the revised Directives) would 
seem a desirable exercise if the DCFR is still to fulfil a function as toolbox in the further 
development of the private law acquis. After all, it may be doubted whether actors would 
make use of a toolbox that provides for a level of protection inconsistent with the acquis.910 
More generally, inclusion of the consumer law acquis in the DCFR may also provide an 
opportunity to take the criticism on the DCFR into account, and discuss the role of the 
different sets of soft law. Notably, though, the DCFR has already – if not very often – been 
used in the development of the acquis, and the question arises whether such reform would 
be necessary. 
Additionally, what consequences would reconsideration of the DCFR have? Possibly, 
a re-examination might not lead to the provision of different rules, if the revised DCFR is to 
be used as a toolbox. At most, a critical examination could indicate a need for reform – yet it 
may not be desirable to initiate more reform after the acquis has already been reformed, as 
ongoing reform may limit not only the accessibility of the acquis, but also the predictable and 
consistent development of the private law acquis. Also, if the DCFR should reflect the 
consumer law acquis more, when should that take place - before the reform of Directive 
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90/314 has been finished? On the one hand, if the review of the package travel takes a long 
time, it may benefit from a revised DCFR. On the other hand, the review of the package 
travel Directive may also be held up the revision process. Unfortunately, it is difficult to 
predict how long the reform of this Directive will take.   
It may be concluded that drafters of especially the DCFR as well as European actors 
have insufficiently made clear how the rules in soft law will be used in the development of the 
private law acquis and how soft laws will cope with changes in the private law acquis. 
Consequently, the role of the DCFR in the reform of the acquis is not clear, which inhibits the 
predictable development of the private law acquis and increases the chance of 
inconsistencies, especially if the European legislator uses the DCFR inconsistently.   
 
7.3.4. Conclusion on the use of soft laws 
Have the drafters of soft law have taken into account dependence on state actors and have 
actors accordingly interacted with each other, and how has this approach affected the extent 
to which shoft laws have enhanced the predictability, accessibility, consistency and 
responsiveness of European private law?  
Firstly, the choice for soft law in the form of codifications has not been given much 
thought, and consequently the limited capability of soft law codifications to safeguard the 
predictability, consistency, accessibility and responsiveness of private law is overlooked. 
Because actors have insufficiently recognised dependence on other actors making use of 
soft law, the accessibility of private law may be lessened. Also, the lack of interaction and 
debate on the different provisions are a missed opportunity to provide the European 
legislator – for whom the DCFR was drafted – with a more elaborately discussed set of rules 
that can serve as an inspiration for the development of the acquis.   
Possibly, drafters, if they had wished to maintain the codification technique, could 
have considered the additional use of techniques to compensate for potential weaknesses 
arising from the use of codification, especially techniques that might have a chance to 
successfully further the consistent, accessible, and predictable development of the acquis, 
for example the development of databases and networks.911  
   Secondly, more interaction between drafters of sets of soft law and state actors may 
provide more clarity on relation between the different sets of soft law, and provide starting 
points for reform or debate. In that way, current inconsistencies may make clear that a 
particular subject is controversial and provide alternative models for solutions, so that the 
added value of different sets of soft law is more visible.  
Thirdly, both European actors and the drafters of especially the DCFR have not 
satisfactorily indicated how the DCFR relates to the acquis, how it would cope with 
developments and changes in the acquis and how it would be used in the reform in the 
acquis. This has given rise to confusion on the development of the acquis and the role of the 
DCFR, which decreases the stable and consistent development of private law.  
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7.4. The use of blanket clauses in a multilevel legal order 
Have actors adequately considered that other actors develop private law and adequately 
interacted with one another, and how has that affected the extent to which blanket clauses 
improve the predictability, consistency, accessibility and responsiveness of European private 
law?  
Paragraph 7.4.1. will consider the reasoning of the European and national legislators 
for using blanket clauses in the private law acquis, and par. 7.4.2 will consider the interaction 
between courts in the interpretation of blanket clauses in the private law acquis. Paragraph 
7.4.3. will end with a conclusion. 
 
7.4.1. Blanket clauses: furthering the responsiveness of European private law? 
This paragraph will ask for what reasons legislators at the national and European level have 
used blanket clauses (‘open normen’, ‘Generalklauseln’) and consider whether, in this 
reasoning, legislators have sufficiently considered the coexistence of actors, and how this 
has affected the quality of European private law.  
National legislators frequently use blanket clauses to provide for some leeway in 
national laws, and allow the national judiciary some room for reaching a just outcome in 
individual cases.912 Thus, the use of blanket clauses benefits the responsiveness of private 
law, both to business practices and to society’s legal views on justice. Similarly, at the 
European level, the use of blanket clauses has been considered as hard to avoid, if the 
private law acquis is to deal adequately with future developments, thereby aiming to ensure 
that the law is also responsive to future practice.913  Also, the private law acquis frequently 
uses blanket clauses to allow judges to reach a just outcome. Accordingly, consideration 16 
in the preamble to Directive 93/13 on unfair contract terms holds that the assessment of the 
fairness of contract terms in consumer contracts ‘must be supplemented by a means of 
making an overall evaluation of the different interests involved; (…) this constitutes the 
requirement of good faith’. Thus, European blanket clauses should also contribute to the 
responsiveness of private law to society’s legal views on justice. The inclusion of this clause 
was originally supported by national legislators.  
Several difficulties however become apparent when blanket clauses at a European 
level seek to increase responsiveness. Firstly, the inclusion of blanket clauses may entail 
that the CJEU is competent to interpret – but not apply – these blanket clauses. Mak914 notes 
that the CJEU is not meant to balance the interest of parties to a dispute, and ‘lacks sufficient 
insight in the social and economic make-up of individual Member States to assess which 
outcome would be appropriate in individual cases’. Wissink 915  points out that the 
interpretation of blanket clauses may depend upon factual circumstances, which might, in 
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combination with the increased workload of the CJEU, be a reason for the CJEU to give 
some leeway to national judges. Roth916 holds that the duty to act in good faith may, for 
example, concern the limitation of the exercise of rights as recognised in national law. In 
those cases, it is especially necessary to take national private laws into account. Thus, the 
inclusion of blanket clauses in the acquis and potential corresponding competence of the 
CJEU may not be a good way to contribute to the responsiveness of the private law acquis.  
Secondly, it can be questioned to what extent European blanket clauses allow for 
responsiveness to legal practice. To the contrary, it seems as if blanket clauses, especially 
when combined with maximum harmonisation, may lead to outdated law, as it may severely 
limit the ability of other actors than the European legislator to respond to developing legal 
practices. The flexibility provided by national blanket clauses is also difficult to attain at a 
European level, especially if Union law strives for maximum harmonisation. At the European 
level, the development and adaptation of the private law acquis takes place at a rather slow 
pace, if only because of the necessity to reach political consensus between 27 Member 
States. Consequently, maximum harmonisation petrifies parts of national private law, leaving 
further development to the European level.   
Thirdly, it may be asked whether legislators have sufficiently taken into account the 
weaknesses of blanket clauses if they are used in a multilevel legal order. Particularly, the 
use of blanket clauses also entails disadvantages in the form of inconsistencies, both at a 
national level and a European level.  
The use of blanket clauses in the private law acquis that are identical to national 
blanket clauses may give rise to inconsistencies. This is also recognised at the European 
level, where the wording of those blanket clauses places the legislator before a difficult 
choice: whether to use new terms or to use ones that are identical to national blanket clauses 
that already have a particular meaning in national private laws. Dannemann, Ferreri and 
Graziadei 917  point out that to some extent, the use of existing terms, including blanket 
clauses, is inevitable. Inventing new terms at a European level may also cause 
misunderstanding, lead to various interpretations of the same concept, and undermine 
harmonisation as well as predictability. They point out that the Joint practical guide of the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission for persons involved in the drafting of 
legislation within the Community institutions918 recommends a restrictive use of terms that 
carry a specific meaning in national laws, which is visible in some of the private law acquis – 
for example Directive 99/44 referring to ‘guarantee’ instead of ‘warranty’. However, in some 
cases, the private law acquis still makes use of concepts also known in national laws, such 
as good faith.  
Yet this may result in the insertion of a blanket clause into national law that already 
exists in national private law, but that has to be interpreted differently. Consequently, two 
seemingly identical concepts with divergent interpretations coexist – one concept in national 
general contract law and one originally European concept that has to be implemented in 
national law, which seems an undesirable development. Roth919 has pointed out that this is 
especially problematic if a European blanket clause is implemented within a Civil Code, as 
this practice may lead to existence of ‘Begriffsinseln’ as well as ‘Begriffsspaltungen’, where 
identical concepts within the Civil Code have a divergent meaning.  
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Fourthly, the use of blanket clauses may also lead to inconsistencies within the 
private law acquis. Notably, the interpretation of identical or similar blanket clauses in the 
private law acquis may well diverge. This may be the result of nationally coloured 
interpretation or of divergent interpretation of identical or similar blanket clauses at a 
European level.  
Fifthly, inconsistencies within the private law acquis may also arise from divergent 
interpretation of blanket clauses at the European level. Pavillon920 convincingly argues that 
the interpretation of unfair contract terms may diverge from the interpretation of unfair 
commercial practices, pointing out that, for example, a contract term that is unfair under 
Directive 93/13 may not constitute an unfair commercial practice in the sense of Directive 
2005/29 if the seller has drafted a transparent terms and complied with his information duties. 
Conversely, as Pavillon points out, a contract term that is not necessarily unfair may 
constitute an unfair commercial practice if it is ambiguously drafted and the seller has not 
complied with information duties. Yet the interpretation of these concepts may also diverge 
because the degree of harmonisation and the aim that Directives pursue differ.921  
The divergent interpretation of blanket clauses and key concepts in the acquis is 
visible more generally throughout the acquis.922 Although the differences in interpretation do 
not benefit the consistency and predictability of Union law, divergent interpretation follows 
logically from the character of Union law, which develops private law for varying purposes. 
Notably, the coexistence of divergent aims is not necessarily problematic from the 
perspective of Union law. Yet the importance of a coherent interpretation of the consumer 
law acquis has recently been emphasised by AG Trstenjak in her advice before Pereničová 
and Perenič v SOS. 923  A.G. Trstenjak emphasised the importance of a coherent 
interpretation of unfair contracts terms in the sense of Directive 93/13 on unfair contract 
terms and unfair commercial practices in the sense of Directive 2005/29 on unfair 
commercial practices in the consumer law acquis.  
 Unfortunately, it does not appear as if legislators have foreseen the difficulties that 
may arise from the use of blanket clauses, especially problems arising if European blanket 
clauses closely resembled blanket clauses that play a central role in national private law.  
The potential difficulties have however become apparent as problems with regard to 
responsiveness and inconsistencies have arisen.Consequently, the extent to which blanket 
clauses in the acquis may contribute to the responsiveness of private law is limited. 
 
7.4.2. Interaction between courts in the interpretation of blanket clauses 
This paragraph will consider whether courts have sufficiently interacted with one another and 
how that has affected the extent to which blanket clause contribute to predictability, 
consistency, accessibility and responsiveness of private law.   
                                               
920
 C.M.D.S. Pavillon, Open normen in het Europees consumentenrecht, De oneerlijkheidsnorm in vergelijkend perspectief (PhD 
thesis Groningen), Kluwer: Deventer 2011, p. 516-517. 
921
 C.M.D.S. Pavillon, Open normen in het Europees consumentenrecht, De oneerlijkheidsnorm in vergelijkend perspectief (PhD 
thesis Groningen), Kluwer: Deventer 2011, p. 518. 
922
 See for example W. van Gerven, ‘The CJEU case law as a means for the unification of private law?’, in: A.S. Hartkamp, E.H. 
Hondius (eds.), Towards a European Civil Code?,  Ars Aequi Libri: Nijmegen 2004, p. 118-120, P. Rott, ‘What is the role of the 
CJEU in EC private law? – A comment on the CJEU judgments in Océano Grupo, Freiburger Kommunalbauten, Leitner and 
Veedfald’, 1 Hanse LR 2005, p. 14 notes that the CJEU ‘has not developed a clear line between cases where it exercised 
deference and cases where it made a final decision’.   
923
 Conclusion of A.G. Trstenjak of 29 November 2011 in case C-453/10 (Pereničová and Perenič v SOS), par. 90-92. Notably, 




Similar blanket clauses have been used in the BGB, BW and the private law acquis, 
and accordingly,  interaction should takes place between the CJEU and national courts:  
 
1) Courts need to clarify the allocation of competences to interpret blanket clauses in 
the private law acquis  
 
Currently, the question which courts are competent to interpret the blanket clauses in the private law 
acquis has given rise to debate. Roth
924
 holds that blanket clauses intend to leave discretion to 
national legislators, in conformity with the general character of a Directive that is binding with regard to 









 find that the competence of the CJEU depends on the aim and the degree of harmonisation 
that a Directive pursues, as well as relevant national private law. Yet another view is taken by 
Basedow,
929
 who points out that blanket clauses are concepts of Union law and therefore need to be 
interpreted autonomously by the CJEU, even if these clauses are incorporated in minimum 
harmonisation Directives. Yet it can be doubted whether the interpretation of blanket clauses at the 
European level would contribute to responsiveness.   
 
Unfortunately, CJEU case law does not take a consistent approach to the interpretation of 
blanket clauses in the private law acquis, as rightly criticised by Schmid930 and Collins.931 
Consequently, an answer to questions on the competence of the CJEU to interpret blanket 
clauses cannot be deduced from CJEU case law.  
 In turn, the lack of clarity on this point may undermine the consistent interpretation of 
blanket clauses throughout the acquis, as national courts assume that they have remained 
competent to interpret blanket clauses that have not changed on the surface, but that have 
gained a European background. Competence of the CJEU could inhibit the responsiveness 
of the private law acquis, and have consequences for the interpretation of the law that parties 
have not foreseen, thus limiting predictability. Also, national courts are less able to preserve 
the consistent development of the law if they are not competent to interpret blanket clauses. 
Therefore, this point should be addressed.  
  
2) If blanket clauses are to be interpreted in accordance with European law, national 
courts have to take this into account and interact with the CJEU accordingly. 
 
                                               
924
 W.-H. Roth, ‘Generalklauseln im Europäischen Privatrecht’, in: J. Basedow, K.J. Hopt, H. Kötz (eds.), Festschrift für Ulrich 
Drobnig zum siebzigsten Geburtstag, Mohr: Tübingen, 1998, p.  141. Comp. also C.-W. Canaris, ‘Der EuGH als zukünftige 
privatrechtliche Superrevisionsinstanz?’, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 1994, p. 417. 
925
 M. Schillig, Konkretisierungskompetenz und Konkretisierungsmethoden im Europäischen Privatrecht, De Gruyter Recht: 
Berlin 2009, p. 226 et seq, K. Gutman, The constitutionality of European contract law, Leuven 2010, p. 81, also refers to the 
approach adopted by Directives. She notes that the Court cannot remedy ongoing divergence of national private law if 
Directives pursue minimum harmonisation.  
926
 O. Remien, ‘Die Vorlagepflicht bei Auslegung unbestimmter Rechtsbegriffe’, RabelsZ 2002, p. 528-529.  
927
 H.-W. Micklitz, ‘The targeted full harmonisation approach: Looking behind the curtain’, in: G. Howells, R. Schulze (eds.), 
Modernising and harmonising consumer contract law, Sellier: Munich 2009, p. 59-60. 
928
 I. Wolff, Die Verteilung der Konkretisierungskompetenz für Generalklauseln in privatrechtsgestaltenden Richtlinien (PhD 
thesis Bonn), Nomos: Baden Baden 2002, p. 61-62, and specifically on several Directives in the private law acquis p. 201-250. 
Wolff, at p. 179 et seq argues that, considering the principle of proportionality, there is an assumption that the national judiciary 
retains some competence in the harmonisation of blanket clauses in the acquis. 
929
 J. Basedow, ‘Der Bundesgerichtshof, seine Rechtsanwälte und die Verantwortung für das europäische Privatrecht’, in: G. 
Pfeiffer, J. Kummer, S. Scheuch (eds.), Festschrift für Hans Erich Brandner zum 70. Gerburtstag, Schmidt: Köln 1996, p. 675. 
See also for a uniform interpretation by the CJEU M.W. Hesselink, ‘Case: CJEU- Freiburger Kommunalbauten v Hofstetter’, 
ERCL 2006, p. 374-375, and also I. Klauer, ‘General clauses in European private law and “stricter” national standards’, ERPL 
2000, p. 187-210.  
930
 Ch. Schmid, ‘The CJEU as a constitutional and a private law court: A methodological comparison’, ZERP Diskussionspaper 
2006, p. 15-16.  
931
 H. Collins, The European Civil Code: The way forward, CUP: Cambridge 2008, p. 60. 
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National legislators appear to have overlooked the possibility that the use of blanket clauses 
at a European level also means that these blanket clauses should be interpreted in 
accordance with European law.932  A similar tendency from the national judiciary can be 
discerned: currently, blanket clauses in the acquis, especially if they closely resemble 
national blanket clauses, may become ‘nationalised’ if the national judiciary would interpret 
European blanket clauses in conformity with national law. Wissink 933  holds that the 
interpretation of implementation law is affected by national law, and warns that judges should 
not just assume that the interpretation of European law and national law will converge. This 
sort of interpretation would undermine harmonisation.934 
 
3) Interaction between national courts and the CJEU is also essential as the CJEU 
depends on national courts to refer relevant cases to the CJEU.  
 
Currently, it may take some time before questions on the interpretation of blanket clauses come before 
the CJEU, as national judges may show some restraint in referring questions on the interpretation of 




As a result, blanket clauses may leave actors acting contrary to ‘good faith’ better off than 
actors violating a more clearly delineated rule forbidding specific behaviour. 936  The Law 
Commissions937 have pointed out that ambiguous terms leave room for argument on the 
duties of contract parties, which may not necessarily be beneficial for the weaker party 
without expertise or resources to spend on this argument.   
 
4) Regardless of he question whether this is desirable, if blanket clauses in the 
acquis are to be interpreted in a similar manner throughout the Union, this also 
necessitates interaction between national courts. 
 
Comparative research on the interpretation of blanket clauses in the acquis however 
indicates that currently, national supreme courts do not generally seem to have made it a 
practice to refer to foreign decisions in the interpretation of implemented private law. 
 
►It can be concluded that courts in the interpretation of blanket clauses in the private law 
acquis do not sufficiently interact with one another, which may inhibit the predictability, 
consistency and accessibility of private law, as a lack of interaction leads to fewer CJEU 
decisions. Also, competence of the CJEU should be clarified, as this may affect the 
interpretation of blanket clauses, which should be foreseeable. Moreover, the competence of 
                                               
932
 Comp. recently T. Ritter, ‘Europarechtsneutralität mitgliedstaatlicher Generalklauseln?’, NJW 2012, p. 1549.  
933
 M.H. Wissink, Richtlijnconforme interpretatie in het burgerlijk recht, 2001, 372-374, referring to HR 10 January 1992, NJ 1992, 
576 (Jehro/Brinkhaus), par. 4.4 where the Hoge Raad holds that the law on self-employed commercial agents has remained the 
same after implementation of Directive 86/653. 
934
 P. Rott, ‘What is the role of the CJEU in EC private law? – A comment on the CJEU judgments in Océano Grupo, Freiburger 
Kommunalbauten, Leitner and Veedfald’, 1 Hanse LR 2005, p. 6 notes that, notwithstanding the principle of autonomous 
interpretation and consistent interpretation, national courts may tend to strive for application of Directives that is consistent with 
‘pre-harmonisation’ case law. 
935
 L. Niglia, ‘The non-Europeanisation of private law’, ERPL 2001, p. 575-599, even finds that national courts do not take note 
of the private law acquis when ruling on private law. See on the practice of the Hoge Raad with regard to international private 
law M.V. Polak, ‘Spreken is zilver, zwijgen is goud’, in: A.G. Castermans et al (eds.), Het zwijgen van de Hoge Raad, p. 89-114. 
See on the practice of the German Bundesgerichtshof,  J. Basedow ‘Der Europäische gerichtshof und die Klauselrichtlinie 93/13 
– Der verweigerte Dialog’, in: FS für Günter Hirsch zum 65. Geburtstag, 2008,  
936
 E.S. van Nimwegen, ‘Handhaving door de Consumentenautoriteit: een goed samenspel met het Burgerlijk Wetboek en 
Europese regelgeving?’, Contracteren 2010, p. 57. 
937
 Law Commission, the Scottish Law Commission, An optional Common European Sales Law: Advantages and problems, 
Advice to the UK Government, 10 November 2011, available at  
http://www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/docs/Common_European_Sales_Law_Advice.pdf, p. viii, x. 
205 
 
the CJEU may lessen national; courts’ possibilities to interpret blanket clauses responsively 
and consistently with surrounding naitonal private law. Also, inconsistent decisions 
throughout the Union may undermine harmonisation, while they will also not contribute to the 
accessibility of the private law acquis.         
 
7.4.3. Conclusion on the use of blanket clauses 
These paragraphs have asked whether actors have adequately considered that other actors 
develop private law and adequately interacted with one another, and how that has affected 
the extent to which blanket clauses improve the predictability, consistency, accessibility and 
responsiveness of European private law?  
Firstly, although both the national and European legislator have aimed to increase the 
responsiveness of private law in the use of blanket clauses, actors seem to have been 
insufficiently aware of potential problems that can arise from the use of these techniques. In 
particular, the dependence of European actors for a responsive interpretation of blanket 
clauses has been overlooked. Conversely, the dependence of national actors on European 
actors for a consistent development of the law through blanket clauses has not sufficiently 
been considered.   
Secondly, both at the national and European level, courts have shown restraint in 
interacting with one another, which has not contributed to the predictability, consistency, and 
accessibility of the private law acquis.  
Importantly, however, national courts may have good reasons for their restraint: 
 
i) Referring cases to the CJEU may be a lengthy procedure and it is not self-evident to 
make use of this possibility in apparently straightforward cases.  
 
ii) National supreme courts generally also have the task to ensure legal unity, and 
frequently referring to the CJEU may not be in line with that task, especially if it is not 
clear what decision the CJEU will take, whether that decision is likely to be in line with 
other relevant national private law, and whether the decision of the CJEU will 
contribute to the consistency of the private law acquis.  
 
Furthermore, national courts may also exercise some restraint in referring to foreign 
decisions that may not always be available and accessible for national courts. Foreign 
decisions are usually taken in accordance with foreign law, and foreign decisions may 
diverge from national decisions, which may lead to inconsistencies.   
 Thus, although the lack of interaction between courts may undermine consistency 
and predictability, it may also have some disadvantages. Notably, more clarity on future 
CJEU decision, which presupposes more interaction between the CJEU and national courts, 





7.5. The use of general principles  
This paragraph will ask whether general principles contribute to the development of a more 
comprehensible European private law. It is submitted that the use of general principles is not 
necessarily based on interaction, but instead, on converging basic ideas on justice that may 
allow for multiple outcomes.938 As such, general principles may provide a starting point for 
interaction between actors. Accordingly, this paragraph asks whether general principles are 
used as a starting point for interaction, and whether the use of general principles may give 
rise to potential problems that justify carefully considering the use of general principles, and 
how that has affected the predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness of 
European private law.  
It may be counter-intuitive to consider the “use” of general principles, as this may 
denote the “use” of ideas on justice. However, general principles are “used” in the reasoning 
of the courts, or in the development of codes on the basis of not only abstract ideas on 
justice , but also general rules or concepts deduced from specific  rules. Moreover, especially 
at the European level, the idea of “using” private law, including ideas of justice, to promote 
the aims of the Treaties, is less unfamiliar than may the case at the national level. 
Paragraph 7.5.1. will consider whether general principles contribute to the interaction 
between actors in the multilevel legal order by providing a starting point for discussion. 
Paragraph 7.5.2. will turn to the weaknesses that become apparent when considering the 
“use” of general principles. Paragraph 7.5.3 will end with a conclusion.  
 
7.5.1. Interaction on the basis of general principles? 
Have actors used principles, and for what reasons? Have principles served as a starting 
point for interaction?  
The European legislator, in article 340 TFEU, already recognised that the contractual 
liability of the Union is determined by common principles. Already in AM&S/Commission,939 
the CJEU recognised the relevance of principles common to Member States and has since 
then repeatedly referred to common principles in some of its leading cases. Thus, in 
Francovich,940 the CJEU referred to the principle of equal treatment. Later decisions have 
also recognised principles common to Member States. 941  However, the CJEU may not 
always find that a decision can be derived from common principles, but instead emphasise 
the aim of European measures or take the wording of European measures as a starting point 
for interpretation. Thus, in the interpretation of article 3 Directive 93/13, the CJEU has, 
instead of referring to common principles, emphasised the aim of the Directive. Accordingly,  
in Freiburger Kommunalbauten,942 the Court emphasised that ‘[a]rticle 3 of the Directive 
merely defines in a general way the factors that render unfair a contractual term that has not 
been individually negotiated’, and did not refer to principles common to the Member States. 
                                               
938
 Accordingly, this research will consider general principles as ideas on justice, such as legal equality,iIn accordance with the 
definition of the Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, ‘Social justice in European contract law: A manifesto’, 
ELJ 2004, p. 656. A. Metzger, Extra legem, intra ius: Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze im Europäischen Privatrecht, Mohr Siebeck: 
Tübingen 2009, p. 35, uses a broader definition as he considers the inductive process leading to the discovery of general 
principles as a defining characteristic. 
939
 CJEU 18 May 1982 (AM & S v Commission), C 155/79, [1982] ECR, p. I-1575, par. 18.  
940
 CJEU 9 November 1995 (Francovich v Italian Republic), C- 479/93, [1995], p. I-3843, par. 23.  
941
 See for example CJEU 3 December 1974 (van Binsbergen v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid), , 
[1974], p. 1299, par. 12-14, more recently CJEU 10 April 2008 (Hamilton v Volksbank Filder), C-412/06. [2008], p. I-2383, par. 
42.   
942
 CJEU 1 April 2004 (Freiburger Kommunalbauten v Hofstetter), C-237/02, [2004] ECR, p. I-3403, par. 19, see more recently 
also CJEU 26 April 2012 (Hatóság v Invitel),C-472/10, [2012] ECR, p. I-o.  
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National courts have also recognised the added value of general principles in soft laws,943 
although restraint in referring to these principles is also visible in for example the Dutch legal 
order.944  
Typically, general principles may contribute to a more comprehensible private law in 
various ways. General principles are typically primarily used to improve the coherence of 
European private law, either filling in lacunas in the law, as a weighty argument in the 
interpretation of law, or in the evaluation of laws,945  which may enhance the consistent 
development of law. Moreover, deducing general principles from private law may provide 
starting points to determine the future development of private law, which may contribute to 
the predictable development of private law. Furthermore, principles can also play an 
important role in furthering the responsiveness of European private law to society’s ideas on 
justice.  
Arguably, the added value of general principles in the multilevel legal order is also 
their role in providing starting points for debate.946 Soft laws such as the PECL may also 
serve as a starting point for debate. Hesselink947 finds that establishing ‘neutral’ language 
that could be used in debate, whether on comparative law or on the unification of private 
laws, is one of the most important benefits of the PECL. In this view, the ‘neutral’ language 
provided by the PECL facilitates identifying the various divergences and converges between 
the different national laws in the European Union, as differences in legal terminology may 
either cover up divergences or give the false impression of similarities. According to Mak,948 
by recognising general principles instead of imposing one solution, the CJEU could provide 
some leeway for states in the implementation of the acquis and increase the acceptability of 
the acquis in states. In this view, general ideas on justice (for example: equality) are common 
to Member States and the Union, but further interpretation and application of these principles 
are left to the national level. Such leeway may also prevent that private law eventually 
becomes outdated, as national judges are given some room for coping with new 
developments in legal practice.  
 
7.5.2. Weaknesses arising from the use of general principles? 
This paragraph will ask whether the use of general principles may give rise to problems that 
justify carefully assessing the benefits and detriments of general principles before promoting 
their increased use.  
       This paragraph will subsequently discuss unpredictability in paragraph 7.5.2.1. 
Subsequently, paragraph 7.5.2.2. will address problems of inaccessibility. Paragraph 7.5.2.3. 
will end with a conclusion. 
  
7.5.2.1. The ‘discovery’ of general principles and predictability  
                                               
943
 See above, par. 7.3.2. on the use of soft law made by national courts.   
944
 See for examples J.M. Smits, E.A.G. van schagen , ‘De Hoge Raad las Europese rechter: Mag het ietsje meer zijn?’, in: A.G. 
castermans et al (eds.), Het zwijgen van de Hoge Raad, BWKJ 25, Kluwer: Deventer 2009, p. 84.  
945
 Comp. A.S. Hartkamp, ‘De algemene beginselen van het Unierecht en het privaatrecht’, WPNR 6901 (2011).  
946
 In this sense V. Mak, ‘A shift of focus: Systematisation in European private law through EU law’, ELJ 2011, p. 417: 
‘[Principles]  are anchor points, able to ensure the observance of fundamental values and a coherent development of the legal 
system, while leaving room for further development according to the needs of society.’ Similarly V. Trstenjak, E. Beysen, 
‘European consumer protection law: Curia simper dabit remedium?’, CMLRev 2011, p. 116. 
947
 M.W. Hesselink, ‘The Principles of European Contract Law: Some choices made by the Lando Commission’, in: M.W. 
Hesselink, G, de Vries (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Preadviezen uitgebracht voor de Vereniging voor Burgerlijk 
Recht, Deventer: Kluwer 2001, p. 13 
948
 C. Mak, ‘Hedgehogs in Luxembourg?’ A Dworkinian reading of the CJEU’s case law on principles of private law and a reply 
of the fox’, CSECL Working Paper 2011, p. 17.  
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This paragraph will discuss the unpredictability that may arise from the ‘discovery’ of general 
principles by the judiciary, turning firstly to the reallocation of competences that may arise 
from the use of general principles and secondly to the weaknesses of the inductive process. 
 
1) The use of general principles gives the impression that law is discovered. Because it 
does not entail the development of ‘new’ law, the discovery of principles is not subject 
to principles of conferral of competence, even though principles may profoundly affect 
the further development of European private law as well as the allocation of 




 points out that although formally, the Court merely discovers an already existing principle, 
the recognition of that principle enables the Court to evaluate whether private law is in conformity with 
these principles. Referring to CJEU decisions such as François,
951
 Devroe further argues that the 
Court may even, by using general principles, extend the scope of existing European law.  
Moreover, the emphasis on the ‘discovery’ of general principles suggests that the discovery of 
such principles takes place in a neutral, objective manner. This can however be doubted,
952
 especially 
if “general principles” denote society’s ideas on justice, which may differ among the legal orders. 
 
2) Finding general principles of private law typically takes place through inductive 
reasoning, which has been defined as: ‘the process of inferring a general law or 
principle from the observation of particular instances’.953  
 
A well known example of inductive reasoning is the conclusion that all swans are white because of all 
the separate instances (swans a, b, c, d, e, f, etc) are white. The weakness in this form of reasoning 
lies in the assumption that from the separate instances, a more general conclusion logically follows, 
while that may not necessarily be the case. Thus, objections can be made against such ‘discovery’ of 
general principles. Accordingly, Collins
954
 points out that generalisation of the repetitively used of 
withdrawal periods in the consumer acquis to general contract law, on the basis that the use of 
withdrawal periods can be explained by the principle of self-determination,
955
 may not be without risk, 
because the European legislator may have consciously limited the use of withdrawal periods to 
specific fields.  
Although the fragmented nature of the acquis may make the problems of inductive reasoning 
more apparent, this weakness in the discovery of general principles is not particular to the acquis. At a 
national level, Scholten
956
 considers that finding general principles on which specific rules are based 
may not necessarily lead to the conclusion that some rules can be also be applied in situations that fall 
outside of the scope of the rule. Interestingly, Lord Goff
957
 warns against a number of pitfalls that can 
occur in the search of legal principles, including the ‘temptation of elegance’: just because a solution is 
                                               
949
 S. Weatherill, ‘The “principles of civil law” as a basis for interpreting the legislative acquis’, ERCL 2010, p. 77. 
950
 W. Devroe, ‘Impact van door het Europees Hof van Justitie ontwikkelde algemene beginselen op privaatrechtelijke 
verhoudingen’, in: A.S. Hartkamp, C.H. Sieburgh, L.A.D. Keus (eds.), De invloed van het Europese recht op het Nederlandse 
privaatrecht I, Kluwer: Deventer 2007, p. 134-135.  
951
 CJEU 19 November 1991 (Francovich and others v Italian Republic), joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, ECR [1991], p. I-5357, 
par. 32-36.  
952
 S. Weatherill, ‘The “principles of civil law” as a basis for interpreting the legislative acquis’, ERCL 2010, p. 74-85, A. Metzger, 
‘Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze im europäischen Privatrecht: Ansätze für eine einheitliche Techniqueenlehre im europäischen 
Mehrebenensystem’, Rechtstheorie 2009, p. 325. 
953
 Comp. the definition of the Oxford English Dictionary that defines ‘induction’ as ‘[t]he process of inferring a general law 
principle from the observation of particular instances’. J. Vickers, ‘The problem of induction’, Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, accessible at  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/ points out that this definition is not completely 
correct, as inductive reasoning is generally considered to include more instances of reasoning than the one stated in the OED.  
954
 H. Collins, ‘The alchemy of deriving general principles of contract law from European legislation: In search of the 
philosopher’s stone’, ERCL 2006, p. 221. 
955
 As defended by K. Riesenhuber, ‘System and principles of EC contract law’, ERCL 2005, p. 297.   
956
 P. Scholten, Algemeen Deel, Kluwer: Deventer 1974, p. 45-46.   
957




simple and elegant, does not necessarily mean that it is accurate, that it allows for exceptions and 
further qualifications, or that it adequately reflects a complex area of law.  
Accordingly, Metzger
958
 notes that the inductive process may entail that general principles do 
not have absolute effect. Instead, principles should be seen as “Abwägungsgebote” – thus, they may 
play a role in the arguments that have a ‘dimension of weight’ for actors forming private law. 
Alternatively, principles, in Metzger’s view, may be seen as rules that are “probably” binding, as the 
inductive reasoning process may not be suitable for definite conclusions – findings based on  inductive 
reasoning may instead be valid until there is an ‘atypical’ instance (the black swan) that disproves the 
finding.   
  




 rightly points out that similarity of national laws may not necessarily point to the existence of 
a general principle in European law. But if private laws show great similarities and a general principle 
is not recognised, is there an additional requirement for the recognition of general principles? 
Metzger
960
 finds that the recognition of general principles may depend on either extra-legal elements 
such as the views of justice in society, or the political aims of the Union. This answer does not improve 
the predictability or accessibility of private law, as courts frequently only briefly refer to general 
principles without giving insight in the premises upon which the courts inductive conclusions are 
based.
961
 Confusingly, however, general principles can be recognised in the absence of similarity of 
laws, and thus, it seems as if the similarity between private laws is not a strict requirement of in some 
cases.  
The lack of predictability on the recognition of principles becomes apparent from the drafting of 
the DCFR. Initially, the Interim Outline Edition
962
 sought to introduce a number of fundamental 
principles, including ‘justice’, ‘solidarity’ as well as ‘legal certainty’ and ‘efficiency’. These principles 
were however severely criticised,
963
 because the restrictions in the interim draft of party autonomy 
went too far, that rules of non-discrimination were ineffective, and that private law in general did not 
aim to further ‘distributive justice’. Accordingly, the later 2009 outline edition
964
 had substantively 
altered the principles underlying European private law, to freedom, security, justice and efficiency, 
unfortunately without explaining why the drafters had chosen to alter their approach and what 




4) Even the use of clearly recognised principles may still leave lack of clarity,966 because 
general principles do not single out one particular rule or conclusion.967 Typically, 
various conflicting principles play a role in the development of private law and the 
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 A. Metzger, Extra legem, intra ius: Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze im Europäischen Privatrecht, Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen 2009, 
p. 60-61, p. 546, A. Metzger, ‘Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze im europäischen Privatrecht: Ansätze für eine einheitliche 
Methodenlehre im europäischen Mehrebenensystem’, Rechtstheorie 2009, p. 315, p. 317-318. 
959
 W. Devroe, ‘Impact van door het Europees Hof van Justite ontwikkelde algemene beginselen op privaatrechtelijke 
verhoudingen’, in: A.S. Hartkamp, C.H. Sieburgh, L.A.D. Keus (eds.), De invloed van het Europese recht op het Nederlandse 
privaatrecht I, Kluwer: Deventer 2007, p. 136, similarly V. Mak, ‘A shift of focus: Systematisation in European private law 
through EU law’, ELJ 2011, p. 422. 
960
 A. Metzger, Extra legem, intra ius: Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze im Europäischen Privatrecht, Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen 2009, 
p. 219, p. 466. 
961
 A. Metzger, Extra legem, intra ius: Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze im Europäischen Privatrecht, Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen 2009, 
p. 546, as well as A. Metzger, ‘Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze im europäischen Privatrecht: Ansätze für eine einheitliche 
Methodenlehre im europäischen Mehrebenensystem’, Rechtstheorie 2009, p. 323. 
962
 C. von Bar et al. (eds.), Draft Common Frame of Reference, Interim Outline Edition, Introduction, Sellier: Munich 2008, par. 
22 
963
 H. Eidenmüller, ‘Party autonomy, distributive justice and the conclusion of contracts in the DCFR’, ERCL 2009, p. 109-131.   
964
 C. von Bar et al. (eds.), Draft Common Frame of Reference, Outline Edition, Principles, Sellier: Munich 2009. 
965
 See critically M.W. Hesselink, ‘If you don’t like our principles we have others’. CSECL Working Paper 2008. 
966
 Comp. Lord Goff of Chievely, ‘The future of the common law’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1997, p. 753: 
‘Continental lawyers love to proclaim some great principle, and then knock it into shape afterwards. Instead, the boring British 
want to find out first whether, and if so, how these great ideas are going to work in practice.’   
967
 Lord Goff, ‘In search for principle’, Maccabean lectures on Jurisprudence, Proceedings of the British Academy 1984, p. 174-
177 has pointed out that even if legal principles are established, one may still not know a complete answer to a particular 
problem, especially as the law is continually developing. 
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adjudication of disputes. In the absence of an established hierarchy between 
principles, the outcome in individual cases is not predetermined by these general 
principles. 968  Instead, the choice for a specific outcome is influenced in the 
preferences of the legislator, the judge or the academic.969 
 
For example, article 6:2 Dutch Civil Code stipulates that contracting parties have to comply, in their 
behaviour towards one another, with the principle of fairness (‘redelijkheid en billijkheid’), but that duty 
still leaves open how contract parties’ rights and duties arising from contracts are affected in individual 
cases. The consequences of choices between, for example, predictability and fairness may instead 
become clear in specific cases.
970
 Similarly,  if the CJEU concludes that a general principle of civil law 
exists – the principle that ‘full performance of a contract results, as a general rule, from discharge of 
the mutual obligations under the contract or from termination of that contract’,
971
 lack of clarity may 
arise with regard to the applicability of this principle in areas that fall beyond the scope of the 
Directive.
972
 Consequently, a decision based on principles may still give rise to questions how private 
law will be developed in individual cases. 
 Nevertheless, in individual cases, principles may have far-reaching impact on the development 
of European private law.
973
 A well-known example of far-reaching and unexpected development on the 
basis of the principle of legal equality is the CJEU ruling in Mangold
974
 that set aside provisions of 
private law that parties had relied on.  
 
►Thus, general principles may profoundly affect the development of the law, but both the 
recognition of principles and the further development of the law on the basis of principles 
may undermine the predictable development of private law.  
 
7.5.2.2. The discovery and the use of general principles: problems of 
accessibility  
Problems of inaccessibility may arise especially as general principles do not necessarily 
have to be written. General principles introduce an unwritten source of private law, alongside 
other sources of private law, which does not benefit accessibility. 975  Admittedly, private 
parties can look at case law and use decisions of the judiciary as a starting point to discover 
general principles. However, case law can only offer a starting point, which moreover may be 
subject to change. Furthermore, courts may not make explicit on what premises they base 
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 R. Dworkin, Taking rights seriously, Duckworth: London 1977, p. 25-26.  
969
 Accordingly, K.P. Purnhagen, ‘Principles of European private or civil law? A reminder of the symbiotic relationship between 
the CJEU and the DCFR in a pluralistic European private law’, CSECL Working Paper 2011, p. 4, points to the relevance of the 
question  which actor has the competence to ‘find’ principles. 
970
 See for example HR 28 April 2000, NJ 2000, 430.   
971
 CJEU 10 April 2008, (Hamilton v Volksbank Filder eG), C-412/06, ECR [2008], p. I-2383, par. 42.  
972
 S. Weatherill, ‘The “principles of civil law” as a basis for interpreting the legislative acquis’, ERCL 2010, p. 77. 
973
 W. Devroe, ‘Impact van door het Europees Hof van Justitie ontwikkelde algemene beginselen op privaatrechtelijke 
verhoudingen’, in: A.S. Hartkamp, C.H. Sieburgh, L.A.D. Keus (eds.), De invloed van het Europese recht op het Nederlandse 
privaatrecht I, Kluwer: Deventer 2007, p. 133, considers the use of general principles as one of the most powerful tools of 
lawyersin European law.  
974
 CJEU 22 November 2005 (Mangold v Helm), C-144/04, [2005] ECR, p. I-9981, par. 59-65, 74. In this decision, the Court 
established that in the European legal order, a general principle of legal equality prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age, 
existed, on which Directive 2000/78 was based. This principle, as discovered by the court, could set aside German law 
stipulating that although objective reasons needed to be given for the conclusion of fixed term employment contracts, these 
objective reasons were not required if the employee was, at the time of conclusion of the employment contract, 52 years or older. 
Although the court considered that this exception, which was made in order to reduce the unemployment of people over the age 
of 52 in Germany, legitimate, it was not proportional to the aim it pursued, also considering that the age of workers was the only 
criterion for the exception, notwithstanding other relevant circumstances. Both the recognition of this principle and the effects in 
this case are not entirely uncontroversial.  For example, A.S. Hartkamp, ‘The general principles of EU law and private law’, 
RabelsZ 2011, p. 246 calls the recognition of this principle ‘unconvincing’. 
975
 Comp. the view that principles may also be used to introduce ‘society’s views’ into private law- thus, principles introduce an 
interaction between private law and society: J.H. Nieuwenhuis, Drie beginselen van contractenrecht (PhD thesis Leiden) Kluwer: 
Deventer 1979, p. 41-42.   
211 
 
general principles. Metzger976 rightly points out that especially national civil law courts as well 
as the CJEU frequently do not make all of the premises on which they base the recognition 
of a general principle explicit. Especially if extra-legal elements, such as moral or political 
points of view play a role in the recognition of general principles, these may not always found 
in either statutes or case law. Yet for private parties these underlying ideas on justice, and 
their consequences in individual cases, may not always be self-evident. 
 However, simultaneously, the development of private law on the basis of general 
principles may also increase accessibility as it contributes to the development of private law 
in accordance with society’s legal views on justice, which in turn will facilitate the 
understanding of private law for parties not familiar with private law.  
 
7.5.2.3. Conclusion 
Thus, the development of private law on the basis of general principles also shows weakness, 
particularly with regard to the predictable development of private law. This lack of 
rpedictability can be traced to the way principles are ‘discovered’ as well as the application of 
principles in individual cases and their effect on the outcome of disputes. Also, general 
principles are an unwritten source of law that may undermine the accessibility of the law. 
However, simultaneously, the development of the law on the basis of general principles may 
also increase responsiveness, which in turn is advantageous for accessibility. Nevertheless, 
actors involved in the development of private law should take into account these potential 
problems and seek to alleviate these problems, by making the recognition of principles more 
insightful and by mitigating the effect that principles may have on the outcome of individual 
cases. Alternatively, literature could seek to provide more insight in underlying ideas – 
although if the premises of courts are not made explicit, the insight provided by literature may 
necessarily have to rely upon some amount of guesswork. 
 
7.5.3. Conclusion on the use of principles 
This paragraph has asked whether general principles are used as a starting point for 
interaction, and how that has affected the predictability, accessibility, consistency and 
responsiveness of European private law.  
Actors law have have recognised that principles may serve as a starting point for 
interaction. Accordingly, general principles may be a useful starting point for developing 
harmonised law and may serve as a starting point for debate. This use of general principles 
also allows for flexibility in the development of harmonised private law. However, actors have 
not consistently adopted this approach – thus, general principles in soft law have not 
sufficiently prompted debate, and the both national courts and the CJEU have not 
consistently referred to principles common to the Member States.  
The use of general principles may also undermine the predictable development of 
private law, particularly because of a lack of clarity with regard to the recognition and further 
application of principles. A more careful use of general principles that is aimed at interaction 
may however lessen current problems of unpredictability as well as inaccessibility. These 
weaknesses should therefore not stand in the way of a more prominent role of general 
principles in the development of private law as a starting point for interaction.  
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 A. Metzger, Extra legem, intra ius: Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze im Europäischen Privatrecht, Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen 2009, 




Generally, in the development of the private law through codification, soft laws, blanket 
clauses, and general principles, actors have not adequately taken into account that other 
actors also develop private law and that, therefore, the ability of actors to safeguard 
benchmarks of predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness through 
these techniques has been diminished: 
 
i) The extent to which codifications can ensure the predictable, accessible, consistent 
and responsive development of private law is diminished as the private law acquis 
develops. 
ii) The extent to which soft laws can contribute to the predictable, accessible and 
consistent development of private law decreases as national and European state 
actors, as well as other groups of academics, develop national private law, the acquis 
and competing sets of soft law. 
iii) The extent to which blanket clauses can guarantee the responsive and consistent 
development of private law is lessened as national and European actors have both 
used identical blanket clauses. 
iv) The extent to which general principles can provide a starting point for interaction 
between actors that support the responsiveness of private law to legal views on 
justice is weakened as general principles play a different role in the development of 
national private law and the acquis, while it is not clear what principles play a role in 
the development of the acquis. 
 
European actors have a different view on how to ensure that the law develops in accordance 
with benchmarks of predictability, accessibility, and consistency of private law. The focus of 
European actors is on the quality of private law in cross-border situations. However, the 
acquis does not meet these benchmarks, which may severely undermine the extent to which 
the acquis enhances the functioning of the internal market.  
Also, European actors do not, as such, focus on ensuring the quality of private 
law, an increasingly complicated task that is mostly left to national actors. In turn, the 
focus of national actors to ensure the quality of their codifications is a reason for a defensive 
approach to European developments. National actors, rather than reconsidering the way in 
which they develop use national techniques, emphasise the quality of their codifications – 
and not without reason.  
Moreover, in particular, national actors are much better positioned to ensure the 
responsiveness of private law to national practices as well as national legal views on 
justice. Techniques that are particularly suited to ensure responsiveness are blanket 
clauses and general principles, that are however also used by European actors. Yet 
European actors have developed an approach in which the lack of predictability and 
consistency of the law developed through these techniques is emphasised. These 
weaknesses may be reinforced as actors use these techniques uncritically, without 
considering the role of the CJEU and national courts, and do not sufficiently interact on how 
they develop the law through these principles. Instead, European actors stress the need for 
further harmonisation to mitigate these problems. Unfortunately, more harmonisation may 
limit the extent to which blanket clauses contribute to the responsiveness of the law, 
as well as the consistency of national law.  
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Because interdependence in ensuring the quality of European private law has 
not been recognised as such, interaction between actors has not paid attention to 
interdependence, nor have actors, in interacting with one another, expressly 
considered the use of techniques. Instead, in interacting with one another, state actors 
pursue their own interests – European actors want to further develop the acquis and collect 
political support, while national actors maintain their national laws, promote their own private 
laws as a model for the acquis (which may well be beneficial for the acquis), and more 
generally their own interests within the Union.  
Consequently, the way that actors interact with each other should be adjusted. 
National actors are used to debate on the development of private law, without debating on 
questions of legislative competence and the aim of private law, while these questions are 
important at the European level. The attention of national state actors, national practitioners 
and scholars in particular seems to be concentrated on national law and national issues.977 
Possibly, as international traffic and international legal relationships increase, the limited 
ability of national actors to cope with problems arising in a cross-border context will become 
more apparent. This perspective firstly makes it less likely that the debate at the European 
level will focus on the question whether the reallocation of legislative competences to the 
European level, the effect of harmonisation, or the roles of actors as competences are 
reallocated or as alternative regulation develops.  
Actors’ different perspectives have likely also contributed to the separation 
between debate on national private law and debate on private law at the European 
level. More participation of legal practitioners and the judiciary from the national level may 
also be beneficial as these actors are presumably well-placed to signal problems arising in 
legal practice. However, the question arises why practitioners and judges would have an 
interest in development of foreign private law or the development of private law at the 
European or international level. Perhaps practitioners in areas of private law with an inherent 
cross-border aspect, such as international private law, or intellectual property have more 
interest in development of private law at a European or international level than practitioners 
in more ‘nationally’ developed areas. However, eventually, ‘nationally’ oriented areas may 
well become possible objects for harmonisation.  
Furthermore, the perspective of national actors makes it less probable that the 
use of techniques in the multilevel legal order is subject to debate. This not only means 
that the use of national techniques is not the result of careful consideration, it also means 
that the possible development of alternative regulation is currently overlooked and that 
successful national techniques are tranferred to the European level. This ‘national’ approach 
to private law has also been visible in the increased move to a more horizontal approach to 
harmonisation, one may also ask whether this approach also suits the European legislator 
who does not have a general competence to legislate in the area private law, but rather 
pursues the objectives of the Treaties.978 Transferring successful national techniques to the 
European level may also be problematic because these techniques are typically not used in 
isolation from other techniques, but in combination with one another. Therefore, if a 
technique is transferred to the European level, it is not clear how this technique will function 
without the use of additional techniques.  
                                               
977
 Comp. S. Prechal, R.H. van Ooik, J.H. Jans, K.J.M. Mortelmans, ‘Europeanisation of the law: Consequences for the Dutch 
judiciary, Report of October 2005, available at http://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie/Raad-Voor-De-
Rechtspraak/WetenschapsOnderzoek/Overzichtonderzoeksprojecten/Europeanisering/Pages/default.aspx, p. 49-50.   
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 J.M. Smits, ‘The Draft Common Frame of  Reference, methodological nationalism and the way forward’, ERCL 2008, p. 274-
276 describes this national approach to developing private law as ‘methodological nationalism’, as well as L. Miller, The 
emergence of EU contract law: Exploring Europeanization, OUP: Oxford 2011, p. 167. 
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The similarly uncritical approach of the European legislator to the use of techniques is 
especially unfortunate because the European legislator pursues a specific aim, and 
consequently, one would expect more focus on the question how to achieve that aim. Thus, 
debate should focus more on the use of techniques. This means that actors should 
reconsider simply transferring successful national techniques to the European level, and also 
consider alternatives to traditionally used techniques. Interaction may entail that actors 
become better acquainted with alternative approaches from other actors and benefit 
from experiences in other legal orders. Possibly, this may make actors more aware of 
strengths or shortcomings in the techniques they use and provide them with a more critical 
perspective on the use of techniques. It is also important that they reconsider what these 
techniques can realistically achieve. Typically, the use of national techniques may also lead 
one to compare the use of those techniques at a European level with the use of techniques 
at a national level. If the European use of a national technique is not as successful as the 
national use, does that mean that the use of that technique is problematic?  
In some cases, interaction need not necessarily take place between actors. More 
clearly communicating actors’ approach may provide more clarity to other actors. Accordingly, 
more clarity on what grounds principles will be accepted or rejected may increase the 
predictability and accessibility of private law developed through general principles. 
However, in some cases, interaction between actors in the legislative process may 
undermine efficient decision-making, or interaction between national courts and the CJEU 
may delay decisions in relatively straightforward cases. Notably, the chance of detrimental 
interaction may be increased if debate does not meet the requirements for deliberation. 
Therefore, interaction is not a value in itself, but rather serves to make actors 
aware that other actors also develop private law and that the extent to which national 
techniques ensure the predctiability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness of the law 
is diminished. It follows that this thesis has not and will not make an argument for as much 
interaction between actors as possible.  
In some cases, the diminished ability of techniques to contribute to the 
comprehensibility of European private law, may not be an attractive idea, and perhaps, if less 
interaction takes place, the limitations to national techniques are not as apparent. Moreover, 
if initiatives of actors undermine the quality of private law, other actors may seek to avoid too 
much interaction with these actors, in order to maintain the quality of private law.  
If the initatives of other actors undermine the quality of private law, the lack of 
interaction does not seem directly problematic for private parties in terms of 
predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness, but the lack of 
interaction in itself indicates problems. What if this also the case for the private law 
acquis?  
Avoiding interaction does not mean that European actors will cease to develop the 
law and a lack of interaction will only enhance the chance that the acquis will disturb the 
quality of national law. Thus, while no interaction – for example between national courts and 
the CJEU – may be beneficial for private parties, it is not a long term solution that can 
moreover be undermined as courts across the Union may not show similar restraint in 
referring questions to the CJEU. Eventually, keeping silent and ignoring the role of the 
European legislator and the unclear role of the CJEU where possible is not going to improve 
the quality of private law. Thus, European private law can only be improved if actors 
sufficiently interact with one another.  
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Chapter 8: The use of additional and alternative techniques    
 
8.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter has considered the use of national techniques in the multilevel legal 
order. What is often overlooked, however, is that actors do not use these techniques in 
isolation from one another; they use techniques in combination with one another. In nation 
states, techniques that facilitate interaction between actors, such as consultations, databases 
and networks, are typically used in the development of private law. Although actors are 
familiar with the use of these techniques and frequently rely on them, they have not 
considered these techniques as a means to improve the quality of European private law, 
perhaps because the focus of private law debate is not on the use of techniques. Therefore, 
this chapter will ask what techniques can be used in addition to or instead of currently used 
techniques that will support the extent to which national techniques contribute to the 
predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness of European private law.  
 Paragraph 8.2. will consider additional techniques that are typically used to support 
the legislative process. Paragraph 8.3. will consider additional techniques that more 
particularly aim to strengthen the extent to which blanket clauses can contribute to 
benchmarks of predictbility, consistency and responsiveness. Paragraph 8.4. will consider 
whether more attention for STC’s will enhance the predictable development of the private law 
acquis, which could help actors to maintain the predictable development of private law. 
Paragraph 8.5. will ask whether the use of the Open Method of Coordination (hereafter: 
‘OMC’) coud contribute to the responsiveness of legislation. Paragraph 8.6. will consider 
alternative techniques and paragraph 8.7. will end with a conclusion.979 
This chapter does not aim to provide a comprehensive overview of techniques that 
could be used in addition or instead of currently used techniques. Instead, the chapter will 
focus on the use of techniques that seem particularly suitable to cope with the problems 
detected in the use of codifications, blanket clauses and general principles. These 
techniques may be particularly suitable to further interaction between actors. This is the case 
for additional techniques that typically support the legislative process, discussed in 
paragraph 8.2. Other alternative techniques may be particularly suited to deal with problems 
arising from the use of a particular techniques, such as blanket clauses, discussed in 
paragraph 8.3. Alternativey, techniques may form an alternative for European measures that 
may limit national legislators’ ability to maintain the predictability, consistency, accessibility 
and responsiveness of the law through codifications and blanket clauses.  
 
8.2. Additional techniques supporting the legislative process   
What additional techniques could support the legislative process in the multilevel legal order? 
Weaknesses in the use of codifications and blanket clauses may be traced to defects in the 
legislative process. Shortcomings in this process have been detected in the Dutch legal order, 
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 This distinction between additional and alternative techniques is not meant to be used as a sharp distinction. However, 
considering the shortcomings visible in the legislative process, additional techniques that could especially support this process 
will be considered firstly, and separately, because of the important role of the legislative process. Other additional and 
alternative techniques are discussed subsequently, but they may well show overlap. However, alternative techniques are 
discussed after additional techniques have been discussed as their use may necessitate more change in the use of techniques. 
Accordingly, the use of additional and alternative techniques that are less disruptive for actors involved in the development of 
private law will also be discussed before turning to more disruptive techniques.   
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where the long period of reforms and overlooking relevant comments have been criticised. 980 
In the German legal order, the too frequent amendments in the BGB, the implementation of 
the acquis and ‘blunders’ have been criticised.981 At the European level, the lack of openness 
and debate has been criticised. 982  The reasoning in courts does not show similar 
shortcomings, but courts have not sought to compensate, insofar as possible, weaknesses in 
the implementation of Directives by referring to foreign courts and the CJEU.983 Both in the 
German984 and Dutch985 legal order, courts have exercised restraint in referring to the CJEU 
and referring to foreign law. This restraint may however also be traced to the restraint of 
parties to adjudication in relying on comparative law arguments, especially where 
comparative law is not directly relevant or not to the benefit of parties’ position.  
This does not mean that the legislative process cannot lead to successful initatives, 
which are also visible, such as the BW,986 as well as the Community trademark.987  In these 
                                               
980
 H.M. Vletter- van Dort, ‘Horen, zien en luisteren’, Ondernemingsrecht 2011, 73. has signalled a tendency for government 
officials to ignore advice on legislative proposals that they find inconvenient. Eventually, this trend might result in legislation 
ignoring the needs and preference of legal practice. Redactie WPNR, ‘Onvrede over wetgevingsproces’, WPNR 6868 (2010) 
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981 J. Huber, ‘Das Gesetz zur Beschleunigung fälliger Zahlungen’, JZ 2000, p. 966 has criticised the approach of the German 
legislator towards late payments. More drastic criticism has been voiced by W. Flume, ‘Vom Beruf unserer Zeit zur 
Gesetzgebung’, ZIP 2000, p. 1427, on the implementation of Directive 97/7 on distance contracts and in particular the 
introduction of articles 13 and 14 BGB introducing a definition of respectively consumers and entrepreneurs. Similarly, H.H. 
Seiler, ‘Bewahrung von Kodifikationen in der Gegenwart am Beispiel des BGB’, in: O. Behrends, W. Sellert (eds), Der 
Kodifikationsgedanke und das Modell des Buergerlichen Gesetzbuches, Van den Hoek & Ruprecht: Göttingen 2000, p. 109-110 
has criticised the “Regelwut” (regulatory frenzy), which he traces to the need to involve a large amount of committees in a 
process without an actor who clearly has final responsibility for a product – in this case a provision in the BGB. Moreover, Seiler 
points to the increased emphasis of policy aims and the need to realise this through speedy legislation, which, in his opinion, 
lead to ‘Wegwerfgesetze’. R. Zimmerman, ‘Characteristic aspects of German legal culture’, in: J. Zekoll, M. Reimann (eds.), 
Introduction to German law, Kluwer Law International: the Hague 2005, p. 17 has criticised German legislative practices, 
referring to ‘blunders’ that ‘have given rise to doubts whether the German legislature is still capable today of legislating in an 
academically sound and responsible manner.’    
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 W. Doralt, ‘Strukturelle Schwächen in der Europäisierung des Privatrechts’, RabelsZ 2011, p. 280. refers to the withdrawal of 
a critical member of the Expert Group studying the possible uses of the DCFR (Prof. S. Whittaker), and notes that the relatively 
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Zimmerman, ‘Europäisches Privatrecht – Irrungen, Wirtungen’, Max Planck Private Law Research Paper 2011, p. 22 and K. 
Riesenhuber, ‘A competitive approach to EU contract law’, ERCL 2011, p. 119-121 who notes that the time pressure in the 
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JZ 1992, p. 604, but also by H. Kötz, ‘Der Bundesgerichtshof und die rechtsvergleichung’, in: C.-W. Canaris et al (eds.), 50 
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courts referring a question to the CJEU may provide insight in questions of national law, while other states and experts may 
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984
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courts by M. Siems, ‘The adjudication of the German Federal Supreme Court, 2007, Oxford University Comparative Law Forum, 
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examples in  E. Kramer, ‘Konvergenz und Internationalisierung der juristischen Methode’, in: Meier-Schatz (ed.), Die Zukunft der 
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 V. van den Eeckhout, ‘The application of foreign law by judicial and non-judicial authorities – The Netherlands’, via 
www.ssrn.com, p. 6 indicates that national courts seem to prefer to apply national law rather than foreign law, in order to avoid 
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(eds.), Het zwijgen van de Hoge Raad, BWKJ 25, Kluwer: Deventer 2009, p. 79. 
986
 W. van Gerven, S. Lierman, Algemeen Deel, Veertig jaar later, Kluwer: Deventer 2010, p. 192 however consider the Dutch 
codification, especially the involvement of Parliament, as well as the emphasis on comparative law in the drafting of the code, as 
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 Regulation 207/2009 on a Community trademark. 
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cases, it seems as if the democratic process does guarantee open and transparent debate, 
and thus has a clear added value over private law that is formed by actors that do not 
similarly allow for open and transparent debate. 
Interestingly, the shortcomings visible in the legislative processes coincide with 
comments for more debate. 988  Some authors 989  have argued for deliberation, 990  i.e., 
discourse that takes place in a pluralistic society where groups and subcultures – and in the 
European Union, groups and subcultures in different states – have different backgrounds – in 
terms of, for example, religion – on which they base their convictions about right and wrong, 
while disputes between those groups may arise on an increasing number of issues. 
Deliberation takes place between actors that have to be able to put themselves in the 
position of other actors, who are trying to reach consensus based on as many rational 
arguments as possible.  
Although deliberation may not necessarily achieve consensus on future action, 
generally limits the number of options for future action, and also contributes to the quality of 
those options. These options can subsequently be taken as a starting point in decision-
making and facilitate political compromise. For European private law, this means that debate 
has to meet the following requirements:  
 
1) Representativeness 
A deliberative process should include a representative number of stakeholders, state actors, and 
experts.
991
 Interestingly, Van Gerven and Lierman
992
 have suggested that actors who are well placed 
to represent the interests of stakeholders, and who are well placed to gather information in a 
transparent and professional manner, should have a prominent place in deliberative discourse. 
 
2) Inclusiveness 
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implement it into national law – which seems frequently the case in European private law – the national legislator has less 
possibilities to cope with fragmentation in national private laws, and may choose to copy-paste the Directive into national law, a 
phenomenon not unfamiliar in European private law. W. van Gerven, S. Lierman, Algemeen deel. Veertig jaar later, Kluwer: 
Deventer 2010, p. 146 have held that in order to achieve convergence, cooperation of both state actors – legislators and judges 
– as well as non-state actors – including legal practice and academics – is necessary. Although the added value of comparative 
law insights in the drafting of legislation are familiar in private law, the added value of these insights have recently been 
recognised more generally by W. Voermans et al, Legislative processes in transition, WODC: Leiden, The Hague 2012, 
available at http://www.wodc.nl   
989
 J. Neyer, ‘Discourse and order in the EU: A deliberative approach to multi-level governance’, JMCS 2003, p. 690-691 has 
argued for ‘deliberation’, in the sense of ‘an inclusive and co-operative mode of interaction’, which is based on ‘claims of factual 
truth and/or normative validity’ while promises and threats are only relied on as a ‘last resort’, and which mostly takes place prior 
to official decision-making. Similarly, Ch. Joerges, ‘On the legitimacy of Europeanising private law: Considerations on a justice-
making law for the EU multi-level system’, vol 7.3 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 2003, available at 
http://www.ejcl.org/ejcl/73/art73-3.html has argued that the interdependence between actors forming European private law 
necessitates ‘a communication-oriented “deliberative” political style’. 
990
 J. Habermas, Between facts and norms, Contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy, MIT: Cambridge Mass. 
1996, 2
nd
 ed.Comp. the translator’s introduction: ‘As understood by participants engaged in interaction and discourse, truth 
claims are claims about the objective world that all human beings share, and moral claims have to do with norms for 
interpresonal relationships that any autonomous adult should find rationally acceptable from the standpoint of justice and 
respect for persons’, p. xv.  
991
 Comp. J. Neyer, ‘Discourse and order in the EU: A deliberative approach to multi-level governance’, JMCS 2003, p. 694, who 
notes that wide participation involves and connects important actors, and also increases responsiveness. C. de la Porte, P. 
Nanz, ‘The OMC – a deliberative-democratic mode of governance? The cases of employment and pensions’, JEPP 2004, p. 
270-271 distinguish the argument of Joerges and Neyer for deliberative supranationalism from deliberative democracy defended 
by Habermas. They rightly argue that Joerges and Neyer focus on comitology, where experts involve in evidence-based 
deliberative discourse. Notably, deliberative discourse ideally takes place within a limited circle of people with sufficient 
expertise, as is the case in comitology. However, this paragraph seeks to extend the ideal of deliberation to the democratic 
procedures at especially the European level.    
992
 W. van Gerven, S. Lierman, Algemeen Deel, Veertig jaar later, Kluwer: Deventer 2010, p. 287: ‘’voorang zou [kunnen] 
worden gegeven aan organisaties die dusdanig gestructureerd zijn dat zij specifieke en algemene belangen van burgers naar 
buiten toe kunnen vertegenwoordigen, en bij machte zijn om informatie op een transparante en deskundige wijze te verzamelen, 
haar intern af te toesten, en degene te verspreiden die nuttig is voor het nemen van beleidsbeslissingen’.   
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A deliberative process should include all relevant actors. Relevant actors are actors whose rights are 
affected by the development of European private law. This also entails that foreign parties should have 
the possibility to participate in the drafting of national private law if  national private law affects the 
rights and duties of foreign contract parties. If foreign parties that do not democratically elect the 
national Parliament are involved in the development of national private law, this may also limit 
potential Fremdbestimmung. 
Inclusiveness may also mean that the differences in the availability of financial and 
organisational resources, as well as expertise, should be neutralised as far as possible. Meuwese
993
  
points out that the necessary equality presupposes a number of circumstances, including the ability of 
actors to place themselves in the position of other actors participating in debate, which should be 
demonstrated in deliberative discourse. 
 
3) Openness and transparency.  
Debate should be open and transparent, which forces actors to account for their choices and give 
insight in the arguments used to justify such choices. Ideally, in the development of European private 
law, such transparent debate may give more insight into the arguments leading to the formation of 
rules. Such insight may ‘[sharpen] our focus on the weight of competing considerations. And it reminds 




4) Actors should be able to gain an overview of debate. 
Deliberation should not lead to a ‘cacophony of viewpoints’,
995
 or ‘or a ‘noisy dialogue of the deaf’.
996
 
To avoid too much cacophony, it would be necessary that deliberation takes place in a coordinated 




5) Actors should not use the debate to primarily pursue their own interests 
Actors participating in the debate must be willing and able to reflect on the arguments by other parties, 
instead of seeking to further their own interests. Currently, that may not always be the case. Hirsch 
Ballin
998
  states that ‘[m]any Member States representatives participating in the decision-making are 
driven by the desire to derive the greatest possible benefit and the least possible incoinvenience.’ The 
question however arises whether a deliberative attitude can be imposed on actors.  
 
Various additional techniques may improve debate, which can be a step towards 
deliberation.999  
Paragraph 8.2.1. will turn to consultations and paragraph 8.2.2. will discuss impact 
assessments. Paragraph 8.2.3. will consider databases and paragraph 8.2.4. will address the 
use of networks. Paragraph 8.2.5. will end with a conclusion. 
 
8.2.1. Consultations 
To what extent can consultations contribute to more interaction between actors in the 
development of codifications and blanket clauses in the legislative process? 
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 A.C.M. Meuwese, Impact assessment in EU lawmaking, Wöhrmann Print Service: Zutphen 2008, p. 42.  
994
 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59 (HL), 81, per Lord Steyn.  
995
 H.-W. Micklitz, ‘The visible hand of European regulatory private law. The transformation of European private law from 
autonomy to functionalism in competition and regulation’, EUI Working Paper 2008, p. 29. 
996
 J. Neyer, ‘Discourse and order in the EU: A deliberative approach to multi-level governance’, JMCS 2003, p. 695. 
997
 Possibly, making use of techniques such as networks and databases may also contribute to structuring the debate; see 
further par. 8.2.3. and 8.2.4. 
998
 E.M.H. Hirsch Ballin, ‘Reflections on co-actorship’, in: E.M.H. Hirsch Ballin, L.A.J. Senden (eds.), Co-actorship in the 
development of European law-making’, TMC Asser Press: The Hague 2005, p. 14.   
999
 This chapter does not seek to argue that deliberation is a de facto mode of communication in the development of European 
private law.   
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Paragraph 8.2.1.1. will summarise current consultation practices and paragraph 
8.2.1.2. will discuss shortcomings in the current use of consultations. Paragraph 8.2.1.3. will 
ask how the use of consultations can be improved and paragraph 8.2.1.4. will end with a 
conclusion.  
 
8.2.1.1. The current use of consultations 
Consultations are used widely in by Dutch, German and European actors, and they are 
generally recognised as generating input that may prompt the legislator to amend a proposal. 
In the German legal order, more emphasis has been put on the participation of academics. In 
particular, proposals from committees of academics, commission by the legislator, may 
produce a first academic draft (‘Referententwurf’), which generally prompts debate, 
sometimes in the form of preliminary reports, which may lead to a proposal of the legislator 
(‘Regierungsentwurf’). These proposals will be discussed by the committees, during which 
stakeholders and experts may also be heard. Moreover, academics may discuss the 
proposal, insofar it is amended, further. Comments are frequently taken into account. In this 
procedure, both the academic draft and the legislative proposal are circulated by way of 
generating debate and feedback.  
Similarly, in the Dutch legal order, a committee of academics, commission by the 
legislator, may issue a first draft, which will generally prompt debate. The draft may lead to a 
legislative proposal that may subject to further debate and which is advised upon by the 
Raad van Staate. Announcements in journals may further prompt debate and online 
consultations can be opened for submissions. Consultations usually last around one or two 
months.1000 The Dutch legislator has not developed standard consultation procedures. The 
way in which parties are consulted may differ among departments, and at an ad hoc basis. 
The inclination of some departments to contact parties that they are already familiar with may 
benefit ‘repeat players’. 1001  Unfortunately, doubts have arisen whether submissions to 
consultations are generally sufficiently taken into account by Parliament. 1002  Moreover, 
although some legislative initiatives are taken in the context of regulatory competition, it has 
not become a habit to consult foreign parties; instead, referral to comparative law is 
widespread. It has also not a habit to involve actors form the European level in national 
consultations.  
Neither the German nor the Dutch legislator has made it a habit to include foreign or 
European actors in consultations, not in the drafting process of legislation developed in the 
light of regulatory competition and not in the implementation of Directives. Notably, national 
consultations may not be similarly accessible to foreign and European actors. Moreover, 
national legislators may prefer simply informing the Commission of implementation 
afterwards, as is already generally required. Especially the possibility that implementation 
becomes subject to an ‘extra’ instance of control within the national democratic process may 
considered as intrusive and therefore problematic. Moreover, the resources of European 
actors may be limited and participation in consultative procedures throughout the Union may 
therefore be problematic. 
Likewise, the European Commission frequently uses Green Papers in the 
development of the private law acquis, initiating consultations that discussed possible future 
                                               
1000
 P. Popelier et al, Consulteren over ontwerpregelgeving, available at http://www.wodc.nl, p. 114.  
1001
 P. Popelier et al, Consulteren over ontwerpregelgeving, available at http://www.wodc.nl, p. 114.  
1002
 T. Cardoso Ribeiro,  Naar een zichtbaar effectieve wisselwerking tussen beleid en uitvoering, The Hague 28 March 2007, 
available at http://www.eerstekamer.nl.  
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action. 1003  These consultations proved to be starting points for especially academic debate 
on the future of the private law acquis, and they have played an important role in the debate 
on the future of European contract law. 1004  Senden 1005  has however remarked that the 
Commission is generally not under a duty to take the outcomes of consultations into account. 
Thus, consultations aim to generate interaction between relevant actors and thereby 
contribute to the quality of legislation. 
 
 
8.2.1.2. Shortcomings in the use of consultations  
Various shortcomings may be detected in the use of consultations by both national 
legislators and the European Commission.  
 
1) Both the German and the Dutch legislator generally consult national stakeholders on 
the implementation of Directives. However, during this stage, the choice for a 
Directive has already been made, and amendments cannot be made to provisions in 
the Directive that national stakeholders or experts perceive as particularly problematic. 
 
2) In European consultation, future action is already determined when consultations are 
initiated, which guarantees that future action is not based on the responses to 
consultations.  
The clearest example is the 2010 Green Paper on policy options towards progress towards a 
European contract law, discussing various possible uses for a final CFR. It may be doubted what 
weight is given to the preferences of stakeholders for the different options sketched in the Green 
Paper. Although the consultation lasted from July 2010 to February 2011, the Expert Group working 
on a “feasibility study”
1006
 that would be used to decide which parts of the DCFR were to be used for a 
Common Frame of Reference was already appointed in April 2010.
1007
 Although the Green Paper duly 
stated that the Expert Group would study the feasibility of an instrument of European contract law,
1008
 
and that further action by the Commission in 2012 would depend on the evaluation of the responses to 
the Green Paper,
1009
 the Commission seemed to favour the fourth option set out in the Green Paper, 
the optional instrument of a European contract code, in the form of a Regulation, and pointed out 
significant disadvantages associated with the other six options.
1010
 This preference was also 
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 See for example the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on European 
contract law, COM (2001) 398 final, the Communication from the Commission to the European parliament and the Council, 
European contract law and the revision of the acquis: the way forward, Com (2004) 651 final, European Commission, Green 
Paper on the Review of the consumer acquis, COM (2006) 744 final, and most recently the European Commission, Green 
Paper on policy options for progress towards a European contract law for businesses and consumers, COM (2010) 348 final.   
1004
 See, for example, the February issue of the European Review of Contract Law 2011, or the collection of essays on the 
Green Paper on policy options for progress towards a European contract law for businesses and consumers, COM (2010) 348 
final, M.W. Hesselink et al. (eds.), Het Groenboek Europees contractenrecht: naar een optioneel instrument?, The Hague: BJU 
2011.   
1005
 L.A.J. Senden, ‘De lidstaten en de kwaliteit van Europese wetgeving: geen consumenten, maar co-actoren’, SEW 2006, p. 
55. 
1006
 Comp. the criticism of E. Clive, ‘European contract law feasibility study’, European private law news, 11 May 2011available 
at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/epln/blogentry.aspx?blogentryref=8658 (consulted 26 August 2011): ‘ “Feasibility study” is a nice, 
neutral, non-committal name which did not, however, feature in the group discussions at all and which is not very accurate 
because this text is not a study about the feasibility of anything. The only doubt about feasibility within the expert group was 
whether a text could be produced within the limited time available. The text could be used as a partial basis for discussions 
about what might be feasible politically, but that is something different.’ 
1007
 Commission Decision of 26 April 2010, OJ L 105, 27.4.2010, p. 109. 
1008
 Green Paper on policy options for progress towards a European contract law for businesses and consumers, COM (2010) 
348 final, p. 4.  
1009
 Green Paper on policy options for progress towards a European contract law for businesses and consumers, COM (2010) 
348 final, p. 2.   
1010
 Comp. also V. Reding, ‘Warum Europea ein optionales Europäisches Vertragsrecht benötigt’, ZEuP 2011, p. 1. 
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expressed by the European Parliament.
1011
 This preference for an optional instrument is also visible in 
the Digital Agenda for Europe,
1012
 where the Commission indicates that one of the actions to be 
undertaken is the formation of an optional instrument of European contract law. Accordingly, the 
Expert Group has worked ‘on the assumption of an optional instrument’.
1013
 The clearly expressed 
preference of the Commission for a particular option may, according to Howells,
1014
  have limited the 
amount of responses.  
 
3) Consultations at the European level have narrowed debate.  
Consultations typically do not discuss all possible options, but focus on a limited number of options 
that are the focus of subsequent debate. Consequently, other options may be overlooked. For 
example, the 2007 Green Paper on the review of the consumer acquis
1015
 discusses the degree of 
harmonisation, proposing either full harmonisation, minimum harmonisation, or minimum 
harmonisation combined with a mutual recognition clause, while not discussing other options, such as 
optional harmonisation that gives businesses the option to apply either national or European law, or 
partial harmonisation that establishes two sets of rules, but does not leave businesses involved in 
cross-border trade with the option to apply national laws to their contracts.
1016
 Both degrees of 




Furthermore, the 2007 Green Paper proposes the different degrees of harmonisation as 
opposites, overlooking the possibility to combine minimum and maximum harmonisation, as is for 
example the case in Directive 2006/114 on misleading and comparative advertising. Typically, the 
options suggested in consultations in European private law include options that are not feasible or not 
likely to contribute to solving the problem signalled in the consultation. A clear example of this is the 
2001 Green Paper on European contract law, which proposes four options to improve the private law 
acquis. The first option, no European action, is not likely to improve the private law acquis, while the 
fourth option, comprehensive legislation at a European level, is not politically feasible. Unsurprisingly, 
a considerable majority of the consulted parties preferred the remaining options 2 and 3.
1018
  
Green Papers may also steer towards an option preferred by the Commission. Thus, the 
outcome of consultations may be affected by the questioning techniques used in consultations. 
Rutgers and Sufton-Green
1019
 find that the 2007 Green Paper on the reform of the consumer law 
acquis suggests several courses of action, one of which is the formation of an optional instrument, 
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 Resolution P7_TA-PROV(2009)0090 of the European Parliament of 25 November 2009 on the Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – An area of freedom, security and justice serving the citizen – 
Stockholm programme, par. 99-100.  
1012
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee and the regions, A digital agenda for Europe, COM (2010) 245 final, p. 13. See similarly 
Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020, A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM (2010) 2020 
final, p. 21. 
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 Expert Group on a Common Frame of Reference in European contract law, Synthesis of the fourth meeting, 1-2 September 
2010, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/consumer/docs/cfr_report_10_09_01_02_en.pdf, p. 1.  
1014
 G. Howells, ‘European contract law reform and European consumer law – Two related but distinct regimes’, ERCL 2011, p. 
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on the Optional Instrument. Indeed there is a danger that the Commission may not receive as full a range of responses as 
otherwise might have been the case for many commentators may believe the only realistic option on the Commission’s agenda 
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.  See also K. Riesenhuber, ‘A competitive approach to EU contract law’, ERCL 2011, p. 124-125. Similarly  R. Zimmerman, 
‘Europäisches Privatrecht – Irrungen, Wirtungen’, Max Planck Private Law Research Paper 2011, p. 24-25, who finds the 
consultation ‘einem leeren Legitimationsritual’.  
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 COM (2006) 744 final, par. 4.5.  
1016
 See on the different options P.J. Slot, ‘Harmonisation’, ELR 1996, p. 383-384. 
1017
 D. Curtin, ‘Emerging institutional parameters and organised difference in the European Union’, in: B. de Witte, D. Hanf, E. de 
Vos (eds.), The many faces of differentiation in EU law, Intersentia: Antwerp 2001, p. 363-364, remarks that optional 
harmonisation has been used predominantly to further the free movement of goods, and should be seen within that context. 
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 Comp. the Commission’s summary of the reactions to the communication on European contract law, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/comments/summaries/sum_en.pdf.  
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subsequent questions concern the horizontal instrument, and other questions are not discussed. Thus, 
the questioning style of the Green Papers, already favouring a particular course of action, does not 
seem to be structured in a way most suitable to receive suggestions on what particular grounds private 
law could or should be harmonised. 
 
4) Consultations do not consult all relevant parties. 
This means that respondents who may have valuable insights on the use of a particular technique or 
who may suggest alternative techniques are not consuled. Thus, neither the Dutch consumers’ 
association (‘Consumentenbond’) nor the German consumer protection association (‘Deutscher 





Consultations are currently used in a way that does not aim at generating the maximum 
amount of input. Accordingly, both Senden1021 and Zimmerman1022 have doubted the added 
value of especially European consultations.  
 
8.2.1.3. Improving the use of consultations 
The use of consultations may be improved if shortcomings currently visible in the private law 
acquis are remedied. Moreover, additional measures may further enhance the quality of 
consultations:  
 
1) Organising consultations in addition to European consultations preceding the drafting 
of Directives. 
Neither the Dutch nor the German legislator has chosen to organise consultations in addition to 
European consultations. In the German legal order, however, European consultations may sometimes 
be announced in legal journals.
1023
 In the Dutch legal order, the legislator may organise closed 
consultations prior to its reaction to European initiatives, in particular obtaining advice from the 
Commission for Consumer Affairs (‘Commissie voor Consumentenaangelegenheden’, ‘CCA’).
1024
 
However, the CCA has not participated in the debate at a European law. The German approach 
seems somewhat more successful when comparing the participation of German and Dutch actors in 
the debate at the European level.
1025
 A valuable example is set by the English legislator, who 
generally initiates consultations on European proposals. 
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available at http://www.minbuza.nl/ecer/icer/zoeken-in-icer-adviezen/2008/2008--rapport-common-frame-of-reference.html.  
1025
 Comp. the responses to COM (2006) 744 final, at 
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2) Establishing an obligation for the Commission to account how the outcomes of a 
consultation have been taken into account in the action undertaken after a 
consultation. 
This obligations should be included in the Interinstitutional Agreement on better lawmaking, which 




3) Opening national consultations to participation from memers of the European 
Parliament.  
Members of the European Parliament may be well placed to participate in national consultations, 
because of their expertise on European matters and their national political experiences. Participation 
of actors with both a national and a European background may prevent incorrect implementation and 
maybe increase the chance that an implementation law is judged as “best practice” and may serve as 
inspiration to other actors.   
  
4) Encouraging national Parliaments to participate in European consultations 
The Protocol on the application of the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality to the TFEU may 
provide national Parliaments with a possibility to engage more actively in the development of the 
consumer law acquis. Notably, national Parliaments have already delivered opinions on recent 
initiatives in European private law, especially the proposal for a Regulation establishing a European 
contract law.
1027
 It will be interesting to see whether some national Parliaments in particular provide 
frequent opinions, and to look at the possibilities to encourage less active national Parliaments to 
adopt an active approach as well. 
 
5) Using separate consultations on future action and legislative proposals.  
Sandström
1028
 has argued that consultations should include draft of proposed legislation, as this may 
provide an opportunity for consulted parties to address all relevant points. This argument does 
however raise the question whether it would not be useful to distinguish the course of action to be 
adopted first, and to subsequently consult on a specific legislative proposal that includes the draft 
proposal, as Green Papers in European private law now seek to answer both questions in one 
consultation.  
 
6) Promoting the better circulation of consultations 
It would be interesting to gain insight in the way that for example Green Papers are circulated.
1029
 The 
promotion tactics exercised at the European level may not be as successful as national practices. 
Consequently, national legal practitioners may not be  aware of the consultations issued by the 
Commission. Possibly, successful national practices to spread policy documents could be taken as a 
starting point to reach legal practitioners. 
 
7) Providing more opportunities for responses to consultations 
In this regard, the initiative to extend the minimum period of consultations from 8 to 12 weeks
1030
 
should be welcomed. The introduction of an alert service
1031
 should in addition ensure that actors who 
sign up for that service will be made aware of subsequent consultations in their field.  
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WEB/dossier/dossier.do?code=COD&year=2011&number=0284&appLng=EN.  
1028
 G. Sandström, ‘Knocking EU law into shape’, CLMRev 2003, p. 1310. 
1029
 L. Senden, Soft law in European Community law, Hart: Oxford 2004, p. 126 notes that one of the weaknesses of the Green 
Papers is that they do not provide insight into the ways in which they are circulated, stating: ‘one may wonder whether Green 
Papers that are silent on this particular aspect are notified to interested parties at all’. 
1030
 European Commission, ‘Have a bigger say in European policy-making: Commission extends public consultations to twelve 
weeks and creates new alert service’, Press Release European Commission 3 January 2012, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/1&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.  
1031




These measures would significantly increase the chance that relevant actors become aware 
of consultations. Remedying the shortcomings in the current use of consultations and 
improvements, some of which have already been made, may also make it more likely that 
actors will subsequently respond to consultations.  
 
8.2.1.4. Conclusion on the use of consultations 
The shortcomings in the current use of consultations may have contributed to the separate 
debates on private law at the national and the European level. In particular, the lack of 
interaction between European and national actors may help to maintain the seperation 
between national and European debate, which in turn makes it more likely that actors will 
continue to overlook increasing interdependence  Thus, if consultations encourage European 
and national actors to interact more and take into account one another’s responses, this may 
benefit the use of codifications and blanket clauses in the multilevel legal order. Specifically, 
if European actors become aware of national experiences and problems in the 
implementation and applicaton of Directives, this may prompt European actors to provide 
more clarity on the meaning of concepts used in Directves and encourage national actors to 
compare strategies to the implementation of Directives. More awareness of problems at the 
national level should also prompt European actors to reconsider the use of blanket clauses in 
the private law acquis, consider the need for responsiveness at the national level, and 
provide more clarity on the allocation of competences between the CJEU and national courts. 
If national actors interact more with European actors, this may make them more aware of 
future initiatives for harmonisation, or they may lobby for more clarity on future European 
measures. National actors may also anticipate the development of the acquis.  
 The suggestions for improvement make the interdependence between actors 
apparent. Notably, national actors may compensate for shortcomings in European 
consultations, and European actors should rely more on national actors to ensure that 
relevant actors are consulted. However, the efforts of national actors have little added value 
if European actors do not take actors´ responses into account. Simultaneously, European 
actors may compensate for shortcomings in national consultation practices and sugest 
improvement.  
 
8.2.2. Impact assessments 
Impact assessments are a relatively new technique used at the European level that still has 
to develop further.1032 According to the Commission,1033 impact assessments are not meant 
to replace political decision-making. Instead, they are aimed to further decision-making 
based on ‘transparent, comprehensive and balanced evidence’.1034 Notably, however, RIA’s 
are not binding and do not diminish the discretion of the Commission to initiate harmonisation. 
1035 To what extent can impact assessments contribute to the predictability and 
responsiveness of the private law acquis? 
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CJEU 7 September 2006 (Spain v Council), C-310/04, [2006] ECR p. I-7285 could be a sign that the CJEU will take more note 
of RIA’s. However, as Meuwese also points out, this concerns a case in which an impact assessment had not been made, which 
led the Advocate General and the Court to doubt whether the Commission could have made proper use of its discretion as it 
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 Paragraph 8.2.2.1. will discuss the shortcomings in the current use of impact 
assessments and paragraph 8.2.2.2. will turn to starting points to improve the use of impact 
assessments. Paragraph 8.2.2.3. will end with a conclusion. 
 
8.2.2.1. Shortcomings in the use of impact assessments 
Various serious shortcomings are currently visible in the use of impact assessments in the 
private law acquis:  
 
1) Impact assessments assess the impact of the options suggested in consultations, 
even though these options are hardly exhaustive. Consequently, problems signalled 
in the impact assessment may be dealt with in other ways that have not been 
assessed.  
For example, impact assessments, before the proposal for a Regulation establishing a Common 
European Sales Law, did not include optional harmonisation in its analysis.
1036
 Also, if consumers think 
they are more likely to become a victim of fraud when entering into cross-border contracts, especially 
via Internet, a service like Pay Pall might further consumer confidence, as it guarantees consumers a 
refund if, for example, they have not received the product they bought or if the product is not in 
accordance with the contract.
1037
 Similarly, Van Boom
1038
 points out that the argument that consumer 
confidence is furthered by more harmonisation may be more effectively pursued by other techniques, 
such as inserting standard clauses in often used contracts.  
 Even if stakeholders suggest alternative measures, these have not been considered in impact 
assessments. Accordingly, the suggestion of stakeholders to introduce professional licensing 
requirements in timeshare matters was not assessed. The reasoning for this choice are interesting:
1039
   
 
‘The minimum intervention priority induced the elimination of the sub-option of professional 
licensing requirements in the proposal for a revised Directive, despite the merits of this sub-
option, and strong support from numerous Member States and stakeholders. When weighing 
the benefits for consumers of introducing the licensing requirements sub-option, and the 
additional regulatory burden it would impose on the industry, it was concluded that, on balance, 
the benefits did not, at this stage, justify this measure. 
 
It can however be doubted whether this ‘minimum requirement principle’ – which in the form of the 
principles of subsidiarity proportionality should not only be taken as a starting point for only one option 
and which does not seem to have led to reconsideration of the maximum harmonisation approach – 
justifies the exclusion of this option. Arguably, licensing may well be suitable to achieve the objective 
pursued by the European Union, especially limiting the amount of rogue traders, which, in time, may 
contribute to consumer confidence. One may also ask whether impact assessments are not meant to 
analyse the benefits and disadvantages of a particular option. Apparently, however, it is also possible 
to reject an option without such an analysis. In addition, the report appears to contradict itself by 
stating that the option to introduce licensing requirements receives strong support, while previously 
                                                                                                                                                   
was not sufficiently familiar with all relevant facts. If an impact assessment has been conducted, the CJEU may continue to 
exercise restraint – it is not clear whether shortcomings in impact assessments discussed below will prompt a more critical 
approach.  
1036
 The European Economic and Social Committee, ‘The 28
th
 regime – an alternative allowing less lawmaking at Community 
level’, OJ 2011, C 21/26, 21.2.2011, par. 1.14 has suggested to include this option in future impact assessments.  
1037
 See for the full terms and conditions (in Dutch) https://cms.paypal.com/nl/cgi-bin/?&cmd=_render-
content&content_ID=ua/UserAgreement_full#13.%20PayPal%20Buyer%20Protection.  
1038
 W.H. van Boom, ‘The Draft Directive on consumer rights: Choices made and arguments used’, Journal of Contemporary 
European Research 2009, p. 462. 
1039
 Commission staff working document, Accompanying document to the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the protection of consumers in respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-term holiday products, resale 
and exchange, Impact assessment, COM (2007) 303 final, p. 37. 
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admitting that there were few responses of stakeholders on this point. However, an explanation for a 




2) Impact assessments are based on controversial assumptions that are however 
essential for the outcome of the assessment. 
Accordingly, impact assessments generally assume that divergences between private laws pose an 
obstacle to the internal market.
1041
 However, this assumption overlooks that the assumption that 
especially default private law poses a barrier to the internal market is quite controversial.
1042
 This 
assumption is also difficult to reconcile with the Tobacco Advertising,
1043
 where the CJEU held that the 
existence of divergences and the abstract risk of obstacles to the internal market do not by themselves 
justify harmonisation. Moreover, impact assessments do not make use of insights that draw into doubt 
that divergences between private laws always present an obstacle to cross-border trade, or present 
the most pressing obstacle to cross-border trade.
1044
  
Notably, previous legislation was also not based on impact assessments. For example, in the 
proposal for Directive 97/7 on distance selling,
1045
 the Commission relies on data provided by 
stakeholders and seems to assume, rather than investigate, that divergences of national laws provide 
an obstacle to the internal market: ‘It is the Commission’s job to avoid such fragmentation.’
1046
 An 
impact assessment on the impact of divergent private laws on the internal market is long overdue.   
 
3) Impact assessments are superficial and do not sufficiently take into account elements 
that are relevant for the outcme of the assessment. 
 
A good example is the impact assessment accompanying the CESL, which does not compare the 
impact of alternative optional instruments that would, for example, also deal with complex contracts 
containing elements of manufacturing, finance, and transport. The current limitation of the CESL to 
sales contracts and the exclusion of mixed contracts in article 5, 6 and article 2 (m) proposed 
Regulation means that parties to often-used complex contracts are less likely to opt for the CESL, as it 
would only cover the ‘sales’ part of the contract and not the parts of the contract relating to, for 
                                               
1040
 Comp. the consultation document, available http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/travel_en.htm#time.  
1041
 See for example recently European Commission, Commission staff working paper, Impact Assessment accompanying the 
document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law, 2011, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/1_en_impact_assesment_111011.pdf, p. 10, the Commission Staff Working 
Document,  Accompanying document to the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and Council on the protection 
of consumers in respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-term holiday products, resale and exchange, Impact Assessment, 
COM (2007) 303 final, p. 24. See, somewhat more extensively, the Commission Staff Working Paper, Extended Impact 
Assessment on the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning unfair business-to-consumer 
commercial practices in the internal market, COM (2003) 356 final, p. 5-8,  
1042
 M. Schillig, Konkretisierungskompetenz und Konkretisierungsmethoden im Europäischen Privatrecht, De Gruyter Recht: 
Berlin 2009, p. 294, Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, ‘Social justice in European contract law: A 
Manifesto’, ELJ 2004, p. 656, McKendrick, ‘Harmonisation of European contract law: The state we are in’, in: S. Vogenauer, S. 
Weatherill (eds.), The harmonisation of European contract law, Hart: Oxford 2006, p. 21, O. Remien, Denationalisierung des 
Privatrechts in der Europäischen Union?’, Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung 1995, p. 129-130, H. Beale, ‘Finding the remaining 
traps instead of unifying contract law’, in: S. Grundmann, J. Stuyck (eds.), An academic green paper on European contract law, 
KLI: The Hague 2002, p. 67-72, H. Collins, ‘Transaction costs and subsidiarity in European contract law’, in: S. Grundmann, J. 
Stuyck (eds.), An academic green paper on European contract law, KLI: The Hague 2002, p. 270-271, G. Wagner, ‘The virtues 
of diversity in European private law’, in: J.M. Smits (ed.), The need for a European contract law, Europa Law Publishing: 
Groningen 2005, p. 17-18.  
1043
 CJEU 5 October 2000 (Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European Union), C-376/98, 
ECR [2000], p. I-8419, par. 84. 
1044
 J.M. Smits, ‘Diversity of contract law and the European internal market’, in: J.M. Smits (ed.), The need for a European 
contract law, Europa Law Publishing: Groningen 2005, p. 169-170. Smits, at p. 171, also points out that the effect of uniform law 
on contracting is scarce. Similarly,  E. Kieninger Wettbewerb der Privatrechtsordnungen im Europäischen Binnenmarkt, Mohr 
Siebeck: Tübingen 2002, p. 86-87 remarks that the choice to start business in a particular market may be influenced more by 
factors like a potential market for a product, availability of employees, infrastructure, or tax law than diverging private laws. 
1045
 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive on distance selling, COM (92) 11 final, p. 3-5. Although the Commission 
refers to ‘recent study’(p. 5) and ‘detailed study’ (p. 7) it does not become clear what the subject of these studies was or by 
whom it was performed, which makes it difficult to retrieve these studies. I can find no impact assessment empirically 
underpinning the arguments of the Commission that fragmentation of laws hinders the internal market.   
1046
 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive on distance selling, COM (92) 11 final, p 11. 
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example, manufacture, transport, finance and installation.
1047
 Arguably, inserting such provisions into 
an optional instrument may significantly affect the added value of an optional instrument to parties to 
complex contracts, which in turn may significantly affect the chances of success of the CESL. 
Consequently, the impact assessment fails to point out which content of an optional instrument is most 
likely to generate optimal impact for the internal market.  
Frequently, also, impact assessments may also overlook other relevant factors that may affect 
the success of a new or reformed Directive. In particular, the question arises whether impact 
assessment pay sufficient attention to the possibility that parties upon whom rights are conferred – in 
particular consumers – are sufficiently aware of these rights and consequently enforce these rights. 
Generally, the possibility that a party can enforce his rights may serve as an additional incentive for 
other parties to meet their obligations under private law – thus, the possibility of enforcement may 
have a preventive function in itself.
1048
  Yet characteristically, the enforcement of private law depends 
on private parties. Thus, if private parties do not enforce their rights, this may lead to a lack of case 
law and literature discussing this case law. Thus, a lack of information of the development and 
application of rules in legal practice may arise.
1049
 Consequently, rules that do not respond to the 
needs of legal practice, or society’s views on justice, or rules that are circumvented because they give 
rise to problems of unpredictability and inconsistency, or rules that are not accessible, may continue to 
exist because of a lack of information of these problems. Arguably, this may be a reason to exercise 
some caution in the conclusions of impact assessments: possibly, the failure of a rule to visibly 
advance the internal market may not necessarily be due to, for example, minimum harmonisation, but 
also because parties have not enforced their rights, which in turn can be due to multiple reasons: 
consumers were already satisfied with the service provided by sellers, or they were unaware of their 




Because of these shortcomings, impact assessments currently do not contribute to evidence-
based interaction between actors, which should be one of the important advantages 
associated with impact assessments. 1051  Instead, impact assessments may undermine 
debate, as they generally support harmonisation rather than debate on the desirability of 
harmonisation, or debate on the possible ways to address problems for the internal market. 
Impact Assessment Reports frequently present rather exact transaction costs and 
percentages1052 that provide a false sense of exactness which may inhibit further debate.  
 
                                               
1047
 Comp. the response of the British Exporters Association to the Feasibility Study, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/expert-group/index_en.htm, p. 2, under 8.  
1048
 H.J. Snijders, C.J.M. Klaassen, G.J. Meijer, Nederlands burgerlijk procesrecht, Kluwer: Deventer 2007,4
th
 ed., par. 11, 
rightly note that the preventive effect may also be a disadvantage, especially if it has a greater effect on a party with less 
financial resources and expertise than the party he contracts with.   
1049
 Notably. a large amount of case law does not necessarily mean that a particular rule is problematic – rather, especially 
blanket clauses need to be interpreted taking into account all the relevant circumstances in individual cases, while a lack of case 
law need not necessarily mean that a provision is not of importance to legal practice, see for Dutch law recently A.S. Hartkamp, 
‘Het nieuwe BW – ontwikkelingen sinds 1992’, AA 2012, p. 49, referring to the interpretation of article 6:162 par. 2 BW  as well 
as the supplementary function of good faith in article 6:248 BW in HR 12 January 2001, NJ 2001, 253 and HR 12 december 
2003, NJ 2004, 117.  
1050
 See further also W. van Boom, Efficacious enforcement in contract and tort, BJU: The Hague 2006, who has identified 
various features of contract law that may stand in the way of the effective enforcement of contract and tort law, which may be 
particularly problematic if these rules pursue a specific aim. 
1051
 W.H. van Boom, ‘The Draft Directive on consumer rights: Choices made and arguments used’, Journal of Contemporary 
European Research 2009, p. 460. 
1052
 See for example the European Commission working staff document, accompanying the proposal for a directive on consumer 
rights, Impact Assessment Report, p. 9-12, available at  http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/cons_acquis_en.htm. These 
predictions seem rather perilous to begin with and moreover have already been challenged by stakeholders, see Oxera, What is 
the impact of the proposed Consumer Credit Directive?, April 2007, available at 
http://www.oxera.com/cmsDocuments/Oxera%20report%20on%20CCD%20April%202007.pdf (study commissioned by APACS, 
the British Bankers’ Association, the Consumer Credit Association and the Finance & Leasing Organisation.)  See for example 




8.2.2.2. Improving the use of impact assessments 
Despite shortcomings in the use of impact assessments, the European Commission has not 
critically considered the use of impact assessments in the development of the private law 
acquis.1053 Nevertheless, the use of impact assessments can be improved if shortcomings 
are addressed and if measures for improved impact assessments are taken: 
 
1) Impact assessments should accompany general consultations on future action and 
precede legislative proposals.  
Thus, impact assessments are able to critically evaluate the need for proposed legislation, critically 
test assumptions, and go beyond the options suggested in consultation documents.  
 
2) Actors participating in European consultations should take impact assessments into 
account.  
More attention for impact assessments may pressure European actors to improve the use of impact 
assessments. The Roadmap service
1054
 should contribute to the awareness of actors of planned 
impact assessments as well as facilitate getting an overview of the wide range of European 
Commission initiatives.  
 
3) National actors should consider carrying out separate impact assessments. 
Senden
1055
 has suggested that impact assessments should also be held at the national level. Arguably, 
national impact assessments will enable a clearer view on the impact of the reform of contract law on 
national markets, which may lead to more ‘evidence-based’ debate.  
 
8.2.2.3. Conclusion on the use of impact assessments 
This paragraph has considered whether the use of impact assessments strengthens the 
legislative processes, which in turn could benefit the use of blanket clauses. Impact 
assessments currently hinder rather than help interaction between actors. These 
shortcomings should not be seen in isolation from the shortcomings in the use of blanket 
clauses by the European legislator. The shortcomings in impact assessments are 
unfortunate, as impact assessments are a suitable means to draw attention to the question 
which techniques should be used in the development of private law. Perhaps, a more critical 
approach of the use of techniques would have encouraged both national and European 
actors to use blanket clauses more sparingly. However, if the shortcomings in impact 
assessments are remedied, and if measures to improve impact assessments are taken, 
impact assessments may still provide a valuable contribution to the debate by focusing on 
the use of techniques. More critical and thorough impact assessments would hopefully also 
lead to more specific guidelines when differences in national private laws could pose barriers 
to the internal market, and thus indicate on what areas of law the Union is likely to pursue 
harmonisation, thereby furthering the predictability of harmonisation and limiting the 
arbitrariness of harmonisation.1056  
                                               
1053
 The House of Lords European Union Committee, Impact Assessments in the EU: room for improvement?, available at  
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldeucom/61/6106.htm, 2009-10, par. 66 has moreover 
pointed out that early drafts of impact assessments and draft Directives are not generally available, which makes it more difficult 
to estimate the influence of these documents on one another during the drafting process.   
1054
 See http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/planned_ia_en.htm.  
1055
 L.A.J. Senden, ‘General Report, The quality of European legislation and its implementation and application in the national 
legal order’, in: E.M.H. Hirsch Ballin, L.A.J. Senden (eds.), Co-actorship in the development of European law-making’, TMC 
Asser Press: The Hague 2005, p. 157. 
1056
 J.M. Smits, ‘European private law: A plea for a spontaneous legal order’, in: D.M. Curtin, J.M. Smits (eds.), European 





Networks are frequently well-developed in nation states and accordingly facilitate interaction 
between various actors involved in the development of private law. Networks may be used to 
create discussion outside of the legislative process, but their role in facilitating debate in the 
legislative process can be essential and often, actors simply rely on networks in the 
development of private law.  In the multilevel legal order, networks are not as well-developed, 
while there is more need for interaction between actors as interdependence develops further. 
How can the use of networks contribute to the legislative process, in particular the extent to 
which codifications and blanket clauses contribute to the comprehensiveness of European 
private law? 
 Paragrah 8.2.3.1. will consider the use of current networks and paragraph 8.2.3.2. will 
discuss shortcomings in the use of networks. Paragraph 8.2.3.3. will turn to the improved use 
of networks and paragraph 8.2.3.4. will end with a conclusion.  
 
 
8.2.3.1. The current use of networks  
Generally, the scope and function of networks differ widely from one another. Initiatives may 
range from cross-border cooperation between specific institutes, 1057  to well-established 
national networks. 1058 At the European level, different forms of networks have also developed, 
ranging from SECOLA,1059 to for example the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme 
Judicial Courts of the European Union.1060 Both European and national state actors have 
recognised the added value of networks in the devlopment of private law. Thus, when 
initiating legislation, Member States may rely on national networks that provide input on, for 
example, a bill, inclusing implementation legislation, and prompt debate. The European 
Commission has similarly attempted to collect input on its initatives through consultations. 
Generally, networks facilitate targeting actors with relevant expertise and experience who 
could contribute to the quality of private law. 
 
8.2.3.2. Current shortcomings in the use of networks 
What shortcomings are currently visible in the use of networks?  
 
1) Generaly, networks have failed to sufficiently facilitate and interest members in 
entering into debate across borders and across levels.  
Parties involved in national legal practice or research and education do not necessarily also participate 
in networks at the European level. Consequently, a separation exists between debate on national 
private law on the one hand, where discussion takes place between national actors, through well-
established national networks, and literature, taking national statutory and case law as a starting point.   
                                               
1057
 For example the Deutsch-Russische Juristenvereinigung e.V. (DRJV), or cooperation between universities in different legal 
orders, 
1058
 For example, the Dutch Lawyers’ Society (‘Nederlandse Juristen Vereniging’ see http://njv.nl/), as well as the Dutch Society 
on Private Law ( ‘Nederlandse Vereniging voor Burgerlijk Recht’, see http://www.verenigingvoorburgerlijkrecht.nl/), the 
Netherlands Comparative law Association (‘Nederlandse Vereniging voor Rechtsvergelijking, see 
http://www.ejcl.org/general/nvvrhome.html), the Council for the Judiciary (‘Raad voor de Rechtspraak, see 
http://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie/Raad-Voor-De-Rechtspraak/OverDeRvdr/Pages/default.aspx), and the Dutch Bar (‘Orde 
van Advocaten’, see http://www.advocatenorde.nl/consumenten/). 
1059
 See further http://www.secola.org/.  
1060
 See further http://www.rpcsjue.org/.  
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European law generally takes a less prominent position.
1061
 On the other hand, debate on ‘European’ 
private law, which includes the development of the private law acquis, the desirability of further 
harmonisation, and the interaction between European and national private law, takes European law 
and questions whether national private laws diverge as a starting point, where prominent “European” 
stakeholders may play an important role.
1062
  Grundman and Stuyck
1063
 state that: 
  
‘The attendees [of the 2001 SECOLA conference] (…) represent the academic circles with a 
strong interest in the Europeanisation of private law. These circles, however, encompass 
probably not more than 10-20 per cent of private law scholars in the Member States 
(….)Therefore, the reservations which have been made against more intensive unification or in 
favour of maintaining elements of flexibility and diversity by a large majority even in this forum 
in Leuven have to be taken very seriously. It is not impossible that the majority view in legal 
academia in general could go in a direction more or less opposite or less favourable to any 
more harmonisation or unification.’ 
 
More generally, Schepel and Wesseling
1064
 have also emphasised the ‘homogeneity of the European 
legal community. Also, Armstrong
1065
 has noted that the emphasis of the Commission on including 
“civil society” in the White Paper on European governance seems to emphasise transnational actors, 
which moreover seems aimed at supporting European legislation. 
 
2) Stakeholders who can easily organise themselves may participate more prominently 
in networks than weaker stakeholders. Thus, the formation of networks does not 
necessarily encourage inclusive debate.       
 
3) European actors take European networks as a starting point instead of turning to 
national networks.  
Arguably, European networks should not be used as an alternative to various national networks, but 
as a supplement to national networks, and make use of the contacts established in these national 
networks. Arguably, national state actors are best placed to involve actors in debate on European 
legal reform.
 1066
  State actors may also be better placed than actors at the European or international 
level to recognise important actors and well-established, representative stakeholder groups at the 
national level. 
The development of multiple networks which apparently overlap may lead to confusion. This 
becomes apparent in Directive 2013/11 on ADR in consumer disputes,
1067
 which envisages an 
important role for the European Consumer Centres-network, and also notes that ADR organisations 
should be encouraged to join FIN-NET with regard to ADR in financial services. However, the 
existence of the European Extra-Judicial network may also create some confusion, as the division of 
tasks between the EEJ-net and the ECC-net, as well as the relationship between these two networks, 
                                               
1061
 Comp. S. Prechal, R.H. van Ooik, J.H. Jans, K.J.M. Mortelmans, ‘Europeanisation of the law: Consequences for the Dutch 
judiciary’, Report of October 2005, available at http://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie/Raad-Voor-De-
Rechtspraak/WetenschapsOnderzoek/Overzichtonderzoeksprojecten/Europeanisering/Pages/default.aspx, p. 49-50.   
1062
 For example, the formation of the Optional Instrument (see for the members of the stakeholder group 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/stakeholder-meeting/index_en.htm), Directive 2011/83 on consumer rights (see for the 
members of the stakeholder group http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/cons_acquis_en.htm). Comp. also the members of the 
Round Table on Travel Contracts, on the review of Directive 90/314 on package travel (see for the members of the group  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/pack_trav/pack_trav03_en.pdf)   
1063
 Comp. the observation of S. Grundmann, J. Stuyck, ‘An academic Green Paper on European contract law – Scope, 
common ground and debated issues’, in: S. Grundmann, J. Stuyck, (eds.), An academic Green Paper on European contract law, 
KLI: The Hague 2002, p. 7-8.  
1064
 H. Schepel, R. Wesseling, ‘The legal community: Judges, lawyers, officials and clerks in the writing of Europe’, ELJ 1997, p. 
165.  
1065
 K. Armstrong, ‘Rediscovering civil society: The European Union and the White paper on Governance’, ELJ 2002, p. 116.   
1066
 Comp. the European Union Select Committee, Correspondence with Ministers November 2007 to April 2008, Review of the 
consumer acquis, accessed at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldeucom/29/29250.htm#note133.  
1067
 COM (2011) 793 final. 
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is not clear. This also makes it more difficult for national state actors to keep track of developments in 
these areas. 
 
Thus, shortcomings in the debate in European private law can also be traced to 
shortcomings in the use of networks.  
 
8.2.3.3. Improvements in the use of networks 
The use of networks can be improved in various ways: 
 
1) Networks should be more open to wider participation.  
Networks may not be open to participation by all relevant actors, which may limit the extent to which 
these networks encourage inclusive, accessible and transparent debate. Important national networks 
may moreover require members to have a law degree from a university in that particular Member 
State,
1068
 and discussions in networks are held in the language of the Member State, which may limit 
the extent to which foreign actors can participate in the debate in Member States. In some cases, 




2) Actors should be made aware of relevant networks 
Zimmerman
1070
 argues that networks such as the European Law Institute
1071
  should provide an 
overview of existing networks. In this way, a European Law Institute could contribute to keeping an 
overview of the different existing networks, forging contacts when the work of such networks could 
further debate in European private law, while making use of the memberships and contacts 
established in existing networks, instead of potentially creating confusion by replacing one network 
with another while actors may already be familiar with one network.  
 
8.2.3.4. Conclusion on the use of networks 
Currently, the use of networks does not facilitate debate on private law in the multilevel legal 
roder to the extent that they facilitate debate within Member States, even though more 
interaction between actors from different legal orders and different levels is necessary. Thus, 
networks currently do make actors involvd in legislative processs more aware of other actors 
also developing private law. The suggestions for improvement may encourage actors to look 
at foreign and European networks, while European actors should pay more attention to 
prominent national networks. However, the success of networks depends on the participation 
by relevant actors, and attempts to establish networks may not necessarily be successful, 
while it may take up considerable resources. Even if all relevant actors are participating in a 
network, this may not, necessarily, point towards a specific outcome.  
 
8.2.4. Databases 
The use of databases is important in facilitating “evidence-based” interaction between actors. 
Therefore, paragraph 8.2.4.1. will consider the current use of databases, and paragraph 
                                               
1068
 This is the case for the Dutch Jurists’ Association (‘Nederlandse Juristen Vereniging’), see http://njv.nl/lidmaatschap/lid-
worden/. The German Law Association (‘Deutscher Juristentag’)  provides that foreign lawyers can become members if they are 
recommended by members, see http://www.djt.de/recht-mitgestalten/mitglied-werden/.  
1069
 For example the Anglo-German Law Society, http://www.aglawsoc.org/ or the Asscociation for comparative legal studies in 
Belgium and The Nederlands (‘Vereniging voor de vergelijkende studie van het recht van België en Nederland’). 
1070
 R. Zimmerman, ‘Reflections on a European Law Institute – based on the proceedings of the Florence Conference’, ZEuP 
2010, p. 721. 
1071
 See further http://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/eli/index.php.  
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8.2.4.2. will consider shortcomings in the use of databases. Paragraph 8.2.4.3. will consider 
improvements in the use of databases and paragraph 8.2.4.4. will end with a conclusion.   
 
8.2.4.1. The current use of databases  
Databases are widely used in national legal orders as well as the European legal order. They 
provide actors with the necessary information to participate in debate based on adequate 
knowledge of the law. National databases provide one with information about relevant 
national and European legislation and (most) case law. At the European level, databases 
have been established within various European networks: from the well-known EU consumer 
law acquis database1072 to the less-well-known and accessible search engine of national 
case law established by the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the 
European Union.1073 Thus, the scope and content of these databases varies: from widely 
available information on the implementation of the acquis, to information shared between 
courts. 
 
8.2.4.2. Shortcomings in the use of databases 
Currently, databases are not used optimally within the multilevel legal order:  
 
1) Few databases on national decisions on the private law acquis have been established 
and the success of databases that do exist varies and is difficult to assess.  
Whereas the CLABB-database was not well-known and abandoned after some years, the EU 
consumer law acquis database was used as a starting point to evaluate which Directives would be 
included in the review of the consumer acquis. 
 
2) Decisions in ADR are not consistently published and may be confidential.  
However, ADR becomes increasingly important in transnational trade and it is also encouraged by the 
European Commission.
1074
 Therefore, an important source of information on the application of the law 
in individual disputes is missing.    
 
3) Databases on the implementation of the acquis are established in addition to well-
established national databases.  
Accordingly, the European legislator has similarly recognised the added value of more information on 
the interpretation of the private law acquis, considering its proposal to collect information on the 
application of a future Regulation by both national courts and the CJEU in article 14 par. 2 Regulation 
for a Common European Sales Law. In addition, databases have also been established with regard to 
Directive 2005/29
1075
 and in private international law.
1076
 
Typically, national databases that are most often used do not provide one with information on 
foreign statutory law or case law implementing the private law acquis. Actors who are familiar with 
these databases will however not seek to rely on other databases without clear incentive to do so. 
Including decisions on the implementation of the acquis in national databases may increase the 
chance that actors will become more aware of these decisions.   
It is however important to realise for what actors databases are established. For some actors, 
databases that are interesting for other actors may have little added value. For example, a database 
on the implementation of the acquis may have limited value for Member States. Generally, Member 
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States simultaneously have to draft implementation legislation. By the time the database contains 
information on these implementation laws, most Member States will already have implemented the 
acquis, and therefore will not make use of a database providing information on the implementation of a 




8.2.4.3. Improving the use of databases 
The use of databases can be improved in various ways: 
 
1) Rather than establishing separate and possinbly overlapping databases, the 
European legislator should consider the use of national databases to make actors 
more aware of European and foreign decisions.  
The development of overlapping databases – as well as networks – alongside one another may give 
rise to confusion. Similar to networks, it may be therefore worthwhile to take existing, well-established 
networks – insofar as they exist throughout the Union – and databases as starting points in the 
collection of information. 
Moreover, European actors may also make actors aware of well-established databases in various 
legal orders. 
 
2) More use could be made of national databases in the development of transnational 
private law 
Databases on national case law or national laws could underpin the development of model rules found 
in the different sets of soft law as well as debate on the question whether and how a model rule 
(detailed or otherwise) could be distilled from these cases.
1078
   
 
3) Foreign databases should be made more accessible.  
Particularly, the availability of the database in multiple languages may further its successful use. 
Doralt
1079
 points out that not all lawyers have a good command of more than one foreign language and 
that translations of national case law, or summaries, could for that reason be valuable.  
Weatherill
1080
 finds that merely making mention of foreign decisions may not be as interesting 
as also providing information of the contents of a decision, previous decisions, and its relevance for 
legal practice. Furthermore, when using databases, users should be able to overview the information 
offered in those databases, in order to avoid an overload of information.  
 
8.2.4.4. Conclusion on the use of databases 
The current use of databases does not support interaction between actors in a manner 
similar in nation states. However, the use of databases can be improved. Rather than 
establishing new, overlapping databases, European actors should be encouraged to make 
more use of well-established databases in Member States, and the accessibility of these 
databases to foreign actors should be improved. In turn, wider accessibility may make actors 
more aware of relevant initiatives of other actors.   
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8.2.5. Conclusion on the use techniques to strengthen the legislative process 
This paragraph has asked what additional techniques could support the legislative process in 
the multilevel legal order.  
 Typically, the legislative process, and the techniques that support this process, show 
shortcomings and are not designed to facilitate interaction in the multilevel legal order. These 
shortcomings may already undermine the legislative process in nation states, but more 
problems may arise in the multilevel legal order. The criticism of the private law acquis and 
problems arising from the use of blanket clauses by the European legislator could also be 
seen in this light.  
In particular the use of consultations and impact assessments could be improved. 
Notably, because the use of consultations and impact assessments is closely interrelated, 
especially at the European level, the shortcomings visible in the use of both these techniques 
may reinforce one another.  
 
Because the use of consultations and impact assessments often overlap, problems in the 
use of one of these techniques may undermine the quality of legislation in the area of private 
law.   
1) This has already become clear from the incomplete assessments based on the 
options presented in preceding consultations.  
2) In addition, shortcomings in the use of consultations and impact assessments may 
facilitate ad hoc legislation, which may undermine the stable development as well as 
the quality of European private law.1081  
 
For example, the reform of insolvency law was defended as a necessary modernisation that would 
ensure that insolvency law was in accordance with legal practice, and further accessibility, and could 
even prevent the bankruptcy of businesses that had less chance under the ‘old’ insolvency law.
1082
 
Instead, the government eventually found that a far-reaching reform of insolvency law was undesirable 
in times of recession, and existing insolvency law was maintained to improve predictability.
1083
 That 
does not mean that insolvency law is not amended; instead, a legislative programme targeting specific 
aspects of insolvency law has been announced.
1084
 If impact assessments underpin legislative 
proposals, would this ensure that either reforming or postponing reforming laws is based on more than 
assertions?  
Failed suggestions for reform suggest that impact assessments or other empirical support for 
legislation do not stand in the way of ad hoc legislation or the delay or cancellation of well-established 
projects. For example, the proposal to allow for the compensation of emotional harm from the death or 
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3) Defects in the use of consultations make it less likely that the law is developed in a 
responsive manner, which can be aggravated by shortcomings in the use of impact 
assessments, which decrease the chance that the development of private law is 
based on a demonstrable need for the development of private law in a specific way in 
legal practice.  
 
A defective use of both consultations and impact assessment will not serve to further debate, and 
makes it more likely that legal reform is not based on views from legal practice, experts, and 
stakeholders. Ignoring expert advice may undermine the quality of private law, especially if it leads to 
inconsistencies between national private laws and private law at the European level. In turn, national 
private law that is, for example, inconsistent, easily outdated, largely circumvented in practice, or 
unpredictable, may affect the interpretation of Directives.  
Interestingly, there are indications that Dutch private law judges in courts of first instance and 





 traces the lack of enforcement to the limited involvement of 
national scholars and judges in the drafting of the private law acquis.  
 
The use of networks and databases does not show similarly serious shortcomings, but 
neither do they compensate for these shortcomings.  
The suggestions for improvement for the additional techniques make apparent that 
improvements depend on the participation of both national and European actors, as well as 
non-state actors. Interdependence also becomes visible when shortcomings are visible in the 
legislative process at one level. 
 
1) Delay in the legislative process at the European or national level may in turn affect 
the legislative process at the national or the European level.  
Lengthy legislative procedures at the European level may inhibit the reform of national private law as 
harmonisation on this issue is forthcoming. Alternatively, national legislators may speed up reform, in 
order for reformed law to act as a model for European measures, or the national legislature may 
choose to anticipate harmonisation or quickly implement harmonised law, trying to  compensate for a 
lengthy legislative procedure at the European level. If this is not the case, the delay in legislative 
procedures may also ‘add up’, leading to both a lengthy legislative procedure at the European level, as 
well as a lengthy (and probably late) implementation into national law.  
 
2) Shortcomings in the European legislative process frequently entail ignoring insights 
from legal practice, which decreases the chance that private law will be responsive. 
Importantly, this lack of responsiveness may subsequently ‘spread’ to national law if 
legislative competences have been reallocated to the European level, which will be 
the case if European measures pursue maximum harmonisation.  
 
Do the suggestions for improvement lead to a legislative process that closely resembles the 
legislative process in nation states? The argument for deliberation may give this impression. 
Notably, the use of consultations, networks and databases may contribute to debate in the 
legislative process that more closely resembles the debate in the legislative process in nation 
states. However, this is not the case:  
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 Debate should not merely resemble the debate in nation states; there should be more 
and better interaction than is the case in nation states, between more actors.  
 
In particular, interaction between actors from different level should be encouraged. National legal 
practitioners and academics should be involved more in the debate at a European level. Also, national 
Parliaments should already be involved in the drafting of the private law acquis in an early stage.
1090
  
Accordingly, national Parliaments may initiate debate on the reform of the acquis.
1091
 Additionally, 
national state actors as well as European institutions should more closely interact with European 
actors, for example with regard to the question what role soft laws should play in the reform of the 
private law acquis. European actors should also be more involved in the developments at the national 
and the international level.   
The debate could ibe strengthened if advisory organs to legislators also pay attention to 
comparative law and developments by other states or developments at a European and the 
international level.
1092
 National advisory organs may also seek to participate in the drafting of 
European law.
1093
 At the European level, Sandström
1094
 has pointed to the possible role of the Council 
Legal Service in this respect, and suggested a European Council on legislation. 
 
 The use of consultations, networks and databases does not necessarily mean that 
actors will change the way they interact with one another. In particular, these 
techniques do not encourage actors to pay more attention to the use of techniques.  
However, a better use of impact assessments may change debate in this respect.  
 
These improvements may be a step towards deliberation, but deliberation, which aims at 
achieving consensus, may well turn out to be cumbersome and lengthy. 1095 The length of this 
process is not only affected by the number of participants, but also by the number of points 
that parties have to agree upon. Thus, the wider the scope of harmonisation initiatives, the 
more difficult it will be to achieve consensus and the lengthier the process. However, the 
current shortcomings in the legislative process have also led to problems that include slow, 
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8.3. Additional techniques beyond the legislative process: blanket clauses 
This paragraph asks which techniques used in addition to currently used techniques could 
contribute to a the predictability and consistency of private law developed through blanket  
clauses. The use of blanket clauses may give rise to unpredictability, and suggestions for the 
use of additional techniques to compenstae for these problems can be found both at the 
European and the national level. At both levels, the importance of coordination between 
different actors has been emphasised.  
Paragraph 8.3.1. will discuss the suggestions for guidance on the interpretation of 
blanket clauses and paragraph 8.3.2. will consider the development of comitology 
procedures and reminiscent national procedures. Paragraph 8.3.3 will address the use of 
alternative regulation and paragrah 8.3.4. will end with a conclusion. 
   
8.3.1. Guidance on the interpretation of blanket clauses 
The development of guidelines has been suggested for both the European and the national 
level. For the European level, Pavillon1096 finds that there should be more information on the 
interpretation of harmonised law throughout the Union, in order for judges to be able to refer 
to it. To this end, she suggests the use of Guidances by the European Commission, which 
should be available in the different languages spoken in the EU, as well as easily accessible, 
and based on a database collecting decisions on the interpretation of blanket clauses.1097 
Accordingly, guidance on the interpretation of Directive 2005/29 on unfair commercial 
practices has been developed. 1098   
Similar suggestions for additional techniques can be found especially in the Dutch 
legal order. Asser, Groen, Vranken and Tzankova,1099 in their 2006 report on the reform of 
Dutch civil procedure law, state that alongside a new codification, guidance on the 
interpretation of the new codification should be developed, in addition to case law and 
literature that will develop on a new codification. In their opinion, such guidance will 
considerably accelerate the understanding and application of reformed law in legal practice, 
which may otherwise be a lengthy process in which lack of clarity exists on the meaning of 
reformed law. The additional ways in which guidance is offered should be seen in 
combination with one another, and include setting up a helpdesk dealing with questions on 
the new law, the answers to which should be made available to legal practice. Guidance has 
also been developed at a national level.1100  
 
8.3.2. Suggestions for comitology procdures 
Pavillon1101 points to article 40 proposal for a Directive on consumer rights, which initially 
suggested establishing a comitology committee for further developing black and grey lists. 
Yet it was insufficiently clear what sort of comitology comittee would be established, and 
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whether the suggestion that the black and grey lists are a merely technical issue that can be 
dealt with through comitology is convincing. 
The suggestion for comitology committees is in line with other suggestions to 
accelerating procedures to amend European law rather than using blanket clauses, to 
enhance the flexibility of European law.1102 Arguably, minimum harmonisation should leave 
national state actors with sufficient competence to respond to developing practices, and 
society’s legal views on justice. Thus, minimum harmonisation takes the coexistence of 
actors as a starting point and allows for legal experimentation by Member States, which in 
turn may provide a source of inspiration for other Member States as well as European  
actors.1103 
At a national level, proposals for procedures reminiscent of comitology have also 
been made. The 2006 Dutch report has suggested establishing a committee with limited 
competences to provide rules on the interpretation of blanket clauses, as well as benchmark 
figures and other ambiguous provisions in codifications. Such a committee should ideally 
consist of legal practitioners as well as scholars.1104 Thus, differently than the European 
proposal, the Dutch suggestion did not concern the amendment of the Dutch black and grey 
lists, but it did aim to provide clarity on the interpretation of blanket clauses. The European 
suggestion, however, was also aimed at promoting flexibility. At the national level, there was 
less need for flexibility, and more need to guarantee the predictable and consistent 
development of the law int he event of recodification.  
 
8.3.3.   The use of alternative regulation in the interpretation of blanket clauses 
Arguments to make use of alternative regulation in the interpretation of both harmonised and 
“traditional” blanket clauses have been made. Taking into account national alternative 
regulation would also allow for the differentiation in the interpretation of blanket clauses.1105 
In some successful Dutch instances, alternative regulation already provides more 
predictability and consistency.1106 
Possibly, consistently looking to both surrounding private law and well-established 
self-regulation and co-regulation may increase responsiveness and make clearer to foreign 
private parties what standards of behaviour are expected from businesses, if those standards 
are freely and fully available to those foreign private parties. However, if self- and co-
regulation bind third parties, it is essential that foreign parties that are affected by those rules 
are aware of these rules; this means not only publicly providing these rules, but also making 
them available in multiple languages. Subsequently, the more sharply delineated rules could 
be evaluated by the judiciary.  
Perhaps, comparing self-regulation in different Member States, and collecting 
information on codes of conduct in different Member States would make self-regulation more 
accessible to foreign contract parties. Additionally, actors may be made more aware of 
relevant self-regulation through databases and through network organisations that promote 
self-regulation, while the members of these organisations also widely develop self-regulation, 
such as the European Advertising Standards Alliance.   
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However, this presupposes that such codes of conduct exist, and that they are also 
generally acceptable in other Member States. Difficulties may also arise if self-regulation is 
interpreted differently in different Member States, or if relevant national mandatory private 
laws diverge.  
Pavillon1107 argues against the use of national default law or alternative regulation as 
a decisive means to clarify or differentiate in the interpretation of European concepts. She 
points out that putting too much weight on national viewpoints may undermine harmonisation. 
Yet if measures pursue minimum harmonisation, this arguably leaves room for courts to take 
national viewpoints into account, provided that the level of consumer protection does not go 
below the standard set by the Directives or violates the fundamental freedoms set out in the 
TFEU. In contrast, if measures pursue full or ‘targeted’ full harmonisation, it is less likely that 
judges can take national points of view into account. In those cases, however, perhaps 
cross-border self-regulation – such as the EMOTA Convention – may be used to interpret 
blanket clauses.  
However, the argument that alternative regulation may undermine harmonisation 
becomes less convincing when considering Dutch case law. Giesen1108 has pointed out that 
Dutch courts occasionally refer to alternative regulation without adopting a consistent 
approach to the use of alternative regulation, and the use of alternative regulation does not 
lead to a specific outcome. Vranken,1109 on the other hand, holds that the Hoge Raad does 
take alternative regulation into account, but often does not do so explicitly, and this is the 
reason for criticism of unpredictability in the interpretation of ambiguous concepts. Therefore, 
Vranken suggests that the Hoge Raad should explicitly leave room for filling in blanket 
clauses.  
 
8.3.4. The introduction of the prejudicial procedure in Dutch law 
The introduction of the prejudicial procedure is based on a 2007 report on the task of the 
Hoge Raad and also inspired by the European prejudicial procedure as well as French 
procedures. The drafting of the law was preceded by a public consultation and advice from 
practitioners and the judiciary.1110 
The introduction of the prejudicial procedure in collective procedures in Dutch law 
could, in combination with the cassation in the public interest (‘cassatie in het belang der wet’) 
stimulate the development of case law by the highest courts on issues that do not frequently 
come before higher courts.1111 Thus, more decisions, will contribute to the consistent and 
predictable development of the law. Generally, this procedure should enable the courts to 
refer questions at the request of parties or ex officio1112 on questions of law arising from 
cases where mass damages may arise, thus contributing to the responsiveness of private 
law to legal practice. Article 392 par. 1 sub b Rv also enables courts to refer questions for 
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cases where the answer to the question is of direct interest for the adjudication of multiple 
similar cases where a similar question arises. In other words, questions should reflect a more 
general public interest. The standard established in article 392 Rv indicates that referral 
should not be done lightly, and the legislator did not expect that this new procedure will give 
rise to a considerable additional number of cases before the Hoge Raad; the legislator 
estimated that ten prejudicial questions per year would be decided.1113 
The extent to which prejudicial questions will contribute to the relatively quick 
adjudication of cases will also depend on the stage of proceedings in which a question is 
referred.1114 Initially, courts with a single member could not refer prejudicial questions to the 
Hoge Raad, which also includes cantonial courts. This would have considerably limited the 
extent to which the introduction of the prejudicial procedure could have contributed to 
predictable and consistent decisions in consumer law, as article 93 sub d Rv provides that 
consumer cases1115 are decided by cantonial courts which are typically composed of one 
judge. It concerns an experiment, partially based on comparative law insights, which in 
accordance with article IV Act on prejudicial questions will be evaluated in five years.   
Arguably, the successful introduction of a national prejudicial procedure in the Dutch 
legal order may encourage the Hoge Raad to submit more questions to the CJEU, especially 
if it concerns cases that would otherwise not have reached the Hoge Raad. 
 
8.3.5. Conclusion on the use of techniques in addition to blanket clauses 
The use of guidelines, comitology committees, and ex ante control  may contribute to the 
predictability and consistency of private law developed through blanket clauses. The 
similarity between these suggestions indicate that current suggestions for additional 
techniques may be based on national ideas on the interpretation of blanket clauses in the 
private law acquis. Both the suggestions of Asser, Groen, Vranken and Tzankova1116 as well 
as Pavillon1117 indicate that ideally, guidance and practice directions should be based on 
debate between all relevant actors, and they set out various techniques to be used alongside 
one another. The suggestions of Pavillon make clear that the clarification of blanket clauses 
in the private law acquis could be achieved by using additional techniques that contribute the 
harmonised interpretation of those provisions throughout the Union.  
Yet it can be doubted whether a more harmonised interpretation and application of 
blanket clauses would leave sufficient room for responsiveness. If blanket clauses in the 
private law acquis may not be interpreted in accordance with national alternative regulation, 
this increases the chance that blanket clauses will not be interpreted responsively.  
The suggestions to increase the predictability and consistency of private law have not 
been made in all legal orders. Particularly, similar suggestions have not been made in the 
German legal order, although blanket clauses have been subject to criticism in the past.1118 
However, the additional techniques may lead to Fremdbestimmung. However, the amount of 
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529. 
1118
 Especially J.W. Hedemann, Die Flucht in Generalklauseln, Mohr: Tübingen 1933. 
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Fremdbestimmung also depends on the question how committees are composed – if 
committees consist of academics and members of the judiciary, this is likely less problematic, 
if stakeholder groups would play a role, even if legal practitioners were to play a role, this 
may be more problematic. Moreover, the transparency of the drafting processes, and 
opportunity for debate, would also be relevant, as it may provide actors affected by these 
rules a chance to influence these rules. Yet even if such committees were accepted, their 
role in developing, for example, black and grey lists would be limited, as these lists are 
considered as clearly political, and development of these lists should therefore be subject to 
democratic scrutiny. Consequently, guidelines developed by committees would still be 
subject to democratic debate, depending on the political content of these rules. 
Instead, a more traditional approach becomes apparent: by establishing a general 
part, and a coherent system, the legislator has provided “guidelines” to the interpretation of 
blanket clauses.1119 The amount of case law subsequently contributes to the predictability 
and consistency of newly drafted blanket clauses.   
 
 
                                               
1119
 HKK/Schmoeckel, Allgemeiner Teil des BGB, introduction, nrs 35, 41. It is unclear, however, how general provisions may 
provide specific guidance on the interpretation of blanket clauses in individual cases. 
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8.4. Additional techniques beyond the legislative process: Standard Terms 
and Conditions (STC’s) 
This paragraph will ask will ask how STC’s could be used as an additional technique, and 
how that could improve European private law.  
Paragraph 8.4.1. will consider the use of STC’s and paragraph 8.4.2. will consider 
how STC’s may contribute to the predictable and responsive development of the private law 
acquis. Paragraph 8.4.3. will end with a conclusion.  
 
8.4.1. The current use of STC’s 
STC’s have frequently been recognised as an important element in trade.1120 A number of 
often used clauses identified by McKendrick1121 include: clauses to ensure that the standard 
terms are applicable to contracts, retention of title clauses – also recognised by the 
Commission1122 – hardship clauses, clauses limiting or excluding liability, price escalation 
clauses, clauses on the payment of interest, clauses on arbitration and choice of law and 
clauses with regard to assignment. In addition, the International Contracts Working Group 
has published analysed the use of a number of often used clauses in international 
commercial practice, also discussing the use of confidentiality clauses, penalty clauses and 
termination clauses.1123  
 
8.4.2. Improving the predictability and responsiveness of private law   
STC’s can contribute to a more predictable development of the acquis in the following ways: 
 
1)  STC’s could be used as a starting point to identify which divergences of private laws 
may pose an obstacle to cross-border trade.  
Especially mandatory private law may block the application of ‘foreign’ STC’s. In addition, the private 
law acquis, especially Directive 86/653 on self-employed commercial agents and Regulations in the 
field of international private law may affect the validity of standard contract terms.
1124
 Also, the use of 
cross-border STC may be affected by ‘surrounding’ national default contract law. If these default rules 
are identified, the question arises whether these divergences should subsequently be harmonised. 
Notably, private parties, if made aware of these divergences, could subsequently seek to provide for 
specific rules in their contracts that diverge from these default rules. Notwithstanding these 
possibilities, harmonisation in this area has already been proposed.  
 
2) The development of STC that could be used throughout the Union could contribute to 
predictability. 
In its 2003 Action Plan, the Commission, suggested promoting the use of standard contract terms and 
conditions throughout the Union.
1125
 Subsequently, the 2004 Communication
1126
 on the revision of the 
                                               
1120
 R.P.J.L. Tjittes, ‘Uitleg van schriftelijke contracten’, RM Themis 2005, p. 2 even states that these clauses can be considered 
as more adequately reflecting “principles” of contract law in the European Union than soft law rules such as the DCFR, PECL 
and the UNIDROIT Principles.  
1121
 E. McKendrick, The creation of a European law of contracts – The role of standard form contracts and principles of 
interpretation, Kluwer: Deventer 2004, p. 5. 
1122
 See for example European Commission, Proposal for a European parliament and Council Directive combating late payment 
in commercial transactions, COM (1998) 126 final, p. 8. 
1123
 M. Fontaine, F. de Ly, Drafting international contracts: An analysis of contracts clauses, Nijhoff: Leiden/Boston 2009.  
1124
 U. Bernitz, ‘The Commission’s Communications and standard contract terms’, in: S. Vogenauer, S. Weatherill (eds.), The 
harmonisation of European contract law, Hart: Oxford 2006, p. 186. 
1125
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A more coherent European contract law: 
An action plan, COM (2003) 68 final, p. 21 et seq.  
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acquis suggested that private parties develop standard terms and conditions that could subsequently 
be used throughout the Union, claiming that ‘there are a number of examples of EU-wide STC being 
used successfully’, unfortunately without elaborating which standard terms are defended as such.
1127
 
The Commission emphasised the role of private parties and the use of a website by way of a ‘platform’ 
to promote the exchange of information and considering the possibility that mandatory law could be an 
obstacle. 
However, in later policy papers, this idea has disappeared. In its first annual report on 
European contract law and the acquis review,
1128
 the Commission states that providing a website to 
promote the exchange of information is problematic for a number of reasons: 
i) European-wide contract terms would have to meet the requirements of the national 
private law extending the most extensive control over standard contract terms, which 
would may make them less attractive for actors involved in cross-border trade in 
states with less extensive constraints.  
ii) EU wide standard contract terms would only be used in specific sector instead of 
several sectors. The complexity of this initiative should not be underestimated. If the 
development of these sets is not coordinated, fragmentation and inconsistencies may 
arise.  
iii) The necessity to keep standard contract terms up to date with changing legislation 
and case law may be problematic, and require considerable time and money. Parties 
that have invested in up-to-date standard contract terms may not be inclined to make 
the results of their investment freely available.  
iv) Providing a platform for standard contract terms while not checking the compatibility of 
these terms with contract law and competition law constraints undermines the value of 
that exchange.   
v) Whittaker
1129
 points out that problems might arise with regard to the question in what 
languages European STC’s should be provided, and the lack of ‘autonomous’ 
interpretation of these terms throughout the Union, as the CJEU would not have 





 point out that European STC’s would still be 
interpreted differently throughout the Union, even in the absence of mandatory law 
restrictions, as judges adopt a different approach to the interpretation of contracts, and 
make use of different sources for the interpretation of contracts.  
 
However, this option may not be feasible politically. An important added value of a European 
set of STC’s would be the possibility that European STC’s would be applicable throughout 
the Union regardless of diverging mandatory law. However, this possibility would entail 
radical changes of national mandatory laws, and quite probably it is much less feasible than 
‘traditional’ harmonisation.  
 
3) Non-state actors may also collect and provide information of often-used clauses and 
thereby improve parties’ ability to adequately assess their legal position in cross-
border contracts. Increasing parties’ awareness of the risks in the use of STC’s may 
                                                                                                                                                   
1126
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, European contract law and the revision 
of the acquis: the way forward, COM (2004) 651 final, par. 2.2.1, 2.2.2.  
1127
 These might include the standard terms and conditions developed by Orgalime and the terms and conditions developed by 
the Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply. See further 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/contractlaw/2004workshop_summary_en.htm.  
1128
 European Commission, First annual report on European contract law and the acquis review, COM (2005) 456, par. 41.  
1129
 S. Whittaker, ‘On the development of European standard contract terms’, ERCL 2006, p. 60-61. 
1130
 E. McKendrick, The creation of a European law of contracts – The role of standard form contracts and principles of 
interpretation, Kluwer: Deventer 2004, p. 27-43.  
1131
 S. Whittaker, ‘On the development of European standard contract terms’, ERCL 2006, p.66-67. 
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enable them to cope with these difficulties more easily, especially if STCs are 
interpreted in accordance with national default law.  
Of course, gathering information on STC’s in itself does little to overcome divergences in national 
private laws, and this might lessen the attractiveness of this course of action by the European 
legislator.
1132
 For example, alerting parties to different approaches towards the interpretation of 
contracts may prove worthwhile.  
Collecting information, and making it available to private parties, if possible in multiple 
languages, may take place through various ways that may also be pursued in combination with one 
another – through establishing databases on boilerplate clauses, case law and legislation, and 
academic research and publications on often used clauses may well provide a suitable starting point. 
However, the success of such an enterprise possible also depends on the use that private parties 
make of this information, and the awareness with private parties that such information is provided.  
 
4) Studying STC’s may also contribute to the responsiveness of the law 
According to Montaine and De Ly,
1133
 the study of international legal practice may add insight on 
practices, such as the use of letters of intent that are currently ignored in traditional debate on private 
law. Montaine and De Ly
1134
 also point out that studying international legal practice may provide more 
insight in creative drafting processes and enable rules to adequately cope with these practices, thus 
contributing to the responsiveness of private law to legal practice. For example, instead of 
concentrating upon the question whether offer and acceptance lead to a contract, it is also possible to 
look at the international practice of ‘letters of intent’, ‘heads of agreement’ and ‘memorandum of 
understanding’ and question what legal consequences these different kinds letters have for private 
parties, or give guidelines whether and which parts of such letters or agreements could be binding.
1135  
 
8.4.3. Conclusion on the use of STC’s 
STC’s can contribute to especially the predictable and responsive development of the private 
law acquis. Studying STC’s to identify divergences that hinder cross-border trade may 
benefit predictability, while it also enhances insight in cross-border businesses. Moreover, 
sharing information on STC’s may increase predictability for parties involved in cross-border 
trade.   
However, the development of European STC’s may entail fragmentation as the 
development of European STC’s would necessitate changes in various areas of private laws. 
For example, divergences in property law may be found to pose a barrier to the cross-border 
use of title of retention clauses,1136 but the effectiveness of retention of title clauses may also 
depend on insolvency law and procedural law. Other initiatives may however similarly lead to 
fragmentation – for example, establishing STC’s that could be used throughout the Union 
would necessarily have to be formed per sector, rather than generally, for ‘all’ contract 
parties. If harmonisation in these different areas is considered desirable, as well as feasible, 
impact assessments and consultations could contribute to finding techniques to deal with 
fragmentation and inconsistencies in the acquis and national private laws that may arise after 
harmonisation – or other actions.   
                                               
1132
 Comp. also S. Whittaker, ‘On the development of European standard contract terms’, ERCL 2006, p. 54, who points out that 
contracts generally seek to provide contract parties with predictability with regard to their legal position and its rights and duties 
towards other contract parties, and asserts that this primary aim of contracts should not be distracted by an implicit aim to 
further convergence of private laws throughout the Union.  
1133
 M. Fontaine, F. de Ly, Drafting international contracts: An analysis of contracts clauses, Nijhoff: Leiden/Boston 2009, p. 621. 
1134
 M. Fontaine, F. de Ly, Drafting international contracts: An analysis of contracts clauses, Nijhoff: Leiden/Boston 2009, p. 634-
635.  
1135
 See on this question G. Cordero Moss, ‘The function of letters of intent and their recognition in modern legal systems’, in: R. 
Schulze (ed.), New features in European contract law, Sellier: Munich 2007, p. 139. 
1136




STC’s can be used in combination with various other techniques. Thus, European-
wide STC’s could be developed more easily under an optional instrument that provides a 
framework for drafting and interpreting STC’s. Also, soft laws could be used to clarify the 
meaning of often used terms in so-called boilerplate clauses.1137  
  
 
                                               
1137
 E. McKendrick, The creation of a European law of contracts – The role of standard form contracts and principles of 
interpretation, Kluwer: Deventer 2004, p. 43-44 suggests that predictability in cross-border trade could be enhanced if there is 
agreement on a common meaning of often-used terms, in the DCFR. The DCFR has also been considered in this regard by the 
European Parliament that suggested, in the 2004 Communication of the Commission Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament and the Council, European contract law and the revision of the acquis: the way forward, COM (2004) 
651 final, par. 2.1.2 that states that a CFR could be used as ‘a body of standard contract terms to be made available to legal 
practitioners’. S. Whittaker, ‘On the development of European standard contract terms’, ERCL 2006, p. 57 however rightly notes 
that the idea of developing STC, which necessarily would be sector-specific, does not agree with the idea of developing the idea 
of the DCFR as a non-sector specific instrument, and accordingly, the idea of the DCFR containing standard terms and 
conditions seems to have been abandoned. Additionally, as the DCFR may at points diverge from the private law acquis, the 
question arises to what extent the DCFR is suitable to be used as such a ‘dictionary’ in transnational commercial contracts. 
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8.5. Additional techniques beyond the legislative process: The Open Method 
of Coordination (‘OMC’) 
This paragraph will ask whether the use of OMC may contribute to the development of 
European private law that is more predictable, consistent, accessible or responsive.  
 Paragraph 8.5.1. will descibe the OMC and paragraph 8.5.2. will ask in what ways the 
use of OMC can contribute to a more comprehensible European private law. Paragraph 8.5.3. 
will address the drawbacks of OMC and paragraph 8.5.4. will end with a conclusion.   
 
8.5.1. A closer look at the OMC 
Typically, OMC has primarily been used in social policy areas where the Union has little or 
no legislative competences. 1138  Accordingly, article 5 par. 3 TFEU recognises that 
coordination may take place with regard to Member States’ social policies.1139 Rather than 
emphasising harmonisation, the OMC would focus on the development of policies, and the 
focus could also shift from legislation towards other ‘softer’ methods, such as the use of 
databases, networks, or model laws.1140 
The OMC emphasises co-operation between actors, to establish common goals, and 
exchange best practices.1141 Four stages can be distinguished in OMC: firstly, common aims 
are established, as well as schedules to achieve these aims. Subsequently, benchmarks and 
indications to identify and compare best practices are developed, and actors establish 
policies to achieve the common aims. Finally, periodical review and evaluation are 
established.1142  
The Commission plays ‘an active co-ordinating role’, which implies a top-down 
approach towards OMC. In addition, De la Rosa1143 also signals the prominent role of both 
the Commission and the Council in the OMC. According to the European Council, the OMC 
does not only involve state actors. Instead, it includes the Union, Member States, sub-
national actors, the social partners and civil society.1144  Possibly, if OMC is used in a way 
that includes relevant (affected) actors, this could stimulate debate between those actors on 
the basis of, for example, exchanged best practices or similar problems. Senden 1145 
moreover notes that the OMC should not be considered as “one instrument” that necessarily 
embodies all the characteristics summed up above and is generally based upon “soft 
techniques” such as benchmarks and peer pressure.  
For European private law, the use of OMC entails that the Union may encourage 
Member States to coordinate their policies, in the interest of the internal market or the 
                                               
1138
 E. Szyszczak, ‘Experimental governance: the Open method of Coordination’, ELJ 2006, p. 488. 
1139
 Comp. also articles 23 TFEU (withr egard to diplomatic assistence to Union citizens in third countries), articles 67and 73 
TFEU (with regard to a high level of security in the area of freedom, seurity, and justice), article 85 TFEU (on Eurojust), articles 
119 TFEU (with regard to a economic policy),article 150 TFEU (withregard to an Employment Committee), article 156 TFEU (on 
social policies), article 171 TFEU (with regard to trans-Euroepan networks of energy, transport and energy infrastructures), 173 
TFEU (industry), article 181 TFEU (research and technical development activities), artciles 210 and 214 TFEU (humanitarian 
aid). 
1140
 See further on the use of model laws below par. 8.6.3.3. 
1141
 Comp. the Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm, 
23-24 March 2000, par. 37, European Commission, White paper on European Governance, COM (2001) 428 final, p. 21-22.  
1142
 Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm, 23-24 March 
2000, par. 37. 
1143
 S. de la Rosa, ‘The Open Method of Coordination in new Member States – the perspectives for its use as a tool of soft law’, 
ELJ 2005, p. 627-628. 
1144
 Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm, 23-24 March 
2000, par. 38.   
1145
 L.A.J. Senden, Reguleringsintensiteit en regelgevinsinstrumentarium in het Europees Gemeenschapsrecht. Over de relatie 
tussen wetgeving, soft law en de open methode van coördinatie’, SEW 2008, p. 50. 
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freedoms established in the Treaties. 1146  As Borrás and Greve 1147  point out, the OMC 
generally emphasises a common aim, rather than the means to achieve that aim, which 
provides Member States with a considerable amount of leeway to take measures to achieve 
common aims, and takes away the need for detailed rules and mechanisms at a European 
level.  
The OMC could be used in addition to existing harmonisation measures. If actors are 
not willing to participate in the OMC, this could prompt the use of less voluntary methods. 
OMC could also serve as a first step towards future harmonisation initiatives. Typically, the 
use of OMC does not confer competences from the national to the European level.1148 Yet if 
the OMC can be used as a starting point for harmonisation, it may strengthen ‘competence 
creep’.1149 
 
8.5.2. Improving the responsiveness of European private law? 
The OMC could contribute to the quality of European private law in various ways:  
 
1) The OMC could stimulate regulatory competition. 
The OMC has already been mentioned in the Lisbon conclusions with regard to the reform of company 
law.
1150
 Similarly, in other areas, such as corporate governance or collective redress, regulatory 
competition and further convergence could be improved. 
 
2) The OMC could improve interaction between actors. 
Van Gerven
1151
 has suggested the use of a ‘Open Method of Convergence’, rather than the Open 
Method of Coordination that focusses on the coordination of national policies. The Open Method of 
Convergence entails that converge would not only be the result of harmonisation efforts from the 
European Union, but also from comparative law research and databases, education throughout the 
EU on a firm comparative and European law basis and a better coordinated implementation of the 
acquis, based on voluntary participation by not only Member States but also non-state actors.  
 
3) The OMC could improve participation in alternative regulation. 
For example, the Commission has suggested that OMC could stimulate the involvement of relevant 
stakeholders to “social dialogue”- which could for example affect the participation of relevant 
stakeholders to consultations preceding framework agreements.
1152
 Although increasing the amount of 
responses to consultations may be useful and provide more insights in the views and needs of 
stakeholders, this does not increase the influence of consulted parties. 
 
Thus, the OMC can contribute to the responsiveness of private law as it emphasises 
interaction between actors, which increases the chance that state actors will become aware 
                                               
1146
 L.A.J. Senden, Reguleringsintensiteit en regelgevinsinstrumentarium in het Europees Gemeenschapsrecht. Over de relatie 
tussen wetgeving, soft law en de open methode van coördinatie’, SEW 2008, p.54. The European Commission, European 
governance, A White Paper, COM (2001) 428 final, p. 21-22 has clearly considered OMC as a ‘complementary’ technique, to 
support, not replace, the “traditional” method of harmonisation. 
1147
 S. Borrás, B. Greve, ‘Concluding remarks: New method or just cheap talk?’, JEPP 2004, p. 332. 
1148
 V. Hatzopoulos, ‘Why the Open Method of Coordination is bad for you: A letter to the EU’, ELJ, p. 318-319. 
1149
 E. Szyszczak, ‘Experimental governance: The Open Method of Coordination’, ELJ 2006, p. 501. Comp. also J. Scott, D.M. 
Trubek, ‘Mind the gap: law and new approaches to governance in the European Union’, ELJ 2002, p. 7. Comp. Ph. Syrpis, 
‘Legitimising European governance: Taking subsidiairyt seriously within the Open Method of Coordination’, EUI Working Paper 
2002, p. 28, who is critical of the OMC insofar as actors increasingly set specific goals at the European level even if the benefit 
of those aims is not clear. 
1150
 See European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency of the meeting of 23 and 24 March 2000, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm#b, par. 14-15.  
1151
 W. van Gerven, ‘The Open Method of Convergence’, Juridica International 2008, p. 40. 
1152
 European Commission, The European social dialogue, a force for innovation and change, COM (2002) 341 final, p. 14. 
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The following potential drawbacks of the OMC should not be overlooked: 
  
1) A lack of openness and transparency.1153  
Szyszczak
1154
 has even stated that ‘the approach of the OMC runs counter to the principles of good 
governance that have emerged (transparency, accountability, democratic input)’ and has pointed to 
‘[t]he lack of transparency and the failure to engage with the (more) democratic institutions of the EU‘. 
However, part of this lack of transparency is also due to the technicality of some subjects.
1155
 The 
Study Group on Social Justice
1156
 has criticised the use of “technical language” and the evasion of 
political choices. Arguably, a lack of open debate is not specific to OMC, but if OMC is to be used, the 
use of technical terms is problematic, for example as it may entail that groups with considerable 
amounts of expertise, financial and organisation resources may gain ‘privileged’ access to the debate 
on European private law. Problems with regard to participation in the development of private law are 
already visible.
1157





2) A lack of success in increasing debate. 
The success of the OMC in increasing participation is subject to debate. Trubek and Trubek
1159
 point 
out that while the Commission has evaluated the OMC in the area of the European Employment 
Strategy rather positively,
 1160
 other evaluations have been more critical, and note the lack of 
agreement of the success of this particularly well developed area in which the OMC is used. 
Szyszczak
1161
 points out that positive evaluations of the OMC ‘come from within’, especially the 
Commission.  
Accordingly, the Open Method of Convergence also emphasises the participation by expert 
actors, while less attention is given to the role, expectations, and preferences of, for example, contract 
parties. It is not clear how ‘open’ the process would be to actors that are affected by this strategy, but 
who have insufficient knowledge of private law to participate in debate. Unfortunately, it can be 
doubted whether affected actors that have not been included in the use of OMC have an action to 




3) The success of OMC depends on the willingness of both state actors and non-state 
actors at the different levels to participate in this method.  
                                               
1153
 V. Hatzopoulos, ‘Why the Open Method of Coordination is bad for you: A letter to the EU’, ELJ, p. 325. 
1154
 E. Szyszczak, ‘Experimental governance: The Open Method of Coordination’, ELJ 2006, p. 495. 
1155
 Comp. S. Borrás, B. Greve, ‘Concluding remarks: New method or just cheap talk?’, JEPP 2004, p. 333 point out that the 
OMC covers multiple policy areas: ‘The more [OMC] grows, the less people will be able to read, understand and digest what is 
happening in the OMC process.’ 
1156
 Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, ‘Social justice in European contract law: A manifesto’, ELJ 2004, p. 
653,   
1157
 Comp. also the shortcomings in the use of networks, par. 8.2.3.2.   
1158
 S. de la Rosa, ‘The Open Method of Coordinaiton in new Member States – the perspectives for its use as a tool of soft law’, 
ELJ 2005, p. 623, C. de la Porte, P. Nanz, ‘The OMC – a deliberative-democratic mode of governance? The cases of 
employenet and pensions’, JEPP 2004, p. 267. 
1159
 D.M. Trubek, L.G. Trubek, ‘Hard and soft law in the construction of social Europe: The role of the Open method of Co-
ordination’, ELJ 2005, p. 350-351. 
1160
 Comp. the indeed rather positive evaluation of the European Employment Strategy, one of the well-established areas for the 
OMC with a Treaty basis: European Commission, Taking stock of five years of the European Employment Strategy, COM (2002) 
416 final. 
1161
 E. Szyszczak, ‘Experimental governance: The Open Method of Coordination’, ELJ 2006, p. 496. Accordingly, Comp. Ph. 
Syrpis, ‘Legitimising European governance: Taking subsidiairyt seriously within the Open Method of Coordination’, EUI Working 
Paper 2002, p. 38 is decidedly less optimistic on the European Employment Strategy. 
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 V. Hatzopoulos, ‘Why the Open Method of Coordination is bad for you: A letter to the EU’, ELJ, p. 326. 
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Thus, the question may arise how OMC would work in practice. Notably, Hatzopoulos,
1163
 presenting 
an overview of empirical research on the use of OMC, notes that OMC shows limited direct effects. 
However, if OMC is used in addition to existing harmonisation techniques, this may improve the effect 
of OMC.  
 
Thus, the extent to which the OMC improves the responsiveness of private alw may be 
severely undermined.  
 
8.5.4. Conclusion on the use of the OMC 
Will the OMC contribute to a more responsive European private law? Although it might 
support the development of regulatory competition, which may enhance the quality of private 
law, the extent to which the OMC will enhance interaction between more actors should not 
be overestimated. Instead, use of the OMC may reinforce shortcomings already visible in the 
debate in European private law.   
 
                                               
1163
 V. Hatzopoulos, ‘Why the Open Method of Coordination is bad for you: A letter to the EU’, ELJ, p. 309. Comp. also C. de la 
Porte, ‘Is the Open method of Coordination appropriate for organising activities at European level in sensitive policy areas?’, 
ELJ 2002, p. 56, finds that the diverse social models may also be relevant for the success of OMC in these areas.  
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8.6. Alternative techniques  
What techniques can be used instead of currently used techniques to cope with problems of 
unpredictability, inconsistency, accessibility and responsiveness? 
The paragraph will start by discussing alternative top-down techniques, some of 
which seem much less far-reaching than others. Paragraph 8.6.1. will discuss the use of 
Regulations rather than Directives and paragraph 8.6.2. will turn to optional regimes. 
Paragraph 8.6.3. will consider slightly more disruptive alternative techniques based on 
American examples. Paragraph 8.6.4. will analyse the use of collective bargaining and, 
paragraph 8.6.5 will end with a conclusion. 
   
8.6.1. Implementation problems and strategies: Regulations instead of 
Directives? 
This paragraph will ask whether the use of Regulations rather than Directives will improve 
the consistent and accessible development of European private law.  
The use of Directives allows Member States a margin of appreciation that enables 
them to preserve a coherent set of national rules. Coherent national law increases the 
accessibility of private law for private parties at a national level. 1164 Secondly, Johnston and 
Unberath1165 emphasise that Directives provide for more flexibility, in the legislative process. 
However, this benefit is not achieved1166,  as Directives frequently contain rather detailed 
provisions, and the CJEU has provided strict standards for the implementation by Member 
States in Commission v The Netherlands,1167 and Commission v Sweden.1168 Also, Directives 
that aim for maximum harmonisation leave little room for the national legislator.  
The use of Directives also entails disadvantages that have become visible in the 
implementation of the acquis in the BGB and the BW. Member States have adopted different 
strategies in the implementation of the acquis, which has not helped the consistency  of the 
acquis throughout the Union, nor is implemented law visible as such,. Which may inhibit 
accessibility, as the European background of a rule, and the corresponding need for 
harmonsied interpretation, are not visible.   
The use of Regulations would remedy some of these weaknesses:  
 
1) The use of Regulations, instead of Directives, would remedy the lack of 
accessibility and moreover have direct effect, which is in line with the aim of some 
of the measures in the acquis aiming to further consumer protection.1169  
 
2) If the European legislator aims for maximum harmonisation, this may be achieved 
more easily through Regulations.1170  
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 COM (2008) 614 final, p. 8.  
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 A. Johnston, H. Unberath, ‘Law at, to or from the centre?’, in: F. Cafaggi (ed.), The institutional framework of European 
private law, Oxford: OUP 2006, p. 150-151. 
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 Comp. also Ch. Twigg-Flesner, D. Metcalfe, ‘The proposed consumer rights Directive – less haste, more thought?’, ERCL 
2011, p. 374. 
1167
 CJEU 10 May 2001 (Commission v The Netherlands), C-144/99, [2001] ECR, p. I-3541, par. 17-18.. 
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 CJEU 7 May 2002 (Commission v Sweden), C-478/99, ECR [2002], p. I-4147, par. 21-23. 
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3) The use of Regulations rather than Directives may simplify the legislative process 
and relieve the legislative burden of states.1171  
 
Accordingly, the Commission has recognised the benefits of Regulations.1172 In the 2010 
Green Paper on progress towards a European contract law,1173 the Commission favours the 
use of a Regulation containing an optional instrument, emphasising that this choice would 
advance the internal market. Regulations have already been used in the harmonisation of 
international private law1174 but also in the area of passenger rights.1175  
 However, do the disadvantages arising from the use of Regulations entail that the 
European legislator should continue to use Directives rather than Regulations? These 
disadvantages are:  
 
1) The development of Regulations would entail the development of more sources 
simultaneously that may be simultaneously applicable, which is not likely to increase 
the accessibility of European private law.  
 
2) The use of Regulations may mean that parties remain unaware of these rules and do 
not sufficiently rely on them, while implementation of the private law acquis in 
codifications increases the chance that private parties will consider these rules 
 
3) The use of Regulations may raise questions with regard to minimum harmonisation. it 
is not clear whether the use of Regulations stands in the way of minimum 
harmonisation. This may inhibit the predictable development of private law. 
On the one hand, minimum harmonisation is hard to reconcile with the ruling in Variola v 
Amministrazione italiana delle Finanze,
1176
 where the Court decided that the effect of a Regulation 
does not depend on national laws. Member States may not obstruct this direct effect, and ‘strict 
compliance with this obligation is an indispensable condition of simultaneous and uniform application 
of Community regulations throughout the Community’. Moreover, ‘Member States are under an 
obligation not to introduce any measure which might affect the jurisdiction of the Court to pronounce 
on any question involving the interpretation of Community law or the validity of an Act of the 
institutions of the Community, which means that no procedure is permissible whereby the Community 
nature of a legal rule in concealed from those subject to it.’ Arguably, if Member States would 
introduce more stringent rules, they oblige consumers and businesses to also inform themselves of 
national law, which may undermine accessibility and clarity, and raise questions on the competence 
with regard to the interpretation of provisions in the Regulation and national law.  
On the other hand, if Regulations are adopted under article 114 TFEU, minimum 
harmonisation as such is not precluded.
1177
 Furthermore, article 169 TFEU, which expressly allows for 
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minimum, harmonisation is not limited to Directives, but speaks of “measures”, which includes 
Regulations, adopted under article 114 TFEU or measures which support consumer protection 




►Thus, the use of Regulations may be beneficial for the consistency of the acquis 
throughout the Union, but it may simultaneously inhibit the consistent development of private 
law at the national level. Also, the use of Regulations clarifies the European background of a 
rule, which may contribute to accessibility. The use of Regulations may simulteanously inhibt 
accessibility as it leads to the development of more potentially overlapping sources, while 
parties may also not be sufficiently aware of the existence and the relevance of Regulations. 
Therefore, Regulations would hinder rather than help consistency and accessibility, and they 
should not be used as an alternative to contribute to these benchmarks.  
  
8.6.2. Optional regimes 
This paragraph will ask whether the use of optional regimes rather than traditional 
harmonisation may contribute to a more comprehensible European private law.  
Paragraph 8.6.2.1. will consider optional regimes more closely and paragraph 8.6.2.2. 
will ask how optional regimes may contribute to the comprehensibility of European private 
law will be discussed. Paragraph 8.6.2.3. will turn to more general questions that should be 
addressed by actors drafting optional regimes. Paragraph 8.6.2.4. will end with a conclusion.  
 
8.6.2.1. A closer look at optional regimes 
Actors may develop optional regimes, i.e. optional sets of rules, which parties can opt for 
when entering into transactions. The subject and the scope of these optional regimes is 
decided by its drafters.    
Optional regimes may entail opt-in as well as opt-out rules.1179 Presently, article 6 
CISG makes clear that the CISG establishes an opt-out system that moreover allows for 
derogation by contract parties, while article 3 of the proposal for a Regulation establishing a 
Common European Sales Law makes clear that parties can opt for the future optional 
instrument.   
Optional regimes can be developed in various ways. Optional harmonisation has 
been established under article 114 TFEU1180  although it has been doubted whether the 
proposed Regulation for a Common European Sales Law can be based on this article. 
Nevertheless, future initiatives in the area of insurance law have already been 
announced.1181 The development of optional regimes gives rise to a number of questions:  
 
1) What level of consumer protection would be considered satisfactory in optional 
harmonisation measures? 
A starting point for the level of protection could be the level of protection offered in the consumer 
acquis. Yet problems may arise, on the one hand, when the level of consumer protection would make 
it unattractive for businesses to opt for optionally harmonised rules. Of course, it might be possible that 
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 Comp. N. Reich, ‘A European contract law, or a EU contract law Regulation for consumers?’, Journal of Consumer Policy 
2005, p. 400.  
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 G. Bachmann, ‘Optionsmodelle im Privatrecht’, JZ 2008, p. 11 moreover distinguishes between strict and lenient options. 
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 Before the proposal for a Regulation establishing a Common European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final, optional 
harmonisation was primarily used under article 114 TFEU to further the free movement of goods. See …  
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 EU Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding meets with leaders of Europe’s insurance industry, Press release MEMO/11/624 , 
21 Sptember 2011, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-624_en.htm.  
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businesses would be quite willing to accept a high level of consumer protection if that would mean 
they could apply one level of consumer protection throughout the Union when doing business with 
consumers.
1182
 Interestingly, however, the reactions to other recent measures such as the consumer 
rights Directive
1183
 from stakeholder organisations
1184
 show that businesses may not necessarily plead 
for the highest level of consumer protection, but instead advocate a maximum harmonisation approach 
that will, in their view, ensure predictability and consistency. Therefore, it would be interesting to know 
whether businesses throughout the Union would be willing to accept a high level of consumer 
protection.  
In contrast, a low level of consumer protection may be problematic. Whittaker
1185
 has argued 
that a lower level of consumer protection than provided in national laws may give rise to questions 
whether standard terms applying the Optional Instrument to a business to consumer contract could be 
an unfair term in the meaning of Directive 93/13 or an unfair commercial practice in the meaning of 
Directive 2005/29. A lower level of consumer protection could prompt consumers to consider sellers 
who abide by national – higher – standards.
1186
 In that case, the choice for an optional instrument by 
businesses might even inhibit cross-border trade.  
 
2) The success of optional harmonisation depends on the adoption of optionally 
harmonised rules by private parties.1187  
The attractiveness of optionally harmonised rules may well depend on the predictability and 
consistency achieved by such an Optional Instrument. However, in the Feasibility Study,
1188
 as well as 
the subsequent proposal for a Regulation establishing a Common European Sales Law,
1189
 frequently, 
concepts are used that would need additional interpretation. For example, what does the duty to 
negotiate in good faith (article 8) mean? What duties can be imposed on parties on the basis of this 
rule? How will courts interpret contracts if article 56 of the Optional instrument dictates that a contract 
is to be interpreted in accordance with parties’ common intentions? What if parties are accustomed to 
relying upon the wording of the contract, having negotiated carefully on that wording? If parties can be 
bound by usages and practices, as stipulated in article 65, how will it be established that such a 
general usage exists? What future loss, in the sense of article 163 par. 2, is ‘reasonably likely to occur’? 
Furthermore, especially in the earliest phase, when the Optional Instrument is just adopted, there 
would not be any case law on the interpretation of these terms and rules, which private parties and 
their advisors could turn to.
1190
 Neither would there be an extensive amount of academic debate, as is 
the case in national jurisdictions. This might arguably set an optional instrument at a competitive 
disadvantage. The scope of optionally harmonised rules may also play an important role in the 
subsequent success of those rules.
1191
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3) Can optional harmonisation effectively be pursued by Directives, or does a choice for 
optional harmonisation also entail a choice for Regulations?  
 
4) Is the possible future use of optional harmonisation a reason to abandon the 
fragmented approach visible in the private law acquis?   
 
Thus, developing optional harmonisation necessitates more thought about these questions 
as they are important for the further development of the private law acquis.  
Alternatively, “European” sets of rules have been established under article 352 
TFEU.1192 However, the use of article 352 TFEU may well be complicated further by the 
BVerfG Lisbon decision.1193 In addition, sets of soft law such as the PECL can be developed, 
although opting for these sets of soft law as applicable law is not permitted under Rome I. 
Other options to establish optional regimes, currently not sufficiently considered in the 
drafting of a possible Common European Sales Law include enhanced cooperation, under 
which Member States enter into treaties in the sense of article 329 TFEU. So far, this 
possibility has led to the development of a regime in divorce law.1194 Also, a German-French 
optional regime on matrimonial property law has also been established through a bilateral 
treaty.1195  Alternatively, optional regimes on sales law in the EU may also be increased if the 
EU had the competence to accede to the CISG. 
 
8.6.2.2. How can optional regimes contribute to more comprehensible 
European private law? 
Smits1196 describes three benefits that can be derived from optional harmonisation:  
1) Optional harmonisation allows private parties to opt for either harmonised, national or 
international rules if that is in their own interests, which should increase the law’s 
ability to respond to divergent preferences.  
2) The development of optional rules could give rise to regulatory competition that 
should be beneficial for European private law in the long term.  
3) Optional harmonisation could also provide an attractive alternative to full 
harmonisation of national private laws, establishing a level playing field that parties 
can opt into if they choose, while leaving Member States with discretion to develop 
national rules in accordance with the needs and preferences of their own legal order. 
Thus, petrification and lack of responsiveness that may follow from maximum 
harmonisation can be avoided while divergences of harmonised law throughout the 
Union are prevented as well.  
 
8.6.2.3. Drawbacks  
Importantly, the development of optional regimes also shows detriments that should not be 
overlooked:  
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1) Developing optional regimes in addition to national, as well as other harmonised rules 





 have pointed to possible confusion that may arise when multiple 
instruments apply simultaneously – especially if those sources of law provide for different levels of 
consumer protection. This could for example be the case if the proposed optional instruments, the 
consumer law acquis, as well as national consumer contract law apply simultaneously, while also 
setting divergent levels of consumer protection. 
 
2) The choice of parties for optional regimes is not necessarily a rational one, which may 
limit the extent to which private actors prompt legislators to participate in regulatory 
competition.  
Arguably, a choice for an optional instrument does not have to be founded upon the superior quality of 
the instrument. Instead, the choice may also be traced to parties who are not aware that an optionally 
harmonised rule can be applied to the contract. Similarly, a choice against an optional instrument does 
not have to be based upon disapproval of the instrument, but based on, for example, model contracts 
that habitually opt out of optional instruments. Likewise, a choice to not opt for an optional instrument 
may be based on model contracts that do not contain an opt in clause, or, generally, an unwillingness 
to “try out” new law rather than familiar law systems.
1199
 Cognitive limitations and biases may also limit 
the extent to which parties opt for an instrument that they are not familiar with.
1200
 Notably, these 
flawed “choices” may undermine the idea of regulatory competition, as it makes clear that parties may 
not base their decisions on the quality of optional instruments – thus, the coexistence of these 
instruments does not necessarily lead to competition on the basis of the quality of those instruments, 
which also makes it less likely if competition occurs, this may not necessarily result in “better” law.  
Despite shortcomings in the theory that private parties make rational choices between different 
legal regimes, legislators still choose to participate in regulatory competition.  
 
Notably, in the drafting of optional harmonisation measures, actors will have to take possible 
problems with accessibility into account. Moreover, actors should not assume that parties will 
opt for an optional instrument because of its superior quality, even though problems of 
inconsistency and unpredictability may withhold actors from opting for an optional instrument.  
 
8.6.2.4. Conclusion on the use of optional regimes 
This paragraph has asked whether the use of optional regimes rather than traditional 
harmonisation may contribute to a more comprehensible European private law.  
The development of optional regimes may entail that the ability of private law to better 
respond to varying preferences improves, while it also provides an attractive alternative to 
previously pursued maximum harmonisation. Moreover, the development of optional regimes 
may also stimulate regulatory competition.  
Notably, optional harmonisation will likely result in a less fragmented harmonisation of private 
law, as the attractiveness of optional instruments also depends on their scope. The question 
arises, if optional harmonisation is not sufficiently successful, whether the European 
legislator turn towards more hierarchical approaches, perhaps, by transforming measures 
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pursuing optional harmonisation into measures pursuing partial harmonisation – i.e. 
measures imposing a harmonised set of rules for cross-border transactions.  
However, the success of optional regimes depends on the question whether drafters 
of these regimes sufficiently consider crucial questions. Also, the development of optional 
regimes may undermine the accessibility of European private law as it leads to multiple 
overlapping sets of regimes. Moreover, regulatory competition need not necessarily lead to 
better law.  
These potential drawbacks are however not sufficient reason to abandon the 
development of optional regimes, provided that drafters sufficiently take into account parties’ 
preferences as well as the relation between optional regimes and other sources of private 
law.   
 
8.6.3. American inspiration 
Could techniques inspired by the U.S. legal order, especially the U.S. Restatements and 
model laws, contribute to the comprehensibility of European private law?  
In particular, Restatements, similar to the DCFR, or model laws, could replace 
currently used techniques at the European level.This would however entail a significant 
change from the current private law acquis.   
Paragraph 8.6.3.1. will consider techniques that have been compared to 
Restatements in the European legal order and paragraph 8.6.3.2. will ask whether current 
experences with Restatement-like instruments indicate that further use of these instruments, 
rather than the use of Directives and Regulations, should be used more, considering the 
comprehensibility of European private law. Paragraph 8.6.3.3. will consider whether model 
laws should be used if harmonisation is not feasible. Paragraph 8.6.3.4. will end with a 
conclusion.  
 
8.6.3.1. The use of Restatements in the European legal order 
Various similarities are visible between the U.S. Restatements and the DCFR, which were 
inspired by the U.S. Restatements: 
1) The DCFR claims to restate existing law in blank letter rules, accompanied by 
comparative notes.1201  
Gutman
1202
 states that the aim of Restatements was not purely to ‘restate’ existing laws. Instead, 
Restatements should also consider ‘situations not yet discussed by the courts or dealt with by the 
legislatures’, as well as reflecting what the law should be if the law was not clear, and suggest 
changes. Consequently, Gutman describes the Restatements as ‘theoretical hybrids’ between 




2) Both the DCFR and the Restatements seek to establish systematisation. 
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 holds that although the Restatements were not drafted in the form of a code, they are 
reminiscent of codes as they did intend to provide a systematic description of the law.  
 
3) Both the DCFR and the DCFR seek to establish a common terminology1205 
Hyland
1206
 holds that a European codification should mainly seek to establish a common terminology 
and a structure that furthers debate, and should therefore be based on soft law such as the PECL and 




Notwithstanding some similarities, the assertion that the DCFR was a ‘Restatement’ 
has been doubted by various authors who point to divergences between the DCFR and the 
American Restatements:  
 
1) The DCFR has resulted in the proposal for a Regulation for a Common European 
Sales Law,1208 but the Restatements are expressly aimed at the judiciary and they 
are not meant to be adopted as laws throughout the United States.1209  
 
2) Rather than restating a black-letter rule of a complicated area of law, the DCFR 
seeks to formulate black-letter rules that are, as such, arguably not a restatement 
of existing law.  
Notably, the Study Group on a European Civil Code took the PECL, formulated by the Commission on 
European contract law, the predecessor of the Study Group, as a stating point to draft the DCFR. The 
Commission recognised that the PECL did not serve to restate the law, but rather served as a starting 
point for a European Civil Code. As such, the Commission held that there is no common law in Europe 
that could be restated, and instead of being based on an already existing black letter rule common to 





 moreover points out that a Restatement “restating” existing law would necessarily 
include not only the acquis, but also, for example, CJEU case law on general principles of European 
law. Jansen and Zimmerman
1212
 point out that especially for areas other than contract law, the 
argument that common rules – in the form of black letter rules, no less – can be found, overlooks the 
differences between national laws. Consequently, the DCFR contains rules that differ from national 
laws and such deviations should be justified more explicitly.  
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3) Whereas the Restatements focus on separate areas of law, the DCFR instead 
provides a systematisation of private law as such.1213 
  
Is the DCFR a European equivalent of the Restatements? While the DCFR certainly differs 
from the Restatements as it does not restate the law, it adequately demonstrates what a 
European equivalent would look like.  
The fact that the DCFR does not restate the law as such is not surprising, because of 
the differences between the U.S. and the European legal order 1214 The acquis is fragmented 
and there currently is no common law that is similar to a common law that can be deduced 
from the U.S. legal order. Moreover, it is unfortunate that the DCFR has been developed in 
spite of existing instruments – which it does not adequately take into account – rather than 
beong developed in close coordination with other instruments, as is the case for the 
Restatements. In this respect, the DCFR should take more note of the Restatements. The 
DCFR could also take the more transparent debate on the Restatements as an example.  
Moreover, a recommendation to a European judiciary would be difficult as no 
hierarchical judiciary has been established to interpret and apply European law. Instead, 
national courts are also tasked with applying European law. However, the majority of 
decisions continues to be on national law, and courts correspondingly make use of sources 
on national private law rather than European private law.  
Thus, the DCFR adequately reflects a European Restatement that is however in need 
for improvement.  
 
8.6.3.2. Experiences with the DCFR and the Restatements  
Do the experiences with the DCFR indicate that European Restatements should be used 
further or should their use be reconsidered?  
Experiences so far do not indicate success. Interestingly, Jansen1215 finds that one of 
the reasons that Restatements are so much more prominent in the U.S. legal order than the 
PECL and the DCFR may be that the Restatements were drafted as a response to a widely 
agreed ’crisis’ in American private law and thus responded to a need of legal practice. The 
higher responsiveness of the Restatements enhances the chances that they are 
subsequently widely accepted and used in legal practice.  In contrast, as Jansen points out, 
especially the PECL was not developed in response to a need expressed by legal practice, 
which considerably diminishes the chances for its subsequent use and acceptance by legal 
practice and judges. Accordingly, Jansen finds that it seems unlikely that actors will turn to 
European texts as primary sources or reflections of private law, unless European texts 
provide a clear added value to national texts for legal practice. This would be the case if 
                                               
1213
 N. Jansen, R. Zimmerman, ‘Was ist und wozu der DCFR?’, NJW 2009, p. 3405, speak of ‘systematisch verhärtern’, also N, 
Jansen, The making of legal authority, Non-legislative codifications in historical and comparative perspective, Oxford: OUP 2010, 
p. 53.   
1214
 Comp. for example, M. Reimann, ‘American private law and European legal unification – Can the United States be a 
model?’, MJ 1996, p. 217, emphasising that U.S. private law may not be as uniform as ‘European observes’ assume, while M. 
Reimann, ‘Towards a European Civil Code: Why continental jurists should consult their transatlantic colleagues’, Tulane Law 
Review 1998-1999, p. 1337, emphasises that European lawyers should look to the U.S. experience in codification as the U.S. 
legal order shows some important similarities with the European legal order, including the coexistence of common and civil law 
jurisdiction within a legal order. K. Gutman, The constitutionality of European contract law, Leuven 2011, p. 502-504, also points 
to differences between the U.S. and EU legal order when considering using ‘American techniques” as a source of inspiration, 
and argues that the European legislator has a set of different techniques at its disposal that may be better suited for the EU 
legal order.  
1215
 N, Jansen, The making of legal authority, Non-legislative codifications in historical and comparative perspective, Oxford: 
OUP 2010, p. 66, p. 51. 
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harmonisation of national private laws continues to the point that it replaces national private 
law as the primary source for private law. In that scenario, the relevance of national texts as 
sources of private law is severely diminished, and consequently, a European text would have 
a clear added value that is also apparent to legal practice.  
Currently, Nilsen1216 remarks that different from Restatements, the DCFR, as well 
other soft law principles, do not serve to improve accessibility but on the contrary are an 
“irritant” at the national level where there is no immediate need for soft law principles.  
Notably, the criticism of the DCFR with regard to the confusion on the relation 
between the DCFR and the private law acquis and other soft laws indicates that the drafters 
of the DCFR should take more note of the development of the U.S. Restatements against the 
background of other measures. Thus, the UCC and the uniform an model laws, established 
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the NCCUSL), the 
Restatements, formed by the American Law Institute (ALI), and the federal common law,1217 
as well as the division of competences between the federal and the state level in the U.S., 
should be considered in combination with one another. Accordingly, Gutman1218 describes 
the development of the different techniques in the U.S. legal system as ‘inextricably 
intertwined’, and emphasises the influence of constitutional questions in the use of these 
techniques. Moreover, when comparing the drafting of the DCFR and the development of 
Restatements, the transparency in the U.S. debate sets a good example for the drafting of 
the DCFR.1219 
Therefore, the extent to which the DCFR or other European “Restatements” currently 
contribute to benchmarks of predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness is 
limited.  
 
8.6.3.3. The use of model laws 
Besides the American Restatements, the question arises whether the use of model laws1220 
can be a source of inspiration for actors in the European legal order.  
U.S. model laws allow for amendments and are generally used in more controversial areas of 
private law – in the European legal order, examples of such areas are for example property 
or insolvency laws. Gutman 1221  compares the use of model laws with non-binding 
recommendations. Other instruments reminiscent of model laws have also been used in the 
European legal order:  
 
1) Soft laws as well as international conventions, frequently use ‘model rules’, and 
legislators can use these rules as a source of inspiration when drafting legislation. 
However, this does not entail adopting a ‘model law’ but merely looking at the 
European level for incidental ideas.  
                                               
1216
 N. Jansen, ‘Dogmatising non-legislative codification. Non legislative texts in European legal discourse’, in: R. Brownsword, 
H.-W. Micklitz, L. Niglia (eds.), The foundations of European law, 2011, via www.ssrn.com, p. 5. 
1217
 See for a comparison between U.S. and EU ‘federal common law’ K. Lenearts, K. Gutman, ‘”Federal common law” in the 
European Union’, American Journal of Comparative Law 2006, p. 1.   
1218
 K. Gutman, The constitutionality of European contract law (PhD thesis Leuven) 2011, p. 102, 165. 
1219
 Comp. J. Zekoll, ‘Das American Law Institute – ein Vorbil für Europa?’, in: R. Zimmerman (ed.), Globalisierung und 
Entstaatlichung des Rechts, Teilband II, Nichtstaatliches Privatrecht: Geltung und Genese, Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen 2008, p. 
118-119, see in the same sense C.U. Schmid, ‘Legitimitätsbedingungen eines Europäischen Zivilgesetzbuchs’, JZ 2001, p. 681. 
1220
 This does not includeuniform laws, the most prominent example of which is the Uniform Commercial Code. K. Gutman, The 
constitutionality of European contract law (PhD thesis Leuven) 2011, p. 502 emphasises the “American” understanding of 
uniform laws – which are intended to be implemented without amendments by state legislators. Uniform laws are particularly 
resorted to if convergence of state laws is considered desirable. Thus, uniform laws resemble current harmonisation initiatives 
and are therefore not considered as an alternative technique. 
1221




2) Divergent private laws throughout the Union may also inspire legislators. 
Admittedly, though, possible inspiration takes place in the absence of a “uniform” 
model rule.  
 
3) Model laws drafted by international organisations such as UNCITRAL, as well as 
the legislative guides used in areas less likely to be harmonised. 
 
Consequently, the use of model laws is not limited to the U.S. legal system. Yet their use in 
the European legal order may give rise to questions:  
 
1) Are these instruments likely to be used in areas that show overlap with the private law 
acquis, especially if model laws are not attuned to the acquis?  
For example, the UNCITRAL model law on cross-border insolvencies coexists with Regulation 
1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, and the UNCITRAL model law has mostly been adopted by 
states outside the Union. Notably, the Regulation contains rules for jurisdiction issues, applicable law 
and provisions on the effects of the initiation of insolvency proceedings on the rights of third parties, 
and the law applicable for a number of specified contract parties, as well as the recognition of 
insolvency proceedings. The contents of the model law on the recognition of insolvencies overlaps 
with some of these provisions, but the model laws also provides rules on cross-border cooperation for 
cross-border insolvencies. Notably, however, in the – postponed – revision of Dutch insolvency law, 
the expert committee did not only take into account the Regulation, but also considered the model law 
for insolvencies involving states outside the Union that fall beyond the scope of the Regulation.
1222
   
 
2) Will the promotion of UNCITRAL of uniformity through model laws inspire the 
European legislator? 
Several reactions are possible. If further harmonisation is not feasible, the Union may try to 
recommend its Member States to adopt the model laws provided by prominent international 
organisations. Alternatively, the Union may attempt to establish harmonisation in areas covered by 
model laws, as was the case in e-commerce. In 1996, UNCITRAL provided states with a model law on 
e-commerce. This prompted the Union
1223
 to consider EU initiatives in this field in order to ensure a 
prominent role in international negotiations, which led to the adoption of Directive 2000/31 on e-
commerce, whereas outside the European Union, most states have adopted laws based on the 
UNCITRAL model law.
1224
 Thus, in these cases the harmonisation of laws at a European level may 




3) If a model law is successfully used throughout the Union, will this bar the 
Commission’s competence to initiate harmonisation in that particular field? 
It is difficult to argue that divergences in private laws give rise to barriers to the internal market. Yet in 
the Biotechnology case,
1226
 the CJEU ruled that unclarities or divergences in the interpretation of an 
international convention could give rise to barriers to the internal market, enabling the Commission to 
initiate harmonisation that would ensure autonomous interpretation of the rules in the convention 
                                               
1222
 Commissie insolventierecht, Voorontwerp Insolventiewet, 2007, p. 4 (t). 
1223
 European Commission, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on certain legal aspects of electronic 
commerce in the internal market, COM (1998) 586 final, p. 3. 
1224
 UNCITRAL, Promoting confidence in electronic commerce: legal issues on international use of electronic authentication and 
signature methods, Vienna 2009, available at http://www.cnudci.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/08-55698_Ebook.pdf, par. 87. 
1225
 See critically C. Hultmark Ramberg, ‘The e-commerce directive and the formation of contract in a comparative perspective’, 
Global Jurist Advances 2001-2, who criticises Directive 2000/31 for overlooking relevant international developments such as the 
UNCITRAL model law.  
1226
 CJEU 9 October 2001 (Kingdom of the Netherlands v European Parliament and Council of the European Union), C-377/98, 
ECR [2001], p. I-7079, par. 19-20. 
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throughout the Union. Thus, the Commission may first try to recommend states to take model laws as 
starting points when they are revising areas of private law.  
If a model law is especially successful, and states are able to observe the application of model 
laws in practice, they may be less likely to object. However, if states find they prefer a larger say in the 
harmonisation of private law in particular areas – if they prefer harmonisation at all – this is a reason to 
opt for harmonisation, as states may have less influence in the drafting of model laws by international 
organisations.     
 
Is the use of model laws likely to contribute to benchmarks of predictability, accessibility, 
consistency and responsiveness?  
 The success of model laws depends on the use of model laws by the European 
legislator which may also influence the use made of model laws by states, if hamronisation 
measures diverge from model laws and do not leave room for the national legislator to take 
into account model laws. Model laws are however more likely to be successful than 
Recommendations and soft laws as states and the European legislator may observe more 
easily how model laws are used in practice, while the adoption of model laws by third states 
may encourage both national legislators and the European Commission to take these model 
laws into account, while their use does not necessarily bar harmonisation. Therefore, model 
laws may present an interesting alternative for the use of Recommendations and soft laws.  
  
8.6.3.4. Conclusion on the use of American techniques 
Is the use of European equivalents of the Restatements and model laws likely to contribute 
to the predictability, consistency, accessibility and responsiveness of European private law? 
 The European equivalent of the U.S. Restatements, in the form of the DCFR, is not 
likely to be as successful as the European equivalent, not only because of weakness in the 
drafting process in the DCFR that are not similarly visible in the U.S. legal order, but also 
because of the differences between the European and the U.S. legal order.  
 However, the use of international model laws may present an interesting alternative to 
hamronisation, particularly in areas less likely to be subject to harmonisation, and should be 
considered more prominently in improved consultations and impact assessments, provided 
that successful relevant model laws exist. Model laws may also be used as an additional 
technique that may precede harmonisation. 
 
8.6.4. Collective bargaining  
This paragraph will ask whether the use of collective bargaining can contribute to a more 
comprehensible European private law.  
Paragraph 8.6.4.1. will address the various possible ways in which collective 
bargaining can be used. Paragraph 8.6.4.2. will identify potential problems. Paragraph 




8.6.4.1. Suggestions for collective bargaining1227 
Collins 1228  has suggested the formation of ‘autonomous agreements’ through collective 
bargaining under article 155 TFEU. Under article 155 TFEU, framework agreements have 
been considered as an alternative to traditional harmonisation in social policy areas.1229 
Collins 1230  points out that the participation of private parties ensures responsiveness, 
reflecting business needs and practices, and leads to a more balanced result than one-sided 
self-regulation.  
If national actors seek to initiate collective agreements with actors at the European 
level, for example as they need to bargain with multinational organisations to adequately 
protect the interests of their members at a national level, European collective bargaining may 
have a clear added value for actors at the national level. For example, Schiek1231 points to 
the initiative shown by various national unions to engage in collective negotiations with a 
transnational business established in accordance with the European Company Directive 
provided by Regulation 2157/2001. 
Could collective bargaining at a European level also be undertaken for a limited 
amount of Member States, so that actors in a Member States that are familiar with collective 
bargaining for business to consumer transactions can enter into transnational framework 
agreements? This would enable other actors and other Member States to observe collective 
bargaining in a cross-border context on a limited scale. Also, it would be easier to achieve 
consensus on framework agreements if less parties that moreover have similar backgrounds 
are involved in framework agreements.  
However, it may be doubted whether the Commission wants a ‘two-speed Europe’ – 
or several speeds Europe – where businesses from states not participating in the framework 
agreements have access to states participating in framework agreements without being 
bound to those agreements.1232  
 
8.6.4.2. The need for inclusive and representative negotiations between 
equal parties 
Collective negotiations should be inclusive and negotiations should take place between 
sufficiently representative parties with equal bargaining power. If this is not the case, 
agreements may become binding on parties that have had no chance to influence the 
process, which may severely limit the responsiveness of the outcomes of collective 
negotiations to society’s – and contract parties’  – views on justice.  
In particular, problems of Fremdbestimmung may arise, and consequently, the 
outcomes of collective bargaining should but could not be subject to judicial evaluation in the 
                                               
1227
 The suggestion in this paragraph differs from the previous suggestion to establish a ‘European Self regulatory consultation 
system’ by A.G. Castermans, ‘Towards a European contract law through social dialogue’, ERCL 2011, p. 366, as this form of 
self-regulation does not lead to framework agreements that can be transformed into binding law under article 155 TFEU. Comp. 
also J. Cartwright et al., ‘Grensoverschrijdend contracteren? Dat lossen we zelf wel op’, NJB 2011, p. 1250. 
1228
 H. Collins, ‘The freedom to circulate documents : regulating contracts in Europe’, ELJ 2004, p. 798-802. D. Schiek, 
‘Autonomous collective agreements as a regulatory device in European labour law: How to read article 139’, Industrial Law 
Journal 2005, p. 26 similarly argues that the ‘European social dialogue’ established under article 155 TFEU can be considered 
as an example for other areas of contract law. Also G. Guéry, ‘European collective bargainign and the Maastricht Treaty’, 
International Labour Review 1992, p. 583-584.  
1229
 See previously par. 4.4.2.1. 
1230
 H. Collins, ‘The freedom to circulate documents : regulating contracts in Europe’, ELJ 2004, p. 798-802. 
1231
 D. Schiek, ‘Autonomous collective agreements as a regulatory device in European labour law: How to read article 139’, 
Industrial Law Journal 2005, p. 24. 
1232
 H. Cullen, E. Campbell, ‘The future of social policy-making in the European Union’, in: P. Craig, C. Harlow (eds.), 
Lawmaking in the European Union, KLI: The Hague 1998, p. 275.   
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German legal order. Whittaker1233 has questioned whether collective agreements violate the 
freedom of contract. Collins1234 also points to the need to ensure the representativeness of 
the stakeholder organisations involved in the drafting process. Similarly, Schiek1235 stresses 
the need for representativeness of stakeholder organisations participating in collective 
bargaining.1236  
Accordingly, Member States frequently impose requirements with regard to the 
representativeness and insofar as they exist, these national requirements may be taken as a 
starting point to ensure the inclusiveness of European collective bargaining. In addition, 
collective bargaining at the European level may involve European stakeholder organisations 
(hopefully) representing these representative national stakeholder organisations. Lack of 
representativeness can be a ground for challenging the validity of Decisions. However, the 
CJEU1237 has adopted considerable restraint in assessing the representativeness of parties 
admitted to collective bargaining. Furthermore, restrictions found in mandatory national law 
and the consumer law acquis as well as competition law should be taken into account. 
  
8.6.4.3. Conclusion on the use of collective bargaining 
Will collective bargaining, as an alternative to traditional harmonisation, contribute to the 
predictability, consistency, accessibility and responsiveness of European private law? 
 Extending framework agreements to consumer contract law may provide interesting 
alternatives that could be considered in more thorough impact assessment, especially if 
collective negotiations are also possible between actors from a  limited number of Member 
States. This option would on the one hand allow for more experimentation, but on the other 
hand it would also lead to a two-tier Europe which is politically problematic and may lead to 
free-riders. Also, current safeguards to ensure the inclusiveness of framework agreements 
are not satisfactory and should be improved. 
However, the success of framework agreements could be undermined as the scope 
of framework agreements may well be limited. Moreover, the success of this alternative 
depends on initiatives from private parties. The amount of initiative shown by stakeholders 
must however not be overestimated or taken for granted. 1238  Moreover, initiatives from 
stakeholders may not necessarily result in an agreement. The Commission 1239  has 
suggested that the Open Method of Coordination (‘OMC’) could be used to stimulate the 
involvement of relevant stakeholders, which has led to the adoption of frameworks of 
action.1240 However, Smismans1241 has argued that collective negotiations usually take place 
‘in the shadow of hierarchy’, i.e. under the threat, for example, of legislative intervention, also 
due to unequal bargaining positions between labour and management.  
 
                                               
1233
 S. Whittaker, ‘On the development of European standard contract terms’, ERCL 2006, p. 74. 
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 H. Collins, ‘The freedom to circulate documents : regulating contracts in Europe’, ELJ 2004, p. 798-802. 
1235
 D. Schiek, ‘Autonomous collective agreements as a regulatory device in European labour law: How to read article 139’, 
Industrial Law Journal 2005, p. 26 
1236
 K. Armstrong, ‘Rediscovering civil society: The European Union and the White Paper on Governance‘, ELJ 2002, p. 123 
however argues that a distinciton should be made between the different sorts of stakeholders participating in the ‘social 
dialogue’, that consists of actors having to implement policies later agreed upon, actors whose interests are directly affected by 
the outcome of the process, as well as actors that represent a public interest while they are not directly affected by the outcome 
of the process. These actors, Armstrong argues, act in their own interest rather than ‘public’ interests.  
1237
 CJEU 17 June 1998 (UEAPME v Council of the European Union), T-135/96, ECR [1998], p. II-2335, par. 88-89. See further 
previously par. 4.4.2.3. 
1238
 Comp. H. Cullen, E. Campbell, ‘The future of social policy-making in the European Union’, in: P. Craig, C. Harlow (eds.), 
Lawmaking in the European Union, KLI: The Hague 1998, p. 274-275.   
1239
 European Commission, The European social dialogue, a force for innovation and change, COM (2002) 341 final, p. 14.  
1240
 For example the Framework agreement on gender equality.   
1241
 S. Smismans, ‘European social dialogue in the shadow of hierarchy’, Journal of Public Policy 2008, p. 161 et seq. 
264 
 
8.6.5. Conclusion  on the use of alternative techniques 
What techniques could be used instead of currently used techniques that are likely to 
contribute to the comprehensibility of European private law? 
The development of optional regimes seems an attractive alternative to maximum or 
minimum harmonisation, but the basis for optional harmonisation may be problematic under 
article 114 and 352 TFEU. In addition, the use of model laws also presents an interesting 
alternative to European measures, which can also be used in addition to subsequent 
traditional harmonisation, if it does not prove successful.  
In contrast, the extent to which other alternative techniques can enhance the 
predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness of private law is limited. The use 
of Regulations may inhibit accessibility and the use of European equivalents of Restatements 
have hitherto not indicated that this technique should be pursued further. Also, the use of 
collective bargaining may be problematic as it depends on the willingness of private parties, 
which should not be overestimated, and safeguards to establish inclusiveness and remedy 
Fremdbestimmung have not been established.  
The suggestions for the use of alternative techniques all concern techniques that can 
be used at the European level. Notably, at the national level, the use of techniques may be 
less flexible – in the German and Dutch legal order, suggestions for alternatives to 
codifications and blanket clauses are problematic.  
However, the alternative techniques may also be suitable to contribute to problems at 
the national level. The use of optional harmonisation may provide legislators with more room 
to maintain a consistent, predictable law within the framework of national law.  The use of 
Regulations could take away national legislator’s difficulties in implementing the private law 
acquis, although it would not contribute to the accessibility and consistency of law as it can 
leads to the simultaneous applicability of multiple sources.   
Thus, interdependence becomes apparent; if actors at one level experience problems, 
initiatives from actors at other levels may resolve these problems, or reinforce problems. The 
use of Regulations moreover draws attention to actors’ different understanding of 
benchmarks of accessibility and consistency. 
The use of alternative techniques and other techniques may moreover show 
considerable overlap. Accordingly, the successful development of optional regimes, as well 
as Regulations and model laws, may arguably be considerably be enhanced through the use 
of networks and databases.1242  Also, a better use of impact assessment may separately 
assess the use of alternative techniques, in particular the development of optional regimes 
and model laws. Consultations may evaluate whether actors are interested in these options, 




                                               
1242





In the development of private law through codification, soft laws, blanket clauses, and 
general principles, actors have not adequately taken into account that other actors also 
develop private law and that, therefore, the ability of actors to safeguard benchmarks of 
predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness through these techniques has 
been diminished.  
However, actors typically use techniques in addition to codifications, soft laws, 
blanket clauses and general principles, and in some cases, the use of alternative techniques, 
especially at the European level, is possible. What techniques can be used in addition to or 
instead of currently used techniques that will support the extent to which national techniques 
contribute to the predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness of European 
private law? 
Techniques should be combined with currently used top-down, hierarchical 
techniques that play a central role in the development of European private law. The 
suggestions for and the use of Regulations in the private law acquis, and the use of 
maximum harmonisation can also be seen in this light. 1243  This preference may be 
institutionally embedded at the European level, perhaps because the conferral of 
competences takes the European institutions as a starting point and suggestions and 
initiatives take place within the existing framework of these institutions. The preference for 
top-down techniques is echoed by non-state actors. 1244  For the Dutch legal order, 
Vranken1245 notes that practitioners as well as scholars are often ‘wired’ to legal practice, and 
their reasoning is accordingly influenced. However, hard law may not necessarily be 
successful.1246 Actors’ expectations about the extent to which these hierarchical techniques 
contribute to benchmarks may be overly optimistic, especially if the existence of other actors 
is not taken into account, and should be adjusted accordingly.  
Moreover, if the legislative process consistently shows severe shortcomings – which 
is currently not the case – and does not show improvement, formally democratically 
developed rules may de facto lead to Fremdbestimmung. The current shortcomings in the 
legislative process already make the need to use of additional and alternative techniques 
more visible and attractive. Specifically, the distinction between the development of private 
law by democratically elected state actors and non-state actors becomes smaller and the 
preference for democratically elected state actors over non-democratically elected state 
actors also becomes less convincing. Accordingly, Scheltema1247 finds that the development 
of private law by the legislator is not necessarily preferable to the development of private law 
through case law – at least, the argument that the legislator should have a more prominent 
role as he is democratically legitimated, decreases significantly. Should the judiciary 
                                               
1243
 More generally, the European Commission, European governance: A White Paper, COM (2001) 428 final also prefers a 
hierarchical approach. 
1244
 See for example M. Storme, ‘The foundations of private law in a multilevel structure: Balancing, distibution of lawmaking 
power, and other constitutional issues’, ERPL 2012, p. 249, this preference has also been signalled by Buck-Heeb & Dieckmann 
2010, p. 230. 
1245
 Asser/Vranken 1-III (2005), nr. 140-143. S. Ferreri, ‘General report: Sources of transnational law’, ERPL 2012, p. 9-11, p. 29, 
p. 40  also finds that both practitioners and judges in many legal orders adopt a somewhat conservative approach to both 
foreign law and international law, and instead seem to focus on national law and national issues. 
1246
 Comp. also H.-J. Mertens, ‘Nichtlegislatorische Rechtsvereinheitlichung durch transnationales Wirtschaftsrecht und 
Rechtsbegriff’, RabelsZ 1992, p. 219. This for example becomes visible from the late implementation of Directives, the restraint 
of some national judges in referring to European law or the CJEU, or the creation of precontractual duties in for example the 
field of consumer credit, which makes it more difficult for consumers to determine the costs of online credit , see the 2011 
consumer credit sweep at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/enforcement/sweep/consumer_credits/index_en.htm.  
1247
 M. Scheltema, Het recht van de toekomst (inaugural address Utrecht),Kluwer: Deventer 2005, p. 9.  
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therefore play a more important role in providing guidelines for the interpretation of blanket 
clauses, and should the judiciary more generally play a more active role in the multilevel 
legal order? Should soft laws be a more prominent source in the interpretation of blanket 
clauses?1248 
Instead of emphasising top-down techniques, actors should develop a combination of 
top-down and bottom-up techniques, and some areas of law have already been 
characterised as a hybrid of top-down an bottom-up approaches.1249 Additional techniques 
that may contribute to the comprehensibility of European private law are:  
 
1) The improved use of techniques to support the legislative process will increase to the 
extent to which codifications and blanket clauses contribute to benchmarks of 
predictability, consistency, accessibility and responsiveness. 
The weaknesses in the use of codifications, soft laws, blanket clauses and general principles has been 
linked to criticism of the legislative process and arguments for more debate in European private law. 
Specifically, the use of consultations and impact assessments show serious shortcomings that are not 
remedied by other actors or techniques. Improvements of these techniques, and better use of 
networks and databases, may be a first step to deliberation.  
 
2) The use of techniques in addition to blanket clauses will enhance the extent to which 
blanket clauses contribute to predictability, consistency, and responsiveness. 
The use of guidelines and in the Dutch legal order, the newly introduced prejudicial procedure could 
also advance predictability and consistency. The responsiveness of private law may be enhanced if 
courts consistently use well-established and accepted alternative regulation in the interpretation of 
blanket clauses.   
 
3) The study of STC’s will increase extent to which national actors may contribute to the 
predictable development of the law through codifications and blanket clauses.  
The predictable development of private law at a national level may benefit from studying STC’s to 
identify potential areas for harmonisation, which may however also inhibit the consistent development 
of national private law. The exchange of information on STC’s may also contribute to predictability.  
 
4) The use of the OMC could contribute to regulatory competition, which could make 
actors more aware of areas of private law in need of improvement. In turn, reforming 
outdated areas of private law may contribute to the respponsiveness of private law. 
 
Alternative techniques that could contribute to the comprehensibility are: 
 
1) Optional regimes could facilitate the consistent and predictable development of 
private law within national codifications and enhace the capacity of law to respond to 
divergent preferences 
 
2) Model laws could enhance the consistent development of private law throughout the 
Union, as model laws encourage convergence and states interested in adopting 
(parts of) successful model laws have the opportunity to see how model laws are 
applied in practice, which is beneficial for predictability. 
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 Comp. R. Michaels, ‘Umdenken für die UNIDROIT Prinzipien. Vom rechtswahlstatut zum Algemeinen Teil des 
transnationalen Vertragsrecht’, RabelsZ 2009, p. 885.  
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 Especially J. Basedow, ‘The state’s private law and the economy – commercial law as an amalgam of public and private 
rule-making’, American Journal of Comparative Law 2008, p. 703, considering the circumstances under which state law or 




The emphasis of this chapter has been on potentially successful additional and alternative 
techniques that are often bottom-up techniques, and the use of these techniques implies a 
shift towards the use of soft and bottom-up techniques. However, should soft or bottom-up 
techniques be used solely as a means to support the existing preferences for hierarchical 
techniques or is this view too narrow, overlooking instances in which “pure” bottom-up 
approaches are beneficial?  
Currently, the preference for the use of “traditional” techniques has meant that 
potential techniques have been overlooked and that the strengths and weaknesses of 
various alternative techniques may not have been sufficiently thoroughly considered. 
German law rightly emphasises that the development of alternative regulation can have 
value in itself, as an exercise of constitutional rights. Even if the development of alternative 
regulation does not have a similar constitutional background, the ability of actors to develop 
and enforce their own rules is in accordance with the widely recognised principle of private 
autonomy and therefore has value in and of itself. 
This does not mean that alternative regulation will necessarily be more successful 
than “traditional” legislation,1250 but neither will legislation necessarily be more successful 
than alternative regulation. Unfortunately, the strengths of bottom-up techniques may be 
overlooked as the current use of bottom-up techniques does not remedy problems apparent 
in the use of techniques. Instead, the use of initiatives such as the OMC, but also collective 
bargaining, may reinforce problems in the legislative process.  Thus, the drawbacks of 
bottom-up techniques should not be overlooked: 
 
1) The development of bottom-up development takes time and its success depends on 
the initiatives from private parties.  
Notably, the development of ‘bottom-up’ techniques also depends on the awareness of private actors 
of the possibilities to develop such initatives. As long as (many of) those initiatives do not seem to be 
progressing rapidly, ‘bottom-up’ techniques may take a long time to develop.  
 
2) Some bottom-up initiatives do not adequately ensure representativeness and 
inclusiveness.  
Presently, interesting starting points have resulted in debate with a limited number of highly qualified 
participants. It seems that in debate on ‘European’ private law prominent “European” stakeholders 
may play an important role.
1251
 The suggestions for an Open Method of Convergence as well as the 
suggestion to develop a social dialogue also suggest the use of techniques which includes a limited 
number of highly qualified particpants. Notably, this small number of highly qualified participants may 
be beneficial for stimulating the exchange of rational arguments based on sufficient expertise. 
Notwithstanding the desirability of this exchange, however, the lack of participation from legal 
practitioners specialised in national law considerably weakens the debate in European private law, as 
it seems cut off from at least part of legal practice which, in many areas, is still predominantly national. 
                                               
1250
 Comp. J. Köndgen, ‘Privatisierung des Rechts’, AcP 2006, p. 507-508, who, referring to the Enron and Worldcom cases, 
states that positive (criminal) law has failed rather than self-regulation. He emphasises that self-regulation is not intended to 
have preventive effect – instead, it can help the judiciary by indicating what behaviour can be expected from, for example, a 
particular profession. However, it seems that behaviour has not been in accordance with such rules, despite the involvement of 
relevant actors. This may form an indication against the argument that involvement of interested parties – such as professions – 
will strengthen compliance. Similar conclusions may also be drawn for corporate governance codes, see previouslypar. 5.4.2.3. 
1251
 For example, the draftingof the Optional Instrument (see for the members of the stakeholder group 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/stakeholder-meeting/index_en.htm), Directive 2011/83 on consumer rights (see for the 
members of the stakeholder group http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/cons_acquis_en.htm). Comp. also the members of the 
Round Table on Travel Contracts, on the review of Directive 90/314 on package travel (see for the members of the group  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/pack_trav/pack_trav03_en.pdf)  Comp, also S. Grundmann, J. Stuyck, ‘An 
academic Green Paper on European contract law – Scope, common ground and debated issues’, in: S. Grundmann, J. Stuyck, 
(eds.), An academic Green Paper on European contract law, KLI: The Hague 2002, p. 7-8.  
268 
 
Consequently, it does not seem likely that legal practice will develop much initiatives even if additional 
or alternative techniques provide room for actors to do so.  
  
In the use of additional and alternative techniques, interdependence becomes visible:  
 
1) If actors use techniques in addition to already used techniques, they can compensate 
for the weaknesses of a particular technique or reinforce other actors’ initiatives. 
Thus, the use of national consultations and impact assessments may reinforce interaction in the 
debate on private law at the European level.  
 
2)  Unfortunately, the use of additional and alternative techniques may also undermine 
other actors’ initiatives.  
Thus, the use of Regulations instead of Directives would make it considerably more difficult for 
legislators to maintain the consistent and accessible development of private law within national 
codifications. Moreover, banning national, well-established and accepted alternative regulation as a 
relevant source for the interpretation of blanket clauses in the private law acquis and introducing 
comitology may lessen the responsive interpretation of blanket clauses. 
 
Actors are also dependent on one another for the successful use of alternative and additional 
techniques, which becomes apparent in various ways: 
 
1) National state actors are better placed to encourage national actors to participate in 
debate – but this will not contribute to responsiveness if the responses are not taken 
into account. Similarly, organising national impact assessments is not going to lead to 
more evidence-based debate if they do not play a role in further debate.  
2) The suggestion to use the OMC to encourage regulatory competition should not 
overlook that, despite European encouragement, states may choose not to amend 
their laws, which may severely undermine the success of the OMC. 
3) The possibility to develop optional regimes makes clear that the preferences of non-
state actors who will might make use of these optional regimes should be taken into 
account. Logically, if optional regimes are not in accordance with non-state actors’ 
needs and preferences, this diminishes the chance that these actors will subquently 
opt for it. 
4) The suggestion for bottom-up techniques more generally draws attention to the 
dependance on private parties for the success of these techniques. Referring to 
alternative regulation in the interpretation of blanket clauses presupposes that private 
parties have drafted or participated in the drafting of alternative regulation, and 
framework agreements may similarly only be transformed into binding law if parties 
enter into collective negotiations with one another.  
 
This chapter has argued that interaction in the development of European private law should 
be more like deliberation. Notably, deliberation refers to legislation, as the drafting of 
alternative regulation may be open to a limtied group of participant, while alternative 
regulation may also not be as accessible as legislation. Nevertheless, more interaction that 
moves towards deliberation may also benefit the development of additional and alternative 
techniques, and the development of alternative regulation may also enhance deliberation:  
1) Deliberation should involve discussing critically which techniques would be most 
suitable for European private law, which may point to the use of other techniques 
than traditional legislation.  
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2) Typically, bottom-up techniques depend on participation and debate and may 
therefore  benefit considerably from deliberation. Also, framework agreements could 
gain from deliberation.  
3) Interaction will benefit from the use of additional or alternative techniques.  
In particular, interaction will benefit from the improved use of networks and databases. Also, it has 
been argued that OMC recognises the coexistence of actors and encourages ‘power-sharing’ and 
‘mutual problem solving’, which makes the need for interaction between participating actors 
apparent.
1252
 However, the success of the OMC in facilitating interaction is subject to doubt. There are 
also arguments that collective bargaining could improve debate. Schiek 
1253
 emphasises that collective 
bargaining at the European level fits in the multilevel legal order in which actors become increasingly 
interdependent, providing arrangements that are relatively flexible when compared with European or 
national legislation. However, extending framework agreements to private law may be problematic, 
especially if the inclusiveness and representativeness of actors is not yet sufficiently guaranteed. 
Moreover, Armstrong
1254
 points out that collective negotiation processes at the European level typically 
only include actors at the European level that moreover negotiate to achieve an agreement, whilst 
pursuing their own interests. 
 
The distinction between additional and alternative techniques is not a sharp distinction; some 
techniques used in addition to currently used techniques, such as the OMC, may, if 
successful, be used instead of traditional harmonisation techniques.  
The choice for these techniques depends on actors’ preferences and their views on 
the benefits and weaknesses of additional or alternative techniques – however, the 
preferences of different actors for particular techniques may differ. Thus, an abstract 
evaluation of the benefits of legislation, and alternative or additional techniques will not be 
made. Also, the choice for “optimal” techniques is not a definitive choice, but may also 












                                               
1252
 J. Scott, D.M. Trubek, ‘Mind the gap: law and new approaches to governance in the European Union’, ELJ 2002, p. 6 
1253
 D. Schiek, ‘Autonomous collective agreements as a regulatory device in European labour law: How to read article 139’, 
Industrial Law Journal 2005, p. 27, 33. 
1254
 K. Amstrong, ‘Rediscovering civil society: The European Union and the White Paper on Governance’, ELJ 2002, p. 123-124. 
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Chapter 9: The development of the law on standard 
contract terms  
 
9.1. Introduction 
The previous chapters have considered the role of actors in the German and Dutch legal 
orders in the development of private law and the use of techniques in the multilevel legal 
order. Although the role of actors beyond the national level and non-strate actors differs in 
the German and Dutch legal order, these differences have not resulted in a different use of 
techniques by state actors. However, differences in the development of alternative regulation 
have been discovered.  
The previous chapters have considered that generally, both state and non-state 
actors show a preference for a hierarchical development of private law. It was also concluded 
that the coexistence of actors may be beneficial if actors manage to benefit form one 
another’s insights and experiences, whereas coexistence may be problematic if actors ignore 
that other actors also develop private law and that the use of techniques by other actors may 
therefore be relevant when pursuing benchmarks of predictability, accessibility, consistency, 
and responsiveness.  
Can the extent to which a particular area of law meets benchmarks of predictability, 
consistency, accessibility and responsiveness be traced to the coexistence of interdependent 
actors and the interaction between these actors? 
Studying a particular area of law more closely may also be valuable because the 
optimal use of techniques may change over time, and depends on the degree of European 
integration as well as the area of law. Thus, some areas of law, such as timeshare, develop 
rapidly, which necessitates the use of techniques that allow for sufficient flexibility. Also, 
some areas of private law, such as insolvency law or property law, may be politically 
sensitive, which may decrease state actors’ willingness for harmonisation. In contrast, other 
areas are not as sensitive, and may allow more easily for European initiatives – such as 
contract law. Alternatively, some areas consist of a relatively high number of mandatory rules 
– for example consumer law – which may make it more likely that parties in cross-border 
trade are confronted with two sets of inconsistent mandatory rules. In some areas of private 
law, such as property law, the need for predictability is emphasised.  
Consequently, the question whether the coexistence of actors is problematic or 
beneficial can be answered for separate areas of the law. Accordingly, this part of the 
research will turn to contract law, in particular to the law on STC’s. The case studies will 
consider whether actors have taken into account that other actors also develop private law, 
which limits the extent to which national techniques may contribute to benchmarks of 
predictability, accessibility, consistency, and responsiveness, whether actors have interacted 
with each other accordingly, and how this has affected the law on STC’s in terms of these 
benchmarks.  
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3) Openness and transparency 
4)  Actors should be able to gain an overview of debate 
5) Actors should not use debate primarily to pursue their own interests 
 
Moreover, interaction between actors should serve to make actors aware of interdependence, 
and adjust the use of their techniques accordingly.1256  
Especially in the German legal order, but also in the Dutch legal order, the law on 
STC’s is generally considered to be of good quality. Does that mean that actors have 
recognised interdependence has developed and interacted accordingly, or not? 
Paragraph 9.2 will discuss the choice for the law on STC’s. Paragraph 9.3 will discuss 
which actors coexist in the German and Dutch legal order, and whether interdependence 
between actors has developed. Paragraph 9.4 will end with a conclusion and sketch the 
approach in chapters 10, 11 and 12. 
 
9.2. The choice for a case study 
This paragraph will consider the choice for the law on STC’s. Paragraph 9.2.1. will consider 
the dilemma’s accompanying the choice for a case study and paragraph 9.2.2. will discuss 
the choice for the law on STC’s. 
 
9.2.1. Dilemma’s 
In the choice for an area of law for a case study, several dilemmas may arise. Choosing a 
“national” area of law such as the law on the transfer of real property may not make apparent 
whether the simultaneous use of techniques by multiple actors is problematic, because not 
many techniques are used simultaneously in these areas, and the development of those 
areas remains, by definition, predominantly national. Yet opting for “hybrid” areas that 
develop functionally and where the difference between public and private law is less 
apparent, such as for example labour law or company law, may be problematic because the 
development of law in these functional areas can be considered “atypical” for areas of 
“traditional” private law. Alternatively, in “European” area of law, many actors coexist, which 
may lead to arguments that this area is similarly atypical and that the conclusions with regard 
to this area are not relevant for other “traditional” areas.  
Arguably, choosing an area of European private law where many actors coexist 
provides an opportunity to look at the simultaneous development of European private law by 
different actors. Moreover, the number of actors involved in the development of European 
private law is not likely to become smaller over time, which may also make the conclusions of 
the simultaneous use of techniques alongside one another interesting for other areas of 
private law, especially considering the developments in “traditional” areas of private law.1257. 
Mandatory rules in traditional areas such as property law may also be difficult to reconcile 
with the rights to free movement within the European Union, or, eventually, if they pose 
justifiable barriers to trade, they may become harmonised.1258  Thus, “national” areas of 
private law can also look to the development of other areas of private law if and when 
                                               
1256
 See previously par. 8.7.5.   
1257
 Comp. the proposal for a Directive on credit agreements relating to residential property, COM (2011) 142 final.   
1258
 See further on the compatibility of property law and European law B. Akkermans, E. Ramaekers, ‘Free movement of goods 
and property law’, Maastricht European Private Law Institute (M-EPLI) Working Paper 26/2011, available on www.ssrn.com.  
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increased international trade necessitates the development of for example, European 
initiatives on the registration of immovable property in national registers. 
 
9.2.2. The law on STC’s 
STC’s are important for both national and international trade. STC’s have even been 
described as “principles” of European contract law, more so than the PECL, because of their 
central importance to legal practice, and the European legislator agrees. 1259 Contract law 
plays a central role for the inclusion of STC’s in contracts, the interpretation and the validity 
of STC’s.1260 The case study will look at the use of techniques by multiple actors in the 
development of the law on STC’s. Thus, this case study is not aimed at studying the use of 
STC’s as an additional technique that may make clear which differences in private law are 
problematic for the internal market.1261   
Studying this area of law may prove interesting as STC’s are used widely, both in 
B2B contracts and B2C contracts. Therefore, the research would consider an area where 
parties may have to deal with mandatory law provisions as well as an area where parties 
largely decide for themselves which STC’s to include. It is moreover an area of private law 
where many techniques have been used alongside one another, and where it is therefore 
possible to see whether the simultaneous use of techniques by multiple actors has been 
problematic or beneficial, or both. It is moreover an area where relevant previous 
comparative law research already exists,1262 which may facilitate a comparative law case 
study.   
 Which characteristics in this area of law may be important for an optimal use of 
techniques?  
i) The law on STC’s has developed rapidly and therefore the law should be able to 
adequately respond to changing practices, in accordance with society’s views on 
justice.  
ii) Contract law typically facilitates entering into contracts, which requires an approach 
that is predictable, consistent and accessible.   
iii) Much alternative regulation has developed, and the law should accordingly leave 
sufficient room for alternative regulation, unless that leads to Fremdbestimmung. 
iv) The law on STC’s has been subject to considerable harmonisation, as part of 
consumer contract law consists of mandatory law that may in the eyes of the 
European legislator give rise to barriers to the internal market.  
 
Arguably, conclusions drawn from this case study may be especially interesting for areas of 
law with similar characteristics – quickly developing areas of law, with both mandatory and 
default rules, where alternative regulation has developed or may still develop, or where 
harmonisation measures have developed or may develop. Also, the conclusions on the 
                                               
1259
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A more coherent European contract law: 
An action plan, COM (2003) 68 final, p. 21 et seq.  
1260
 Looking at STC’s themselves may reveal that the validity of STC’s may not only depend on contract laws, but also on, for 
example, national property laws, or civil procedure laws. Although it makes clear that the different areas of law should not be 
seen in isolation from one another, these areas of law are not included in the case study. Notably, this case study concentrates 
on the use of techniques in the development of the law on STC’s rather than the cross-border effectiveness of STC’s 
themselves. This case study will also not separately consider private law that may be relevant for negotiations such as the 
question whether parties breaking off negotiations may be liable for precontractual damages. 
1261
 See previously on this question par. 8.4. 
1262
 For the Dutch legal order prominently E.H. Hondius, Standaardvoorwaarden. Rechtsvergelijkende beschouwingen over de 
standaardisering van kontraktsbedingen en overheidstoezicht daarop, 1978 and more recently R.H.C. Jongeneel, Algemene 
voorwaarden en het AGB-Gesetz, 1991. Comparative information on the implementation of Directive 93/13 can be found in the 
EC Consumer Law Compendium (the CLABB-database is no longer available).      
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development of the law on STC’s also affect more general questions of contract law, and may 
therefore be interesting for the use of techniques in the area of contract law more generally. 
 
9.3. Which actors coexist and has interdependence developed? 
This paragraph will ask what actors develop the law on STC’s in the German and Dutch legal 
order and whether interdependence has developed between what actors.  
Paragraph 9.3.1. will consider which actors have played a role in the development of 
the law on STC’s, and paragraph 9.3.2. will consider interdependence. Paragraph 9.3.3. will 
end with a conclusion. 
 
9.3.1. Actors developing the law on STC’s 
The law on STC’s has been developed by various actors:  
 
1) The German and Dutch legislator have developed general contract law as well as 
specific provisions for STC’s. National legislators have established private 
international law on the jurisdiction, applicable law and the execution of foreign 
decisions relating to STC’s. 
 
2) The European legislator has developed various measures on the law of STC’s. 
These measures are Directive 93/13 on unfair contract terms as well as other Directives that may 
affect the content and judicial evaluation of STC’s. Thus, article 7 Directive 2011/7 on late payment 
stipulates that terms on the date or period of payment, interest, or recovery costs that are grossly 
unfair to the creditor shall either be unenforceable or give rise to damages. Article 7 provides a 
number of criteria to establish whether a term is grossly unfair. Also, article 4 par. 4 Directive 90/314 
on package travel limits the possibility to change the price of package travel when the contract has 
already been concluded. Also, Directive 2008/48 on consumer creditor and Directive 2007/64 on 
payment services have affected STC’s in contracts between German banks and other creditors and 
consumers.
1263
 Moreover, other Directives that do not directly stipulate on the unfairness of contract 
terms may be relevant for assessing whether a term is fair or unfair, for example by guaranteeing an 
intellectual property right.
1264
 Moreover, other Directives
1265
 also contain blanket clauses referring to 
‘good faith’, although this does not mean that article 3 Directive 93/13 has to be interpreted 
consistently with these clauses.    
Other Directives may also be applicable for consumer contracts containing unfair terms: 
Directive 2000/31 on e-commerce, Directive 97/7 on distance contracts, to be replaced by Directive 
2011/83 on consumer rights, as well as timeshare contracts falling under Directive 2008/122 or credit 
contracts falling within the scope of Directive 2008/48 – or contracts may fall under all these Directives, 
if a timeshare contract linked with a credit agreement is entered into from a distance. Unfair terms may 
also constitute an unfair commercial practice under Directive 2005/29. Furthermore, Annex A to 
Directive 2003/55 also contains provisions on consumer contract law.  
 
The European legislator has established rules on private international law on the jurisdiction, 
applicable law and the execution of foreign decisions relating to STC’s in Regulation 44/2001 
(‘Brussels I’) and Regulation 593/2008 (‘Rome I’).  
For cases falling within the scope of Rome I, the competence to determine whether German or Dutch 
law on STC’s – or other law – is applicable has also been reallocated to the European level. For B2C 
                                               
1263
 See in more detail Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen/AGB-Recht/Fuchs, Specific STC’s, Banks, nr 1-2.  
1264
 OLG Stuttgart 3 November 2011, BeckRS 2012, 5352. 
1265
 Comp. for example article 3 par. 1 Directive  86/653 on self-employed commercial agents and article 3 par. 2 Directive 
2002/65 on distance contracts for financial services.  
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contracts, in addition to article 6 par. 2 Rome I, and similar to various Directives in the private law 
acquis, article 6 par. 2 Directive 93/13 stipulates that a choice of law may not deprive the consumer of 
the rights conferred upon him by the Directive.  
For cases falling within the scope of Brussels I, the competence to determine which judge will 
be competent to hear a dispute has been reallocated to the European level. The CJEU
1266
 has made 
clear that the validity of a clause making a choice of jurisdiction can only be evaluated by the 
standards of article 23 Brussels I. This means that article 23 Regulation precedes article 305 BGB, 
and articles 6:233 sub b and 6:234 BW for determining whether a clause indicating a choice of 
jurisdiction has been validly entered into and has become part of the contract, as well as the criteria in 
article 307 BGB and article 6:233 sub a BW on the fairness of these clauses. Yet in some cases, 
provisions in the private law acquis may precede questions of private international law; thus, in 
Oéano,
1267
 and subsequent case law,
1268
 Directive 93/13 stood in the way of jurisdiction clauses in 
B2C contracts, and in Ingmar/Eaton,
1269
 the applicability of Directive 86/653 preceded a valid choice of 
law.   
 
3) The UN has established the CISG. 
The CISG is applicable if parties have not opted out of it. If parties have made a choice for Dutch or 
German law, article 1 par. 1 sub b CISG entails that this does not exclude the applicability of the 
CISG.
1270
 The CISG may precede national law.
1271
 Articles 14-24 CISG have precedence over articles 




The CISG may coincide with Rome I. Should the question which law is applicable in 
international business to business (hereafter: ‘B2B’) contracts be decided under article 1 CISG or 
under Rome I? It has been argued that if both contract parties are settled in a contracting state, that 
have not made reservations under article 95 CISG, the CISG should in those cases determine the 
question of applicable law.
1273
 If that is not the case, the CISG can become applicable if private 
international law indicates the application of the law of a contracting state. Article 25 Rome I explicitly 
recognises the precedence of multilateral treaties concluded between Member States such as the 
CISG. Accordingly, questions of applicable law are decided under the CISG rather than Rome I. A 
choice for German or Dutch law may however not necessarily exclude the CISG, depending on the 
wording of the choice of law.  
If the CISG is applicable despite the choice for German or Dutch law, German or Dutch 
lawmay be applied to fill gaps.
1274
 In accordance with article 4 sub a CISG, the evaluation of STC’s in 
contracts applying the CISG is subjected to article 307 BGB and article 6:248 BW, although the 
evaluation has to take into account the standards established in the CISG. If the ineffectiveness of 




                                               
1266
 CJEU 16 March 1999 (Trasporti Castelletti Spedizioni Internazionali SpA v Hugo Trumpy SpA), C-159/97, [1999] ECR, p. I-
1597.  
1267
 CJEU 27 June 2000 (Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Quintero and others), Joined cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, [2000] ECR, p. 
I-4941. 
1268
 CJEU 4 June 2009 (Pannon GSM Zrt v Győrfi), C-243/08,  [2009] ECR p. I-4713.  
1269
 CJEU 9 November 2000 (Ingmar/Eaton), [2000] ECR p. I-9305. 
1270
 Ferrari/Kieninger/Mankowski et al/ Internationales Vertragsrecht/Saenger (2011) article 6 CISG, nr 4, who points out that if 
parties agree that the BGB is applicable, this entails that parties have opted out of the CISG. See for Dutch law Rb. Arhem 29 
July 2009, LJN BJ4645, Rb Zwolle 22 January 2003, LJN AF3345.  
1271
 In the German legal order, the CISG has been implemented into national law. Thus, the statute implementing the CISG sets 
aside other national laws. 
1272
 Ferrari/Kieninger/Mankowski et al/ Internationales Vertragsrecht/Saenger (2011) article 4 CISG nr 23. 
1273
 Ferrari/Kieninger/Mankowski et al/ Internationales Vertragsrecht/Saenger (2011) article 1 CISG nr 14, comp. for Dutch law 
also Hof 's-Hertogenbosch, 13 November 2007, RCR 2008, 18.   
1274
 Ferrari/Kieninger/Mankowski et al/ Internationales Vertragsrecht/Saenger (2011) article 6 CISG nr 4 notes that an explcit 
chocie for the BGB will generally exclude the CISG but a mere choice for German law will not necessarily lead to exclusion of 
the CISG as the CISG has been incorporated into German law.  
1275
 Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen/AGB-Recht/Schmidt (2011) annex to article 305, nr 10.  
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4) Other international organisations have also established treaties relevant for the law 
on STC’s. 
 
Contracts may also be concluded under other international regimes, especially in the area of 
transport.
1276
 Important regimes in this area include the CMR as well as the Montréal Convention, 
adopted by the EU through Regulation 889/2002. Also, treaties have been established for particular 
clauses, in particular the Benelux Convention on Penalty Clauses. The 2005 Hague Convention on 
choice of court clauses may become relevant once it enters into force.  
The CJEU
1277
 has held if the rights of third states are not involved, Member States may not 
rely on treaties to limit from the freedoms provided by the Treaty. Consequently, if European measures 
and treaties collide, the question should not be whether the treaty provides an exclusive regime, but 
whether the treaty provides sufficient predictability and does not limit cross-border trade. It is unclear 
how this should be determined. 
The CMR and the Montréal Convention may well overlap with European measures. The CMR 
may show overlap with Brussels I. The CJEU
1278
 has held that article 71 Brussels I may not entail that 
treaties falling within the scope of the Regulation may provide for less beneficial effects than provided 
for by the Regulation. Tthe rules in treaties may be applied if they provide a high degree of 
predictability, facilitate the administration of justice and limit the risk of parallel procedures.  
 
5) International non-state actors such as the ICC have developed alternative regulation 
that may reflect customary law or that may indicate well-established business 
practices. 
 
6) Non-state actors at the European level have developed alternative regulation. 
Alternative regulation has also been established by the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) 





7) Academic groups have developed soft laws that parties may choose to incorporate 
into their contracts.  
 
Thus, various actors have developed the law on STC’s. Although the national and the 
European legislator play an important role, actors at the international level may also play a 
role. 
 
9.3.2. Interdependence between actors  
In the law of STC’s, various instances of interdependence arise: 
 
1)  The competence of the national legislators to develop the law on STC’s in consumer 
contracts has been reallocated to the European level 
 
What does that mean for the development of the law on STC’s?  
 
                                               
1276
 See further Baumbach/Hopt/Handelsgesetzbuch/Hopt (2012) introduction before article 1, nr 27. 
1277
 CJEU 22 September 1988 (Ministère Punlic/Deserbais), case 286/86, [1988] ECR, p. 4907.  
1278
 CJEU 4 May 2010 (TNT/Axa Versicherung), C-533/08, [2010] ECR, p. I- 4107.  
1279
 UNCITRAL Report of the Secretary-General, 23 September 1966, Sixth Committee, doc.no. A/6396, par. 67,  referring to the 
ECE General Conditions of Sale and Standard Forms of Contract. 
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i) Both the German and Dutch legislator need to take into account the possible reform 
of Directive 93/13. They may participate in the drafting process of a new Directive, 
but it is possible that the Directive is reformed in a manner contrary to the 
preferences of both Member States.  
 
ii) In the reform of national law, national legislators need to take into account existing 
and new harmonisation initiatives.  
This means, for example, that national legislators may not establish that article 307 BGB or article 
6:233 sub a BW is not mandatory law – although such initiatives are highly unlikely. However, as 
Directive 93/13 aims for minimum harmonisation, national legislators remain competent to, for 
example, expand the black or grey lists of unfair clauses. This might de different if a future revised 
Directive aimed for maximum harmonisation and the European model list became binding. If the 
European legislator were to opt for a Regulation instead of a Directive, this may even draw the 
admissibility to maintain articles 305-310 BGB and articles 6:231-247 BW for consumer contracts into 
doubt.  
 
iii) National  legislators are less able to guarantee the accessibility of private law.  
Through codifications, the German and Dutch legislator increased accessibility as parties no longer 
had to look at various case law, mandatory provisions scattered over multiple laws and default rules 
in national law. Instead, parties could take the BGB or the BW as a starting point to determine which 
terms were acceptable or unacceptable. As the EU has developed separate laws containing specific 
provisions on STC’s, and as CJEU case law from the CJEU develops, this undermines accessibility.  
National legislators seeking to improve accessibility must therefore adopt a strategy to deal 
with the development of rules in specific European measures, for example by implementing the 
separate provisions on STC’s within articles 305-310 BGB or articles 6:231-247 BW. Moreover, state 
actors should be more active in promoting the need for the accessible development of private law at 
the European level. 
 
iv) National legislators are less able to guarantee the consistent development of the law 
through codifications. 
While codifications help to ensure the consistent development of the law, the European legislator 
does not take a similar perspective and has harmonised fragmented parts of the law. The 
inconsistencies visible in the private law acquis undermine the consistency of the law in codifications. 
 
v) National legislators are less able to guarantee the predictable development of private 
law as the extent to which codifications act as a ‘filter’ or a ‘brake’ for arbitrary 
development of fragmented areas that are politically popular decreases.1280  
While codifications form a framework for the predictable development of private law, the private law 
acquis does not know a similar barrier and develops as the European legislator considers this 
beneficial for the internal market. Although problems may not always arise in a logical, predictable 
manner, national actors could take a more active approach in indicating the need for a predictable 
development of the law. 
  
vi) The interpretation of blanket clauses by the CJEU in this area may in turn affect the 
interpretation of national blanket clauses.  
The interpretation of articles 307 BGB and 6:233 sub a BW, and the consistency of these articles with 
respectively articles 242 BGB and 6:2 and 6:248 BW may be affected. Directive 93/13 and other 
relevant Directives are developed by a legislator who is not necessarily aware of the 
Richtigkeitsgewähr or of the content of national default rules that may be relevant for determining 
                                               
1280
 Comp. M. Lieb, ‘Grundfragen einer Schuldrechtsreform’, AcP 1983, p. 347. 
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whether clauses are unfair. Wolf
1281
 has pointed out that judicial evaluation of STC’s should also take 
into account the incompatibility of some clauses with European law, including relevant measures such 
as Brussels I. Simultaneously, the German judiciary remains obliged to interpret article 307 BGB in 
accordance with the GG, even if such is not in accordance with European law.  
Moreover, the question which court is competent to interpret blanket clauses in the private law 
acquis is not clear. However, the CJEU generally is competent to interpret European law and it has 
decided on the allcation of competences. The division of competences depends on the aim of 
European measures, as well as the degree of harmonisation involved and the question whether it 
concerns a Directive or a Regulation. 
If a revised Directive aims for maximum harmonisation, it is not unlikely that articles 307 BGB 
and 6:233 sub a BW would have to be interpreted in accordance with article 3 Directive 93/13, which 
may entail a change in the interpretation of these articles, and which may lead to inconsistencies 
between articles 307 and 242 BGB and articles 6:233 sub a and 6:248 BW.  
It follows that the German and Dutch judiciary need to interact with the CJEU for the correct 
interpretation of Directive 93/13. This involves especially referring cases to the CJEU with regard to 
the interpretation of implemented law within the scope of the Directive. As the German and Dutch 
legislator have both chosen to expand the scope of the Directive in articles 305-310 BGB, the CJEU 
may assume competence for the interpretation of articles going beyond the scope of the Directive.
1282
  
Also, the German and Dutch judiciary arguably need to interact with foreign judges interpreting 
Directive 93/13 to ensure the harmonised interpretation of the private law acquis, especially if 
Directives pursue maximum harmonisation. However, this may not necessarily be in the interest of 
private parties, who may have little insight in these decisions, while foreign decisions may also be 
influenced by divergent default law.  
However, the reform of the Directive should be a reason to consider national experiences. The 
German use of article 242 and 307 BGB and the underlying doctrine of the Richtigkeitsgewähr may be 
interesting for the European legislator. If the courts take an active approach to the conform 
interpretation of implemented law, the relevance of studies that stubbornly cling to the national 
analysis of methods might decrease. This however does not seem to be the case – rather, the national 





vii) The European legislator needs the support of national state actors to pursue 
harmonisation. 
If national legislators do not support European initiatives, pursuing harmonisation will be problematic. 
Moreover, generally, the European legislator depends on national actors for the enforcement of 
Directive 93/13, implemented in respectively articles 305-310 BGB and articles 6:231-247 BW. 
Moreover, in the review of Directive 93/13, national experiences should be taken into account. 
 
2) The development of treaties and the development of cross-border trade entails that 
state actors should taken into account decisions and initiatives from foreign state 
actors.  
 
What does that mean for the development of the law on STC’s? 
 
i) The needs of international commerce and regulatory competition may induce German 
and Dutch state actors to take note of foreign and transnational developments.  
                                               
1281
 M. Wolf, ‘Vertragsfreiheit und Vertragsrecht im Lichte des AGB-Rechtsprechung des BGH’, in: FG 50 Jahre BGH, I, p. 123. 
1282
 ECJ 17 July 1997 (Bernd Giloy v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Ost), C-130/95, [1997] ERC, p. I-4291. 
1283
 Comp. below par. 10.3.1.3. 
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Studying foreign laws and decisions, as well as soft laws – such as the PECL, the UNIDROIT 




Regulatory competition need not necessarily take place through the reform of the law on 
STC’s, but also through the reform of the law on ADR as well as civil procedure law. National 
legislators however need to take into account existing harmonisation on the law on STC’s in their 
attempts to establish a set of rules that will make it more attractive for foreign and international parties 
to settle their disputes under German or Dutch law.  
Alternatively, regulatory competition may lead to a different approach to the interpretation of 
international contracts. Accordingly, in German law, it has been argued that instead of a ‘national’ 
interpretation, where default rules are used to fill gaps arising from the ineffectiveness of unfair STC’s, 





 has even argued that an international standard should be established to evaluate the fairness 
of STC’s used in international B2B contracts.  
 
ii) Judges increasingly need to take into account foreign decisions. 
As more contracts are concluded under international instruments, referring to foreign decisions may 
enhance predictability, if the relevance of foreign decisions is accepted. 
For contracts concluded under the CISG, judges should look at foreign decisions to ensure 
that the CISG is interpreted and applied consistently throughout contracting states. Article 7 par. 1 
CISG notes that it is to be interpreted uniformly. The consistent interpretation of the CISG also benefits 
predictability for private parties, especially if there are few decisions under the CISG in a particular 
contracting state. As a database provides parties with relevant decisions on the CISG, they may be 
better aware of relevant foreign decisions.  
Also, if the number of cross-border cases increases, national judges may increasingly be 
confronted with the need to interpret STC’s in accordance with applicable foreign law. Courts can 
become aware of foreign law through expert advice or through interaction with foreign courts. 
 
3) The need for interaction between state and non-state actors may increase as non-
state actors gain experience and expertise on complex cross-border contracts and 
STC’s used in those contracts. 
This may have the following consequences for the development of the law on STC’s:  
 
i) At the national level, the added value of alternative regulation has already been 
recognised.  
In the German legal order, state actors and non-state actors have cooperated in the drafting of STC’s 
for buidling contracts (Verdingungsordnung für Bauleistungen/B) that are partially exempted from 
judicial control in accordance with article 310 par. 1 BGB, if the VOB/B, the content of which may not 
have been altered by contract parties, are included in B2B contracts.
1287
 In the Dutch legal order, state 
actors have encouraged the development of collectively negotiated STC’s.  
 
ii) The expertise and the extent to which alternative regulation reflects business 
practices may also be a reason to turn to sources of alternative regulation in the 
interpretation and evaluation of STC’s.  
                                               
1284
 R. Zimmerman, The new German law of obligations, Historical and comparative perspectives, OUP: Oxford 2005, p. 77.    
1285
 Baumbach/Hopt/Handelsgesetzbuch/Hopt (2012) Incoterms introduction, nr 18. Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen/AGB-
Recht/Schmidt (2011) annex to article 305, nr 32 finds that international STC’s have to be interpreted in accordance with the 
views and practices in internaitonal trade, but rejects a principle of uniform interpretation of international STC’s.   
1286
 M. Wolf, ‘Auslegung und Inhaltskontrolle von AGB im internationalen kaufmännischen Verkehr’, ZHR 1989, p. 312-313. 
1287
 MunchKomm zum BGB/Wurmnest (2012) article 307 nr 143. See critically on the VOB/B Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen/AGB-
Recht/Christensen (2011) specific STC’s, building contracts, nr 3.  
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In the interpretation of international contracts and international STC’s, article 346 HGB provides that 
business practices should be taken into account. Accordingly, Blaurock
1288
 notes that despite efforts to 
harmonise private laws, international STC’s and model contracts, as well as customary law and 
business practices, continue to play a prominent role. Possibly, the rules established in these 
instruments may be more suitable for filling up gaps in the contract the use of default rules if gaps 
arise. Default rules may be less suitable in international cases and in cases where STC’s are part of 
complex contracts or particular types of contracts that the legislator has not provided specific rules for. 
In these cases, the contractual provisions as well as the provisions from actors specialised in drafting 
STC’s for international trade may be better suited to provide rules for cross-border contracts that are in 
accordance with the needs of legal practice. 
 
iii) As businesses practices are increasingly cross-border and become more complex, 
more European and international law may develop.  
If this is the case, the role of stakeholder organisations that provide their members with STC’s suitable 
for complex cross-border contracts may increase, especially as these organisations may gain 
experience and build considerable expertise in drafting model contracts and STC’s to the advantage 
of their members who may not have this expertise themselves.
1289
  
International organisations may for example also collect information about diverging 
interpretation of STC’s. Furthermore, especially if they have expertise of international trade that state 




Moreover, if courts have little experience in dealing with cross-border cases, or if parties 
parties may  opt for ADR. If contract parties increasingly rely on arbitration, this may make it more 
difficult for the European legislator to determine which divergences between private laws can pose a 
barrier for cross-border trade. In this view, the focus on divergent positive laws can thus be doubted.  
 
9.3.3. Conclusion on interdependence and the need for interaction 
Various actors have participated in the development of the law on STC´s, and 
interdependence has arisen. Therefore, interaction is necessary between the following actors: 
 
1) National and European state actors 
2) State actors and non-state actors 
3) State actors from different legal orders 
 
As interdependence develops, more interaction, in the form of deliberation, becomes 
necessary, and eventually, actors have to adjust the use of techniques.  
 
9.4. Conclusion and outlook 
The interdependence between actors means that actors in the development of the law on 
STC’s should take into account that other actors also develop private law, interact with these 
actors accordingly, and eventually adjust the use of techniques. If this is the case, this will 
benefit the extent to which techniques contribute to predictability, accessibility, consistency 
                                               
1288
 U. Blaurock, ‘Wirtschaft und Rechtsordnung’, U. Blaurock,  N. Goldschmidt, A. Hollerbach (eds.), Das selbstgeschaffene 
Recht der Wirtschaft. Zum Gedenken an Hans Groβmann-Doerth (1894-1944), Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen 2005, p. 70. 
1289
 For example the STC’s on auctions established by the Federal Association for  German Art Auctioneers, (‘Bundesverband 
deutschen Kunstversteigerer’), see further Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen/AGB-Recht/Schmidt (2011), specific STC’s, Auctions.  
1290
 For example, the Commercial Law and Practice Commission of the ICC claims to ‘[feed] business views into 
intergovernmental organizations as they shape policies that directly affect business operations’, see 
http://www.iccwbo.org/about-icc/policy-commissions/commercial-law-and-practice/ (accessed on 11 July 2012).  
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and responsiveness. Conversely, if this is not the case, the extent to which techniques 
contribute to these benchmarks is limited. 
Chapter 10 will ask whether the extent to which the German law on STC’s meets 
benchmarks of predictability, consistency, accessibility and responsiveness can be traced to 
actors’ recognition of other actors’ initiatives and the interaction between these actors. 
Chapter 11 will ask whether the extent to which the Dutch law on STC’s meets 
benchmarks of predictability, consistency, accessibility and responsiveness can be traced to 
actors’ recognition of other actors’ initiatives and the interaction between these actors. 
Chapter 12 will consider more general conclusions for the development of European 
private law through national techniques that can be deduced from the case studies. 
Some limitations have been set to the case study. The case study will focus on the 
use of national techniques discussed in chapter 7 and the additional and alternative 
techniques considered in chapter 8. Also, the case study will not seek to provide a 
comprehensive overview of the abundantly available case law, but rather consider relatively 
recent decisions in order to determine whether the judiciaries take into account the 
development of law by other actors than the national legislator. The case studies will both 
look at decisions in which initiatives from other actors are clearly taken into account, as well 
as decisions where the initiatives from other actors seem to have been ignored. 
Both the German and the Dutch case study will include the DCFR. However, the 
DCFR is not part of positive law that can currently be invoked before the courts. Therefore, 
the extent to which respectively German and Dutch law on STC’s is comprehensible to 
private parties cannot be found by studying the relevant provisions in the DCFR. Despite its 
lack of binding force, the DCFR may play an important role in the development of the private 
law acquis, particularly in the development of a Common European Sales Law and, as a 
‘toolbox’, possble, in the reform of the private law acquis. Accordingly, the DCFR will be 
studied as a technique in addition to the acquis and national laws. If actors, in the 
development of the DCFR, have adequately taken into account relevant initiatives from other 
actors, is it likely to contribute to the quality of the law on STC’s? Notably, studying the rules 
of the DCFR on unfair contract terms may make clear whether the DCFR, as an additional 
set of rules, provides a clear additional value, a question considered in chapter 7.  
Moreover, some differences between the German and Dutch legal order should be 
noted beforehand. In the German case study, BGH case law plays an important role, while 
the Dutch case study pays more attention to the decisions from lower courts and ADR 
decisions. The Dutch chapter considers lower courts’ decisions more extensively, because 
less case law from the Hoge Raad has developed, unlike the German legal order, where an 
abundant amount of BGH case law is available. In contrast, the Dutch chapter also pays 
attention to decisions in ADR cases. A similar system of ADR has not yet been established in 
Germany and decisions in German ADR cases have moreover rarely been published. In 
addition, European developments that have been considered in chapter 10, in particular the 
development of the DCFR and general principles, will be considered in less detail in chapter 
11, to prevent unneccessary repetition. 
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Chapter 10: The development of the law on Allgemeine 
Geschäftsbedingungen  
 
10.1. Introduction.  
This chapter will ask whether the extent to which the German law on STC’s meets 
benchmarks of predictability, consistency, accessibility and responsiveness can be traced to 
actors’ recognition of other actors’ initiatives and the interaction between these actors.
 Paragraph 10.2 will discuss the quality of the German law on STC’s. Subsequently, 
paragraph 10.3 will consider the use of codifications, and paragraph 10.4. will turn the use of 
blanket clauses. Paragraph 10.5. will address the development of the law on general 
principles. Paragraph 10.6. will draw some conclusions and paragraph 10.7. will turn to the 
use of additional or alternative techniques. Paragraph 10.8. will end with a conclusion. 
 
10.2. The law on Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen 
The German legislator initially stipulated the law on STC’s outside the BGB, through 
Sonderprivatrecht, in the Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen 
Geschäftsbedingungen (‘AGB-Gesetz’, hereafter: ‘AGBG’), established in 1976. The AGBG 
has been amended only slightly for the implementation of Directive 93/13, and it was 
incorporated in the BGB in the Schuldrechtsreform. The revision of the law on STC’s was not 
considered during the Schuldrechtsreform, which took place under considerable time 
pressure that decreased the chances that the law on STC’s would be critically reconsidered. 
The most controversial question seems to have been whether the AGBG should be 
incorporated in the BGB.1291 Thus, the AGBG, and later articles 305-310 BGB, have provided 
a stable framework for the development of the law on STC’s. 
Although unpredictability and inconsistency may be difficult to avoid with the 
introduction of more judicial control through blanket clauses, the extent to which this was the 
case was limited as preceding case law already evaluated STC’s.1292 The introduction of the 
AGBG also served to establish a more consistent standard for evaluating clauses as 
inconsistencies in case law became apparent. 1293 Since its introduction, the BGH has 
provided clear guidelines on the assessment of the fairness of clauses1294 that have made 
current article 307 BGB one of the most prominent blanket clauses in the BGB.1295 
Thus, the room left to the judiciary under the AGBG and later articles 305 et seq BGB 
has not resulted in unpredictability or inconsistency.1296 Ulmer1297 finds that the AGB-Gesetz 
has contributed significantly to the quality of STC’s and the transparency in trade. 
                                               
1291
 Comp. Pfeiffer, VuR 2001, p. 95, 99 who criticises the haste of the process, which he explains by pointing to the need to 
make use of political support for the reform of law while it lasted, and questions whether rushing the incorporation of an 
important subject such as AGB’s is convincing. 
1292
 BGH 27 November 1974, VIII ZR 9/73, NJW 1975, 163.   
1293
 H. Kötz, Welche gesetzgeberischen Massnahmen empfehlen sich zum Schutze des Endverbrauchers gegenüber 
Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen und Formularverträgen: dargestellt an Beispielen aus dem Kaufs- und Werkvertrags- sowie 
dem Maklerrecht, Gutachten für den 50. Deutschen Juristentag, Volume I, A, p. 52-53. 
1294
 M. Wolf, ‘Vertragsfreiheit und Vertragsrecht im Lichte der AGB-Rechtsprechung des BGH’, in: C.-W. Canaris, A. Heldrich, 
(eds.), 50 Jahre Bundesgerichtshof. Festgabe aus der Wissenschaft, I, Beck: München 2000, p. 113. 
1295
 MunchKomm zum BGB/Basedow (2012), introduction to articles 305 et seq BGB, nr 15. 
1296
 P. Ulmer, ‘Zehn Jahre AGB-Gesetz – Rückblick und Ausblick’, in: H. Heinrichs, W. Löwe, P. Ulmer (eds.), Zehn Jahre AGB-
Gesetz, Kommunikationsforum Recht: Köln 1987, p. 5. 
1297
 P. Ulmer, ‘Zehn Jahre AGB-Gesetz – Rückblick und Ausblick’, in: H. Heinrichs, W. Löwe, P. Ulmer (eds.), Zehn Jahre AGB-
Gesetz, Kommunikationsforum Recht: Köln 1987, p.17-18. 
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However, the regime has also been subjected to cricitism,1298 also visible in private 
initiatives for reform of the law. These initiatives do not concern the quality of the law in terms 
of predictability, consistency or accessibility. Instead, it is argued that the law hinders trade 
by subjecting clauses in business contracts to judicial evaluation1299 and because of the strict 
requirements of clauses that are argued to be individually negotiated.1300 
Thus, generally, the quality of the regime is considered high. Can this success be 
traced to the sufficient recognition of interdependence and corresponding interaction 
between relevant actors, or not?  
 
10.3.  The development of the law on STC’s through the BGB   
As the private law acquis develops, the extent to which the BGB can contribute to the 
predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsivenessof private law decreases. 
Therefore, interaction between German state actors and European state actors has become 
necessary. This paragraph asks whether German state actors have taken into account that 
the European legislator also develops private law, and have interacted with these actors 
accordingly, and how this has affected the predictability, consistency, accessibility and 
responsiveness of private law.    
Paragraph 10.3.1. will consider the choice of the legislator between the development 
of the law on STC’s through Sonderprivatrecht or through the BGB. Paragraph 10.3.2. will 
consider the implementation of Directive 93/13 by the German legislator and judiciary. 
Paragraph 10.3.3. will consider the German law on STC’s and international trade and 
paragraph 10.3.4. will end with a concusion.  
 
10.3.1. Codification or Sonderprivatrecht? 
This paragraph will ask whether the German legislator, in the development of the law on 
STC’s, have adequately taken into account that other actors also develop private law, which 
may inhibit the extent to which the BGB can contribute to benchmarks of predictability, 
accessibility, consistency and responsiveness. Has the German legislator adequately 
interacted with European actors and how this has affected the predictability, consistency, 
accessibility and responsiveness of the law on STC’s? 
Paragraph 10.3.1.1. will consider the initial choice for Sonderprivatrecht. Paragraph 
10.3.1.2. will turn to the 1980s initatives for the reform of the law of obligations. Paragraph 
10.3.1.3. will turn to the Schuldrechtsmodernierung and paragraph 10.3.1.4 will end with a 
conclusion.  
 
10.3.1.1. A national choice for Sonderprivatrecht 
Why did the German legislator initially opt for Sonderprivatrecht and did the German 
legislator sufficiently recognise interdependence between actors developing the law on 
STC’s?  
Importantly, when the AGBG was drafted, the role of the EU in the area was arguably 
much smaller than it is today. As competence had not yet been reallocated to the European 
                                               
1298
 Comp. prominently Staudinger Komm zum BGB/Schlosser (2006), Introduction to articles 305 et seq, nr 24, also K.P. Berger, 
‘Abschied von Privatautonomie im unternehmerischen Geschäftsverkehr?’, ZIP 2006, p. 2149. 
1299
 See further below par. 10.3.3.1.2. 
1300
 See for example E. Gottschalck, ‘Neues zur Abgrenzung zwischen AGB und Individualabrede’, NJW 2005, p. 2493. See on 
both points of criticism convincingly F. Graf von Westphalen, ’30 Jahre AGB-Recht – Eine Erfolgsbilanz’, ZIP 2007, p. 149. 
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level, or to a much smaller extent, there was less interdependence between actors, and thus, 
less need to develop a strategy to deal with the ongoing development of private law at a 
European level. However, generally, the added value of comparative research in the drafting 
of legislation had been recognised. Also, the use of codifications in a pluralistic modern 
industrial society had been criticised, as reaching consensus became more difficult while the 
legislator also needed to deal with social and economical issues, frequently through 
Sonderprivatrecht.1301 In the 1970s, the EU had published an outline for a Directive on unfair 
terms, in accordance with its pursuit to establish a consumer protection policy. 1302  This 
development did however not inhibit Germany to develop the laws in this area.1303 What were 
the reasons to develop the law on STC’s outside the BGB? 
 
1) As the AGBG pursued a ‘social’ aim, it did not belong in the BGB that took private 
autonomy and freedom of contract as a starting point.1304  
 
The drafting of the AGBG should be seen against the background of the 1971 statement of the 
Bundesregierung on establishing a consumer policy.
1305
 Accordingly, the first draft of the working 
group on the AGBG emphasised that the freedom of contract, which in normal cases effected a 
balance of contract parties’ rights and duties, was in reality used to the advantage of one contract 
party with a better bargaining position who drafted STC’s.
1306
 In particular, the proposal emphasised 
that a retreat of the legislator from the law on STC’s, also characterised as the self-created law of 
trade (‘selbstgeschaffenes Recht der Wirtschaft’) was irreconcilable with the the constitutional task of 
the legislator to establish a social state, and the proposal accordingly sought to establish a ‘social’ 
contract law.
1307
 This emphasis was not in accordance with the general principles of contractual 
freedom of the BGB. Accordingly, article 24 AGBG stipulated that although some of its provisions were 
not applicable in cases where STC’s were used against businesses or legal persons under public law, 
some provisions   – including the blanket clause in article 9 AGBG – were applicable.  
In its advice before Parliament, the committee argued that the AGBG is necessary to protect 
consumers from the one-sided drafting of STC’s by sellers, to their detriment. Although the scope of 
the AGBG is not limited to business to consumer contracts, the committee notes that in the long term, 
protection of businesses is to the benefit of consumers as well, as the extra costs caused by unfair 
STC’s are likely at least partially passed on to consumers.
1308
 This raises the question whether other 
consumer protection laws should not also be extended to contracts between businesses. 
The choice for Sonderprivatrecht because of the social character of the AGBG may be 
criticised on the following grounds: 
 
i) The AGBG did not exclusively aim to increase consumer protection, but was extended 
to protect businesses subjected to STC’s as well. Should the AGBG therefore not 
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 J. Esser,’Gesetzesrationalität im Kodifikationszeitalter und heute’, in: H.-J. Vogel, J. Esser, Recht und Staat im Geschichte 
und Gegenwart, 100 Jahre oberste deutsche Justizbehörde, Morh Siebeck: Tübingen 1977, p. 13 et seq, comp. also F. 
Wieacker, ‘Aufstieg, Blüte und Krisis der Kodifikationsidee’, in: Festschrift für Gustav Boehmer, Roerscheid: Bonn 1954, p. 48-
49.  
1302
 Comp. the Preliminary programm of the European Economic Community for a consumer protection and information policy, 
OJ C 92/2, 25.4.1975. 
1303
 See for a comparative overview HKK/Hofer (200?), articles 305-310, nr 30.  
1304
 Comp. N. Reich, ‘Zivilrechtstheorie, Sozialwissenschaften und Verbraucherschutz’, ZRP 1974, p. 187.   
1305
 Arbeitsgruppe zur Verbesserung des Verbraucherschutzes gegenüber Allgemeine Geschäftsbedinungen, Vorschläge zur 
Verbesserung des Schutzes der Verbraucher gegenüber Allgemeine Geschäftsbedinungen, Erster Teilbericht, Referat für 
Presse und Öffentlichkeit: Bonn 1974, p. 18-20.  
1306
 Erster Teilbericht, p. 13.  
1307
 Erster Teilbericht, p. 35. 
1308
 Bericht des Rechtsausschusses, 23 June 1976, Drucksache 7/5422, p.1, 4, available at 
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/07/054/0705422.pdf.  
1309
 U. Preis, ‘Persönlicher Anwendungsbereich der Sonderprivatrechte’, ZHR 1994, p. 603. 
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ii) The BGB is, as such, not completely unfamiliar with the protection of a contract party 
who is in a less advantageous bargaining position than its contract party. Despite the 
focus of the BGB on private autonomy, the BGB did, before the incorporation of the 




Notwithstanding these objections, the distinction between ‘general’ private law and Sonderprivatrecht 




2) The initial choice to develop rules outside the BGB was in accordance with the 
choice to develop Sonderprivatrecht outside of the BGB to safeguard the stable 
development of the BGB as well as the flexibility of laws outside the BGB. 
Accordingly, the committe recognised the possibility that the AGBG would need to 
be amended.1312   
 
3) The inclusion of provisions on civil procedure law also indicated the development 
of Sonderprivatrecht in the AGBG.  
 
4) Also, if the AGBGwould have been incorporated in the BGB, this would have been 
part of a more general reform of the law of obligations, which would probably have 
postponed the introduction of the AGBG. The drafting of the AGBG did give rise to 
arguments for reform. 
 
These arguments for Sonderprivatrecht are not based on foreign experiences or European 
initiatives. 1313  Although the first draft pointed to comparative research on the judicial 
evaluation of STC’s,1314 the draft proposal focussed on a national level and did not mention 
the debate that had also started at a European level, and it does not evaluate foreign 
solutions. Consequently, the choice to establish separate legislation cannot really be seen as 
an argument against the incorporation of the private law acquis into the BGB.  
 However, the reasons to develop Sonderprivatrecht rather than incorporate the 
acquis into the BGB should be considered in the implementation of the acquis. Are these 
arguments still considered or are there reasons for the German legislator to change its 
approach as Sonderprivatrecht, both at the national and the European level, continues to 
develop? 
 
10.3.1.2. Comparative law and the continued existence of Sonderprivatrecht 
The development of Sonderprivatrecht alongside the BGB, especially the AGBG, gave rise to 
the question whether this was a desirable development, whether these subjects should really 
be stipulated outside the BGB, or whether the BGB should be reformed.1315 Consequently, 
only a few years after the AGBG was established, initiatives to reform the BGB were 
                                               
1310
 Comp. M. Lieb, ‘Sonderprivatrecht für Ungleichgewichtslagen?’, AcP 1978, p. 197 who has argued that the AGBG only 
partially codified the law on the judicial evaluation of contracts on the basis of article 242 BGB, which went beyond the 
evaluation of STC’s. 
1311
 J. Stürner, ‘Der hundertste Geburtstag des BGB – nationale Kodifikation im Greisenalter?’, JZ 1996, p. 742. 
1312
 Bericht des Rechtsausschusses 1976, p. 1, 4 .  
1313
 See critically W. Tilman, ‘Das AGB-Gesetz und die Einheit des Privatrechts’, ZHR 1978, p. 54, who argues that in the 
drafting of the AGBG, too little attention was paid to alternative possibilities, in particular the alternative to include the AGBG in 
the BGB. 
1314
 See for an overview H.E. Brandner, ‘Wege und Zielvorstellungen auf dem Gebiet der Allgemeinen Geschäftbedingungen’, 
JZ 1973, p. 613.  
1315
 See further A. Wolf, ´Die Ueberarbeitung des Schuldrechts´, AcP 1982, p. 80 et seq. 
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developed. The government, preceding legislative activities, organised the drafting of 
preliminary reports (‘Vorschläge und Gutachten’).’1316 
A separate report on comparative law should enable the German legislator to benefit 
from experiences in other legal orders on the inclusion of separate laws into a 
codification.1317  
This preliminary report on comparative law 1318  concluded that in prominent legal 
orders – especially with similar codifications, in Switzerland and The Netherlands – the 
development of separate legislation alongside codifications had been regarded with 
suspicion,  while other legal orders – especially France – had chosen for separate legislation. 
The reasoning for incorporation or Sonderprivatrecht differed. While Italy and The 
Netherlands, at the time, had both already chosen to incorporate the law on STC’s into the 
codification, this was more difficult for legal orders with older codifications such as France, 
that had chosen for separate legislation. Austria opted for a middle road by establishing a 
separate law for consumer protection (‘Konsumentenschutzgesetz’), which was however 
criticised as having little relevance for German law. The comparative law report payed limited 
attention to Member States – such as the United Kingdom and Sweden – that used 
techniques that differed too much from German experiences.1319 Thus, the experience in 
these legal orders with the coexistence of separate laws without a codification was not an 
object of inspiration, even though the experience with the development of particular 
legislation was a reason to include these states in the comparative law report.1320 
However, the report merely lists the strategies adopted in other legal orders without 
specifically arguing for a course of action. The other reports were also not unequivocal. 
Interestingly, Westermann,1321 noted that the Konsumentenschutzgesetz could serve as a 
source of inspiration for the legal order as it provided an alternative between 
Sonderprivatrecht and incorporation. However, he considered the development of a separate 
code for consumer contracts unattractive as it could give rise to demarcation difficulties.  
The assignment to the commission on the reform of the law of obligations aimed at 
revising parts of the law of obligations and prescription that were in need of reform,1322 
especially against the background of initiatives for harmonisation in this area and 
comparative research.1323 Even though the development of consumer protection legislation 
alongside the BGB prompted the legislator to consider revision, 1324  and the inclusion of 
Sondergesetze into the BGB had been subject to debate, 1325  the revision aimed to 
incorporate the experiences of legal practice since the establishment of the BGB, thereby 
maintaining the methodology and the principles underlying the BGB. Drafts for Directives in 
the area of revision were not a reason to postpone the revision.1326 
                                               
1316
 Bundesminister der Justiz, ‘Einleitung’, in: Bundesminister der Justiz (ed.), Vorschläge und Gutachten zur Ȕberarbeitung 
des Schuldrecht, Vol. I, Bundesanzeiger: Köln 1981, p. XI. 
1317
 Bundesminister der Justiz, in: Vorschläge und Gutachten zur Ueberarbeitung des Schuldrecht, Vol. I, p. XI. H.-G. 
Landfernmann, ‘Überarbeitung des deutschen Schuldrechts’, RabelsZ 1981, p. 127 also notes that comparative law may give 
insight in the strategies adopted by other states in the development of private law within or outside the civil code. 
1318
 Max Planck Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, ‘Rechtsvergleichung’, in: Bundesminister der Justiz 
(ed.), Vorschläge und Gutachten zur Ȕberarbeitung des Schuldrecht, Vol. I, Bundesanzeiger: Köln 1981, p. 67-68.   
1319
 Max Planck Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht  1981, p. 68. 
1320
 Max Planck Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht  1981, p. 9. 
1321
 H.P. Westermann, ‘Verbraucherschutz’, in: Bundesminister der Justiz (ed.), Gutachten und Vorschläge zur Ȕberarbeitung 
des  Schuldrechts, Vol. III, Bundesanzeiger: Köln 1983, p. 74 et seq. 
1322
 H.A. Engelhard, ‘Zu den Aufgaben einer Kommission für die Überarbeitung des Schuldrechts’, NJW 1984, p. 1201.  
1323
 R. Stürner, ‘Empfiehlt sich die von der Schuldrechtskommission vorgeschlagene Neuregelung des allgemeinen 
Leistungsstörungsrechts, der Mängelhaftung bei Kauf– und Werkvertrag und des Rechts der Verjährung? - Versuch einer 
Themenpräsentation’, NJW-Beil 1994, p. 2. 
1324
 A. Wolf, ‘Überarbeitung des Schuldrechts’’, AcP 1982, p. 80.  
1325
 Comp. the discussion sketched in R. Damm, ‘Verbraucherrechtliche Sondergesetzgebung und Privatrechtssystem’, JZ 1978, 
p. 175-176. 
1326
 A. Wolf, ´Die Ueberarbeitung des Schuldrechts´, AcP 1982, p. 87.   
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According to Ulmer1327  incorporating the AGBG into the BGB was not subject to 
debate, while it was also not in need of revision. Dörner1328 notes that the development of 
Sonderprivatrecht avoided amendments of the BGB. Consequently, the 1992 proposal for 
the Schuldrechtsreform aimed to preserve the AGBG, and limit the amendments to this law 
to amendments that had become necessary by the Schuldrechtsreform.1329 However, after 
the 1994 Deutscher Juristentag, despite a positive reception, the draft designed by the 
committee to revise the BGB did not result in the reform of the BGB until 2000, when the 
draft for the Schuldrechtmodernisierungsgesetz was published.1330 
It may be concluded that the incorporation of the AGBG was not a subject of thorough 
discussion, during the drafting of both the AGBG and the 1981 initative for a 
Schuldrechtsreform, despite comparative research on this point and the comparative 
preliminary report. The choice to maintain the development of Sonderprivatrecht was not 
based on foreign experiences. The German legislator also did not anticipate the ongoing 
development of the private law acquis and did not reconsider its reasoning for codification or 
postpone the revision of the law of obligations in the light of draft Directives.  
 
10.3.1.3. The Schuldrechtsreform and the choice for incorporation  
Whereas interdependence had hardly developed during the drafting of the AGBG and the 
1981 and 1983 preliminary reports, at the time of the Schuldrechtsmodernisierung, 
interdependence had developed as a considerable part of the private law acquis had 
developed. The development of the Directive on consumer sales prompted the German 
legislator to reform the law of obligations and in contrast to the 1992 draft, the discussion 
draft in 2000 incorporated large parts of the AGBG in the BGB, which however did not entail 
drastic changes to the AGBG as such.1331 Did the German legislator recognise that these 
developments could inhibit the extent to which the BGB may ensure the predictability, 
accessibility and consistency of law?  
In the discussion draft, various reasons for incorporation of the AGBG into the BGB 
are considered: 
 
1) The codification principle, according to which private law should be contained within a 
uniform, theoretically and dogmatically sound code that shows no gaps. In turn, this 
furthers the accessibility 1332 and coherence1333 of private law.1334 As the law on STC’s 
concerns a central area of contract law, the development of Sonderprivatrecht would 
                                               
1327
 P. Ulmer, ‘Zehn Jahre AGB-Gesetz – Rückblick und Ausblick’, in:  H. Heinrichts, W. Löwe, P. Ulmer (eds.), Zehn Jahre 
AGB-Gesetz, Verlag Kommunikationsform: Köln 1987, p. 6, 16.   
1328
 H. Dörner, ‘Die Integration des Verbraucherrechts in das BGB’, in: R. Schulze, H. Schulte-Nölke (eds.), Die 
Schuldrechtsreform vor dem Hintergruind des Gemeinschaftsrechts, Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen 2001, p. 178. 
1329
 Abschlussbericht der Kommission zur Ueberarbeitung des Schuldrechts, 1992, p. 278 et seq. Comp. however critically W. 
Ernst, ‘Zum Kommissionsentwurf für eine Schuldrechtsreform’, NJW 1994, p. 2179 who finds that the draft does not sufficiently 
take into account consumer protection law, including the AGBG. 
1330
 See further R. Zimmerman, ‘Schuldrechtsreform?’, in W. Ernst, R. Zimmerman (eds.), Zivilrechtswissenschaft und 
Schuldrechtsreform, Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen 2001, p. 15-16. 
1331
 However, some changes in the evaluaiton of STC’s may be visible. These changes may be attributed to the more general 
reform of the law of obligations and prescription, as this may affect the fairness of STC’s as default law is taken as a starting 
point to assess the fairness of therse terms under article 306 BGB.  
1332
See especially J. Schmidt-Räntsch, ‘Reintegration der Verbraucherschutzgesetze durch den Entwurf eines 
Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetzes’, in: R. Schulze, H. Schulte-Nölke (eds.), Die Schuldrechtsreform vor dem Hintergrund 
des Gemeinschaftsrechts, 2001, p. 169 
1333
 See for example Pfeiffer & Schinkels 2001, p. 140. 
1334
 BGB-Diskussionentwurf, available at http://www.dnoti.de/DOC/2001/eschurmo.pdf, p. 164.    
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moreover undermine the central role of the BGB, while incorporation helps to ensure 
the central role of the BGB.1335  
   
2) The close relation between the BGB and the law on STC’s.  
Notably, the incorporation of the AGBG in the BGB therefore also beneficts consistency. Graf von 
Westphalen
1336
 points to the clearer relation between articles 305-310 and more general contract law 
provisions in the BGB. Laws less intertwined with the BGB, in particular the law on product liability, 
remained outside the BGB.
1337
 Importantly, this reasoning does not imply incorporation of all 
Sonderprivatrechte into the BGB.
1338
 Insofar as separate laws have developed that should not be 
considered a part of ‘general’ private law, the development of private law alongside the codification 
would in this view still be possible – and desirable.  
This reasoning can be contrasted with the restoration the codification principle – or at least, 
this reasoning raises the question what the codification principle entails.  
This reasoning implies a change from the previous approach of the German legislator, 
because the close relation between the AGBG and the BGB was previously not considered a reason 
for integration.
1339
 The AGBG was already considered closely intertwined with the BGB. Not only had 
the AGBG developed on the basis of article 242 BGB, it took default law in the BGB as a starting point 
to decide which contractual provisions could be considered fair, and requirements for the inclusion of 
STC’s were in accordance with principles underlying contractual rules for the conclusion of 
contacts.
1340
 Before the AGBG was included in the BGB, the close relation between the BGB and the 
AGBG was clearly indicated, and problems of inconsistency do not seem to have arisen. Arguably, this 
lack of problems may draw into doubt the necessity of inclusion.
1341
 Why, therefore, is the close 
relation later an important argument for incorporation?  
 
3) The predictable development was less convincing as a reason against incorporation. 
In 2000, the AGBG had proven itself stable enough that incorporation would not subsequently render 
the BGB vulnerable to regular amendments, which would undermine the predictable development of 
the law on STC’s. 
 
► Did the German legislator adequately recognise interdependence in its reasoning? 
Various instances of interdependence have been overlooked:  
 
i) Developing a coherent system is not as feasible as originally envisaged, because 
private law is also developed by the European legislator, who pursues aims that may 
well differ from the aims pursued by the German legislator.  
 
ii) The extent to which the German legislator is able to maintain a dogmatically sound 
system may diminish as the private law acquis develops.  
Articles 305-310 BGB have been criticised for this reason. If the system established by the BGB was 





 moreover argue that implementing the AGBG in the general part of the BGB 
                                               
1335
 Schmidt-Räntsch 2001, p. 171. 
1336
 F. Graf von Westphalen, ‘AGB-Recht ins BGB - Eine erste "Bestandsaufnahme”’, NJW  2002, p. 18-19, who also states that 
this change will increase the relevance of case law.  
1337
 Critically A. Staudinger, ‘Zur Novellierung des Produkthaftungsgesetzes’, NJW 2001, p. 275. 
1338
 M. Lieb, ‘Grundfragen einer Schuldrechtsreform’, AcP 1983, p. 331 rightly notes that this principle does not require gathering 
as many subjects as possible in one codification; rather, if a subject shows close interrelation with the subjects arranged in the 
BGB, this is a reason for inclusion Interestingly, however, Lieb also notes that the historical development of for example a 
subject in the HGB may also be an argument against inclusion. 
1339
 P. Ulmer, ‘Das AGB-Gesetz: Ein eigenständiges Kodifikationswerk’, JZ 2001, p. 492. 
1340
 Th. Pfeiffer, B. Schinkels 2001, p. 139.   
1341
 Th. Pfeiffer, in: Zivilrechtswissenschaft und Schuldrechtsreform, p. 501, also Lieb 1983, p. 331. 
1342
 Interestingly, this approach would be in accordance with the solution in the PECL and the UNIDROIT principles. 
1343
 Pfeiffer & Schinkels 2001, p. 146. 
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would facilitate the protective aim of these provisions, in accordance with Directive 93/13. Notably, 
placing the provisions on STC’s within the law of obligations may imply that outside the law of 
obligations, in binding one-sided juridical acts or juridical acts stipulated outside the BGB, is not 
applicable. Article 310 par. 4 BGB, which provides that for employment contracts, specific 
characteristics of employment law should be taken into account, Artiicle 310 par. 4 BGB exempts 
contracts under company law, and contracts in the area of family law and succession. This provision 




Yet implementation that follows the system established by the BGB means scattering the 
provisions implementing the Directive over the BGB: provisions on the fairness of contract terms would 
be implemented near article 242 BGB, provisions on ineffectiveness would be implemented near 
article 138 BGB, and provisions on the contra legem interpretation and the requirement of 
transparency would be situated in yet another place in the BGB. This strategy would result in multiple 
European islands within the codification, and would not meet requirements of clarity on the 
implementation of Directives that confer rights on consumers; it is not likely that such implementation 
would make consumers sufficiently aware of their rights.  
However, the approach to implement Directives in a group of provisions, rather than in 
separate provisions, may in turn be undermined as Directives also affecting the law on STC’s develop. 
Thus, the proposal for the implementation of Directive 2011/7
1345
 makes clear that article 7 is not 
implemented in articles 305-310 BGB. 
 
iii) The German legislator is less able to independently maintain the central role of the 
BGB, as this also depends on the development of the private law acquis and the case 
law of the CJEU.1346  
Particularly, the development of Regulations and the development of Directives that should be 
implemented as Sonderprivatrecht may undermine the central role of the BGB. 
 
iv) Despite the emphasis on the codifciation principle and the distinction between general 
private law and Sonderprivatrecht, the question whether Directives are 
Sonderprivatrecht has not been debated, nor have the reasons to keep 
Sonderprivatrecht out of the BGB expressly been considered in the implementation of 
the acquis. It follows that the distinction therefore does not currently provide a sound 
basis for a predictable approach to the implementation of the private law acquis. 
 
v) Arguably, in its reasoning under (2), the German legislator has overlooked that there 
is no close relation between the provisions in Directives and general private law. 
Instead, Directives typically seek to advance the internal market.  
 
vi) The reasoning in (3) overlooks that articles 305-310 BGB also implement Directive 
93/13, and the question whether the predictable development of the BGB is 
sufficiently guaranteed also depends on the further development of the acquis, in 
particular the future reform of this Directive, and the interpretation of the Directive by 
the CJEU. 
 
                                               
1344
  See critically Grabitz/Hilf/Das Recht der Europäische Union/Pfeiffer (2009), article 1 nr 17-19. 
1345
 BT-Drucks. 17/10491. 
1346
 Th. Pfeiffer, ‘Die Integration von “Nebengesetzen”in das BGB’, in: W. Ernst. R. Zimmerman (eds.), Zivilrechtswissenschaft 
und Schuldrechtsreform, Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen 2001, p. 485-486. 
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►Thus, the arguments for incorporation in the Schuldrechtsreform have overlooked that as 
the private law acquis develops, the capability of the BGB to contribute to the accessibility, 
consistency and responsiveness of private law becomes subject to more limitations.  
Arguably, reasons for developing Sonderprivatrecht offer an interesting starting point 
for discussions on the implementation of the acquis that may provide a starting point for a 
more predictable and consistent implementation of the acquis. However, predictability and 
consistency also depend on the extent to which the acquis develops predictablly and 
consistently.  
 
10.3.1.4. Conclusion on the choice for codification 
The German legislator did not consider the role of European actors in safeguarding the 
development of the law on STC’s in a predictable, consistent, accessible and responsive 
manner. It follows that interaction between German, European and foreign actors, insofar 
present, has not served to adjust the use of codification. Perhaps, the careful drafting 
process of the AGBG and its success have contributed to this oversight.  
However, it does not become apparent that this lack of attention for interdependence 
German legislator also undermines the predictability, consistency, and the accessibility of 
private law. To the contrary, the AGBG, and later articles 305-310 BGB have been 
considered as a success story. The law on STC’s as such is not in need of revision.  
However, as the private law acquis continues to develop, the extent to which the BGB 
contributes to predictability, accessibility and consistency diminishes further. Regrettably, 
also, a more general strategy for coping with the ongoing development on the law of STC’s 
by the European legislator and in different areas of law has not been generally considered, 
despite interesting starting points in the distinction between general private law and 
Sonderprivatrecht.  
 
10.3.2. The existence of well-developed legislation and harmonisation  
The approach of German actors towards harmonisation is twofold: in the drafting of Directive 
93/13, German actors have actively interacted with European actors, which has benefitted 
the consistent and predictable development of the law. In contrast, in the implementation of 
the Directive, German actors have not adequately interacted with European actors. In the 
short term this may benefit predictability, consistency and responsiveness, but the lack of 
interaction may inhibit the predictable, consistent and responsive development of the acquis 
in the long term.  
 Paragraph 10.3.2.1. will consider the development of the Directive 93/13 and 
paragraph 10.3.2.2. will turn to the subsequent approach of the legislator to the 
implementation of this Directive. Paragraph 10.3.2.3. will turn to the application of the 
Directive by the courts and paragraph 10.3.2.4. will discuss the attempted reform of the 
Directive. Paragraph 10.3.2.5. will end with a conclusion.  
 
10.3.2.1. The debate in the development of the Directive 
The drafting of Directive 93/13 was preceded by extensive comparative research as well as 
the 1975 resolution from the European Council1347 and the European Parliament issued a 
                                               
1347
 OJ No C 92, 25.4.1975.  
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consultation in 1984.1348 Eventually, this led to the 1990 proposal for a Directive on unfair 
terms in consumer contracts.1349 The proposal was accompanied by a ‘competiveness and 
employment statement’, in the Annex. The Annex makes clear that objections to the 
harmonisation of the law were not decisive and the European legislator was optimistic about 
the effects of the draft Directive.1350  
The consultation in the German legal order was held after Directive 93/13 had been 
established, but this did not prevent German experts to take a position on the 1990 draft for a 
Directive, 1351  nor did it stop the federal government from rejecting the 1990 draft. The 
decision of the Bundesrat1352 mainly seems to take German law, as well as the position of 
German businesses, as a starting point, especially arguing for a European regime that is 
more in accordance with the German law. German academia did not pay much attention to 
the European initiative, especially not compared to the drafting of the AGBG.   
German law was one of the first and one of the best developed laws on STC’s in the 
Union, and the European legislator therefore took note of German insights. The 1990 draft 
for a Directive was amended, largely in accordance with German criticism. Thus, the late 
consultation on Directive 93/13 may not have contributed to the debate at the European level, 
but it did not hinder the German legislator and German experts from participating in the 
European discussion. However, the comments on the draft Directive were hardly based on 
comparative research, which was available in abundance.1353  
Thus, debate preceding the drafting of the Directive was limited, it but did not limit the 
discussion to such an extent that the German legislator and academics did not contribute to 
the discussion in the drafting process on the Directive, which benefitted the stable and 
consistent development of the German law on STC’s, which in turn is beneficial for legal 
practice.  
 
10.3.2.2. The implementation of the Directive  
After the Directive had been established, two models for implementation were considered: on 
the one hand, amendments of the AGBG, and on the other hand, new legislation alongside 
the AGBG and the BGB. The expert draft (‘Referententwurf’)1354 did not refer to comparative 
law, and assumed that the Directive already largely resembled the AGBG, arguing that the 
law should be amended as little as possible. This draft was subsequently criticised on 
various points. The draft implementation law (‘Regierungsentwurf’) partially took into account 
the criticism on the expert draft.  
 
Accordingly, the definition of STC’s as terms that are drafted for multiple contracts in the BGB has 
been adapted to the definition in the Directive which does not require multiple contracts, under article 
310 par. 3 sub 2 BGB which stipulates that terms in contracts with consumers will also be considered 
STC’s if they have been drafted for one contract.  
 
                                               
1348
 Supplement 1/84, Bulletin of the European Communities..  
1349
 COM (90) 322 final.  
1350
 Comp. the answer to the question ‘Have both sides of industry been consulted?’: ‘Yes their initial reaction was antagonistic. 
However, they do not perceive the true significance for them of the proposal. It will not harm their interests; just as the extensive 
legislation which already exists in 9 of the 12 Member States has not proved prejudicial to small- and medium sized businesses.’ 
1351
 Among others, see especially the criticism of Brandner & Ulmer BB 1991, p. 701. 
1352
 Decision of the Bundesrat 1 March 1991, BR-Drucks. 611/90 , as well as the recommendation of the committees of 1 March 
1991, BR-Drucks. 611/90.  
1353
 See the overview from H.E. Brandner, ‘Wege und Zielvorstellungen auf dem Gebiet der Allgemeinen Geschäftbedingungen’, 
JZ 1973, p. 613 and the preliminary report on comparative law discussed in par. 10.3.1.2. 
1354
 Referententwurf, BB 1995, p. 110. 
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Also, after the Directive had been established, attention was paid to the duties of Member 
States to implement the Directive. For example, Heinrichs 1355  extensively discusses the 
duties to implement the Directive under European law and argues that parts of the Directive 
can be implemented through the interpretation of national law in accordance with the 
Directive, an argument that has later been superseded by the CJEU decision in 
Commission/The Netherlands.  
However, other, more critical comments, were not followed. In particular, the criticism 
from Schmidt-Salzer,1356 is convincing in the light of later BGH case law on the Directive.1357 
Schmidt-Salzer pointed out that the approach to maintain the AGBG as much as possible, 
increased the risk that the underlying changes would be insufficiently clear. Schmidt-
Salzer1358 also pointed out that from the view of foreign observers, differences between the 
AGBG and the Directive are apparent, making the assumption that the AGBG and the 
Directive are already largely in conformity less convincing towards other Member States and 
the EU. The insights of foreign actors could therefore have prompted a more critical 
approach to the AGBG and led to a more critical evaluation whether the AGBG was in 
accordance with Directive 93/13. 
 
Possible differences include article 9 AGBG, currently article 307 BGB, which stipulates that STC’s 
can also be unfair if it is not clearly worded, while article 5 Directive merely stipulates that STC’s in 
writing must be drafted plainly, and ambiguous terms will be interpreted contra preferentem. In 
addition, the Directive does not provide a specific rule on surprising clauses similar to article 305c par. 
1 BGB. Basedow
1359
 notes that the BGB is more precise than the Directive. In particular, the question 
arises whether the further indication in article 307 par. 2 BGB in which cases a term can be unfair, is in 
conformity with the autonomous interpretation established by the Directive, especially article 4 
Directive that the unfairness of a term shall be assessed taking into account the nature of the goods or 
services on which parties contracted, and by referring at all relevant circumstances at the time of 
conclusion of the contract as well as the other terms of the contract.
1360
 Article 307 par. 2 BGB might 
become especially problematic if the CJEU chooses to determine whether clauses are unfair by noting, 
for example, whether they diverge from the default rules in the DCFR, which may well contradict the 
referral to national default law.
1361
 There is however no indication that the CJEU will adopt such an 
approach. Arguably, the divergences between article 307 par. 2 BGB and article 4 Directive is not 
problematic as the Directive aims for minimum harmonisation. Accordingly, despite the divergence in 
the wording of the Directive and the AGBG – and currently article 307 BGB – the legislator assumed 
that the BGB was in accordance with the Directive and would be interpreted in conformity with the 
Directive.
1362
 Furthermore, it has been argued that the Directive may be indirectly applied for contracts 
between public bodies and consumers, as article 1 Directive speaks of contracts between suppliers 
and sellers and consumers, which, under article 2 par. 3 Directive are defined as either publicly or 
                                               
1355
 H. Heinrichs, ‘Umsetzung der EG-Richtlinie über mißbräuchliche Klauseln in Verbraucherverträgen durch Auslegung 
Erweiterung des Anwendungsbereichs der Inhaltskontrolle’, NJW1995, p. 153 
1356
 J. Schmidt-Salzer, ‘Transformation der EG-Richtlinie über miβbräuchliche Klauseln in Verbraucherverträgen in deutsches 
Recht und AGB-Gesetz’, BB 1995, p.735. 
1357
 See further below par. 10.3.2.3. and 10.4.1.2. Schmidt-Salzer, BB 1995, p. 736-737 moreover notes that the interpretation of 
STC’s also differed from the interpretation foreseen in the Directive.  
1358
 Schmidt-Salzer, BB 1995, p. 739. 
1359
 MunchKomm zum BGB/Basedow (2012),  introduction to articles 305-310, nr 24. 
1360
 Somewhat confusingly, Grabitz/Hilf/Das Recht der Europäische Union/Pfeiffer (2009), article 4 nr 2 notes that article 4 par. 1 
is not intended as a realisation of article 3 but rather as noting which objects are subject to interpretation. J. Schmidt-Salzer, 
‘Transformation der EG-Richtlinie über miβbräuchliche Klauseln in Verbraucherverträgen in deutsches Recht und AGB-Gesetz’, 
BB 1995, p. 734 notes that referral to all circumstances during the time of contracting differed radically from case law and 
literature on the judicial evaluation and the interpretation of AGB’s on the objective (‘generallen’) control and interpretation.   
1361
 See further E.M. Kieninger, ‘Vollharmonisierung des Rechts der AGB’, RabelsZ 2009, p. 793 
1362





 However, these contracts may be determined by mandatory law that leaves no 




The German legislator might not have benefitted from implementation practices of foreign 
legislators. Little information seems to have been available on the implementation practices 
in other Member States that were also slow in implementing the Directive. However, even if 
the German legislator had taken into account the approaches of foreign legislators, it does 
not necessarily follow that this would have prompted a more active approach to the 
implementation of the Directive. Various Member States adopted restraint in the 
implementation of the Directive1365 – and if the German legislator had for example been 
inspired by the approach of the Dutch legislator, this might have resulted in even more 
restraint towards the amendment of the AGBG.  
 In the implementation of Directive 93/13, the German legislator, in accordance with 
the general restraint exercised in the amendment of private law, did not affect drastic 
changes to the successful AGBG. 1366  German law was considered to be already in 
conformity with Directive, making drastic changes unnecessary, while establishing a 
separate law alongside the BGB and the AGBG would be undesirable because of potential 
problems with consistency and predictability.1367 Moreover, this approach was also in the 
interest of a stable development of the law, which is also beneficial for legal practice.  
Despite this restraint and the apparent similarity between the Directive and the BGB, 
the implementation of the Directive into German law was late.1368 Moreover, the decision in 
Commission/The Netherlands1369 indicated that the assumption that the BGB was already in 
accordance with the Directive was incorrect with regard to the contra preferentem 
interpretation of clauses. This decision demonstrates that it is not without risk to assume that 
current law already meets the requirements set out by the Directive.  However, the view of 
the German legislator was based on previous CJEU case law that emphasised the discretion 
of national legislators in the implementation of Directives.1370 More interaction with the CJEU 
would likely not have made national actors aware of further-going obligations. 
Thus, foreign observations on compliance with the Directive would have been 
welcome, especially in the light of Commission/Netherlands. However, more interaction with 
foreign legislators to gain insight on foreign implementation strategies would not have been 
useful, and more interaction with European actors would also not necessarily have added 
useful insights, unless such interaction would have revealed further-going duties of 
implementation. 
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 MunchKomm zum BGB/Basedow (2012) introduction to articles 305-310 BGB, nr 26, similarly Grabitz/Hilf/Das Recht der 
Europäische Union/Pfeiffer (2009), article 2 Directive 93/13, nr 23.  
1364
 See for example Hessisches LSG  9 June 2011, BeckRS 2011, 76272, with references to further case law, on contracts with 
health care insurers that fall under the SGB.  
1365
 COM (2000) 248 final.  
1366
 P. Ulmer, ‘Der AGB-Gesetz nach der Umsetzung der EG-Richtlinie über miβbräuchliche Klauseln in Verbraucherverträgen’, 
in: Karlsruher Reform 1998, p. 9.  According to Baier 2004, p. 49, the Directive was also influenced by the AGBG, which may 
have contributed to this assumption. 
1367
 Baier 2004, p. 50. 
1368
 The BGH has however interpreted German law in accordance with the Directive before it was implemented; comp. BGH 24 
May 1995, NJW 1995, 2034. 
1369
 This has since been corrected, despite objections that expressly including the contra preferentem rule would be difficult to 
reconcile with the system in the BGB, where the requirement of transparency was implied and could be realised through 
different ways, comp. P. Ulmer, ‘Zur Anpassung des AGB-Gesetzes über miβbräuchliche Klauseln’, EuZW 1993, p. 344. Baier 
2004, p. 72 moreover points out that the contra legem interpretation may stand in the way of subsequent judicial control that 
takes the interpretation to the detriment of the consumer – or other party – as a starting point in its evaluation.   
1370
 CJEU 9 April 1987 (Commission/Italy), Case 363/85, ECR [1987], p. 1733, par. 7, CJEU 23 May 1985, 
(Commission/Germany), Case 29/84, ECR 1985, p. 1661, par. 23.  
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10.3.2.3. The application of the Directive by the courts 
Do courts in the interpretation of articles 305-310 BGB take into account Directive 93/13, 
CJEU case law, and foreign decisions to ensure the harmonised interpretation of the 
Directive?   
In various national cases falling within the scope of the Directive, both higher 
courts1371 and lower courts1372 do not refer to the Directive or foreign case law, but rather to 
previous case law and literature. The decisions demonstrate that courts frequently rely on 
national default law to determine whether a clause is unfair. In other cases, a more active 
approach towards the Directive is visible.1373  
Furthermore, in cases where the Directive has been considered, both lower courts1374 
and the BGH1375 leave open the possibility that questions could and, for the BGH, should 
have been referred to the CJEU. 
Notably, this does not necessarily mean that the cases in which courts do not refer to 
the Directive but rather national materials have been decided incorrectly – rather, it is not 
harmonised interpretation. Notably, it is not clear whether Directive 93/13 that aims for 
minimum harmonisation and therefore allows for differences between national laws, entails 
the need for completely harmonised interpretation. Possible, especially lower courts, who do 
not have to refer to the CJEU, are insufficiently able, or aware of the need to interpret articles 
305-310 BGB in accordance with Directive and foreign decisions, especially because foreign 
decisions may not be sufficiently available – although the database in the EC Consumer Law 
Compendium provides a starting point.1376    
  Basedow1377 rightly points out that considering the divergence of laws in this area 
prior to harmonisation, national courts cannot achieve harmonised interpretation 
independently, without the harmonising role of the CJEU, which has unfortunately not 
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 See for example  BGH 8 February 2012, NJW 2012, 1431, BGH 11 June 2010, NJW 2010, 2873, BGH 13 April 2010, NJW 
2010, 1742, BGH 30 March 2010, NJW 2010, 2041, BGH 28 January 2010, NJW 2010, 2046, BGH 9 November 2008, NJW 
2009, 912, BGH 5 July 2009, NJW 2009, 3506, BGH 13 October 2006, NJW-RR 2007, 962.   
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 See for example OLG München 9 June 2011, NJW-RR 2011, 1359, LG Bonn 23 February 2011, BeckRS 2011, 22639, LG 
Münster 22 February 2011, BeckRS 2011, 05151, OLG Hamburg 17 February 2010, BeckRS 2010, 12863, OLG München 17 
January 2008, NJW-RR 2008, 1233; comp. also LG Heilbronn, 12 March 2009, BeckRS 2009, 8141. 
1373
 See for example OLG Stuttgart 18 January 2006, BWNotZ 2007, 16, which however concerned a contract between a 
municipality and a business, questioned the privileged position of contracts used by notaries under the Directive and subjected 
them to judicial review.  
1374
 See for example OLG Brandenburg 21 June 2006, BeckRS 2006, 8091, considering that the Directive is not applicable as it 
has not been established that the clause has been drafted in advance, while article 3 par. 2 Directive that states that ‘a term 
shall always be regarded as not individually negotiated where it has been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore 
not been able to influence the substance of the term’, which also allows for the conclusion that consumers may not have been 
able to influence terms even if they have not been preformulated. This decision is however in conformity with a later BGH 
decision, BGH 15 April 2008, BeckRS 2008, 12098. In the light of the aim of the Directive, particularly the CJEU decision in 
Océano, the question arises whether the OLG Brandenburg should have established this matter of its own motion, particularly 
as it concerned a clause enabling the supplier to alter the price, falling within the scope of sub j of the annex to the Directive. 
Basedow, in: FS Hirsch 2008 p. 62 notes that in cases concerning clauses on the annex to the Directive, cases should be 
reffered to the CJEU.   
1375
 See for example BGH 15 April 2008, BeckRS 2008, 12098, in which it was held that consumers should prove that they did 
not have an opportunity to affect the terms in the meaning of article 310 par. 3 sub 2 BGB. However, this arguably concerns the 
interpretation of standard terms in the sense of article 3 Directive, which defines standard terms as not individually negotiated, 
while stipulating in par. 2 that terms have not been negotiated when terms have been preformulated, while the second sentence 
expressly states that the circumstance that other terms have been negotiated does not entail that other terms will be considered 
negotiated as well. In contrast, the BGH considers that as the consumer negotiated other parts of the terms, he will have to 
prove that he did not have the chance to influence the other terms. Arguably, as it concerned the interpretation of article 3 
Directive, the BGH could and perhaps should have referred this question to the CJEU. Comp. also BGH 19 November 2002, 
BeckRS 2003, 736 on the requirement of transparency, both in article 5 Directive 93/13 and in article 4 par. 4 Directive 90/314, 
that obliges the users of STC’s to draft clauses amending the price in such a way that it enables contract parties subjected to 
STC’s to calculate the price. Otherwise, contract parties are unreasonably disadvantaged. However, this interpretation is not 
likely to be contrary to the Directive. The BGH emphasises the protection of parties subjected to STC’s, notwithstanding 
conflicting requirements set by default law that implemented Directive 90/314 on package travel.  
1376
 See http://www.eu-consumer-law.org/index_en.cfm. The CLABB-database is no longer available.  
1377
 J. Basedow, ‘Der Europäische Gerichtshof und die verweigerte Dialog’, in: G. Müller et al (eds.), Festschrift für Günter 
Hirsch zum 65. Geburtstag, Beck: München 2008, p. 58. 
294 
 
provided much clarity on the unified interpretation of central provisions in the Directive. 
However, the ability of the CJEU to do this depends upon the amount of questions referred to 
it by lower courts.  
The relatively small number of cases before the CJEU – certainly small if compared to 
the number of cases before German courts – may arguably also be traced to various 
circumstances:  
i) Concerns over lengthy procedures in relatively straightforward cases  
ii) The restraint of the CJEU in providing consistent guidelines in the 
interpretation of Directives,1378 especially as it may concern provisions that 
play an important role in the BGB such as article 307 BGB. 
iii) The practice of minimum harmonisation and the view that questions on the 
interpretation of provisions offering more protection than the Directive need 
not be interpreted in accordance with the Directive, and referral to the CJEU 
need not be made.1379 However, decisions of the BGH1380 indicate that the 
BGH does not support this view.  
Not only can it be doubted whether this is in conformity with the wider duty of conform 
interpretation, according to which all provisions of national law need to be interpreted in 
accordance with European law,1381 it can also be doubted whether this view is consistent with 
the CJEU’s decision to accept competence over cases which fall beyond the scope of 
harmonising measures, but which fall under the implemented law that extend the scope of 
the harmonised regime in the interest of consistency.1382  
Thus, in the application of the Directive, courts have not interacted much with 
European actors or foreign actors. This may have undermined the harmonised interpretation 
of the Directive throughout the Union, but it has not undermined the quality of private law. To 
the contrary, especially the restraint of lower courts may benefit the predictability of the law 
for private parties, as parties do not have to rely on decisions from foreign courts that they 
are not familiar with, and as decisions do not suffer much delay. Also, the restraint of courts 
ensures that decisions are consistent with national law. However, the restraint of courts may 
be problematic as it may limit the awareness of consumers of their rights under the Directive. 
However, as German law already provided consumers with protection, this is not directly to 
their detriment. 
In these cases, courts have not recognised interdependence and have therefore not 
interacted much with the CJEU and foreign courts, but this does not seem to have 
undermined the predictability or consistency of the law. However, the lack of interaction may 
eventually affect the revision of Directive 93/13 as problems in national practice do not 
become visible at the European level, and the CJEU has little opportunity to provide clarity 
on the interpretation of concepts in the Directive. Similarly, therefore, the question how 
competences are allocated between the CJEU and national courts, in particular whether 
minimum harmonisation allows for more discretion for national courts, is also not  likely to be 
considered in the future reform of the Directive. In the long term, the lack of interaction may 
thus stand in the way of a more predictable development of the private law acquis. 
 
                                               
1378
 See previously par. 7.4.2. and see on the interpretation of article 3 Directive by the CJEU further below, par. 10.4.1.1. 
1379
 Comp. H. Heinrichs, ‘Das Gesetz zur Änderung des AGB-Gesetzes Umsetzung der EG-Richtlinie über mißbräuchliche 
Klauseln in Verbraucherverträgen durch den Bundesgesetzgeber’, NJW 1996, p. 2196, comp. however differently MunchKomm 
zum BGB/Basedow (2012), introduction to article 305, nr 20. 
1380
 BGH 14 April 2010, NJW 2010, 2122 and BGH 15 April 2010, NJW 2010, 2942. In these cases, the BGH has upheld 
clauses falling under the European model list. 
1381
 CJEU 13 November 1990, C-106/89  (Marleasing).  
1382
 MunchKomm zum BGB/Basedow (2012) introduction to article 305, nr 34.   
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10.3.2.4. The discussion on the revision of Directive 93/13 
This paragraph will ask whether actors in the attempted reform of Directive 93/13 have 
sufficiently recognised interdependence and interacted accordingly. How has this affected  
the accessibility, predictability, consistency or the responsiveness of the law on STC’s? 
The proposal for a Directive on consumer rights was preceded by a more general 
consultation on the reform of the consumer acquis.1383 This 2007 consultation, launched in 
February 2007 and closed in May 2007, followed previous consultations to cope with 
problems in the consumer acquis, in particular problems of fragmentation. To increase the 
quality of the consumer acquis, the consultation suggested a horizontal approach rather than 
a vertical approach. The consultation can be criticised for steering and narrowing the debate, 
as it set out a limited number of options.1384 The consultation further consisted of more 
detailed questions that presupposed the preference for a horizontal instrument. The proposal 
for a Directive on consumer rights1385 was published in October 2008.  
The proposal was accompanied by an impact assessment report.1386 Although the 
report recognises, in passing, the relevance of enforcement mechanisms and self-regulation 
for the level of consumer protection in Member States, 1387  it identifies the minimum 
harmonisation clauses as the main source of fragmentation,1388 which it uncritically considers 
as the source of problems for the internal market. The impact assessment has assessed 
more options than originally envisaged in the 2007 consultation. 1389  However, the 
suggestions to use self-regulation in addition to the preferred policy options and the 
suggestion to raise awareness have not been followed in the Directive. 1390 The responses to 
the consultation1391 are not based on the impact assessment report and do not focus on the 
various policy options presented in the report, nor are suggestions made with regard to 
additionial measures that the report recognised as useful. 
Consequently, the extent to which the impact assessment contributed to the 
evidence-based decision making was limited. It also did not draw attention to the optimal use 
of techniques in the revision of the Directive.  
The 2008 proposal for Directive 2011/83 on consumer rights, which initially also 
included the revision of Directive 93/13, was not accompanied by a separate German 
consultation, but it has nevertheless been discussed, both in legal journals1392 as well as 
newspapers.1393 The lack of a separate consultation also does not mean that the German 
legislator did not take a position in the debate. In its 2009 decision, the Bundesrat 1394 
indicated various problematic points in the proposal, that also come back in its response of 
the Bundesrat to the European consultation:1395 
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 COM (2006) 744 final.  
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 See previously more generally par. 8.2.1.2.  
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 COM (2008) 614 final. 
1386
 Commission staff working document accompanying the proposal for a Directive on consumer rights, Impact Assessment 
Report, available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/docs/impact_assessment_report_en.pdf.  
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 Impact assessment report, p. 12, note 11.  
1388
 Impact assessment report, p. 8. 
1389
 COM (2008) 614 final, p. 5-6. 
1390
 Impact assessment report, p. 21.   
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 See http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/acquis/responses_green_paper_acquis_en.htm.  
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 See for example K. Tonner, M. Tamm, ‘Der Vorschlag einer Richtlinie über die Rechte der Verbraucher’, JZ 2009, 277.  
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 See especially S. Lorenz, ‘Der geplante Verbraucherschutz in Europa ist trügerisch’, FAZ 14 July 2009.  
1394
 BR-Drucksache 765/08, p. 3, 6 (EU: BR-Drucksache 765/08 also notes (par 3) that proposal is not in accordance with better 
legislation programme) 
1395
 Response of the BMJ to the Green Paper on the review of the consumer acquis, COM (2006) 744, p. 4, 16, 17, 18, in 
accordance with the previously agreed position in the Bundesrat, BR-Drucksache 112/07. Responses to the consultation are 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/acquis/responses/ms_bundesministerium.pdf,   
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a) The maximum harmonisation approach, which would lead to a de facto European 
consumer contract law that would make national law largely obsolete, and that 
would would lead to legal uncertainty that would hinder rather than help cross-
border trade.  
b) The binding model list that would pursue maximum harmonisation as various 
clauses are not in accordance with dogmatically developed concepts 
(‘Zivilrechtsdogmatik’) and German practices, also pointing to the discussion 
preceding Directive 93/13 
c) The subjection of individually negotiated to judicial control, as this question was 
also an important point in negotiations preceding Directive 93/13 
d) The extension of the scope of the Directive to the main terms of the contract, 
which seems particularly difficult to reconcile with the Richtigkeitsgewähr as these 
terms will typically be the primary object of consideration for the consumer. 
 
The lack of a seperate German consultation has not impeded German stakeholders from 
responding to the European consultation. Interestingly, many business associations take a 
position similar to the Bundesrat.1396 Some business stakeholders support a black list or a 
grey and black list in the interest of predictability, although it remains unclear how such a list 
would relate to articles 308 and 309 BGB. 1397  Interestingly, the Bundesverband 
Direcktvertrieb Deutschland 1398  also refers to the drafting process of Directive 93/13 in 
rejecting the extension of judicial control of unfair clauses, while supporting a black list. In 
contrast, consumer organisations 1399  do not advocate for a binding black list under a 
Directive pursuing maximum harmonisation, as this would lower the level of consumer 
protection in the German legal order and necessitate the adaptation of a successful system. 
Consumer organisations further point out that national default law served as a standard for 
assessing the fairness of a clause, while they also do not object to extending judicial control, 
criticising the idea of negotiations and emphasising the weak position of consumers in 
negotiations.1400 Thus, stakeholders, occassionally also criticising the European consultation 
procedure,1401 seem to take positions in accordance with the interests of their members, with 
business stakeholders supporting maximum harmonisation, 1402  and with consumer 
organisations arguing for minimum harmonisation.1403 
However, many of the responses of stakeholders are brief, which limits their value in 
the debate.1404 Also, it can be doubted whether the debate included all relevant German 
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pointing out that various Member States have extended judicial control, ADAC p. 4-5.  
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 See for example the response of the Bundesnotarkammer, p. 2, particularly sharply the Deutscher Notarverein, p. 1-2, as 
well as the Bundesverband Direcktvertrieb Deutschland, p.7, as well as the response from B. Heiderhoff and M. Kenny, p. 1.  
1402
 See for example the response of the Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer, p. 5, the German Bar Associaiton, p. 3, the Deutscher 
Notarverein, p. 9, the Detusche Reiseverband, p. 1, the Deutschen Versicherer, p. 5, the HDE, BAG, and bvh, p. 3, the 
Markenverband, p. 3, the ZVEI, p. 2, the ZGE, p. 4, thre Wettbewerbszentrale, p. 3, more cautiously the Bundesverband 
Direcktvertrieb Deutschland, p. 4, as well as the Deutsche Bank, p. 3,  and Vorwerk, p. 3, differently the responses of BDWi, p. 2, 
as well as the VDMA, p. 3. 
1403
 See the elaborate response of the Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverbands, p.  5-9, and the Verbraucherskommission Badem-
Wurtenberg, also extensively, p. 3-7, as well as the ECC Germany, p. 5, and the ADAC, p. 1. 
1404
 Some responses are an exception, such as the response of the Bundesverband Direktvertrieb Deutschland that draws 
attention to the inclusion of subjects that had not been harmonised previously in the 2008 draft, stating that this course was 
considered unattractive not only by Member States but also by businesses, because Member States with a history of 
superogatory implementation – like Germany – would likely also extend the scope of provisions in the draft, which would inhibit 
the freedom of contract for businesses in cross-border contracts.  Various responses from national stakeholders may also be 
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stakeholders – especially if compared to the debate preceding the AGBG, in which around 
150 stakeholders were consulted.1405 Unfortunately, the responses from some international 
stakeholders that could have otherwise have provided valuable input were rather brief and 
remained general.1406 The responses of stakeholders also seem to have been drafted in 
cooperation, considering the close resemblance between the wording of the responses from 
different stakeholders. 1407  Including more actors, especially actors such as the 
Verbraucherschutzverein, with its experience in the enforcement of the Directive, widens the 
debate and helps to ensure that the debate does not overlook relevant insights. 
 The focus of the German legislator logically is a national one, which should however  
not deter national legislators from taking into acocunt the approaches of foreign legislators to 
implementation, or their views in the debate, or the needs and preferences of international 
trade. This is unfortunately not the case.  
In the discussion, references to comparative law have been few, notwithstanding the 
occassional reference to comparative law in academic responses to the consultation,1408 and 
some stakeholders,1409  as well as the Ministry, referring to comparative analysis on the 
implementation of eight Directives,1410 but not to the regimes of other Member States, nor to 
CJEU case law. More attention to comparative law research might provide valuable insights 
on existing implementation practices and obstacles and possible objections to 
harmonisation.1411 Comparative research on the implementation of the Directive is available 
in the EC consumer law compendium.1412 
 Both the European and the German legislator have adopted a narrow view on the 
reform of the Directive. The European legislator sought to to limit the fragmented approach in 
the private law acquis, instead adopting a more horizontal approach reminiscent of national 
law. The German legislator moreover attempted to ensure that the Directive would be in 
accordance with national law and national principles. The European legislator has 
unfortunately narrowed and steered the debate without sufficiently considering the potential 
options. In contrast, the German approach is directed at the status quo, and does not 
consider how the Directive has functioned and what improvements are possible.  
 
This preference for the status quo is particularly visible in the rejection of the suggestion that the 
model list in the Annex to the Directive should become binding – after all, notwithstanding previous 
negotiations, the developments since the Directive has been established may merit a reconsideration 
of the indicative character of the EU model list, especially considering the very limited role of the EU 
model list in the German legal order.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
interesting, such as the reaction from the Deutscher Notarverein and the Deutschen Versicherer, as well as the 
VerbraucherKommission Badem-Württemberg that explicitly refers to implementaiton practices in other Member States. 
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 H.-D. Hensen, ‘Zur Entstehung des AGB-Gesetzes’, in: A. Heldrich, P. Schlechtriem, E. Schmidt (eds.), Recht im 
Spannungsfeld von Theorie und Praxis, Festschrift für Helmut Heinrichs zum 70. Geburtstag, Beck: München 1998, p. 76. 
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 Especially the views from the ICC, but the views from Visa Europe might also have been interesting.  
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 Particularly the responses of the Bundesverband Direktvertrieb Deutschland, the Federation of German Industries, the 
Association of German Chambers of Industries and Commerce, the National association of German commercial agencies and 
distribution, and the German Confederation of skilled crafts and small businesses. 
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 Comp. the responses of Heiderhoff and Kenny, while the comment of Micklitz and Reich involves the discussion at a 
European law and CJEU case law.  
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 Comp. the response of Vorwerk, which however does not refer to the quesitons of the consultaiton on the control of unfair 
clauses. 
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 Response of the BMJ, p. 4, 17. 
1411
 N. Jansen, ‘Klauselkontrolle im Europäischen Privatrecht. Ein Beitrag zur Revision des Verbraucheracquis’, ZeuP 2010, p. 
69.  
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 Available at http://www.eu-consumer-law.org/index_en.cfm as well as comparative research on implementation, see 
especially Baier 2004, and the special issue of the ERPL in 1997.  
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Thus, the shortcomings in the interaction between actors have limited the debate in the 
reform of the Directive. The attempts to streamline the debate have not resulted in actual 
reform and it is not clear whether and how the 1993 Directive will be reformed. Actors with 
relevant insights have not been consulted or have only provided brief responses, which may 
increase the chance that a reformed Directive will overlook relevant insights, which may 
undermine the responsiveness of a reformed Directive.    
 
10.3.2.5. Conclusion on the development of German law on STC’s and 
harmonisation  
Have German actors, in the implementation of Directive 93/13, adequately taken into account 
interdependence in ensuring the predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness 
of the law and have they interacted accordingly? How has that affected the comprehensibility 
of private law? 
In the implementation of Directive 93/13, German state actors have adopted restraint, 
which may have benefitted predictability, consistency and responsiveness for private parties. 
Eventually, however, the restraint in the interaction between German and European actors 
may leave questions on the interpretation of the acquis and the allocation of competences 
between courts and legislator at the national and European level unresolved, which in turn 
undermines extent to which the private law acquis develops in accordance with benchmarks 
of predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness.  
The development of Directive 93/13 did not prompt the German legislator to 
reconsider the AGBG or its choice for Sonderprivatrecht and later codification. However, the 
active participation of German actors at the European level increases the chance that the 
acquis will develop in accordance with German law, which limits the extent to which the 
acquis will undermine the BGB’s ability to contribute to benchmarks of predictability and 
consistency. The German approach may therefore provide an example for other legislators. 
However, as the acquis pursues different aims than German general private law, which 
characteristically does not pursue a specific aim but rather is based on notions of private 





10.3.3. German law on STC’s and internatonal trade 
The development of treaties and international trade may prompt state actors to interact with 
foreign actors and non-state actors. The approach of German actors is not uniform: the 
German legislator has rejected regulatory competition, but has taken into account insights 
from legal practice to help ensure the responsiveness of the law. The private initiative for 
regulatory competition has rightly not prompted the German legislator to change this 
approach. The restraint of the legislator is also compensated by courts that are more inclined 
to interact with foreign, European and international state and non-state actors in cases 
decided under German law, which has benefitted the responsiveness of German law to 
international practice.  
Paragraph 10.3.3.1. will consider whether internationalisation has induced the 
German legislator to take into account the views of foreign legislators and non-state actors. 
Paragraph  10.3.3.2. will ask whether courts have interacted with foreign courts and non-
state actors in the interpretation of STC’s in international contracts. Paragraph 10.3.3.3. will 
end with a conclusion.  
 
10.3.3.1. Regulatory competition 
This paragraph will ask whether the German legislator, in the development of the law on 
STC’s, has taken into account the development of law by foreign legislators and how this has 
affected the predictability, consistency, accessibility and responsiveness of the law on STC’s. 
 Paragraph 10.3.3.1.1. will consider the interaction with foreign legislators and 
paragraph 10.3.3.1.2. will consider the interaction with non-state actors in the drafting of the 
AGBG. Paragraph 10.3.3.1.3. will consider the interaction with non-state actors who drafted 
a private initiative to enhance regulatory competition. Paragraph 10.3.3.1.4. will end with a 
conclusion. 
 
10.3.3.1.1. Regulatory competition: undesirable in the law on STC’s  
The German legislator originally did not consider regulatory competition as a challenge to 
‘improve’ the law. This does not mean that the Germna legislator could not take into account 
insights from comparative law; the draft was preceded by extensive comparative 
research.1413  The idea of amending the law contradicts the typical reestraint of the legislator 
in amending private law in the interest of a stable, predictable development of private law.1414 
Accordingly, the AGBG effectively provided a stable framework for the development of 
law.1415  
Until 1986, the AGBG, included in a choice of law clause in its grey list. Thus, choice 
of law clauses were likely unfair if the choice of law was not based on a justifiable interest, 
which was amended after Germany ratified the Rome Convention. However, in the draft 
implementation of the Directive, proposed article 12 did not only, in accordance with article 6 
par. 2 Directive, prohibit a choice of the law of non-member states, but more generally 
prohibited choice of law. Reich1416 doubts whether this extension would have been covered 
by article 8 Directive. Notably, an extension of this article to business contracts would breach 
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the freedom of choice of law in international business contracts in article 3 Rome I 
Regulation.  
Thus, choice of law was an escape route from domestic mandatory law that should be 
blocked. This approach is in accordance with the idea that regulatory competition can lead to 
a ‘race to the bottom’, which can also be deduced from the German response to the 2006 
consultation on the review of the consumer acquis. Accordingly, the Bundesrat1417 welcomed 
the decision to harmonise the law in this area, stating that the harmonisation of the law on 
STC’s to the high level of protection in Germany would benefit German businesses who were 
at a disadvantage because of the high level of protection of consumers in German law. Thus, 
regulatory competition that results in the application of German law is not rejected.  
 
10.3.3.1.2. Interaction with non-state actors 
If the legislator does not seek to compete with other legislators in the development of the law, 
it is also possible to draft an attractive regime by taking into account the needs and 
preferences of transnational legal practice.  
The drafting of the AGBG was primarily directed at the codification of case law that 
would also make the law more accessible and consistent for contract parties. In the drafting 
of the AGBG, over 150 stakeholders, both business and consumer representatives, have 
been consulted on the draft AGBG,1418 and have had the opportunity to discuss the draft.  
 
Accordingly, the amended draft extends the scope of clauses subject to judicial control while limiting 
judicial control for clauses converging with default law. The draft also refers to individually negotiated 
clauses that are not subject to judicial control, while the referrence to written contracts was dropped. 
Also, some clauses under articles 10 and 11 were nuanced, while article 13, which became article 24 





Thus, the German legislator has sought to draft the law in such a way that it is a regime that 
develops consistently and predictably, which has prompted other states to consider the 
AGBG and German experiences, 1420 especially as the German regime on STC’s was one of 
the first regimes to be established.  Also, German criticism on the1990 draft Directive led to 
important amendments in the Directive, which had, in accordance with the French regime, 
pursued a more general control over clauses in consumer contracts. 
Not all of the amendments can be traced to the consultation of stakeholders; thus, the 
extension of judicial control to business contracts had also been discussed at the Deutschen 
Juristentag.  
Although these discussions have primarily focussed on national legal practice, the 
German judiciary does seem to take into account international legal practice. Brandner1421 
already noted that although BGH case law is not always unequivocal, it seemed to evaluate 
clauses in business contracts in most branches less strictly than clauses in consumer 
contracts, depending on the interest protected by the judicial control of clauses. 
 
                                               
1417
 Decision of the Bundesrat of 1 March 1991, BR-Drucks. 611/90, p. 1. 
1418
 BR-Drucks, 360/75, 30.5.1975. 
1419
 The amended draft was not published. See in more detail H.D. Hensen, ‘Zur Entstehung des AGB-Gesetzes’, in: Festschrift 
Heinrichs, p. 351-352. 
1420
 For example the Dutch legislator, see further chapter 11. 
1421
 Brandner, in: Zehn Jahre AGB-Gesetz, p. 50. 
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10.3.3.1.3. The private initiative for regulatory competition 
The careful preparation of the AGBG may also be a reason to continue to exercise restraint 
in the face of later proposals for reform in accordance with regulatory competition, 
particularly the proposal for reform from private actors1422 that explicitly refers to the initative 
of ‘Law – made in Germany’.1423  
 
The private initiative was developed by the Industrie- und Handelskammer Frankfurt am Main.
1424
 This 
draft has been discussed,
1425
 and an amended draft has been published by the German Bar 
Association, which emphasises that it does not seek to represent stakeholders’ interests through this 
draft.
1426




The proposal from the German Bar Association targets the judicial control of STC’s in 
business contracts, in particular the judicial evaluation of business contracts under article 307 BGB 
and the indirect effect of articles 308 and 309 BGB. The draft emphasises that STC’s that have been 
negotiated, even if no changes result from negotiation, should not be considered STC’s in the sense of 
article 305 BGB, in contrast to current BGH case law.
1428
 Moreover, the draft suggests a more lenient 
evaluation of STC’s in business contracts by stipulating that clauses are not unreasonable depending 
on the content of the contract, the circumstances of the conclusion of the contract, and business 
practices. Interestingly,  the draft from the German Bar Association explicitly states that the law with 
regard to the inclusion of STC’s is not in need of amendment.  
Interestingly, the draft stresses that the protective aim of legislator towards businesses is 
undermined in cases of transnational trade. In transnational cases, a choice of law to the detriment of 
German businesses is permitted, while foreign businesses may subject clauses to judicial control 
under articles 305-310 BGB. Thus, as the law in this area fails to adequately cope with international 
practice, in particular by imposing national standards on international trade, it might just as well 
facilitate the preferences of international trade. In turn, if businesses in international trade are subject 
to no or less intense judicial control, the question arises whether a similar standard should not also be 
applied for domestic contracts.  
Moreover,  revision of the law in the light of regulatory competition is in line with the objectives 
of the EU to establish an internal market, if the revision facilitates the use of STC’s in cross-border 
contracts, and if the revision leads to the convergence of national laws in this area, which, if going far 
enough, would take away the need for harmonisation.  
 
Shoud the limited ability to maintain protective standards prompt the German legislator to   
take more note of the preferences of international trade and national stakeholders? 
So far,1429 there has been no official reaction from the German legislator towards the 
proposals. Constitutional constraints may arise, as article 33 par. 4 GG may stand in the way 
of a too prominent role of stakeholders in the drafting of legislation. In particular, it stands in 
the way of a blanket approval of the proposal by the German legislator without substantive, 
critical democratic debate in Parliament. The current proposal should not lead to reform 
because of the following shortcomings: 
 
1) The draft from stakeholders is contradictory.  
                                               
1422
 See http://www.frankfurt-main.ihk.de/recht/themen/vertragsrecht/agb_recht_initiative/.  
1423
 Critically Dauner-lieb & Axer, ZIP 2010, p. 309, who note that advertising with German law while simultaneouslty arguing it is 
in need of reform, is not convincing. 
1424
 See http://www.frankfurt-main.ihk.de/recht/themen/vertragsrecht/agb_recht_initiative/.  
1425
 See for an overview http://www.frankfurt-main.ihk.de/recht/themen/vertragsrecht/agb_recht_initiative/.  
1426
 Available at http://anwaltverein.de/downloads/Stellungnahmen-11/DAV-SN-23-2012.pdf.  
1427
 See http://www.frankfurt-main.ihk.de/imperia/md/content/pdf/recht/AGB_b2b_Fallbeispiele_aus_der_Praxis.pdf.  
1428
 BGH 19 May 2005, NJW 2005, 2543. 
1429
 December 2012.  
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The list of examples accompanying the proposal,
1430
 claims that German users of STC’s may not opt 
out of German law entirely, and as a result, their clauses are subjected to the strict German judicial 
evaluation under article 307 BGB. In contrast, the draft claims that currently, German businesses tend 
to opt out from German law, especially opting for Swiss law and English law. The list of examples goes 
on to claim that in cases where a German business is subjected to a clause that would be considered 
unfair in German law, will not be able to ‘pass on’ this clause to a German subcontractor, opting 
instead for a foreign subcontractor to whom this potentially objectionable clause will be passed on.  
 
2) The examples accompanying the proposal do not sufficiently take into account that 
the BGH is more lenient in its evaluation of clauses in international cases.  
This becomes particularly clear from example 12 that argues that a clause requiring a surety to be 
available upon request will generally be held ineffective. Even though the BGH
1431
 has held these 
clauses ineffective in domestic cases, international cases may be judged differently. The OLG 
Stuttgart
1432
 upheld a clause described in this example, denying that parties – big businesses – in this 
case were hardly in need of protection. The OLG upheld the decision from the LG Stuttgart,
1433
 which 
distinguished between previous cases on sureties that concerned domestic cases and international 
cases.  
 
3) Both the original proposal and the amended proposal do not make sufficiently clear 
how small businesses would be protected under articles 305-310 BGB, and how 
these cases would be delineated from cses where small businesses have agreed to 
STC’s while not hindered by a weaker bargaining position.  
Possibly, however, the approach defended in Dutch law could be taken as a starting point: where a 
business is in a bargaining position similar to a consumer’s bargaining position, and it oncerns a 
contract not different from normal consumer contracts, businesses may invoke the indirect effect of 
articles 308 and 309 BGB. Notably, however, Dutch law in this point has hardly developed. Regardless, 
the draft does not consider this possibility.  
 
4) The draft overlooks the normative view underpinning articles 305-310 BGB, instead 
emphasising ‘law as a product’.  
The argument that the legislator should not even attempt to pursue a normative system because it is 
not able to do so indepedently is not particularly appealing. Even if the aim of the German legislator is 
undermined, this does not make the question how the legislator should cope with this development in 
a manner that preserves the normative values underlying the law irrelevant, especially as the law 
might increasingly develop inconsistently and less in accordance with society’s views on justice.  
 
5) The attractiveness of German law might also be inhibited by other factors.  
Berger
1434
 argues that case law on the interpretation of international and foreign clauses is limited, and 
has developed through cases on consumer contracts and relatively simple contracts. Consequently, it 
is not a law developed for (international)  businesses contracts.  
 
6) Contrary to the idea of regulatory competition, the draft has paid limited attention to 
developments from other legislators.  
The draft from the German Bar Association
1435
 explicitly refers to the proposal for a Regulation on a 
draft CESL, and notes that if the draft takes the negotiation (‘verhandlen’) of STC’s as a starting point, 
                                               
1430
 Available at http://www.frankfurt-main.ihk.de/imperia/md/content/pdf/recht/AGB_b2b_Fallbeispiele_aus_der_Praxis.pdf, 
examples 2, 5 and 8.  
1431
 BGH 18 April 2002, NJW 2002, 2388.  
1432
 OLG Stuttgart 1 December 2010, BeckRS 2011, 2432.   
1433
 LG Stuttgart 3 May 2010, BeckRS 2010, 19376. 
1434
 K.P. Berger, ‘Für eine Reform des AGB-Rechts im Unternehmerverkehr’, NJW 2010, p. 466.  
1435
 Draft, p. 16.  
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this will distinguish it from the proposal that takes the joint negotiations (‘aushandeln’) as a starting 
point.  Although the draft recognises that especially English and Swiss law are a favourite choice of 
contract parties, it does not look at German or Swiss law to establish what is so attractive about these 
laws. The draft does not ask how the reform may make German law a competitive law within the Union 
that will be elected by both foreign and German parties. Rather, the draft aims to make German law 
less unattractive for German parties. 
As comparative contract law is readily available, the inaccessibility of relevant materials should 
not be an obstacle to more attention to comparative law. Moreover, it should be noted that the draft, 
until now, has especially been circulated between German parties. Since the proposal has been 
drafted in the context of regulatory competition, it would however not be illogical to contact foreign 
parties, especially parties in Member States that are important trade partners of Germany, to establish 
whether they find German law exceptionally unattractive, and if so, why.  
 
7) The draft does not sufficiently consider other options that may facilitate cross-border 
trade.   
The draft does not address the extent to which prominently used STC’s in international contracts are 
evaluated, and does not consider the possibility to encourage, for example, the development of 
guidelines for the interpretation of clauses in international contracts. Also, the draft leaves open the 
possibility that parties may circumvent the evaluation of clauses by opting for ADR. The use of 
collective negotiations, which may be a reason for the judiciary to evaluate STC’s less strictly, is also 
not considered.  
 
10.3.3.1.4.  Conclusion on regulatory competition  
The German legislator has rejected the idea of regulatory competition in the area of 
mandatory law protecting weaker parties. However, the legislator has recognised the added 
value of comparative insights, considering the comparative research and the more general 
initiative for ´Law - made in Germany’. The restraint of the German legislator in amending the 
law benefits predictability, and the attention for national stakeholders benefits the 
responsiveness of the law to business practices and preferences. The restraint of the 
German legislator has moreover not stopped foreign legislators and the European legislator 
from turning to German law as a source of inspiration.   
The private initative for regulatory competition demonstrates that the preference of 
businesses should not override the development of the law in accordance with legal views on 
justice, but it does rase questions on the ability of the legislator to ensure that the law 
develops in accordance with legal views on justice. The German legislator has not expressly 
recognised interdependence in this area, but at the European level, it has actively advocated 
for the development of the acquis with a high level of consumer protection, which may 
prevent that the law in this area does not undermine the high level of consumer protection in 
German law. Eventually, however, the German legislator does not have a decisive say in the 
reform of Directive 93/13, and it is possible that reform may oblige the German legislator to 
lower consumer protection. If this is the case, German actors will have to consider alternative 
ways to preserve the responsive development of private law.  
 
10.3.3.2. The interpretation of international contracts  
As international trade develops, German courts are faced with more international cases. 1436 
The approach of the German courts differ depending on the question whether a case is 
                                               
1436
 See for the evaluation of STC’s article 307 BGB, not considered in this paragraph, below, par. 10.4.3. 
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decided under German law or under European or international law. Its approach to 
international and European state and non-state actors in cases decided under German law 
may increase the responsivenes. In contrast, the restraint of courts in cases decided under 
international or European law may inhibit responsiveness, as well as the consistent and 
predictable interpretation of clauses under treaties and European law, especially for foreign 
parties who are accustomed to courts taking into account  international and European 
sources.  
 Paragraph 10.3.3.2.1. will consider the decisions of courts on the criteria whether 
clauses have been individually negotiated. Paragraph 10.3.3.2.2. will consider the valid 
inclusion of STC’s. Paragraph 10.3.3.2.3. will turn to the adequate availability of STC’s and 
paragraph 10.3.3.2.4. will address the interpretation of clauses. Paragraph 10.3.3.2.5. will 
end with a conclusion. 
The paragraph distinguishes between these questions as different sources of law 
may be applicable per question. Moreover, the paragraph will not only look at international 
cases, but compare decisions in international cases to decisions in domestic cases, to 
determine whether courts adopt a different appoach to domestic decisions, which may also 
be relevant for the consistent development of the law on STC’s. 
    
10.3.3.2.1. Negotiating STC’s  
Article 305 BGB requires that STC’s have been presented (‘gestellt’), and not negotiated 
(‘ausgehandelt’) 1437 Notably, in some international cases, the question whether a clause has 
been presented or not in the sense of article 305 BGB is not addressed as European law or 
international law may precede article 305 BGB, and the question whether clauses have been 
negotiated is not similarly emphasised under European or international regimes. 1438 
Interestingly, the ICC1439 has distinguished between B2C and B2B contracts, and has held 
that clauses that parties have negotiated on, but that have not been altered can be 
considered as  ‘negotiated’ in the sense of article 305 BGB. The ICC extensively refers to 
BGH case law and goes on to follow criticism of the requirement of ‘aushandeln’, and the 
distinction between STC’s and individually negotiated clauses as this distinction overlooks 
the possibility that parties will often not be interested in negotiating on STC’s, which later will 
provide them with an opportunity to challenge those terms.1440 
The ICC decision will likely not be followed by German courts that consider the 
unequal bargaining power between parties when one party has set his STC’s to be either 
accepted or rejected by his counterparty. The BVerfG 1441  has emphasised the need to 
prevent Fremdbestimmung in the use of STC’s, including model contracts. Accordingly, the 
OLG München 1442  rejected the individual negotiation of clauses in international cases, 
referring to BGH decisions in domestic cases.1443  
BGH case law may however be more lenient for clauses in international business 
contracts. 1444  In rare cases, the BGH1445  has referred to foreign courts. The BGH may also 
                                               
1437
 Similarly, article 449 HGB refers to aushandeln, which has been interpreted in conformity with article 305 BGB, see BGH 1 
December 2005, BeckRS 2006, 3324. 
1438
 Comp. for example relatively recently OLG Brandenburg 26 June 2012, BeckRS 2012, 15696, with further references. 
1439
 ICC 29 January 2001, SchiedsVZ 2005, 108. 
1440
Graf von Westphalen/Vertragsrecht und AGB-Klauselwerke/Schöne (30. Ergänzungslieferung 2012), 
Stromlieferungsverträge, nr  48. 
1441
 BVerfG 7 September 2010, NJW 2011, 1339. 
1442
 OLG München 7 March 1986, BeckRS 2010, 25740. 
1443
 BGH 3 July 1985, NJW-RR 1986, 54.  
1444
 BGH 15 February 2007, NJW 2007, 2036 held that a clause appointing the shipowner as transporter was individually 
negotiated as the clause was printed in bold on the front of the bill of lading. Wolf/Lindacher/Pfeiffer/AGB-recht/Hau (2009), AGB 
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evaluate clauses more leniently when STC’s have been drafted by a relatively neutral 
institute in which interests from all relevant contract parties have been represented.1446  
The line in domestic cases is considerably stricter, as the BGH1447 has distinguished 
between ‘aushandeln’ (jointly negotiating) and ‘verhandeln’ (considered). Verhandeln did not 
meet the requirements for individual negotiations in article 305 BGB, which accordingly also 
speaks of ‘aushandeln’, which requires that the user of STC’s has to seriously make the 
content of his STC’s subject to negotiation, enabling his potential contract party to defend his 
own interests. This means that the contract party must have been able to influence the 
content of the STC’s, which turn presupposes that the contract party has adequately 
understood the STC’s, which may require that he is educated on the content of STC’s.  
Thus, German courts take a stricter approach in deciding whether STC’s have been 
negotiated – and therefore do not fall within article 305 BGB – in domestic cases that are 
developed in line with the law on B2C contracts. In international cases, German courts are 
more likely to take into account the role of neutral organisations and in rare cases, foreign 
courts.  
 
10.3.3.2.2. The valid inclusion of STC’s  
The question whether STC’s have been included in international contracts may be answered 
under different regimes that do not always leave room for the additional applicability of article 
305 BGB. Moreover, in addition to article 305 BGB, other provisions may also be applicable, 
especially article 312g BGB, implementing Directive 2000/31 on e-commerce, and article 246 
EGBGB.1448 This paragraph will turn to international cases decided under respectively the 
CMR, CISG, Regulation Brussels I, or the Lugano Convention,1449 and German law, and 
contrast these decisions with domestic cases. 
In cases under the CMR, German courts have expected foreign contract parties to be 
familiar with the use of the often used terms in transport contracts, the Allgemeine Deutsche 
Spenditeurbedingungen (hereafter ‘ADSp’), considering their prominent use within the EU. 
As the CMR does not aim to establish a comprehensive regime for transport contracts, 
insights from German law or other applicable law may also be relevant.1450 Accordingly, the 
BGH1451 has taken into account foreign laws and foreign decisions.  
                                                                                                                                                   
im internationalen Geschäftsverkehr, nr 4 argue that the BGH may accept that clauses have been drafted taking into account 
various interests, which may lead to less intense judicial evaluation. Comp also BGH 17 February 2010, NJW 2010, 1131, a 
domestic case between two private parties, where the BGH held that the question whether STC’s had been presented 
depended on the question which party had introduced the STC’s – drafted by third parties – in the negotiations and required the 
use of these STC’s. The BGH pointed out that the assumption that STC’s had been presented by the seller was not applicable 
beyond B2C contracts.See also BGH 14 May 1992, NJW 1992, 2160 also points to contracts based in which the interests of 
parties have been adequately balanced. 
1445
 BGH 15 February 2007, NJW 2007, 2036. 
1446
 Wolf/Lindacher/Pfeiffer/AGB-Recht/Hau (2009), AGB im internationalen Geschäftsverkehr, nr 57, see for example BGH 26 
June 1997, NJW-RR 1997, 1253, although this seems not to have been considered in BGH 28 June 2001, NJW-RR 2002, 536. 
1447
 BGH 19 May 2005, NJW 2005, 2543, confirming previous decisions in domestic cases in BGH 18 April 2002, NJW 2002, 
2388, and BGH 3 November 1999, NJW 2000, 1110.  
1448
 Article 22 Directive 2006/123 also contains information duties and may also be relevant, but it has not been implemented in 
the BGB; see further BT-Drucks. 16/10493. Notably, however, article 312g BGB is limited to contracts for the delivery of goods 
or services, although the Directive is not limited to these contracts, while the limitation to merchants in the sense of article 14 
BGB may also be diverge from service providers in the Directive, see MunchKomm zum BGB/Wendehorst (2012) article 312g, 
nr 9-10. 
1449
 Regulation Brussels I replaces the European Execution Treaty and is almost identical with the Lugano Convention between 
Member States of the European Free Trade Organisation. 
1450
 Ferrari/Kieninger/Mankowski u.a., Internationales Vertragsrecht/Ferarri (2011), article 1 CMR, nr 3. 
1451
 BGH 26 March 2009, NJW-RR 2010, 247.  
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In previous cases, the ADSp have similarly been held applicable on the basis of silent 
agreement,1452 while courts expressly held that this was not contrary to articles 31 and 41 
CMR.  These decisions were in accordance with BGH case law in domestic cases.   
In cases falling under the CISG, the BGH1453 has not referred to foreign materials, 
instead addressing diverging opinions in German literature. German lower courts1454 have 
followed the BGH and only rarely refer to foreign courts.1455  
For the valid inclusion of jurisdiction clauses, article 23 Brussels I or article 17 Lugano 
Convention plays a central role. The BGH1456 has ccoridngly referred to CJEU case law, and 
interpreted the requirements of article 17 Convention strictly, although it excepted an 
agreement on relative competence (‘Zuständigkeitsvereinbarung’) from Brussels I holding 
that the Regulation did not provide rules for the valid establishment of such an agreement, 
which had to be determined in accordance with applicable (English) law. Nevertheless, it 
held that the requirements in article 23 Brussels I had been met. The LG München1457  
similarly referred to the Convention and CJEU case law, but also to German case law and 
literature.   
In international cases decided under German law, the BGH1458 has taken into account 
business practices and foreign – Dutch – law. Notable, the knowledge and experience of 
international contract parties is often estimated higher than in domestic cases. 1459  The 
decision of the OLG Karlsruhe1460 indicates that these BGH decisions may not always be 
followed.  
In contrast, in domestic cases, the BGH1461 has adopted a much stricter approach. 
The inclusion of STC’s in the contract under article 305 BGB, while not requiring explicit 
confirmation, does require agreement on the inclusion of STC’s, either silently or explicitly. 
Even though handing over the text of STC’s is not required as such, the user of STC’s needs 
to refer unequivocally to the STC’s he wishes to use, in such a way that contract parties 
cannot doubt their application while also being able to read them. This is also true if it 
concerns often used clauses. In cases of battle of forms, businesses asserting the 
application of their standard terms cannot assume that their contract party agrees with this 
application, in particular if the other party’s terms contain a clause rejecting the applicability 
of other parties’ terms and conditions.1462 However, if parties have done business with each 
other for a considerable time, the inclusion of STC’s can be made silently.1463 In these cases, 
only converging clauses will be applicable.1464 
                                               
1452
 OLG Schleswig, 25 May 1987, NJW-RR 1988, 283 and LG Gießen 31 July 2008, BeckRS 2009, 395. 
1453
 BGH 31 October 2001, NJW 2002, 370. See subsequently BGH 9 January 2002, NJW 2002, 1651, followed by OLG 
Koblenz 1 March 2010, 2 U 816/09, http://www.globalsaleslaw.com/content/api/cisg/urteile/2126.pdf. See for an overview 
Kröll/Mistelis/Viscasillas, UN-Convention on the International Sales of Goods (CISG)/Ferrari (2011), article 19, nr 14-17.  
1454
 OLG Frankfurt am Main 26 June 2006, 26 Sch 28/05 , http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/urteile/1385.pdf, OLG Jena 10 
November 2011, BeckRS 2011, 3846, and OLG Celle 24 July 2009, NJW-RR 2010, 136.  
1455
 OLG Düsseldorf  23 March 2011, BeckRS 2011, 17832 similarly followed BGH case law but referred primarily to article 8 
CISG as well as a decision from the Hoge Raad, published in a German journal. 
1456
 BGH 9 March 1994, NJW 1994, 2699, confirmed in BGH 25 February 2004, NJW-RR 2004, 1292. 
1457
 LG München 29 May 1995, NJW 1996, 401.  
1458
 BGH 4 March 2004, BeckRS 2004, 3238, previously also BGH 18 June 1971, NJW 1971, 2126 and BGH 6 December 1990, 
NJW-RR 1991, 570. 
1459
 K.P. Berger, ‘Die Einbeziehung von AGB in internationale Kaufverträge’, in: Festschrift Horn, p. 4. 
1460
 OLG Karlsruhe, 19 October 1992, NJW-RR 199, 567. 
1461
 BGH 3 December 1987, NJW 1988, 1210, repeated in BGH 12 February 1992, NJW 1992, p. 1232, confirming earlier 
decisions in domestic cases, BGH 20 March 1985, NJW 1985, 1838, as well as BGH BGH 7 June 1978, NJW 1978, 2243 with 
further references.  
1462
 BGH 20 March 1985, NJW 1985, 1838, as well as BGH 24 October 2000, NJW-RR 2001, 484. 
1463
 Rejecting this option BGH 5 May 1982,  NJW 1982, 1751 referring to previous case law.  
1464
 BGH 28 June 1990, NJW-RR 1991, 357. 
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In international cases, the BGH has frequently taken into account foreign judgments, 
CJEU case law and international business practices, while it adopts a stricter approach in 
domestic cases.   
 
10.3.3.2.3. Adequately making STC’s available  
The question whether STC’s have been made available may be decided under various 
regimes. This paragraph will consider the decisions under Brussels I or the Lugano 
Convention, as well as the CISG and German law, and compare these decisions with 
decisions in domestic cases.  
Under article 17 Lugano Convention, the BGH1465 has interpreted the requirements for 
the availability of STC´s strictly, in accordance with CJEU case law. 1466  However, the BGH 
is also bound to taken into account mandatory national law. In this case, the declaration in 
the form that the clauses had been read and understood constituted an unfair clause under 
article 11 par. 15 AGBG (as well as the Annex to Directive 93/13 under q) as it altered the 
burden of proof, which was however not relevant for the question whether a choice of 
jurisdiction had been validly established. 
 In this case, the question arises whether additional national law that is in accordance 
with a non-binding part of a Directive may be taken into account in the question whether a 
clause had been validly established under the Regulation.  While the BGH extensively refers 
to CJEU case law, and its own previous decisions, it does not refer to foreign decisions that 
support its conclusions on this point. Other decisions similarly raise questions with regard to 
simultaneously applicable sources of private law. The OLG Köln1467 upheld a clause for 
arbitration under article 23 Regulation 44/2001, noting that colliding clauses similarly opted 
for arbitration, referring to the rules on colliding clauses in the CISG that was applicable in 
this case, and left the question which clause had been validly included in the contract open. 
The LG Aachen1468 followed previous BGH decisions and the decision of the OLG Köln, and 
held that a choice for jurisdiction had not been validly established. 
However, questions on the simultaneous application of European measures and 
international measures should preferably be resolved by the CJEU, which is well-placed to 
do this because of its competence and because of its ability to prevent that national courts 
will come to diverging decisions throughout the Union. More generally, it is desirable that the 
CJEU develops a clear line on the relation between European measures on private 
international law and the material private law acquis. 
Under the CISG, the BGH 1469  has expressly pointed to diverging practices and 
diverging clauses that may be usual within branches, which may make it more difficult for the 
offeree to gain access to these clauses. This, in turn, may entail that an offeror should send 
the text of the STC’s used by him to the offeree, or make the text otherwise available, which 
is in accordance with duties of cooperation of potential contract parties and which may also 
prevent undue delay in transactions. Schmidt-Kessel1470 has criticised this decision, as he 
finds that the BGH has consciously set stricter standards for making available the text of 
STC’s than is the case under German law that for businesses merely requires the possibility 
to inform oneself of the STC’s. He also disapproves of the attempt if the BGH to develop the 
                                               
1465
 BGH 28 March 1996, NJW 1996, 1819, also BGH 22 February 2001, NJW 2001, 1731. 
1466
 CJEU 14 december 1976 (Colzani/Rüwa), Case 24-76, [1976] ECR, p. 1831 (referred to the CJEU by the BGH).  
1467
 OLG Köln 24 May 2006, 16 W 25/06, http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/urteile/1232.pdf.  
1468
 LG Aachen 22 June 2010, BeckRS 2010, 15502. 
1469
 BGH 31 October 2001, NJW 2002, 370. Accordingly, OLG Koblenz 1 March 2010, 2 U 816/09, 
http://www.globalsaleslaw.com/content/api/cisg/urteile/2126.pdf.  
1470
 M. Schmidt-Kessel, ‘Einbeziehung von Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen unter UN-Kaufrecht’, NJW 2002, p. 3445. 
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law in accordance with consumer protection law. Although the BGH did not refer to Directive 
93/13, it did find that in the interest of the responsiveness of the law to legal practice, as well 
as to prevent a disadvantaging of contract parties not acting in a professional capacity, it was 
necessary to ensure that similar principles underlie the law with regard to the inclusion of 
STC’s, either under the CISG or under articles 305-310 BGB. The CISG is not part of the 
acquis and has not been developed to improve consumer protection – article 2 CISG 
expressly excludes contracts with consumers from its scope, and it is hardly self-evident that 
the CISG should be interpreted in accordance with national consumer protection law.  
Moreover, developing the law implementing Directive 93/13 in accordance with the 
CISG should be left to the CJEU, as it concerns overlaps between the acquis and a treaty.  
Moreover, as Schmidt-Kessel 1471  points out, the BGH interpretation has not taken into 
account diverging foreign case law and is difficult to reconcile with the use of well-established 
international model contracts and clauses.  
However, the desirability of this course may become clearer from a previous decision 
of the LG Düsseldorf,1472 where a Danish buyer had acquired a generator from a German 
seller that had included a choice for German law in its STC’s. Without asking whether the 
case fell within the scope of the Directive – which had not been implemented yet but entered 
into force on 1 January 1995 – the LG held that the clause did not exclude the application of 
the CISG, although article 2 clearly excludes the sale of goods for personal use from the 
CISG. Referring this case to the CJEU could however have provided insight on the 
delineation of the CISG and the Directive. 
 The BGH has been lenient on the valid inclusion of clauses in international contracts 
under German law. Under German law, requirements to make available STC’s are less strict 
for business contracts than for consumer contracts, as article 310 par. 1 BGB makes clear 
that the requirements in article 305 par. 2 and 3 BGB are not applicable to business 
contracts.  
The BGH has referred to parties´ intentions and business practices in determining 
whether clauses have validly been included. In 1971, the BGH1473 already held that referral to 
STC’s sufficed as it made clear that the user of STC’s wished to include them in the contract, 
while the question whether it was usual to send the text of STC’s to business partners was 
considered irrelevant as the contract involved a service that the German bank’s STC’s were 
clearly designed to cover. In a later case the BGH1474 decided that STC’s that had been 
drafted in such small print that they were practically illegible were not validly included in the 
contract, even though similar clauses were often used in that particular branche, on which 
the BGH expressly elaborated, as the user of STC’s could not reasonable expect that his 
contract party by taking notice of hardly legible clauses, had agreed upon these terms.   
 Similarly, the LG Gießen1475 upheld the inclusion of the Dutch FENEX-clauses by 
referral to these clauses in an email, while the referral to ADR was upheld, in accordance 
with BGH case law in domestic cases. The court did however not refer to the applicable 
Directive 2000-31 on e/commerce. 
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 M. Schmidt-Kessel, ‘Einbeziehung von Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen unter UN-Kaufrecht’, NJW 2002, p. 3445-3446. 
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 LG Düsseldorf 11 October 1995, 2 O 506/94, at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=234. The OLG Düsseldorf 25 February 
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held that STC’s should be legible. 
1475
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Article 10 par. 3 Directive e-commerce sets higher standards for making STC’s sufficiently available. 
However, article 312g BGB that implements these requirements, was not considered. Should the court 
should have applied the Directive of its own motion? This seems contrary to the needs of legal 
preference and may also lead to surprises for contract parties that have relied on the applicability of 
STC’s. Also, article 312g par. 5 BGB stipulates, in accordance with article 10 par. 1 Directive, that 
business contracting with one another may agree otherwise. It is however unclear whether parties can 
agree otherwise implicitly, by accepting mere referral to a website, or whether they have to expressly 
agree that referral to well-established STC’s is sufficient. The latter conclusion seems undesirable, as 
this could entail that the establishment of a Directive meant to further online trade would inhibit trade 
and pose requirements contrary to the needs of trade.  
 
In contrast, in domestic cases, the BGH1476 has adopted a stricter approach. Mere referral to 
STC’s does not suffice, as inclusion requires explicit or implicit agreement.   
 It may be concluded that the BGH frequently takes into account relevant decisions 
from the CJEU. Courts deciding cases under German law also seek to take into account the 
needs of international practice by taking a lenient approach to requirements of making STC’s 
sufficiently available. In contrast, the BGH has adopted a stricter approach for determining 
this under international regimes, which may lead to inconsistencies with the decisions of 
foreign courts and be difficult to reconcile with the use of international model STC’s. Its 
restraint in referring questions on the overlap between European measures to the CJEU may 
however undermine consistency throughout the Union, despite existing CJEU case law. In 
turn, this may diminish predictability, as the expectations of private parties relying on CJEU 
case law may be undermined. 
  
10.3.3.2.4. The interpretation of clauses in international contracts 
Typically, the interpretation of international contracts takes place in accordance with the 
applicable regime. Thus, the question of applicable law precedes the interpretation of STC’s. 
However, if a clause has a well-established meaning in international legal practice – which 
will especially the case for clauses often-used in international practice – the courts may take 
that international meaning as a starting point. 1477  In the interpretation of clauses in 
international contracts, courts may accordingly refer to international sources.  
Already in 1967, the BGH1478 had already held that the insurance conditions agreed 
upon by parties had a distinct meaning in international trade and should be interpreted 
accordingly. The BGH went on to consider that the meaning of these clauses in international 
differed from German law and referred to English law.  
Similarly, a 1984 decision of the BGH1479 also referred to the usual meaning of ‘cash on 
delivery’ clauses, referring to its own previous case law in domestic cases as well as 
international materials. In a 1986 decision, the BGH1480 similarly held that the interpretation of 
an English clause required that the court evaluated the meaning of the clause for contract 
parties taking into account practices established in international trade. Similarly, In a 1991 
case, the BGH 1481  held that generally, an indemnity clause was to be interpreted in 
accordance with English law, even though the circumstances did not indicate that English 
law was applicable.  
                                               
1476
 BGH 12 February 1992, NJW 1992, 1232, previously also BGH 3 July 1981, BeckRS 1981, 31065460. 
1477
 Maidl 2000, p. 150. 
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 BGH 13 November 1967, BeckRS 1967, 3037507. 
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 BGH 19 September 1984, NJW 1985, 550, comp. also BGH 2 July 1984, NJW 1985, 550.  
1480
 BGH 16 October 1986, NJW 1987, 591.  
1481
 BGH 2 December 1991, NJW-RR 1992, 423. 
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Recently, the BGH1482 held that the interpretation of a term drafted by the ICC should 
be interpreted in accordance with the directions from the ICC, in accordance with article 8 
CISG, as the term had a well-established meaning that parties were likely to be familiar with 
when entering into the contracts. The BGH referred both to foreign and European decisions 
on this point. 
The BGH has also taken into account parties’ intentions. Accordingly, the BGH1483 
has accordingly held that the use of the clause referring to ‘deadfreight’ did not stand in the 
way of the applicability of article 588 HGB as parties had obviously intended this, although 
‘deadfreight’ usually had a different meaning than ‘Fautfracht’ in articles 580 et seq HGB.  
Lower courts have followed the BGH’s referral to international and foreign 
materials.1484 Earlier, the OLG München1485 had already explicitly referred to Incoterms in its 
interpretation of the terms agreed upon between parties. The OLG Hamm1486 upheld a clause 
stipulating that all additional agreements to the contract should be written under articles 29 
par. 2 CISG. The OLG Hamm1487 also held that determining the palce of delivery should be 
determined in accordance with applicable European law as well as the directions from the 
ICC the clauses of which were applied to the contract.  
Interestingly, the approach towards the interpretation of English clauses differs from 
the interpretation of these clauses in international contracts by the English judiciary that 
adopt a more neutral approach to the interpretation of clauses in foreign languages.1488 Dutch 
judges have also adopted a different approach, an interpret clauses in accordance with 
Dutch concepts.1489 Triebel and Balthasar1490 have pointed out that this approach towards the 
interpretation of clauses in foreign languages is difficult to reconcile with articles 133 and 157 
BGB, as parties unfamiliar with English law will generally not intend to refer to a concept as it 
has been developed in English law, while the use of English in the drafting of the contract 
does not necessarily amount to a choice for English law.  
The BGH1491 has distinguished between international and domestic contracts in the 
interpretation of clauses, and rejected referral to international guidelines to determine 
whether an exclusion clause in a domestic contract was acceptable, while distinguishing the 
duties of banks in international and domestic contracts. In the interpretation of domestic 
contracts, the courts have taken the objective interpretation of STC’s as a starting point. 
Thus, STC’s are interpreted in accordance with the intentions of rational and reasonable 
contract parties, taking into account the interests typically involved in transactions where the 
STC’s are applied.1492 The individual circumstances are not taken as a starting point.1493  
 German courts have frequently interacted with foreign courts and the CJEU in the 
interpretation of clauses in international contracts, which increases the chance that these 
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clauses will be interpreted consistently in different states, which may also benefit accessibility 
and predictability. Moreover, the approach of German courts also takes into account well-
established clauses drafted by non-state actors as well as the intention of parties, which 
increases the chance that German decisions are in accordance with the needs and 
preferences of international practice. 
 
10.3.3.2.5. Conclusion on the interpretation of international contracts 
The approach of German courts to international cases differs depending on the question 
whether it concerns a case under German law or international law. Courts are more inclined 
to refer to foreign materials and international business practices in cases falling under 
German law. The interaction between courts and foreign and international actors contributes 
to the responsiveness of the law to international practice. The active approach of the courts 
may compensate for the restraint of the German legislator with regard to regulatory 
competition. However, as case law is less visible in international trade than legislation, the 
extent to which courts may compensate for the legislator’s restraint remains limited.  
Since the courts clearly recognise the added value of international and foreign 
materials in these cases, it is surprising that the courts have simultaneously adopted restraint 
in referring to foreign and international materials in cases falling under international regimes. 
In these cases, there are more, and not less, reasons for referring to these materials. 
Particularly, the lack of referral may diminish the consistent and predictable interpretation of 
treaties. Especially if treaties such as the CISG indicate that they should be interpreted 
uniformly, the lack of referral to international materials and foreign decisions may be contrary 
to especially foreign parties’ expectations.  
However, German courts have adopted a more lenient approach in international 
cases than in domestic cases, which may be in accordance with the needs and preferences 
of parties in international trade. Yet this development simultaneously increases the chance 
that the law on international B2B contracts is developed differently from domestic B2B and 
B2C contracts, which may increase the chance of inconsistencies, despite the German 
legislator’s choice to extend the scope of Directive 93/13.  
The inclination of German courts to refer to German materials may mroeover inhibit 
accessibility for foreign parties as these parties may not have access to German materials. In 
some cases, the lack of interaction may lead to problems. In particular, the restraint of the 
BGH in referring questions on the overlap between treaties and European measures may 
undermine consistency and accessibility, as the relation between different measures remains 
undecided by the CJEU.  
 
10.3.3.3. Conclusion on the development of German law and international trade 
Have German actors interacted adequately with international actors, European actors and 
non-state actors in the development of the law on STC’s in an international context and how 
has that affected the predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness of the law 
on STC’s? 
 Whereas the German legislator has shown restraint in interacting with international 
actors, particularly with regard to regulatory competition, German courts have considered 
initiatives and preferences from international actors. The lack of interaction between the BGH, 
largely followed by lower courts, and the CJEU, especially with regard to cases on the 
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overlap between European measures, German law and international law may leave room for 
inconsistency and unpredictability, but German courts seem consistent in their restraint. 
The attention fo German courts to international initiatives and practices has benefitted 
the responsiveness of the German law on STC’s to international trade and to national views 
on justice, but German case law is generally not very accessible for international or foreign 
parties.   
 
10.3.4. Conclusion on the development of the law on STC’s through the BGB   
Have German actors adequately taken into account interdependence in the development of 
the law on STC’s, and interacted accordingly, and how has this affected the predictability, 
consistency, accessibility and responsiveness of the law developed through the BGB? 
Firstly, the use of codification and previously the choice to develop Sonderprivatrecht 
was not based on foreign experiences or European initiatives and has not been reconsidered 
as the acquis developed. The German legislator has not recognised interdependence in 
ensuring the predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness through the BGB, 
but German actors have actively interacted with European actors in the development of the 
acquis, which limits the exent to which the acquis disturbs the BGB.  The lack of interaction 
in the implementation and application in the acquis may however undermine the 
comprehensibility of the law in the long term.   
 The German legislator has rejected regulatory competition for the law on STC’s, but 
this has not undermined the quality of the law in terms of predictability, accessibility, 
consistency or responsiveness. In contrast, the private drafts for regulatory competition might 
well undermine the quality of the law. The restraint of the German legislator does however 
not mean that it has not recognised the added value of comparative law insights or that the 
law is not in accordance with the needs of international practice. The referral of courts in 
international cases under German law may further contribute to the responsiveness of the 
law on STC’s to international practice. 
In contrast, the restraint of courts in international cases under international regimes 





10.4. Blanket clauses 
In the area of  STC’s, overlapping blanket clauses coexist, notably article 3 Directive, 
implemented by article 307 BGB, which however diverges slightly from article 3 par. 1 
Directive,1494 as well as article 242 BGB. Have actors taken into account that other actors 
also develop private law and that the extent to which actors may ensure the predictable, 
consistent, accessible and responsive development of the law through blanket clayses may 
be diminished? Have actors interacted with other actors accordingly and how has this 
affected the predictability, consistency, accessibility and the responsiveness of private law in 
this area?  
Paragraph 10.4.1. will ask whether German and European courts have recognised 
the competence of courts at the European and national level to interpret article 307 BGB and 
interacted accordingly. Paragraph 10.4.2. will turn to model lists and paragraph 10.4.3. will 
consider the evaluation of clauses in international contracts. Paragraph 10.4.4. will end with 
a conclusion. 
 
10.4.1. Competence to interpret blanket clauses 
It is not clear how the competence to interpret article 3 Directive 93/13 is divided between the 
CJEU and national courts. Paragraph 10.4.1.1. will consider CJEU case law on this question 
and paragraph 10.4.1.2. will contrast these decisions with BGH case law. Paragraph 10.4.1.3. 
will end with a conclusion. 
 
10.4.1.1. The CJEU on the competence to interpret article 3 Directive 93/13 
The CJEU is competent to interpret European law under article 267 TFEU. National courts 
do not have to refer to the CJEU if it concerns an acte clair: if the interpretation of a blanket 
clause is so obvious that it does not have to be referred to the CJEU.1495 However, this 
concerns the uniform interpretation of European law. Is article 3 Directive also meant to be 
interpreted uniformly? In Freiburger Kommunalbauten, the CJEU ruled that: 
 
‘the Court may interpret general criteria used by the Community legislature in order to define 
the concept of unfair terms. However, it should not rule on the application of these general 
criteria to a particular term, which must be considered in the light of the particular 
circumstances of the case in question’ 
  
The CJEU expressly refers to the conclusion of A.G. Geelhoed,1496 who finds that although 
the CJEU is competent to interpret article 3 Directive, the CJEU is not competent to interpret 
contractual terms and assess the circumstances relevant for deciding whether a clause is in 
fact unfair. He goes on to defend that article 3 is not intended to be interpreted uniformly. 
Although the CJEU does not refer to that particular part of his conclusions, this conclusion 
does not seem irreconcilable with the wording of article 1 Directive that states that it is the 
aim of the Directive to approximate – not unify – the law of Member States on this point. 
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 However, later case law may draw this conclusion into doubt. In Océano,1497 the 
CJEU did not restrain from deciding that a jurisdiction clause in a consumer contract was 
unfair. A.-G. Trstenjak, in her conclusion before Pénzügyi Lízing1498 explicitly refers to the 
conclusion of A.-G. Geelhoed in this matter, finding that subsequent case law supported A.-G. 
Geelhoed’s view that the judicial evaluation of clauses in consumer contacts should be 
decentralised. She specifically points to the relevance of national law and individual 
circumstances to determine the fairness of a clause, and she concludes that:  
 
‘the guidelines on assessment given in those judgments cannot in any way be regarded as 
definitive. They are just some of the ‘general criteria’ within the meaning of the case-law which 
the Court can provide to the national court under its monopoly on the interpretation of 
Community law. The specification of what constitutes unfairness under Article 3(1) of the 
Directive at the level of Community law must ultimately be construed as an ongoing process 
the end point of which it is for the Court to determine. It must be the task of the Court gradually 
to give specific expression to the abstract criteria for reviewing whether a term may be 
classified as unfair and, with increasing experience, to establish a profile for reviewing the 
unfairness of terms at the level of Community law.’ 
 
Perhaps, the wording of the decision in Freiburger Kommunalbauten leaves open the 
possibility that the CJEU ruled that it is competent to provide abstract criteria to interpret 
article 3, while it was left to national judges to determine whether a clause was in fact unfair, 
in other words: a factual decision.1499  
This view is supported by the wording in more recent case law, where the CJEU1500 
has held that ‘[i]t is thus clear that the Court of Justice must limit itself, in its response, to 
providing the referring court with the indications which the latter must take into account in 
order to assess whether the term at issue is unfair’. Accordingly, the CJEU refers to the 
Annex to the Directive, and the reasons for and methods of including a term that is potentially 
unfair, as well as the clarity of that term.  
In other cases, the CJEU has also provided further guidelines relevant for the 
assessment of the fairness of clauses. Thus, in Pereničová and Perenič/SOS financ spol. s 
r.o.,1501 the CJEU held that the unfairness of a commercial practice could be a relevant 
circumstance for the interpretation of unfairness under article 4 Directive. In Pohotovosť 
s.r.o./Korčkovská,1502  the CJEU, referring to Freiburger Kommunalbauten, pointed to the 
Annex to the Directive and the consequences of clauses under the applicable law. In 
Pannon/Győrfi,1503 the CJEU decided that it is for the national court to assess the fairness of 
a clause in fact, taking into account that a term conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the court in 
the place of residence of the seller (a clause that was found to be unfair in Océano1504) ‘may 
be considered to be unfair’. This view has moreover recently been confirmed in Aziz v 
Catalunyacaixa,1505 where the CJEU repeated that it establishes general criteria that national 
courts must or may consider in the factual assessment of clauses. Thus, the CJEU provides 
                                               
1497
 CJEU 27 June 2000 (Océano Grupo/ Quintero), joined cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, [2000] ECR, p. I-4941. 
1498
 Conclusion of A.G. Trstenjak of 6 July 2010 before case C-137/08 (VB Pénzügyi Lízing/ Schneider),  [2010] ECR p. I-0, pars. 
96-97, 99. 
1499
 Also in this sense J. Hijma, Algemene voorwaarden, Kluwer: Deventer 2010, p. 25-26. 
1500
 CJEU 26 April 2012 (Hatóság/Invitel), C-472/10, ECR [2012], p. I-0, par. 22, similarly CJEU 9 November 2010, (VB 
Pénzügyi Lízing/ Schneider), C-137/08 , [2010] ECR p. I-0, par. 44. 
1501
 CJEU 15 March 2012 (Pereničová and Perenič/SOS financ spol. s r.o.), C-453/10, [2012] ECR, p. I-0, par. 43.  
1502
 CJEU 16 November 2010 (Pohotovosť s.r.o./Korčkovská), C-76/10, [2010] ECR, p. I-0, par. 58, 60. 
1503
 CJEU 4 June 2009, (Pannon/Győrfi), C-243/08, ECR [2009], p. I-4713, par. 44. 
1504
 CJEU 7 June 2000 (Océano/ Quintero), joined cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, [2000] ECR, p. I-4941.   
1505




guidance. In this case, the CJEU points to the relevance of national law that would have 
been applicable in the absence of the agreement, to compare the position of the consumer 
under the clause with the position of the consumer under national law. If the position of the 
consumer is decidedly less advantageous, this is an indication that the clause is to the 
detriment of the consumer – whether this is unfairly so, may be another question, answered 
in line with the criteria of article 4 Directive 93/13.  
In addition, according to Basedow,1506 general principles may also play a role in the 
interpretation of blanket clauses by the CJEU.   
 The European view on the allocation between the CJEU and the national courts in the 
interpretation of article 307 BGB leaves room for unclarity. Although initially, the CJEU 
seemed to leave considerable room to national courts, later CJEU case law may indicate a 
more active role for the CJEU in the interpretation of article 3 Directive. Thus, the question 
whether the CJEU is competent to provide guidelines for the interpretation of provisions 
implementing article 3 Directive 93/13 and how that affects the competence of national courts 
has not been clearly decided by the CJEU. Thus, this question is not an acte éclairé.1507 The 
question whether the CJEU is competent to interpret or provide guidelines on article 3 
Directive has as such not been asked before; the question in Freiburger Kommunalbauten 
was whether a specific clause was unfair in the meaning of the Directive. As the Directive 
indicates that this requires an individual rather than an abstract evaluation of the fairness of a 
clause, the factual evaluation remains with national courts. National courts accordingly have 
to refer questions on the allocation of competence in the interpretation of blanket clauses.   
 This does not mean that the CJEU will necessarily declare itself competent. National 
courts may well have decided cases in which the interpreted and applied article 307 BGB 
correctly. The problems is that this question has not yet been decided by the CJEU.  
Quite another question is whether it is desirable for the CJEU to have competence to 
provide guidelines for the interpretation of article 307 BGB. Guidelines have alreayd been 
well-established at the national level, and CJEU guidelines may be different, which could 
undermine the consistency of the law. Moreover, the CJEU does not provide consistent 
guidelines for the development of the acquis; instead, the allocation of competences and the 
guidelines may differ depending on the Directive.   
 
10.4.1.2. The BGH and the interpretation of article 307 BGB 
Initially, the BGH1508 followed the view that article 307 BGB goes beyond the standard of 
article 3 par. 1 Directive, in accordance with the minimum harmonisation character of the 
Directive, and consequently, national courts are competent and referral is not necessary.1509  
The BGH ruled that it would not refer to the CJEU as the question whether clauses are fair or 
unfair within the meaning of articles 9-11 AGBG is a matter for the German judiciary that the 
CJEU is not competent to determine. In contrast,  the BGH later referred questions on the 
interpretation of article 307 BGB in Freiburger Kommunalbauten to the CJEU,1510 concerning 
a clause in a building contract that provided the respondents with a surety, in accordance 
with article 7 of the regulation on real estate agents and builders (‘Makler- und 
Bauträgerverordnung’). The BGH considered that it was doubtful whether the clause was 
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unfair, as it was compensated by another clause to the benefit of the consumers. However, 
as the clause could, in the different legal orders, be considered unfair, and was therefore 
referred to the CJEU. The decision of the BGH in Freiburger Kommunalbauten1511 is in 
accordance with the view that although article 307 BGB provides more protection to the 
consumer than article 3 Directive, referral need not be made when clauses are found to be 
unfair, but in cases where a clause is upheld, the case should be referred to the CJEU, as 
the minimum standard should be complied with, which may become relevant in these 
cases.1512  
The BGH1513 subsequently cited Freiburger Kommunalbauten1514 to confirm its own 
competence to interpret article 307 BGB and evaluate the fairness of clauses under article 
307 BGB in cases falling within the scope of the Directive. Accordingly, since Freiburger 
Kommunalbauten, the BGH has interpreted article 307 BGB and evaluated clauses under 
this provision without referring questions to the CJEU, taking into account CJEU case law, 
Directive 93/13, or foreign case law.1515 However, the CJEU has not provided a conclusive 
answer and it therefore does not concern an acte éclairé. The controversy on this question in 
German debate1516  also indicates that it is hardly a settled question that can easily be 
deduced from existing CJEU case law. Lower courts largely follow BGH case law, although 
some lower courts have referred to the Directive in the interpretation of article 307 BGB. 1517  
However, in a 2011 decision, the BGH1518 did consider the competence of the CJEU 
to interpret the Directive, specifically article 1 par. 2 Directive, implemented in article 307 par. 
3 BGB. The BGH asked the CJEU whether a term for the unilateral amendment of prices in 
contracts for the supply of gas should be evaluated under the Directive, as the terms 
reflected legislative provisions applicable to similar contracts for the supply of gas. The 
CJEU1519 held that if the legislature has chosen to exempt particular contracts from legislation 
that would otherwise prevent the evaluation of clauses in accordance with article 307 par. 3 
BGB, parties cannot circumvent evaluation under article 307 BGB by reflecting the provisions 
of law that is not applicable. To determine the fairness of the term, the question whether 
consumers could foresee changes when they entered into the contract and realistically 
terminate the contract was important. 
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 BGH 2 May 2002, NZM 2002, 764.   
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 P. Ulmer, ‘Der AGB-Gesetz nach der Umsetzung der EG-Richtlinie über miβbräuchliche Klauseln in Verbraucherverträgen’, 
in: Karlsruher Reform 1998, p. 38. 
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 BGH 14 July 2004, BeckRS 2004, 07903, par. II, 3,  see similarly, with an overview of case law, F. Graf von Westphalen, 
‘AGB-Recht im Jahre 2004’, NJW 2005, p. 1987.   
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 CJEU 1 April 2004 (Freiburger Kommunalbauten v Hofstetter), C- 237/02, [2004], ECR, p. I-3403. 
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BGH 20 March 2012, BeckRS 2012, 10736, BGH  14 March 2012, BeckRS 2012, 8786, BGH 9 December 2010, NJW 2011, 
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1516
 MunchKomm zum BGB/Basedow (2012) article 307 nr 25, with further references.  
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 OLG München 9 October 2003, NJW-RR 2004, 212 (the decision has not become binding) noted that in the evaluation of 
clauses, the court should take into account surrounding clauses, as stipulated in article 4 Directive. OLG Stuttgart 3 december 
2009, BeckRS 2009, 88415 upheld a clause that stipulated a tariff that was owed to the bank when the credit contract 
(‘Bausparvertrag’) was concluded constituted a clause on the price that fell under the main terms of the contract, referring to the 
preamble of the Directive. However, the clause endured judicial evaluation under article 307 BGB, and followed BGH case law. 
OLG Frankfurt 15 April 2010, BeckRS 2010, 14553 held that a clause that limited the validity of tickets did not cause a 
significant imbalance in parties’ rights and obligations in the sense of article 3 Directive, as implemented by article 307 BGB, 
and upheld the clause accordingly. 
1518
 BGH 9 February 2011, NJW 2011, 1392. 
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 CJEU 31 March 2013 (RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen), C-92/11, [2013] ECR, p. I0. 
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Interestingly, the change of the approach of the BGH in this matter was preceded by 
a prejudicial question from the OLG Oldenburg.1520 Moreover, terms reserving the right for 
the suppliers of gas to unilaterally amend their prices were increasingly challenged by 
consumers. The CJEU decision does however render previous BGH decisions on this point 
uncertain.1521  
This does not mean that German decisions are not in accordance with the 
Directive,1522  but the interpretation of article 307 BGB is currently oriented at national law,1523 
which may differ from the standard established in article 3 Directive in several respects: 
  




 has ruled that clauses that do not allow contract parties bound to STC’s to assess their 
rights and obligations under the contract, such as amendment clauses that make it impossible for the 
consumer to foresee under what circumstances and to what extent additional payment will be required, 
are unfair. Possibly, this goes beyond the standard of article 3 par. 1 Directive that stipulates that a 
term shall be unfair if it results in a ‘significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations’ that is 
contrary to good faith.  
However, this interpretation is in line with the decision of the CJEU in Invitel,
1525
 that the clarity 
of terms is ‘of fundamental importance’ under article 4 Directive. Arguably, the clarity of terms is 
important, but from subsequent case law it follows that this is not the only relevant circumstance, and 
the question arises whether it can be deduced from the wording of the CJEU that the clarity of a 
contract term should be decisive.  
The outcomes in these cases are not necessarily problematic as this stricter standard leads to 
a higher level of consumer protection, in accordance with the minimum harmonisation character of the 
Directive.  
 
2) Constitutional law may become relevant in the assessment of the fairness of 
terms.1526 It can be doubted, despite the existence of the Charter, whether this will 
similarly be the case for the assessment of terms under the Directive.  
 
3) The BGH evaluates clauses in a more objective manner than indicated in the 
Directive and in CJEU case law.1527  
 
The unclarity on the division of competences between the CJEU and national courts does not 
in fact mean that the CJEU will conclude, if a question is referred, that it is competent to 
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 OLG Oldenburg 14 December 2010, BeckRS 2011, 8627. 
1521
 L. Zabel, ‘Die Anforderungen an Preisanpassungsklauseln in Gas- und Fernwärmelieferverträgen’, KommJur 2011, p. 269. 
1522
 Comp. OLG Bamberg 19 October 2011, BeckRS 2011, 28303 that held a clause that was contrary to the duties following 
from Directive 2007/64 as ineffective under article 307 BGB, holding that previous case law of the BGH was outdated. OLG 
München 17 January 2008, NJW-RR 2008, 1233 held that a clause that limited the validity of a gift coupon to a year was 
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for competition and the constitutional free choice of a lawyer, is very likely also in accordance with the Directive. OLG Koblenz 
13 June 2012, BeckRS 2012, 12430, holding that a clause that excluded the consumer’s right to assignment would be 
ineffective under article 307 BGB is in accordance with the Annex to the Directive that includes clauses that inappropriately limit 
consumers’ rights towards the supplier who has breached the contract under sub b.  OLG Stuttgart 24 May 2012, BeckRS 2012, 
11663 rejecting a clause that enabled an English insurer to limit the value of the claim of the policy holder that had terminated 
the contract is likely also in accordance with the Directive, as the clause may fall under either sub d or sub e of the Annex. 
Despite the abundance of case law on this topic, very few cases that may be problematic under the Directive become apparent. 
1523
 The standard used in the evaluation of STC’s under article 307 BGB can be traced to BGH 11 June 1979, NJW 1979, 1886. 
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 BGH 19 October 1999, NJW 2000, 651. 
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 CJEU 26 April 2012 (Hatóság/Invitel), C-472/10, [2012] ECR, p. I-0, par. 28. 
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 Comp. BverfG 25 October 2004, NJW 2005, 1036, BverfG 23 November 2006, NJW 2007, 286. 
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 Baier 2004, p. 86-87.  
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interpret article 3 Directive. The minimum harmonisation character of the Directive may be a 
reason for the CJEU to allow for discretion at the national level.  
Also, it is also not desirable that courts would have to start referring all its cases to the 
CJEU. The need to refer frequently to the CJEU would undermine the protection offered by 
national courts, and increase the amount of time necessary to decide a case, as referral to 
the CJEU may considerably extend the length of the procedure, which will not benefit 
consumer protection.1528 Moreover, article 307 BGB is closely connected with good faith, a 
fundamental principle in the German legal order.1529 Reallocating competence to interpret 
central principles to the European level could drastically affect the consistent and coherent 
development of German private law. If this decision is made, it should therefore be subject to 
critical democratic debate. 
 
10.4.1.3. Conclusion on the competence to interpret blanket clauses 
Courts at the national and European level have insufficiently recognised the interdependence 
between courts in interpreting blanket clauses. Because of the lack of interaction, this 
question has remained invisble in the European debate on the reform of the Directive. 
However, this question should be addressed in the legislative process, especially as it might 
concern a considerable reallocation of competences to the European level, which may inhibit 
consistency as well as responsiveness, as national courts are better placed to interpret  
blanket clauses in accordance with (national) society’s views on justice and national legal 
practice. As article 3 Directive 93/13 was inserted to improve responsiveness, overlooking 
the roles of national courts in ensuring responsiveness would be unfortunate. 
Meanwhile, it does not become apparent that the lack of interaction directly leads to 
porblems for private parties, as German courts have ensured the predictable, consistent and 
responsive development of the law through article 307 BGB. However, it is desirable that the 
BGH adopts a more consistent, predictable approach to referring questions to the CJEU. 
.   
10.4.2. Model lists 
Model lists have been established both by the European and the German legislator. Neither 
the German1530 nor the European model list1531 provides an exhaustive list of unfair clauses – 
thus, clauses that do not fall within the scope of the list may also be unfair. Generally, model 
lists should clarify how blanket clauses should be interpreted, thus contributing to 
consistency and predictability. Does the simultaneous use of model lists undermine 
predictability, consistency and the accessibility of one or both of these lists, or has interaction 
added to predictability, consistency and accessibility? 
Paragraph 10.4.2.1. will consider the development of the German and European 
model lists and paragraph 10.4.2.2. will discuss the implementation of the European model 
list. Paragraph 10.4.2.3. will turn to the application of the model lists by the courts and 
paragraph 10.4.2.4. will end with a conclusion. 
 
10.4.2.1. The development of the German and European model lists  
                                               
1528
 P. Ulmer, ‘Der AGB-Gesetz nach der Umsetzung der EG-Richtlinie über miβbräuchliche Klauseln in Verbraucherverträgen’, 
in: Karlsruher Reform 1998, p. 38, 39.  
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 Heiderhoff, WM 2003, p. 510 .  
1530
 BGH 24 September 1980, NJW 1981, 118. 
1531
 CJEU 7 May 2002 (Commission/Sweden), C-478/99, [2002] ECR p. I-4147. 
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The German legislator was one of the first legislators to establish a regime, including black 
and grey lists, while European harmonisation initiatives had not yet developed. Consequently, 
the German legislator had less opportunity to draw from the experiences from other 
legislators in the European Union with regard to the use of black and grey lists. However, 
international initiatives had developed, and especially the Warsaw Contention was relevant 
and should have been taken into account.  
The German black and grey list are inspired by standing case law on unfair terms that 
were moreover developed for businesses, which entails that they will also be relevant for 
B2B contracts.1532 Ulmer and Habersack1533 note that the judicial evaluation under article 307 
BGB has been sharpened as the effect of the model lists on article 307 BGB have become 
visible, and as article 307 BGB has been used to fill up gaps in the model lists. Foreign 
legislators, in a later stage, have looked to the German regime for inspiration.1534  
Notably, the German legislator initially objected to the use of the model list at a 
European level,1535 and the indicative nature of the list in the Annex is attributed to German 
criticism.1536 Because of the correlation between model lists and general default law, the use 
of binding model lists has also been rejected because it could be a back door to a European 
contract law.1537  
Originally, the 1990 version of the model list to the Directive was not considered to be 
of much added value, as it did not provide clear guidance on how to balance parties’ right in 
determining whether a term is unfair under the draft Directive. That does not mean that the 
model list as such was considered of little value, as it was simultaneously considered that in 
an amended version, the list could contribute to predictability. 1538  
 Thus, the active participation of German actors limited the obligation of the German 
legislator to amend existing model lists. 
 
10.4.2.2. The implementation of the European model list 
Because of the indicative character of the European model list, it was not clear how far the 
obligation of the German legislator to implement the model list went. Preamble 17 to the 
Directive, referring to its minimum character, allows Member States to alter the wording of 
the annex depending on their national law. Preamble 17 also seems to allow for more 
restrictive drafting.1539 Yet the non-binding nature of the European list does not mean that 
Member States are free to ignore the model list, as this may undermine the extent to which 
the European model list contributes to the predictability of article 3 Directive. The decision of 
the CJEU in Commission/Sweden1540  made clear that the model list should be a source of 
information both for legislators, judiciaries, and contract parties, and consequently, Member 
States must implement the list in a way ‘that offer[s] a sufficient guarantee that the public can 
obtain knowledge of it’.  
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1533
 Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen/AGB-Recht/Ulmer/.Habersack (2012) introduction, nr 71. 
1534
 For example the Dutch legislator; see par. 11.3.  
1535
 BR-Drucks. 611/90, p. 1.  
1536
 P. Ulmer, ‘Das AGB-Gesetz nach der Umsetzung der EG-Richtlinie über miβbräuchliche Lauseln in Verbraucherverträge’, in: 
Karlsruher Forum 1997, p. 31, 33-34. 
1537
 Jansen ZeuP 2010, p. 82. 
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 See for example H.E. Brandner, P. Ulmer, ‘EG-Richtlinie über miβbräuchliche Klauseln in Verbraucherverträgen’, BB 1991, 
p. 706. 
1539
 Grabitz/Hilf/Das Recht der Europäischen Union/Pfeiffer (2012), article 3, nr 89, similarly MunchKomm zum BGB/Wurmnest 
(2012) article 308, nr 10. 
1540
 CJEU 7 May 2002 (Commission/Sweden), C-478/99, [2002] ECR p. I-4147, par. 22. 
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Moreover, in Grimaldi,1541 the Court more generally held that even if measures are not 
binding, this does not mean that they have no legal effect at all, and they should be taken 
into account by national judiciaries in their decisions. Accordingly, Wolf,1542 considering the 
role of the Annex in the clarification of article 3 Directive, has held that divergences from the 
Annex should be based on good reasons. Graf von Westphalen 1543  finds that the 
implementation of the model list in German law is insufficient, as the present implementation 
is not publicly accessible, or publicly known. Similarly, Baier1544 has held that implementation 
in German law does not suffice because differently than the Swedish legislator, the German 
legislator has not made the Annex available for the consumer: ‘Für den deutschen 
Verbraucher existiert die Liste gewissermaβen gar nicht.’  
In these views, implementation apparently requires that the model list in the Annex is 
made separately available to consumers. This would however undermine accessibility, as it 
may be confusing that two apparently largely similar model lists would be available to 
indicate whether a list is unfair.  
In the implementation of the model list, the German legislator amended articles 308 
and 309 BGB, but these provisions do not completely reflect the European model list.  
 
 Some clauses have been inserted after the Directive was established. 
  
Thus, article 309 par. 7 sub a was extended to prohibit the exclusion of damages for death or injury to 
consumers caused by a fault or omission of the user of STC’s.  
 
 Some differences have remained.  
 
In particular, articles 308-309 BGB do not include arbitration clauses, included under 1 sub q in the 
Annex, while article 309 par. 8 sub b BGB is formulated more narrowly, prohibiting exclusion clauses 
with regard to the sale of new goods, while the Annex, under 1 sub b, prohibits all exclusion clauses. 
According to Wurmnest,
1545
 this more narrow interpretation should be seen against the trade in 
secondhand goods that may often show small defects but that are sold for a lower price than new 
goods. Additionally, articles 308 and 309 BGB do not include an express prohibition on clauses falling 
under the Annex par. 1 sub d, although these clauses can be held ineffective under articles 308 par. 7, 
and 309 pars. 5 and 6 BGB. Similarly, articles 308-309 do not expressly prohibit clauses falling under 
the Annex par. 1 sub f, although these clauses can be challenged under articles 308 pars. 3 and 7, 
and 309 pars. 5 and 6 BGB. Also, articles 308 and 309 do not directly bar clauses falling under the 
Annex par. 1 sub g. Moreover, although clauses in the Annex under par. 1 sub m are not expressly 
prohibited under articles 308 and 309, they will generally affect the right of the consumer to 
performance, and these clauses will generally fall under article 309 par. 7 BGB. Additionally, articles 
308-309 do not expressly prohibit clauses falling under the Annex par. 1 sub q, although these clauses 
may be challenged under articles 309 nrs 5 and 12, while clauses limiting consumers’ right to a fair 
process will generally be held ineffective under article 307 BGB.  
 
 Furthermore, provisions in the BGB may prohibit clauses under the Annex.1546  
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 Clauses falling under the Annex par. 1 sub i will generally not be valid as they are in breach of article 305 BGB. Also, 
clauses falling under par. 1 sub f in rent contracts are prohibited by article 547 par. 2 BGB, while article 551 BGB limits the 
possibility to stipulate a security for future rent.. 
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Notably, some clauses under the Annex may diverge from default law and can therefore be 
considered unfair, such as clauses under Annex par. 1 sub n, which diverges from article 164 BGB, 
while these clauses may also fall under article 309 par. 11 BGB, and clauses stipulating a choice of 
jurisdiction between a business and a consumer are contrary to article 38 par. 1 ZPO and therefore 
void.  
 
These divergences do not have to lead to the incorrect implementation of the Directive, but it 
may be doubted whether the model list has been implemented in such a way that the 
European model list serves as a source of information. 
Pfeiffer and Schinkels1547 note that the legislator decided not to copy-paste the grey 
list in the annex to the Directive, despite arguments before the implementation of the 
Directive that the legislator should consider implementing the list in the Annex to the 
Directive, especially with regard to clauses in the black and grey list that are stricter than 
German law, because the CJEU would likely use the black and grey list in its interpretation of 
article 3 Directive.1548  
The decision of the German legislator not to implement the Annex to the Directive in 
German law may be seen against the background of the general restraint of the German 
legislator to amend the AGBG and the BGB to absolutely necessary amendments. 1549 
Moreover, it was not clear whether the German legislator was bound to amend the law for 
the implementation of the model list in the Annex to the Directive, while articles 308 and 309 
BGB already largely reflected the clauses in the Annex. Moreover, the correlation between 
national default law and the model list may also have played a role in the legislator’s 
unwillingness to amend the law.  
Thus, whether interdependence has not clearly developed, but it is possible that the 
German legislator has not sufficiently recognised the potential importance of the European 
model list.  
   
10.4.2.3. The aplication of the European model list by the German courts  
How have German courts approached the evaluation of clauses that may fall in the scope of 
the model list in the Annex to the Directive?  
Paragraph 10.4.2.3.1. will consider the approach of the BGH, and paragraph 
10.4.2.3.2. will turn to the decisions from lower courts. Paragraph 10.4.2.3.3. will end with a 
conclusion. 
 
10.4.2.3.1. The approach of the BGH towards the European model list   
The BGH has not developed a clear approach towards the European model list and has not 
interacted with the CJEU on the status of this list.  
 The BGH1550 has emphasised the CJEU decision in Commission/Sweden where the 
CJEU ruled on the indicative and illustrative character of the model list in the Annex to the 
Directive.  
 
The decision of the BGH to uphold an arbitration clause in this case can be seen against the 
background of a well-established arbitration system that complies with civil procedure law, and the 
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undesirability to overturn a well-established practice on the basis of a non-binding model list that 
moreover refers to arbitration ‘not covered by legal provisions’. Notably, these are sufficient reasons to 
uphold these clauses, and the decision is likely not contrary to the Directive. Nevertheless, the 
conclusion that the Annex – or rather, the clauses in the Annex not included in articles 308-309 – need 
not be implemented can hardly be deduced from Commission/Sweden.   
 
Nevertheless, further decisions of the BGH do not reveal a consistent approach. In the 
majority of cases, the BGH does not refer to the Directive, but some decisions have referred 
to the Directive, while other decisions uphold clauses falling under the European list without 
referring to the Directive. 
The majority of cases does not refer to the Directive or the model list, which does not 
necessarily mean that these decisions are contrary to the Directive.  
 
These decisions include the decision of the BGH in a case on a clause limiting the possibility of interim 
cancellation to cancellation with a doctor’s declaration specifying because of which health problems 
clients were not able to attend a sports studio,
1551
 as well as the decision on a clause providing that 
the offer of the seller of a house would be valid for 4 months and 3 weeks,
1552
 and a clause limiting the 
prescription period for actions of the buyer for breach of contract and compensation thereof.
1553
 
Similarly, a clause for amending the contract, which also falls under Annex under 1 sub j, was held to 
be ineffective under article 308 par. 4 BGB, as it was insufficiently clear to allow the consumer to 
calculate future interests,
1554
 as well as a decision in which a clause concerning a fictive declaration of 
inclusion, also falling under the Annex under 1 sub i, was held ineffective under article 308 par. 5 
BGB.
1555
   
. 
Cases in which the BGH has referred to the Directive include a recent decision of the where 
the BGH1556 referred to the Directive and the Annex to the Directive for the evaluation of a 
penalty clause.  
 
The BGH ruled that article 309 par. 7 sub a BGB is in accordance with the Directive, as a clause 
stipulated the all-in exclusion of strict liability is contrary to the principle of good faith in article 3 
Directive as it causes a significant imbalance in parties’ rights and obligations. A clause that stipulates 
a disproportionate long period for the user of STC’s to perform the contract, thereby excluding the 
consumers’ rights to damages for delay in performing the contract, or the right of the consumer to 
withdraw from the contract, is similarly unfair. The application of article 4 UWG – implementing 
Directive 2005/29 – is in accordance with the Directive.  
Arguably, this decision of the BGH may indicate that the BGH considers itself competent to 
provide guidelines for the interpretation of the Directive. If that is the case, the question arises whether 
this decision adequately takes into account the possible competence of the CJEU to provide such 
guidelines.  
Although the reasoning of the BGH is convincing and probably correct, the interpretation of the 
BGH is less likely to be followed by foreign courts than the interpretation of the CJEU, if only because 
the case law from the BGH is less easily accessible for foreign courts, but also because foreign courts 
may consider penalty clauses less objectionable, or may attach more weight to civil procedure law that 
stands in the way of the evaluation of clauses.
1557
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In other cases, the BGH has upheld clauses falling under the European model list, in contrast 
with the view that cases upholding clauses should be referred to the CJEU as these 




 upheld a clause fixing the amount of damages (‘Schadenspauschalierungsklausel’) 
under article 309 par. 5 sub b BGB. The BGH considered that the clause did not exclude the possibility 
for the consumer to dispute that there were no damages, in which case the clause would be ineffective 
– and it would also fall under Annex under 1 sub q.  
In another case, the BGH
1560
 also upheld a clause setting a period for termination that 
exceeded the duration of the contract, which was challenged on the basis of articles 307 and 309 
under 9 sub b BGB, which also falls under the Annex under 1 sub h.  
 
Arguably, the BGH decisions, and the lack of a consistent approach, is in line with the 
emphasis on the indicative nature of the list, which may be criticised because:  
i) The emphasis on the non-binding status of the list overlooks that the non-binding 
character of the model list does not mean that state actors are free to ignore the 
model list if they choose.  
ii) The approach of the BGH leaves room for a similar inconsistent approach of lower 
courts, which may be detrimental for the consistent and predictable use of model lists, 
and it may limit the extent to which the European model list may contribute to the 
predictable and consistent interpretation of article 307 BGB. 
Notably, however, the approach of the BGH does take into account national practice and 
national legal views on justice that become apparent from default law. Arguably, it is 
desirable that the CJEU makes clear that the need to evaluate clauses in a manner 
consistent with legal practice or legal views on justice should be sufficient justification for 
diverging from the European model list.  
 However, because of the lack of interaction between the BGH and the CJEU, 
questions on the obligation of national legislators and courts to implement and apply the list 
in the Annex to the Directive may remain subject to doubts, which may eventually undermine 
the predictable development of the private law acquis.  
 
10.4.2.3.2. The approach of lower courts: referring to the Directive 
Lower courts have not referred questions on Directive 93/13 to the CJEU, perhaps because 
this may considerably lengthen the duration of the procedure, while other relevant materials 
to decide the case are available. Lower courts especially refer to BGH case law, as well as 
decisions from other lower courts. Courts have not developed a consistent approach to 
referring to the Directive and the list in the Annex to the Directive, but referral to the Directive 
is not decisive: some decisions referring to the Directive or other relevant Directives are in 
line with Directive 93/13, while other decisions not referring to the Directive may also be in 
line with the Directive. In rare cases, both decisions referring to the Directive and non 
referring to the Directive are not in accordance with Directive 93/13.  
 
 Many decisions referring to the Directive are in line with Directive 93/13.  
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Thus, the OLG München
1561
 held a clause that allowed the drafter to amend the contract for ineffective 
as it was contrary to article 308 par. 4 BGB, pointing to established case law of the BGH that 
underlines that clauses that allow for amending the contract limit the extent to which parties can 
determine their future rights and obligations under the contract, also referring, in passing, to the Annex 
to the Directive. The OLG Brandenburg
1562
 that held a clause excluding liability, including liability for 
damages that fell under article 309 par. 7 BGB, caused by reckless or intentionally wrongful behaviour, 
and, referring to the duty of national courts to interpret national law in accordance with the Directive 
held that articles 307 et seq BGB was also applicable in this case.   
 




 held that a clause that stipulated that statements of accounts would be sent to the 
consumer, for payment, unless he rejected this within 30 days was held ineffective. The court, 
following the case law of the BGH, did not refer to the Directive, but held that article 248 EGBGB 
imposed information duties on the bank, as well as article 675d BGB, which should respectively be 
seen against the background of a treaty and a the Directive on payment services. The LG Hamburg
1564
 
held that a clause that required the consumer to inform the seller of defects was contrary to article5 
par. 2 Directive 99/44 on consumer sales, and was contrary to article 309 par. 5 sub b under ee. The 
OLG Düsseldorf,
1565
 in a case that also fell under Directive 85/577, held a clause that declared that the 
consumer had negotiated prior to the visit of the salesman and agreed with the offer unfair under 
article 309 par. 12 BGB, referring to BGH case law as well as a previous decision from a lower court. 
Alternatively, the OLG München,
1566
 although not referring to the Directive, held clauses imposing 
costs on the consumer for reminders for payment that exceeded 1,20 Euros per reminder were 
ineffective under article 309 par. 5 BGB, but the referral  to Directive 2011/7 and its predecessor was 
rejected as this Directive concerned the late payment by businesses, not consumers.  
 
 However, decisions not referring to Directive 93/13 may equally be in line with the 
Directive. 
 
Courts have held that a clause imposing interest on the consumer for late payment that went beyond 
the legally set interest was ineffective.
1567
 The OLG Frankfurt
1568
 similarly rejected a clause that 
excluded the consumer’s possibilities to prove that there was an additional agreement under article 
309 par. 12 BGB. The consumer would therefore be given the opportunity to prove the existence of 
additional agreements. In reality, proving this point may prove rather difficult. The OLG Hamburg
1569
 
accepted the possibility for setoff, holding, in passing that any clause that excluded this right was 
contrary to article 309 par. 3 BGB, especially setoffs with regard to claims immediately due. The LG 
Hamburg
1570
 held that a clause that enabled the supplier to cancel the contract when a host family 
could not be found was ineffective. Although the possibility to cancel was based on sufficient 
justification, the clause did not, in accordance with article 308 par. 8 BGB, oblige the supplier to inform 
the consumer as soon as possible and to return payments that had already been made. The LG 
Köln,
1571
 referring to BGH case law, held a clause that stipulated that a sum would be owned to the 
bank if orders for payments were made while the account contained insufficient funds was unfair and 
moreover contrary to article 309 par. 5 BGB.  
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 In rare cases, both decisions that refer explicitly to the Directive and CJEU case law 
and decisions that do not refer to the Directive but follow BGH case law may not be in 
accordance with the Directive, or could have led to interesting questions to the CJEU. 
 
Thus, the KG Berlin,
1572
 later repealed by the BGH,
1573
 held that the evaluation of clauses is a matter 
for national courts, and did not subject the VOB/B to judicial evaluation, in accordance with article 310 
par. 1 BGB. Although the court distinguishes between providing general criteria for the interpretation of 
article 3 Directive and the factual question whether a clause is unfair in individual cases, but goes on 
to characterise the question whether the VOB/B are subject to judicial evaluation as a purely factual 
one. However, this question may arguably also entail whether, firstly, clauses that have been drafted 
in cooperation of stakeholders and state actors may be exempted from judicial control as such, as is 
the case under article 310 BGB. Secondly, the question may arise whether the implementation of the 
Directive obliges the judiciary to evaluate clauses in the VOB/B, despite the exemption in article 310 
BGB, and thirdly, if clauses in the VOB/B are subject to judicial evaluation, whether the circumstance 
that these clauses typically have not been drafted solely by the user to improve the position of the user 
of STC’s, should be decisive in the judicial evaluation of clauses under article 3 Directive. These are 
all questions that are not purely factual questions, while the response of the CJEU to these questions 
would have provided insight in the admissibility of collectively negotiated STC’s, which may in turn 
may be interesting for the use of STC’s in transnational cases if they have been collectively negotiated 
and have been sanctioned by democratically elected actors. The court considers the question whether 
the VOB/B should be exempt at some length and refers to CJEU case law, European law, and national 
debate, but eventually upholds the VOB/B, in accordance with article 310 BGB established BGH case 
law.   
A case that could similarly have provided interesting questions for the CJEU is the decision of 
LG Bamberg
1574
 decided that a clause in a contract falling under Directive 90/314 for package travel 
that stipulated that 40% of the contract price would be due within a week after the confirmation by the 
travel agency was not necessarily ineffective considering the case law of the BGH, which it however 
recognised as not uncontroversial. This decision seems to be inconsistent with later decisions that 
have held these clauses ineffective.
1575
 The court rejected the respondents’ call for interpretation in 
accordance with the Directive, as the Directive on package travel did not stipulate the amount of the 
sum to be paid by the consumer. Notably, the decision is not necessarily contrary to the Directive, and 
the court was not obliged to refer questions to the CJEU. Yet possibly, a question to the CJEU could 
have provided insight in the overlap between the Directive on unfair terms and the Directive on 
package travel. Yet this would however likely have led to a delay in the procedure which is hardly to 
the advantage of the consumer.  
A problematic decision that followed BGH case law rather than the Directive is the decision of 
the OLG Brandenburg,
1576
 referring to BGH case law. The court upheld a clause that required the 
consumer to declare that he was of age and competent to enter into juridical acts, stating that this 
does not constitute a clause under article 309 par. 12 BGB that reallocates the burden of proof to the 
detriment of the consumer. Notably, this information does appear to be rather important to the valid 
conclusion of a contract.  
The OLG Hamm
1577
 followed the BGH in upholding a clause silently extending a contract for 
24 months for a year. Interestingly, these clauses are more critically evaluated in the Dutch legal order, 
especially after the recent reform of Dutch law, also inspired by experiences in the French, Belgian, 
English and Austrian legal order.
1578
 These practices are moreover in accordance with the Annex to 
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the Directive that includes clauses silently extending contracts if the deadline for the consumer to 
terminate is unreasonable early.  
The decision of the OLG Koblenz
1579
 that upheld a clause that stipulated that the consumer 
was to pay 25% of the price if the consumer wanted to cancel the contract, referring to BGH case law, 
may similarly be questioned. The court held that this was not contrary to article 309 par. 5 BGB as it 
had not been established that the seller had suffered remarkably less damages. This decision may be 
difficult to reconcile with previous decisions of the OLG München
1580
 that held a clause that imposed 
costs for reminders ineffective under article 309 par. 5 BGB. The question arises whether the court 
should have taken into account the possibility that this decision could go below the minimum level of 
protection under the Directive.  
 
Because lower courts generally follow BGH case law and decisions from other lower courts, 
a clear approach on the status of the model lists can also not be found in these decisions. 
However, without interaction, the status of the European model list is not going to be 
resolved at the European level. Instead, decisions will continue to be made at the national 
level, but these decisions may be undermined if courts in other Member States ask questions 
on the status of the model list, which would necessitate a different approach from German 
courts. Such a change would undermine predictability. 
 
10.4.2.3.3. Conclusion on the application of the European model list by German courts 
The BGH has not adopted a consistent approach to the European model list, nor has it 
recognised the potential competence of the CJEU to determine what status the list in the 
Annex to the Directive should have in the adjudication of disputes. Lower courts have 
followed this approach. Consequently, nether the BGH nor lower courts have referred 
questions on the European model list to the CJEU. Thus, the status of the model list has not 
bene clarified by the CJEU. This lack of interaction need not be problematic for private 
parties, as German courts generally decide cases predictably, consistently and responsively, 
nor does it necessarily inhibit the correct application of the Directive, except in rare cases.  
However,  because of the lack of interaction, the obligations of national legislators 
and courts in the implementation and application of the European model list has remained 
unclear, while the accessibility of the European model list may also be undermined.  
 
10.4.2.4. Conclusion on the development of the law on STC’s through model lists 
This paragraph has asked whether actors have interacted in the use of model lists and how 
that has affected the predictability, consistency, accessibility and responsiveness of the law 
on STC’s. 
 Whereas the German legislator could not make much use of comparative insights, the 
drafting of model lists was focused on national practice and consequently overlooked 
relevant treaties. Foreign legislators and the European legislator have turned to German law 
for inspiration, and the German legislator has participated actively in the development of the 
model list in the Annex to the Directive, thereby limiting the effect it has on national law.By 
the active German participation, interdependence between national and European actors in 
ensuring the predictability, consistency, and accessibility of private law through model list has 
remained limited. Nevertheless, the ability of the national legislator to ensure predictability, 
consistency and accessibility of the law through model lists may become limited as 
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international sources of law indicate that clauses falling under national model lists should be 
upheld.   
Because of the indicative nature of the model list, unclarity has arisen on the 
obligation of Member States to implement the list, and the German legislator has not 
separately implemented the European model list. The restraint of the legislator is reinforced 
by the courts that have not developed a consistent approach to the European model list – it 
does not have a specific status, nor does the inclusion of clauses under the European model 
list necessarily form an indication that a clause should be held ineffective. Because of the 
strict approach of courts to unfair clauses, however, cases are only rarely decided contrary to 
the Directive.  
 German actors have shown restraint in interaction with relevant European actors on 
the obligation for national state actors in the implementation of the model list. However, this 
restraint of German state actors does not directly lead to problems for private parties, as the 
restraint serves to maintain consistency, predictability, accessibility and responsiveness for 
private parties. The resistance of German actors to binding model lists, because of previous 
negotiations, also limits problems of accessibility and consistency that may arise if the 
European list woiuld become binding. 
Yet eventually, the lack of interaction may lead to persisting unclarity on the status of 
the European model list, a question that has remained invisible in the attempted reform of 
Directive 93/13. The added value of the European model list is undermined as it does not 
play a clear role in national legal practice. However, the European list may also be used to 
increase the accessibility of private law forespecially foreign parties, who can more easily get 
an oversight of clauses that are not considered acceptable.1581  
 
10.4.3. The evaluation of clauses in international contracts  
Have the courts sufficiently taken into account foreign, European and international state and 
non-state actors, and how has this approach affected the predictability, consistency, 
accessibility, and responsiveness of the law on STC’s in international contracts? 
Paragraph 10.4.3.1. will consider the evaluation of international business contracts 
under article 307 BGB and treaties, and paragraph 10.4.3.2. will discuss the evaluation of 
clauses in international consumer contracts. Paragraph 10.4.3.3. will turn to the evaluation of 
domestic business contracts. Paragraph 10.4.3.4. will end with a conclusion.  
 
10.4.3.1. The evaluation of international business contracts  
In the evaluation of clauses in international business contracts, courts have generally not 
referred to foreign materials. The referral to international materiaks differs, depending on the 
applicable regime. Under German law, courts have frequently referred to international 
sources and taken into account international practice, which should benefit responsiveness. 
In contrast, in the evaluation of clauses under international regimes, courts have referred to 
applicable international regimes, but they have not referred to other materials or international 
practice, which may undermine the responsiveness of international law to international 
practice.   
Paragraph 10.4.3.1.1. will consider some preliminary questions, and paragraph 
10.4.3.1.2. will discuss the evaluation of clauses in international contracts under the Montréal 
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Convention that has been ratified by the EU 1582  and implemented through Regulation 
889/2002. Paragraph 10.4.3.1.3. will turn to the evaluation of clauses in international 
contracts under the CMR. Paragraph 10.4.3.1.4. will analyse the evaluation of clauses under 
the CISG and German law and paragraph 10.4.3.1.4. will end with a conclusion.   
 
10.4.3.1.1. Preliminary questions: comprehensive international regimes? 
The intensity of judicial evaluation depends on the question whether international law aims to 
provide a comprehensive regime to parties.1583  If a regime is comprehensive, the regime 
provided by international law is referred to as a standard.1584 This is for example the case for 
the Montréal convention, where national rules are only applicable insofar as the Convention 
does not aim to provide rules – thus, for example, civil procedure law.1585 The CMR in some 
areas also aims to provide a comprehensive regime.1586  
Thus, if international regimes do not leave room for the application of article 307 BGB, 
it will not be applied. It is not uncontroversial whether article 307 BGB is a provision of ordre 
public in the sense of article 9 Rome I.1587 However, this does not seem to be the case. For 
example, in the decision of the OLG Hamburg,1588 in a case on an international contract 
falling under the CISG, the OLG did not apply article 307 of its own motion as matter of ordre 
public, even though penalty clauses fall under article 309 par. 6 BGB – though they are not 
necessarily unfair in business contracts. 
Not all treaties aim for a comprehsnive regime: article 4 par. 2 CISG makes clear that 
the CISG does not aim to provide a comprehensive regime, which means that article 307 
BGB will be aplicable. 1589  If German law is applicable, clauses are subject to judicial 
evaluation under article 307 BGB.  
If parties have made a choice of law other than German law, the question has arisen 
whether foreign default law, instead of default national law, should be taken as a starting 
point for the evaluation of clauses based on foreign clauses. The applicability of foreign 
default law would entail that clauses in conformiity with foreign default law would not be 
subject to judicial control in accordance with article 307 par. 3 BGB.1590 Clauses that are in 
accordance with European law are also not subject to judicial review.1591  
A different view wouldmean that the German judiciary de facto evaluates the default 
regime of other states, which seems undesirable. However, if clauses violate mandatory, 
ordre public provisions, the German judiciary will have to evaluate them of its own motion.  
If clauses in international contracts have to be evaluated under German law, they will 
not be evaluated under articles 305-310 BGB if they have been individually negotiated. This  
will for example not be the case for some well-established clauses that are more likely to be 
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considered to have been initiated by both parties.1592 Also, if clauses reflect practices in the 
sense of article 346 HGB, or in the sense of article 9 CISG, they will not be subject to judicial 
control, in accordance with article 307 par. 3 BGB that stipulates that terms that reflect 
provisions from mandatory or default national or international private law, are not subject to 
judicial evaluation under article 307 BGB. Although this will not often be the case,1593 this 
exception is in accordance with the need in business practice to speedily deal with these 
matters, while they have also more experience with the use of STC’s. Maidl1594 finds that 
FOB clauses from the ICC (A.5) often converge with international practice, although they do 
not establish, as such, international practice.1595 Pilz1596 finds that referring to Incoterms is a 
practice in the sense of article 9 CISG, while the terms cannot be characterised as 
individually negotiated terms. However, Hopt1597 notes that the applicability of Incoterms does 
not exclude the applicability of the CISG, and they may be subjected to judicial evaluation of 
article 307 BGB. 
 
10.4.3.1.2. The evaluation of clauses under the Montréal Convention  
The Montréal Convention provides a comprehensive regime and does not leave room for 
additional evaluation of clauses under article 307 BGB.  
 




 expressly indicated the methods of interpretation for a uniform interpretation. In particular, 
it held that an international interpretation entailed a grammatical interpretation. Especially if the 
legislative history of the international instrument was unclear, the aim of the instrument was to be 
taken into account, as well as the internal coherence of the instrument, while referral to national 
concepts was to be avoided. 
 
 Despite this emphasis, the BGH has not interacted with foreign actors, and although 
the courts take into acocunt the CMR, other international sources are not considered, 
and courts have typically evaluated clauses in accordance with German law.  
The tendency to decide in accordance with German law is clearly visible in a decision where the 
BGH
1599
 held that although an air operator had excluded liability in accordance with the Montréal 
Convention (at that time still the Warsaw Convention), German law on breach of contract was 
additionally applicable.  
The BGH held that the convention only stipulated the compensation for property arising from 
air traffic, which includes delay. However, damages arising from breach of contract because the air 
operator had overbooked a flight did not constitute delay, while it was also not a risk inherent to air 
traffic. Rather, overbooking is the result of organisation procedures that are under the control of the air 
operator. As the damages did not fall within the scope of the convention, the convention was not 
applied on this point. It followed that the clause excluding damages arising from delay was also not 
applicable to cases where damages arose because a flight had been overbooked.  
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In a later decision, the BGH
1600
 solely referred to German sources. 
 
 This approach is also followed by lower courts. 
 
This BGH decision was followed by the OLG Köln
1601
 that similarly applied national law on breach of 
contract. Although the court extensively referred to previous German case law, as well as German 
commentaries to the Convention, it did not take into account foreign decisions. The AG Hamburg
1602
 
ruled that applicability of the Convention would lead to a similar result reached in German law.  
 
►Alhough the BGH recognised the need for uniform interpretation, this did not entail 
referring to foreign sources or overlooking national mandatory law. Instead, courts have 
maintained a consistent interpretation of the Convention within in the German legal order.  
 
10.4.3.1.3. The evaluation of clauses under the CMR 
The CMR provides a regime that does not leave room for additional evaluation under article 
307 BGB, but it does not provide a comprehensive regime in all respects.  
  
 Initially, the BGH 1603   referred to the Incoterms to determine parties’ rghts and 
obligations.   
 
The BGH held that all clauses on prescription were to be judged exclusively by the CMR that aimed to 
provide a comprehensive regime in matters of prescription. The court further referred to the Incoterms 
for establishing the rights and duties of parties towards one another. The court held that the case did 
not have to be evaluated under the Kraftverkehrsordnung. 
 This decision was followed by the OLG Frankfurt
1604
 held a clause on prescription from the 
Allgemeine Deutsche Spediteurbedingungen ineffective as it was incompatible with article 32 CMR 
 
 Since this decision, however, the BGH has generally not referred to international 
sources other than the CMR, or foreign decisions, but rather its own previous 
decisions, while national mandatory law played a more prominent role in the 
evaluation of clauses.   
 
In a 1983 decision, the BGH
1605
 held that a clause, forming part of the ADSp (‘Allgemeine Deutsche 
Spediteurbedingungen’), that excluded set off and counterclaims was irreconcilable with article 41 
CMR. In addition, it held that the clauses also contradicted complementary mandatory national law, in 
particular the law on goods transport (‘Güterkraftverkehrsgesetz’) as well as the regulation on goods 
transport (‘Kraftverkehrsordnung’), as well as civil procedure law.  
In a 1984 decision, the BGH
1606
 held that a clause in an insurance contract under the CMR, 
excluding article 6 VVG, was ineffective under article 9 AGBG as it unfairly excluded the duty of the 
insurer in all where the insured was negligent, however minimal that negligence was, regardless 
whether the negligent behaviour affected the position of the insurer.  
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►In the evaluation of clauses under the CMR, the BGH has taken into account the CMR, but 
only very rarely international sources and generally not foreign decisions. Instead, clauses 
are evaluated in accordance with national law, and German courts have maintained the 
consistent evaluation of clauses under the CMR. 
 
10.4.3.1.4. The evaluation of clauses under the CISG and German law 
If the CISG is applicable, clauses are subject to evaluation under article 307 BGB. Have 
clauses in cases falling under the CISG been evaluated differently than clauses in cases 
falling under German law? 
 
 Courts have held clauses under the CISG ineffective under the AGBG and article 307 
BGB, without referring to foreign materials or other international sources. Instead, 
clauses have been evaluated in accordance with national law, in particular articles 




 held that in an international contract between businesses falling under the CISG, an 
exclusion clause was invalid under article 9 AGBG, expressly referring to previous case law in its 
statement that these articles were also applicable in business contracts. The court moreover held that 
as judicial evaluation was not established in international law, the standard of article 9 AGBG had to 
be applied, but it also referred to default rules in the CISG, in particular article 74 CISG, as a standard.  
OLG Braunschweig
1609
 held a clause fixing the amount of damages ineffective, referring to 
article 11 AGBG, and, for the applicability of German law, German literature, holding that the CISG did 
not provide rules that entailed a different conclusion. The court moreover held that the decision would 
be similar under German law.   
 
 In the evaluation of clauses in cases under German law, surrounding national law 
plays a role.  
 
Accordingly, the BGH held the exclusion of liability in the ADSp included in a transport contract 




 However, clauses may also be upheld despite conflict with national law if they are in 
accordance with international business practices. In these cases, considerably more 
referral is made to international materials. 
 
In a sea transport case where a clause of the ADSp excluded liability, contrary to article 606 HGB, the 
BGH
1611
 ruled that this clause was not ineffective under article 9 AGBG considering the well-
established business practice to establish these clauses, as reflected in the International Convention 
for the unification of certain rules of law relating to bills of lading (‘Hague Rules’).  
The BGH has moreover ruled that clauses are ineffective if they aim to circumvent mandatory 
rules on liability in the Hague Rules, which is contrary to article 662 HGB,
1612
 although it also held that 
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In another case for sea transport, the BGH
1614
 held that exclusion clauses drafted by the Baltic 
and International Maritime Conference (BIMCO) were contrary to good faith under article 9 AGBG, but 
pointed to the necessity to adequately establish whether the claimant had not suggested the use of 
clauses.  
In another international contract for sea transport, the BGH
1615
 expressly did not consider 
penalty clauses unfair, and referred to various international model contracts containing such clauses, 
including BIMCO clauses, while also considering the justification for the use of such clauses in sea 
transport. Interestingly, however, the BGH did mention, in passing, article 11 AGBG.  
The BGH
1616
 held an exclusion clause of a shipbuilding yard effective as it did not, in this case, 
constitute an exclusion of the main obligations in the contract, which would undermine the aim of the 
contract, also pointing to the generally usual, widely established practice with no known exceptions, to 
insure the ship owner for damages to the ship, on which the shipyard could reasonably rely. 
Simultaneously, however, the court held that article 11 AGBG, although not applicable in business 
contracts, could indicate that a clause is unfair under article 9 AGBG.  
 
 This approach has been followed by lower courts, who have also taken into account 




 in holding a model-like declaration for surety effective, expressly held that these 
clauses are not unusual in international trade and particularly in international trade, there was a 
justifiable need for these sureties, while parties to the agreement were hardly in need of protection. 
Also, the OLG Saarbrücken
1618
 upheld a clause in an insurance contracts that imposed a duty of care 
on the transporter and stipulated that the damages would not be refunded if this duty had been 
breached. The court referred not only extensively to previous BGH case law but also to international 
materials, and held that this duty of care is well-established in transport law, upholding the clause. The 
court further expressly referred to the CMR and held that upholding the clause was also consistent 
with the CMR. 
 
►In the evaluation of clauses under the CISG, the courts have adopted more restraint in the 
referral to international sources than is the case if clauses are evaluated under German law. 
Thus, the courts do recognise the added value of international sources, and it is likely that 
the evaluation of clauses under German law is more responsive to international practice. 
 
10.4.3.1.5. Conclusion on the evaluation of clauses in international business contracts 
The referral to international materials in cases decided under German law may promote the 
responsiveness of German law to international practice, while the restraint of courts in cases 
decided under international regimes may undermine responsiveness. Even though German 
courts have consistently evaluated clauses under international treaties, this may not be as 
accessible foreign parties. Moreover, the added value of the CISG does not contribute to 
predictability as courts have not referred to easily available foreign decisions.   
Courts have recognised the added value of foreign decisions in the interpretaiton of 
STC’s in international contracts, so why have they adopted more restraint in the evaluation of 
clauses, especially considering the easy availability of foreign decisions under the CISG? 
The emphasis on interpretation in accordance with national law suggests that the consistent 
evaluation of clauses within the German legal order has a higher priority. Perhaps, the  
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 BGH 28 February 1983, BeckRS 1983, 30386936.  
1615
 BGH 28 September 1978, NJW 1979,105.  
1616
 BGH 3 March 1988, NJW 1988, 1785. 
1617
 OLG Stuttgart 1 December 2010, BeckRS 2011, 2432.   
1618
 OLG Saarbrücken 18 June 2003, BeckRS 2003, 30321130. 
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correlation between the evaluation of clauses and the values underpinning German law, 
which may differ from the values underpinning foreign, European  and itnernational law, has 
also played a role in courts’ restraint.  
Does the different approach to cases under international regimes and cases under 
German law, which has also become visible in the interpretation of STC’s in international 
trade, contribute to the beneficial position of German law over international sources?  
Possibly, the legislator’s rejection of regulatory competition in this area may be 
compensated by the courts, even though the approach of courts is not as visible to  foreign 
parties as legislative intervention. However, the active approach of courts combined with 
restraint for the legislator facilitates the consistent development of the law on STC’s within a 
clear framework, whcih also benefits predictability.  
 
10.4.3.2. The evaluation of clauses in international consumer contracts 
In the evaluation of clauses in international consumer clauses, the BGH has interpreted 
clauses in accordance with national mandatory law despite contradictory international or 
foreign law, and exercised restraint with referring quesitons to tje CJEU. This has 
undermined accessibility and predictability.  
 
 Initially, the BGH took into account international regimes in the evaluation of clauses 
in international consumer contracts.   
 
In a 1978 decision, the BGH
1619
 upheld a clause limiting the liability of the airline operator in 
accordance with article 22 Warsaw Convention, stating that article 22 also concerned the loss of 
valuables that were handed to the crew as the plane had to make an emergency landing. In this 
decision, the BGH emphasised that the Convention should be interpreted uniformly, referring to its 
earlier decisions where this had similarly been emphasised. The BGH did however not refer to foreign 
decisions that would have contributed to a uniform interpretation, although one of these previous 
decisions
1620
 expressly relied on French and U.S. materials for the interpretation of the Convention.   
 
 In later cases, the BGH has held clauses ineffective despite relevant international and 
foreign law and article 1 par. 2 Directive 93/13 that stipulates that clauses reflecting 
national law, or international law are not subject to judicial evaluation under the 
Directive. 
 
In a 1983 decision, the BGH
1621
 held that a clause that stipulated that times of arrival were merely 
estimates and did not bind airline operators, which excluded compensation for damages caused by 
delay, was ineffective, even though this clause reflected the recommendation of the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) and was in accordance with the Warsaw Treaty, and article 22 Montréal 
Convention. Similarly, a clause giving the airline operator the right to amend the contract was held 
ineffective. Interestingly, this decision was cited by the European Commission in its 1990 proposal for 
a Directive on unfair contract terms, to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of internationally used clauses 
in contracts with consumers in Germany, as a reason for harmonisation.  
In a 2005 case,
1622
 the BGH also held that a clause in an international bus transport contract 
with a consumer was ineffective as it limited the basic performances of the contract to the extent that 
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 BGH 28 November 1978, NJW 1979, 496. 
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 For example BGH 23 March 1976, NJW 1976, 1587, as well as BGH 24 June 1969, NJW 1969, 2008.  
1621
 BGH 20 January 1983, NJW 1983, 1322. Comp. also BGH 24 September 1985, NJW 1986, 1610 where an exclusion clause 
from an international association contrary to article 11 par. 6 AGBG was held ineffective. 
1622
 BGH 1 February 2005, NJW 2005, 1774, comp. also KG Berlin 12 December 2007, BeckRS 2009, 24853. 
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the purpose of the contract was undermined, which, under article 307 par. 2 BGB, leads to 
ineffectiveness of the clause. The strict approach of the BGH is also visible in a later case, where the 
BGH
1623
 held a clause limiting the liability of the airline operator for damages to luggage, and 
stipulating that airline operators had a right to refuse vulnerable or perishable goods in the luggage, 
was contrary to article 17 of the Convention. The BGH held that if a clause diverging from article 17 
limits the liability of the airline operator, this results in an unfair detriment to the consumer that is 
ineffective under article 307 BGB. The BGH rightly does not consider the recommendation of 
international organisations or often-used model clauses in consumer contracts as decisive. Especially 
if these clauses fall under the Annex to Directive 93/13, they should be adapted.  
The German judiciary also adopted a strict approach with regard to international contracts that 
have been validly concluded under English law and have made a valid choice of jurisdiction for 
English courts, as becomes apparent from the decision of the OLG Frankfurt
1624
 that held that the 
clauses should be evaluated under the AGBG as the contracts showed a close connection with 
Germany, while it was also not sufficiently established that the clauses would not be applied in 
consumer contracts. Even if this would not be the case, the clauses had to be evaluated under 
German law as a different decision left open the possibility that the outcome of cases would be 
irreconcilable with the AGBG. Despite harmonisation in this area, the court held that it was unclear 
whether English law provided sufficient protection to consumers as the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977 was not applicable to credit contracts, while it was unclear whether the Unfair Terms in Contracts 
Regulations 1994 would be applicable to the contracts in this case. The court however proceeded to 
uphold the clauses.  
 
Thus, German courts have steadfastedly refused to recognise the ability of internaitonal or 
European actors to limit national mandatory law. Accordingly, interdependence has not been 
recognised and interaction with European, foreign and international actors has remained 
limited.  
 This refusal for interaction need not be problematic for consumers, who can rely on 
national law, but it may undermine predictability for international or foreign actors who rely on 
treaties and European law. Moreover, questions on the relation between the Montréal 
Convention and Directive 93/13 have remained unresolved at the European level, which 
undermines consistency and accessibility.  
Both European and national legislators who have ratified the Convention should 
reconsider either article 22 of the Convention or make an exception for the Convention in the 
Directive, which should moreover be clearly implemented in national legislation in order to 
ensure that this change is sufficiently followed by the courts. 
 
Moreover, the question arises whether article 8 Directive would justify the conclusion that Member 
States can evaluate clauses that are in conformity with treaties that have been ratified in and by the 
Union. This question seems also relevant for the aim of the Directive to further the internal market, 
especially as allowing judicial evaluation of clauses in conformity with international law undermines the 
use of clauses under international regimes in the internal market. As it concerns the interpretation of a 
Directive, the CJEU is competent.   
 
Moreover, the question whether arises German courts are competent to set aside mandatory 
national law, especially as international law, implemented in national law, does not have 
priority over other national law. This question should also be resolved if clauses in 
accordance with future European measures such as the CESL may also undermine national 
mandatory law, which may lead to further inconsistencies. 
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However, because of the lack of interaction between German courts and the CJEU, 
these questions have not been addressed.  
 
10.4.3.3. The evaluation of clauses in domestic business contracts 
The approach of the BGH to the evaluation of clauses used in international trade is more 
lenient than the evaluation of clauses used in national trade. The standard applied in the 
judicial evaluation of clauses in business contracts under article 307 BGB is largely similar to 
the standard of evaluation for consumer contracts under articles 307-309 BGB. 1625   
 
 This becomes especially apparent from the indirect applicability of article 309 BGB in 




 held a clause limiting the period of prescription ineffective, noting that business practices 
did not indicate otherwise, as businesses were disadvantaged by these clauses in a way similar to 
consumers, while they were not inherently better placed to discover deficiencies in goods that 
inherently became visible only after some years.  
Similarly, the BGH
1627
 considered a comprehensive exclusion clause as ineffective. Generally, 
exclusion clauses are, in accordance with article 11 par. 7 AGBG and article 309 par. 7 under b BGB, 
as such not necessarily prohibited, but they are held ineffective if they concern a main obligation of the 
contract which undermines the aim of the contract.
1628
 
 Additionally, the BGH
1629
 has ruled that clauses with regard to the burden of proof that fall 
under article 309 par. 12 sub a BGB are unfair in business contracts as rules on the burden of proof 
are closely correlated with ideas on justice. Although article 436 BGB, implementing Directive 1999/44, 
allows that the burden of proof is shifted to the detriment of the seller, this should be seen against the 
background of consumer protection. In this case, the user of STC’s does not have a weak position 
similar to a consumer, and STC’s that shift the burden of proof to the advantage of the user of the 
STC’s are accordingly ineffective.  
 
 Business practices are only rarely accepted as a reason to hold clauses effective.  
 
Examples of such an exception are penalty clauses in building contracts.
1630
 In contrast, clauses may 




Thus, courts have adopted a considerably more lenient approach to clauses in international 
contracts, which may benefit the responsiveness of the law on STC’s to international practice.  
Hau 1632  finds that the diverging approach can be traced to the assumption that parties 
engaged in international trade are in less need of protection than parties in national trade, 
with the apparent exception of consumers engaged in international trade. 
 
10.4.3.4. Conclusion on the evaluation of clauses in international contracts 
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 R. Koch, ‘Das AGB-Recht im unternehmerischen Verkehr: Zu viel des Guten oder Bewegung in die richtige Richtung?’, BB 
2010, p. 1813, who also finds that the rarity of cases where clauses are upheld because of business practices difficult to 
reconcile with the wording of article 310 BGB. 
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 BGH  8 March 1984, NJW 1984, 1750. 
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 BGH 19 September 2007, NJW 2007, 3774.  
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The interaction between courts with international actors differs depending on the question 
whether it concerns a business contract or a consumer contract, as well as the regime udner 
which clauses are evaluated. Clauses in international consumer contracts and domestic 
business contracts are strictly evaluated, despite the relevance of international and European 
law in international consumer contracts.  
Although the lack of interaction is not directly detrimental to consuemrs, it dimishes 
predictability for epecially foreign or internaitonal businesses and questions on the relation 
between European measures and on the competence of German courts have been left 
unanswered, which may undermine the predictable, accessible, and consistent development 
of the acquis.   
The difference between the evaluation of clauses in international contracts, especially 
udner German law, and the evaluation of clauses in domestic contracts reinforces the 
impression that the strictness of German law and the rejection of rgeulatory competition by 
the German legislator is compensated by the approach of the courts. Even though German 
law is strict, it is not similarly applied in international cases. This approach allows the German 
legislator to maintain the development of the law in accordance with national legal views on 
justice while not diminishing the responsiveness of the law on STC’s to international practice, 
something that is overlooked by the concerns for the attractiveness of German law1633 as well 
as  private initative for regulatory competition in this area 1634  Arguments that German law 
poses barriers to the internal market should similarly be reconsidered insofar as it concerns 
business contracts.1635  
 
 
10.4.4. Conclusion on the development of the law on STC’s through blanket 
clauses 
Have actors taken into account that other actors also develop private law, which may limit the 
extent to which blanket clauses contribute to the responsiveness of law, while more problems 
of predictability, consistency and accessibility may arise?  
 Generally, the German legislator have actively participated in debate at the European 
level preceding harmonisation, which has limited the extent to which the acquis influences 
national law. Simultaneously, German state actors have shown restraint in interacting with 
European and international actors and sources in the implementation and application of the 
acquis and relevant international law. The restraint in the implementation of the acquis has 
generally benefitted the consistency, predictability, accessibility and responsiveness for 
private parties. The restraint of German actors in international cases may be detrimental to 
some private parties in terms of predictability and accessibility, as well as responsiveness. 
However, generally, the lack of interaction may eventually severely undermine the 
predictable, consistent, accessible and responsive development of the acquis. 
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What principles have played a role in the development of German and European law on 
STC’s, have these principles provided a starting point for interaction between actors and how 
has that affected the extent to which principles have contributed to the predictability, 
accessibility, consistency and responsiveness of the law on STC’s?  
This paragraph will in particular consider three principles that have played an 
important role in the development of the law on STC’s:  
 
1) Good faith 
The development of German law on STC’s was based on article 242 BGB on good faith, and since the 
AGBG and its later inclusion in the BGB, good faith in article 307 BGB remains a central concept in the 
judicial evaluation of standard contract terms. At a European level, good faith has similarly been 
included.  
 
2) Consumer protection 
The development of the AGBG was initiated against the background of a consumer protection policy, 
and Directive 93/13 similarly takes consumer protection as a starting point.  
 
3) The Richtigkeitsgewähr. 
The Richtigkeitsgewähr will also be considered, as this principle is often referred to as underlying 
articles 305-310 BGB, which raises the question whether it converges with consumer protection 
underlying the Directive.  
 
Paragraph 10.5.1. will consider the development of German law on the basis of these 
principles, and paragraph 10.5.2. will consider the development of European law on the basis 
of consumer protection and good faith. Paragraph 10.5.3. will consider similarities in the 
development of the law on STC’s by German and European actors and paragraph 10.5.4. 
will turn to divergences. Paragraph 10.5.5. will end with a conclusion. 
 
10.5.1. The development of the German law on STC’s 
The development of the German law on STC’s can be seen against the background of three 
principles: consumer protection, good faith, and the Richtigkeitsgewähr. 
The AGBG was developed against the background of German consumer policies.1636 
The AGBG aimed to provide more clarity for contract parties and especially consumers as 
case law provided insufficient predictability, which withheld consumers from challenging 
unfair STC’s before the courts, while the limited effect of case law enabled practitioners to 
successfully enforce slightly different forms of clauses that had been prohibited.1637  
In the development of the law on STC’s, the principle of good faith has played an 
important role. The Erster Teilbericht1638 stated that draft article 6 AGBG – eventually article 9 
AGBG – would enable sufficient protection of consumers that would not leave gaps and 
make the principles underlying the new regime clear. In particular, the draft held that judicial 
evaluation of STC’s was needed as the user of STC’s usually drafted STC’s to his own 
advantage, limiting the contractual freedom of his contract party to the choice to accept or 
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decline the STC’s. Good faith obliged the person drafting STC’s to take into account the 
interests of his cotnract parties. Thus, parties may use STC’s as long as a balance between 
contract parties’ rights and obligations was effected. The principle of good faith moreover 
looks at the relation between parties in general, and does not limit itself to isolated facts and 
clauses. Moreover, article 9 AGBG established a more accessible and consistent standard 
than had previously been established in case law based on article 242 BGB.1639  
Kötz1640 pointed to the necessity to establish a blanket clause that clearly indicated 
which principles underpinned the legislative measure, and added that although case law had 
developed on this basis, a legislative provision was desirable as the standard in case law 
differed and accessibility decreased as the amount of case law using slightly different criteria 
as a starting point developed. Kötz does not expressly refer to good faith. Instead, he takes 
the Richtigkeitsgewähr, and the absence thereof in the use of STC’s, as a starting point for 
the control of STC’s.  
Thus, the development of the law on AGBG has also been based on the 
Richtigkeitsgewähr.1641 The use of STC’s as a legal problem which gave one party too much 
opportunity to impose his own rules on weaker parties, and which led to a separate private 
order beside the law, had already been identified in 1933. 1642  The importance of the 
Richtigkeitsgewähr and private autonomy is also visible in BGH case law.  
 
In its 1956 decision in which the BGH
1643
 evaluated a clause in the STC’s with the standard of article 
242 BGB, it explicitly referred to scholarly work
1644
 establishing the problems arising from the use of 
STC’s, in particular the weak justification of STC’s by private autonomy, although it did not explicitly 
refer to the idea of Richtigkeitsgewähr. In 1974, the BGH
1645
 emphasised as standing case law that 
parties using STC’s, claiming the amount of contractual freedom allowed within the legislative 
framework to their own advantage, must take the interests of future contract parties into account.  
 
Since these decisions, the development of the law on STC’s, and the need for judicial 
evaluation of STC’s but not of individual contracts, can be seen in the light of the 
Richtigkeitsgewähr. 1646  Thus, acadamics have succeeded in providing a convincing 
explanation for the control over STC’s that more generally underpins the BGB and is 
correlated to important legal principles such as Selbstbestimmung und Fremdbestimmung, 
and that may serve to provide guidelines for the stable development of the law on STC’s.   
Notably, the principles of consumer protection, good faith and Richtigkeitsgewahr 
show considerable overlap; as Richtigkeitsgewähr is absent in cases where parties have not 
negotiated contractual terms, the general duty of good faith imposes on the user of STC’s an 
obligation to take into account the reasonable interests and the legitimate expectations of his 
counterparty, in particular if that counterparty is in a weaker bargaining position. 
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However, the principle of consumer protection and the principle of consumer 
protection do not necessarily coincide. Consumer protection emphasises that the capacity of 
one contract party as a consumer is a reason for judicial evaluation. Accordingly, if a 
consumer is in a weak position, for example because he has insufficient information to 
adequately negotiate, the contract may not fall within the Richtigkeitsgewähr. In contrast, the 
capacity of one party as consumer need not necessarily exclude the Richtigkeitsgewähr, for 
instance if legal professionals, acting as consumers, negotiate with small businesses.  
 
This became clear in a case in which the BGH
1647
 held that a consumer who had negotiated on part of 
the STC’s should prove that the STC’s had been presented. This decision can be contrasted with the 
wording of article 3 par. 2 Directive 93/13, which stipulates that any seller or supplier who claims that a 
clause has been individually negotiated, should prove this claim. This article further provides that the 
circumstance that part of a contract has been individually negotiated shall not exempt the STC’s from 
judicial control of ‘if an overall assessment of the contract indicates that it is nevertheless a pre-
formulated standard contract’.  
 
Thus, principles of consumer protection, but especially good faith and the Richtigkeitsgewähr 
play an important role in the development of the law on STC´s. 
 
10.5.2. The development of the European law on the basis of principles? 
Has Directive 93/13 similarly been developed on the basis of principles of consumer 
protection, good faith and the Richtigkeitsgewähr?  
It is controversial whether the 1993 Directive has been developed on the basis of 
general ideas on justice, which may in turn provide a basis for the further development of the 
law. For the European legal order, the development of the law has been based on article 114 
TFEU to advance the internal market as well as consumer protection.  
Rather than basing its initiatives on abstract ideas of fairness, the European legislator 
has particularly intervened in areas that it considers important for the internal market. 
However, in the Directive, the principle of good faith is quite visible, as well as the principle of 
consumer protection. That does however not mean that these principles have played a 
similar role in the development of the Directive.  
Directive 93/13 was developed against the background of development in the national 
laws on STC’s as well as the calls for a development of a European consumer policy at the 
European level. 1648  Accordingly, the preamble to the Directive refers to a consumer 
protection and information policy and notes that buyers should be protected against abuse of 
powers from sellers or suppliers similarly seems to take the weak position of consumers as a 
starting point. 
Moreover, article 3 Directive expressly refers to good faith. Yet does a European 
principle exist or not, and if so, is it a principle “confined” to this particular Directive or is it a 
general principle that has been recognised, to a different extent, throughout the Union? 
Geelhoed 1649  has argued that article 3 Directive need not be interpreted uniformly, but 
subsequent CJEU case law appears prepared to provide general guidelines for the 
interpretation of national law implementing article 3 Directive. Notably, article 3 Directive also 
refers to the balance of parties’ rights and obligations.  
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The 1990 draft of the Directive was considerably influenced by German criticism. 
Although German ideas on justice underpinning the AGBG have influenced German criticism 
that subsequently led to amendments of the 1990 draft Directive, they did not form a starting 
point for interaction between German or European actors, nor did these principles serve to 
establish common ground in the European debate. Nevertheless, the Directive may indirectly 
be based on abstract ideas of consumer protection and good faith. However, the 
Richtigkeitsgewähr is not visible in the Directive. 
 
10.5.3. Principles underlying the development of the law on STC’s: similarities 
Various similarities with regard to the principles of good faith and consumer protection 
become visible in German law and the Directive.  
1) Both the AGBG and the Directive have been developed against the background of 
consumer protection policies.  
In the German legal order, this principle follows from the protection of contract parties that are in a 
weaker bargaining position than their counterparties that in turn may undermine the bargaining 
process. The Directive was similarly developed against the background of the development of a 
consumer protection policy. A common development on the law of STC’s and more generally a 




2) Both the AGBG and the Directive consider the effect on trade. 
The Directive expressly considers consumer protection in the context of the internal market, stating 
that divergences in consumer protection lead to unpredictability in cross-border contracts, and 
distortion of competition.
1651
 In the German legal order, the increasing role of STC’s in national trade, 
their effectiveness in stipulating one’s legal relations with a multitude of parties, and the need to 
ensure that contract parties would not inherently distrust STC’s, played a role in the draftin g of the 
AGBG.  
 
3) Good faith plays a central role in evaluating parties’ contractual rights and obligations. 
It has been argued that the inclusion of good faith in articles 307 BGB and article 3 Directive is in line 
with a common principle of good faith underlying European private law.
1652
 If this is the case, does the 
interpretation of this principle depend upon the national interpretation of that principle? Brandner and 
Ulmer,
1653
 criticising the 1990 draft Directive, found that ‘good faith’ provided sufficient guidance to 
decide which clauses were unfair, as it was clear that the Directive aimed for an overall assessment of 
the terms of the contract, especially with regard to the rights and obligations of the consumer and 
seller towards each other. It is however unclear in what way practitioners could derive guidance on the 
question when rights and obligations would be deemed to be sufficiently balanced. Possibly, this 
denotes the well-established interpretation of a principle that is assumed to be common to the Union 
and its Member States, the interpretation of which is further developed at a national level. This seems 
especially plausible considering that article 3 Directive was based on similar blanket clauses that had 
been developed throughout the Union.
1654
  
If article 3 Directive 93/13 may accordingly be interpreted in a decentralised manner, it is 
unlikely that article 3 would serve as a basis for the development of case law, similar to the way article 
242 BGB has served as a basis for the development of German law on STC’s. How can this possibility 
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be reconciled with the aim of Directive 93/13 to harmonise national laws to advance the internal 
market?  
 
Notably, however, the existence of a common principle does not necessarily have to lead to 
unification. Instead, it may a reason for the CJEU to leave discretion for national courts to 
assess the fairness of clauses in accordance with the general principle of good faith. This 
enables courts to evaluate clauses responsively as well as consistently with national law. 
  
10.5.4. Principles underlying the development of the law on STC’s: divergences 
Some differences in principles underlying the development of the law on STC’s by German 
and European actors may also become apparent. Generally, the deduction of legal principles 
from the acquis is much more controversial than deduction of principles from national laws 
that may moreover lend itself more easily for generalisation than the acquis with its functional, 
fragmented approach.  
 
1) The development of the Directive is not based on individual consumers’ position and 
it can be doubted whether it can be doubted whether a more general principle of the 
protection of weaker parties can be deduced from the Directive.  
Frey
1655
 points out that the aim of the Directive is not unequivocal as it also aims to further the internal 
market, and seeks to protect consumers because of their importance to the internal market, a view 
that has since frequently returned in other Directives in the private law acquis. It can moreover be 
doubted whether consumer protection in the Directive been based on a balanced analysis of the 
different positions of consumers vis-a-vis sellers – and other strong parties – throughout Europe, as 
the views on the weak position of consumers, and how to compensate for this weak position, if at all, 
may differ between as well as within Member States.  
 
2) The Richtigkeitsgewähr can probably not be deduced from the acquis. 
The Directive does not consider the use of STC’s as such problematic, and neither does it stand in the 
way of the use of international model contracts. To the contrary, the EU has recognised the 
importance of STC’s and sought to promote the use of EU-wide STC’s. Although article 3 par. 1 limits 
itself to clauses that have not been individually negotiated, the Directive focuses on contracts between 
businesses and consumers and emphasises the unequal position of these parties, which may lead to 
unfair contract terms. Even if it is true that unfair contract terms may also be concluded between 
businesses, the reasoning in Directive 93/13 remains that businesses are in an equal position and 
thus do not merit special protection if one contract party is faced with STC’s to his detriment.   
The different approach towards STC’s can also be illustrated by the 1990 proposal for a 
Directive that aimed to protect consumers in all contracts, also with regard to central terms of the 
contract. These suggestions met with widespread protest.
1656
 Accordingly, article 4 par. 2 Directive 
excepts the main contract terms from the judicial evaluation under the Directive, which seems in 
accordance with the idea of Richtigkeitsgewähr, under which these main terms will fall as they have 
typically been individually negotiated. However, in Caja de Ahorros, the CJEU
1657
 held that article 4 
par. 2 did not limit the scope of the Directive, and Member States were accordingly free to provide 
more stricter protection to consumers by extending judicial control to the main terms of the contract. 
A.G. Trstenjak,
1658
 in her conclusion, notes that it cannot be deduced from the legislative history of the 
Directive that the EU legislator wished to exempt these terms from judicial control as the main terms of 
the contract may well be unfair if they have been negotiated by parties in an unequal position. 
                                               
1655
 K. Frey, ‘Wie ändert sich das AGB-Gesetz?’, ZIP 1993, p. 572. 
1656
 See especially P. Hommelhoff, ‘Zivilrecht unter dem Einfluβ europäischer Rechtsangleichung’, AcP 1992, p. 90-93.   
1657
 CJEU 3 June 2010 (Caja de Ahorros), C-484/08, [2010] ECR, p. I-4785, par. 42-44.   
1658
 A.G. Trstenjak before Caja de Ahorros, case C-484/08, [2010] ECR, p. I-4785, par.65. 
342 
 
Moreover, the difference in views may also explain the difference in the interpretation of these 
clauses. The objective interpretation of STC’s in the German legal order is in accordance with the 
scope of terms that will often transcend individual contracts. In contrast, the Directive focuses on 
individual circumstances at the time of the conclusion of the contract, as the focus is on the protection 
of one party that may have been subjected to unfair terms because of his weak bargaining position, 
whereas German case law does not take into account the weak position of the consumer in assessing 
the fairness of a clause.
1659
  
Furthermore, the Richtigkeitsgewähr can be seen in correlation with ideas of private autonomy, 
also protected within the sphere of article 2 GG, and the idea that private parties, acting in their own 
interests, should not be able to impose their terms onto contract parties in a way that will lead to 
Fremdbestimmung. Consequently, even if the idea of Richtigkeitsgewähr can be accepted at the 
European level, it does not have a similar connotation at a European level, and it may be doubted 
whether the value of the negotiating process is a leading concept in the development of the acquis or 
whether it is considered a useful concept that should be taken into account in the development of the 
internal market. 
 
However, these differences do not mean that principles of the protection of weaker parties or 
the Richtigkeitsgewähr cannot provide starting points for debate. Moreover, as the 
Richtigkeitsgewähr, good faith and consumer protection partially overlap, the relevance of 
one principle need not mean that other principles may not play a role anymore in the 
development of the law.   
 
10.5.5. Conclusion on principles underlying the law on STC’s  
The development of Directive 93/13 is not directly based on general principles, but the 
German ideas on justice have clearly influenced the Directive. Especially good faith can 
become a general principle that leaves room for national courts to evaluate clauses in a 
manner that is responsive to national legal views on justice, national practice and consistent 
with national law. In this way, general principles do not lead to unification. However, the 
question arises whether the CJEU also follows this approach in decisions after Freiburger 
Kommunalbauten.  
Also, even if general principles can be discovered, this need not necessarily indicate 
in which direction the law will develop. The way in which good faith and consumer protection 
are weighed against one another and the rules developed on the basis of these principles 
may differ. 
The question however arises whether Directive 93/13 allows for the development of 
the German law on STC’s in accordance with the Richtigkeitsgewähr, especially in cases 
where the Richtigkeitsgewähr and consumer protection do not indicate a similar outcome, 
and the level of protection in the Directive is undermined. Yet in the German legal order, the 
principle of good faith, in the German legal order, seems inextricably connected with 
Richtigkeitsgewähr, which arguably offers a convincing analysis for subjecting STC’s to 
judicial evaluation more generally.   
This does not mean that the Richtigkeitsgewähr cannot form a starting point for 
interaction. To the contrary, European and foreign egilsators should seek to benefit from the 
well-developed ideas and the abundant amount of case law and research in the Germna 
legal order, without uncritically copying these ideas.  
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10.6. Conclusion on the development of the law on STC’s through national 
techniques 
Generally, in the development of the private law  through codification, blanket clauses, and 
general principles, other actors also develop private law and, therefore, the ability of actors to 
safeguard benchmarks of predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness 
through these techniques has been diminished. Because actors have not taken into account 
their dependence on other actors in ensuring that private law meets these benchmarks, they 
have not interacted with other actors accordingly, which has undermined the predictability, 
accessibility, consistency and responsiveness of European private law.  
In the law on STC’s, interdependence has clearly developed, which means that 
the extent to which actors can ensure the comprehensiveness of the law on STC’s 
through the use of national techniques has become limited.  
 
Particularly, this means: 
1) The development of the acquis has limited the extent to which national actors may ensure 
the predictable, accessible, consistent and responsive development of the law on STC’s in 
the BGB. Moreover, the extent to which codifications can deal with the development of 
international trade and treaties is limited.  
2) The extent to which blanket clauses may contribute to the consistent and responsive 
development of the law on STC’s has become limited because multiple actors have 
developed blanket clauses and other relevant measures, as well as international sources 
of law that may affect the interpretation of blanket clauses. 
3) The extent to which general principles can contribute to the responsive development of 
the law on STC’s is limited as different principles play a role in the development of the law 
on STC’s at the national and the European level.  
 
It follows that, theoretically, in order to ensure that the law on STC’s develops in accordance 
with these benchmarks, actors must recognise interdependence and interact with each other 
accordingly. In particular, interaction between European and national state actors is 
necessary. Also, to ensure that the German law on STC’s is in accordance with the needs of 
international trade, interaction between the German legislator and foreign legislators as well 
as non-state actors is necessary. Interaction between German courts, foreign courts, 
European actors and international actors is also necessary.  
The German law on STC’s is generally considered a success story. Does that 
mean that actors have recognised interdependence has developed and interacted 
accordingly, or not? 
Paragraph 10.6.1. will consider whether this is the case in the implementation of 
Directive 93/13. Paragraph 10.6.2. will discuss the law on STC’s and international trade and 
paragraph 10.6.3. will consider starting points for more and better interaction. 
 
10.6.1. The law on STC’s and the implementation of Directive 93/13 
Actors have not recognised interdependence in the development of the law on STC’s 
through national techniques. Notably, when the law on STC’s developed, there was far 
less interdependence between actors than is currently the case. Actors have therefore not 
based their interaction with European and international actors on interdependence. Similarly, 
the development of the acquis and international trade has not prompted national actors to 
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reconsider the use of techniques. Accordingly, the Schuldrechtsreform has not prompted to 
legislator to critically consider whether the Directive was correctly implemented into German 
law, perhaps also because of the limited time of the law reform. 
 Nevertheless, the German legislator and German non-state actors have actively 
participated in the development of the acquis at the European level. This has prevented 
that Directive 93/13 diverged considerably from German law which would have necessitated 
far-going amendments. In that case, the decreased ability of national actors to safeguard the 
predictable, consistent and responsive development of the law on STC’s would have been 
apparent. This was however not the case. Thus, interaction has contributed to the 
consistent and predictable development of the law on STC’s, and it has been prevented 
that successful law that adequately handled national practice and was in accordance with 
national legal views on justice, would have to be adapted after harmonisation 
Simultaneously, once harmonisation had been established, German actors 
exercise restraint in the implementation and application of the acquis, and in the 
interaction with European actors, perhaps also because they believed German law is 
already in accordance with European measures. However, European actors play an 
important role in the correct implementation and application of the acquis. Does the lack of 
interaction therefore not lead to problems? 
This is not the case. National state actors very clearly prioritise safeguarding the 
predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness of the law on STC’s. Because of  
the problems in the quality of the private law acquis, and because of the well-established, 
successful AGB-Gesetz, national state actors may be even more inclined to take a defensive 
approach in which they limit interaction with other actors, especially if that might undermine 
the quality of the law on STC’s. 
In particular, interaction with the CJEU may have been limited because of the time 
involved in prejudicial questions, because of the need to ensure responsiveness to national 
legal views and national legal views on justice, and because of the need to ensure 
predictability and consistency, which may be undermined as CJEU decisions are not always 
easy to predict and usually not attuned to surrounding national private laws.  
Moreover, referring to foreign decisions may be detrimental for accessibility as foreign 
law and decisions are not always sufficiently available to actors. Foreign decisions are 
moreover in accordance with foreign default law, which may diverge from German default 
law, and decisions following foreign decisions may therefore undermine the consistency of 
the law. Furthermore, foreign decisions may not always predictable. The use of foreign 
decisions may also be unpredictable and inaccessible considering the amount of possible 
relevant foreign decisions.  
Thus, the lack of interaction in the implementation and application of the acquis 
has maintained rather than undermined the quality of the law on STC’s. 
The obligations of state actors are divided oddly: national state actors are 
focussed on the quality of the law on STC’s and more broadly private law as such, while 
European actors insufficiently consider this need, even though not undermining these 
benchmarks is important for the extent to which the private law acquis effectively promotes 
the functioning of the internal market and enhances consumer protection. 
However in the long term, the lack of interaction means that relevant questions 
have been overlooked in the attempted reform of Directive 93/13 and will likely 
continued to be overlooked.  
 
These instances include:  
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i) The development of the law on STC’s through Sonderprivatrecht or through codification. The 
reasons for the development of Sonderprivatrecht offer interesting starting points for debate 
and a more predictable, consistent approach to the implementation of the acquis may benefit 
these benchmarks.  
ii) Questions on the allocation of competences between the CJEU and national courts in the 
interpretation of blanket clauses. 
The restraint of the BGH can moreover be undermined if foreign courts refer questions to the CJEU on 
the allocation of the CJEU and national courts to interpret blanket clauses. If the CJEU considers itself 
competent, this would be problematic for predictability. However, the conclusion that the CJEU is 
competent to interpret blanket clauses, especially the conclusiont hat the CJEU is exclusively 
competent, can be very detrimental for the responsiveness of the law on STC’s. 
iii) Questions on the obligation of national state actors to implement the model list in the Annex to 
Directive 93/13. 
iv) Questions to what extent the Richtigkeitsgewähr could and should continue to play a central 
role in the development of the law on STC’s. 
 
These oversights mainly undermine the consistent, predictable and responsive development 
of Directive 93/13. Missed chances to improve the Directive are unfortunate, as it makes little 
sense to maintain unpredictability and inconsistency.  
The lack of interaction may eventually lead to a circle: Because of the lack of 
interaction, the reform of the Directive overlooks questions that are relevant for improving the 
Directive, and because of these oversights, the Directive is not improved. Consequently, 
national actors continue to exercise restraint in the implementation and application of the 
Directive. And so on, and so forth.   
 
10.6.2. The law on STC’s and international trade 
Interdependence between national actors and international actors in developing the law 
on STC’s in accordance with the needs of international trade has also developed.  
 Generally, the German legislator has rejected regulatory competition. Instead, the 
legislator has sought to draft an attractive regime in accordance with the needs of national 
practice. However, in international cases decided under German law, courts have recognised 
the added vaue of international materials and business practices, and to a lesser extent, 
foreign decisions. This approach to international cases contributes to the responsiveness of 
German law to international practice. Moreover, the approach of the courts to 
international cases under German law enables the German legislator to maintain a 
predictable, consistent  regime that is in accordance with national legal views on 
justice for national cases that is applied more leniently in international cases.  
Although it is not clear whether the German legislator has similarly actively 
participated in the drafting of treaties that it has entered into and ratified, it does not seem 
likely that the active  approach has suddenly been abandoned. However, it may be more 
difficult to influence the drafting of treaties as more actors are involved in the drafting of 
treaties, while some treatioes have been drafted already and subsequently been entered into. 
However, German courts have adopted restraint in interacting with international and 
foreign actors in the interpretation of treaties. Reasons for this restraint may be the 
predictable and accessibility of the law. Moreover, the consistent referral to German 
materials has contributed to the consistent application of treaties within the German legal 




The lack of interaction is problematic. It may diminish the responsiveness of 
international law, often drafted to facilitate international trade, to international business 
practices. Additionally, the lack of interaction of courts to foreign decisions and international 
materials may not be beneficial for parties who do not have much access to German 
materials. The lack of interaction may also undermine the extent to which parties can rely 
upon provisions in treaties or on easily available decisions, which is detrimental for 
predictability.  
Moreover, the lack of interaction may undermine the predictable, accessible and 
consistent development of the law on STC’s as relevant questions are not considered in the 
reform of law at the European level.  
 
Relevant issues include 
i) The overlap between European measures or European measures and treaties’ 
ii) The competence of German courts to set aside national mandatory law if it conflicts with 
international law 
iii) The  possibility for a future CESL to allow clauses, especially in consumer contracts,  that are 
contrary to national mandatory law. 
 
Because of the lack of interaction, these questions remain unresolved, and will likely not be 
addressed in the reform of Directive 93/13. A circle of non-interaction could therefore 
develop: As the Directive is not improved, actors continue to exercise restraint, because of 
which the Directive is not resolved. 
 
10.6.3. More and better interaction? 
It has been argued that the interaction between actors should be adjusted. Is this also 
the case for the law on STC’s and if so, how should interaction be changed? 
Arguably, the interaction between actors should serve to improve the quality of the law on 
STC’s. Thus, interaction between national and European actors should make European 
actors aware of relevant questions in the implementation of Directive 93/13, for example if 
these problems are considered in soft law projects or academic research, and the need to 
maintain the comprehensibility of European private law. In turn, interaction should make 
German actors more aware of the use of techniques.  
More interaction between German actors and European and foreign actors, or 
perhaps academics, could also draw more attention to the increasing number of Directives 
providing rules on STC’s.1660 If the legislator seeks to maintain the central role for the BGB, it 
may be worthwhile to consider in what ways the German legislator is to cope with the 
development of the acquis in this area, to prevent that the accessibility of the law of STC’s is 
decreased as various separate laws provide incidental, separate rules that influence the law 
on STC’s.1661  
Possible conflicts between simultaneously applicable sources – such as the CISG 
and national law implementing the Directive 1662  as well as Montréal Convention and 
Directive,1663 as well as the CISG, national law and Directive 2000/311664 may prompt actors 
involved in the development of the law to consider how these sources should be coordinated, 
                                               
1660
 See previously par. 9.3.1.  
1661
 Current course pursued in the implementation of these Directives, in articles 305-310 BGB. Perhaps reconsider the question 
whether the law in this area is stable enough to be included in the BGB, if it is continually being developed at the European level.  
1662
 Especially LG Düsseldorf 11 October 1995, 2 O 506/94, at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=234.   
1663
 Comp. BGH 1 February 2005, NJW 2005, 1774. 
1664
 Comp. LG Gießen 31 July 2008, BeckRS 2009, 395 and  
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which may help to resolve these conflicts, which in turn should contribute to the consistent 
and accessible development of European private law. 
Interaction between national, European and international state and non-state should 
serve to make German actors more aware of the possibility to make the German legal order 
a more attractive forum for the adjudication of disputes under international law.  
However, more interaction need not necessarily lead to deliberation if the 
approach of German and European actors does not change. If national actors are mainly 
focussed on national laws, and European actors are not focussed at all on national laws, 
they pay less attention or even neglect the insights provided by comparative law as well as 
the European view, which may stand in the way of deliberation in the revision of Directive 
93/13. Thus, the revision of the Directive is likely also, if not only, based on conflicting 
European, national and economic interests, rather than on rational arguments which course 
will lead to the most predictable, most consistent, accessible or responsive development of 
the acquis – the emphasis on these benchmarks may arguably also differ. 
However, if the future reform of the 1993 Directive were to take place in 
accordance with these suggestions, the legislative process might have to be 
considerably lengthened. Processes at the European and the national level should be 
carefully coordinated to prevent unnecessary delays.  
Yet some delay is preferable over future problems that may arise if a future Directive 
does not sufficiently take into account the needs and preferences of legal practice or national 
legal views on justice, which may entail that the law will be more quickly outdated, 
necessitating further reform, which is arguably also detrimental to the stable and consistent 
development of the law.  
These possible starting points for more interaction between actors may well reinforce 
one another. Future CJEU decisions on the cases in which the Montréal Convention and the 
Directive overlap should be considered in the future reform of the Directive, which in turn 








10.7. The use of additional or alternative techniques 
Actors involved in the development of the law on STC’s have typically not recognised 
interdependence as such, and have therefore not consciously sought to mitigate the 
decreased extent of national techniques to ensure the comprehensibility of European private 
law through the use of additional or alternative techniques. However, usually, techniques are 
used in combination with one another, and additional and alternative techniques may well 
contribute to benchmarks of predictability, consistency, accessibility and responsiveness. 
Therefore, this paragraph will ask what techniques could be used in addition or instead of 
currently used techniques.  
The narrow approach of both German and European state actors also has 
consequences for the use of additional techniques. Particularly, the limited view of actors 
increases the chance that actors will reject suggestions for the use of additional or alternative 
techniques that is not in accordance with their interests. Therefore, these possibilities will 
only be considered insofar as they are likely to contribute to benchmarks of predictability, 
consistency, accessibility and responsiveness of the law on STC’s. 
Furthermore, this chapter will not consider suggestions for the use of Regulations. 
These suggestions are not likely to meet with support as they may severely undermine the 
central role of the BGB. Regardless, they would not be considered as it is not clear how the 
use of Regulations would contribute to the comprehensibility of the law on STC’s. 1665  
Moreover, the use of the OMC may not be considered favourably by German actors if it aims 
to improve regulatory competition in this area. The success of the OMC depends on the 
willingness of actors to participate in it, which should not be assumed, while the weaknesses 
of the OMC may reinforce the shortcomings apparent in the debate on the reform of the 
acquis, including Directive 93/13.   
Additional and alternative techniques that are likely to be rejected include the use of 
techniques that may lead to Fremdbestimmung, especially comitology, which has already 
been rejected by German actors. 1666  The development of guidelines by the European 
Commission can similarly be rejected and guidelines have moreover proven unsuccessful.  
Although the use of alternative regulation for the interpretation of blanket clauses may be 
problematic as it might lead to Fremdbestimmung, this possibility will nevertheless be 
considered. Courts have recognised added value of alternative regulation that may reflect 
business practices, 1667  as has also become visible in international cases 1668  as well as 
domestic cases. 1669  Taking into account well-established self-regulation – which is 
abundantly available in the German legal order1670 – will contribute to the responsiveness of 
German law to national practices.  
German actors may also be less receptive to suggestions for the study of STC’s to 
identify barriers to the internal market, as this may reinforce the functional, fragmented 
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 A Regulation would not necessarily undermine accessibility. Although consumers may not always be sufficiently aware of 
relevant Regulations, especially German consumers are likely to be aware of their rights because of the well-established 
national rules. The extent to which a Regulation would benefit predictability and consistency depends on the room left under a 
Regulation for national default law and model lists, and national case law, which so far have contributed to the predictable and 
consistent interpretation of article 307 BGB.  It may be doubted whether judges, especially in relatively straightforward cases, 
will extensively consider soft laws, which they have not expressly done before, or foreign case law, especially if national case 
law is available. Moreover, the responsiveness of the law on STC’s may be severely diminished if a Regulation does not leave 
sufficient room for the courts to evaluate clauses in accordance with national legal views on justice and practice, or the 
Richtigkeitsgewähr. 
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 Comitology will be discussed in the subsequent chapter, as Dutch actors have not rejected this option. 
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 BVerfG 9. 5. 1972 - 1 BvR 518/62 u. 308/64, NJW 1972, 1504, C 2.  
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 See previously par. 10.5.3.1.4. 
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 Especially in the area of consumer sales law, see previously par. 4.5.3.4.  
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approach of the acquis, which makes it considerably more difficult to maintain the predictable, 
consistent and accessible development of private law within the BGB. However, these 
initiatives may also serve to make the law more accessible to foreign actors, and as German 
law has provided a successful set of rules, making German law more available may well be a 
way to increase the attractiveness of German law. Also, if the study leads to harmonisation, 
albeit fragmented, this may lead to more convincing initiatives and support for harmonisation 
and improve the quality of the acquis. It is desirable that German actors are prompted to 
reconsider their narrow view, especially if that happens in a way that does not diectly lead to 
harmonisation. 
Conversely, European actors are likely to object to the use of model laws instead of 
currently used European measures, even if model laws will likely increase the quality of 
European private law. However, model laws will not contribute to the comprehensibility of the 
law on STC’s as UNCITRAL has not established model laws or legislative guides for the laws 
on STC’s. Possibly, considering existing initiatives of the ICC, less need was perceived for 
the development of such a model law. It can be doubted whether a model law could be 
developed sufficiently quickly to be taken into account in the reform of Directive 93/13.   
Also, the development of collective bargaining between a limited number of Member 
States is likely to meet with European objections, as this may lead to a ‘two-tier Europe’. In 
addition, the success of collective bargaining depends on the willingness of actors to 
participate, and this willingness should not be overestimated. However, German actors have 
considerable experience in collective bargaining and may be interested to engage in it if this 
would induce the judiciary to evaluate STC’s less strictly. Moreover, the chances that a ‘two-
tier Europe is created may decrease as agreements are initially not transformed into 
equivalents of framework agreements, which may also take away objections of 
Fremdbestimmung. 
This paragraph will follow the order in which the use of additional and alternative 
techniques was discussed in chapter 8. Accordingly, paragraph 10.7.1. will focus on 
techniques to support the legislative process. Paragraph 10.7.2. will focus on the 
development of the DCFR, and paragraph 10.7.3. will consider techniques to support the 
extent to which blanket clauses can contribute to comprehensibility. Paragraph 10.7.4. will 
analyse the possibility to study the use of STC’s in cross-border trade. Paragraph 10.7.5. will 
consider the development of the CESL, paragraph 10.7.6. will turn to the introduction of 
collective bargaining and paragraph 10.7.7. will end with a conclusion.  
 
10.7.1. Techniques to support the legislative process 
The extent to which additional techniques used to support the legislative process could 
strengthen interaction is limited. 
Impact assessments at the national level could draw more attention to the use of 
techniques and provide a valuable impetus for reconsidering the use of techniques. The 
development of national impact assessments would be consistent with Member States’ calls 
for more empirical support for European measures. Respondents may also be prompted to 
consider impact assessments if comments based on the impacts of future initiatives are likely 
to be taken into account. However, German actors are not familiar with impact assessments 
for private law, which would moreover require that German actors recognise that Directive 
93/13, and possibly, therefore, articles 305-310 BGB, like Sonderprivatrecht, aim to improve 
the internal market as well as consumer protection.  
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The use of consultations at the European and national level has not inhibited German 
actors from successfully participating in debate, which indicates that publications in journals 
and newspapers may also serve to prompt participation. However, participation of actors at 
the European level could still be improved. European or national actors might try to make use 
of well-established networks in order to prompt parties with valuable expertise and 
experience to participate, or participate more extensively, in European debate.  
The use of databases on foreign law implementing Directive 93/13 and decisions are 
not likely to generate more referral to these sources. Currently, courts do not refer to foreign 
law in the implementation of the acquis, and foreign decisions are similarly not taken into 
acocunt in the adjudication of disputes under international regimes. hardly used despite 
databases. Perhaps, however, if German actors are more aware that this restraintmay inhibit 
the attractiveness of Germany as a forum to adjudicate disputes, this restraint might be 
reconsidered. However, even if the added value of foreign decisions is more concistently 
recognised, restraint may continue to be exercised in the implementation of the acquis 
because of potential problems with predictability, accessibility, consistency and 
responsiveness.  
Interestingly, however, the improved use of databases may also encourage regulatory 
competition. Possibly, the increased accessibility of German case law could increase 
knowledge of German practice and provide insight into a well-developed legal system that 
could inspire both foreign legislators and foreign judges.  
However, currently, recent BGH case law is already freely accessible, 1671  which 
foreign actors may not realise. Thus, Dutch judges, in decisions under the CISG, have 
consistently referred to one decision from the BGH, while surely, there are also other 
relevant decisions.1672 Thus, merely making available case law may not suffice, as case law 
may prove less accessible than legislative provisions or commentaries. Perhaps, if 
databases are to provide information to not only German parties but also to foreign parties, 
the needs and prior knowledge of foreign actors may prompt actors to increase the 
accessibility of databases for these actors. Thus, for example, BGH decisions on the CISG, 
or BGH decisions on article 307 BGH could be made available in groups, accompanied, 
perhaps, by a short introduction. Importantly, foreign and European actors should be 
sufficiently aware of these initiatives in order to benefit from them. 
Thus, the improved use of consultations and impact assessments may not strengthen 
the legislative process. However, the use of databases may assist the German legislator in 
attempts for regulatory competition in a way that does not require lowering standards of 
consumer protection or repeatedly amending the BGB. 
 
10.7.2. The development of the DCFR 
Currently, the DCFR does not sufficiently take into account parts of the acquis and national 
experiences, which may limit the extent to which the DCFR will contribute to the predictability, 
consistency, accessibility and responsiveness of the law on STC’s. In comparison to other 
soft laws, however, the DCFR does provide a clear added value to the PECL and the 
UNIDROIT Principles.  





 See par. 11.3.4.2.2.  
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Paragraph 10.7.2.1 will consider the DCFR and the private law acquis, and paragraph 
10.7.2.2. will discuss the DCFR and national practice. Paragraph 10.7.2.3. will turn to  other 
sets of soft laws and paragraph 10.7.2.4. will end with a conclusion.  
 
10.7.2.1. The DCFR and the private law acquis 
The drafters of the DCFR have diverged from relevant European initiatives, in particular 
Directive 93/13, which has undermined the extent to which the DCFR can contribute to the 
predictability, consistency, accessibility and responsiveness in the form of a “toolbox”.  
In some cases, the rules in the DCFR expressly take into account the acquis. 
Accordingly, article II – 9:102 et seq DCFR provides rules for pre-contractual statements that 
can be regarded as a contract term. The DCFR expressly refers to various national laws as 
well as Directive 99/44 on consumer sales as well as article 434 BGB. The rule in the DCFR 
is, in an amended form, mirrored in article 69 of the proposed Common European Sales Law.  
However, the DCFR also diverges from the acquis in various respects:  
 
i) The definition of STC’s differs from the definition in Directive 93/13. Proposed article 
30 of the consumer rights Directive did not follow the definition of the DCFR, but the 
CESL does reflect the definition of the DCFR.  
 
The PECL, the UNIDROIT Principles and the DCFR similarly provide rules on general contract law 
and STC’s. Interestingly, both articles II - 1:109 DCFR and 2.1.19 UNIDROIT Principles refer to 
standard terms as terms that are prepared in advance for repeated use and that are not individually 
negotiated with other parties. Interestingly, the DCFR expressly refers to Directive 93/13, but does not 
refer to German law.
1673
 The DCFR moreover diverges from 2:209 par. 3 PECL that refers to terms 
that have not been individually negotiated and that ‘have been formulated in advance for an indefinite 
number of contracts, which it rightly considers as too strict.
1674
  
Notably, Directive 93/13 does not require that terms have been drafted for multiple contracts, 
and the German legislator accordingly amended article 310 par. 3 BGB to ensure that STC’s that were 
only used once in consumer contracts would also be subject to judicial evaluation.
1675
  Interestingly, 
article 30 of the proposal for a Directive on consumer rights referred to terms ‘drafted in advance by 
the trader or a third party, which the consumer agreed to without having the possibility of influencing 
their content’. Although this definition does emphasise drafting terms in advance, it also does not 
require that terms are drafted for multiple contracts. Yet article 2 sub d of the Regulation proposing a 
CESL defines standard contract terms as ‘contract terms which have been drafted in advance for 
several transactions involving different parties, and which have not been individually negotiated by the 
parties within the meaning of Article 7 of the Common European Sales Law’. Accordingly, article 7 of 
the proposed Common European Sales Law also provides that contract terms are not individually 
negotiated ‘if it has been supplied by one party and the other party has not been able to influence its 
content’. 
The DCFR also diverges from Directive 93/13 by not expressly exempting the main terms of 
the contract from the definition of standard contract terms. The debate preceding Directive 2011/83 
however shows that this distinction is important for German actors.
1676
 Unfortunately, article 7 of the 
proposed Regulation also does not make this distinction. 
 
ii) The test of unfairness in the DCFR differs from Directive 93/13. 
                                               
1673
 DCFR, Part I, p. 164. 
1674
 DCFR, Part I, p. 160. 
1675
 MuchKomm/Basedow (2012), article 310, nr 67. 
1676
 See previously par. 10.3.2.4.  
352 
 
Article II – 9: 403 DCFR stipulates that a clause in a consumer contract is unfair if it significantly 
disadvantages the consumer, contrary to good faith. According to the comments,
1677
 this wording 
implies that the test should not be extended to the main contract terms, which however could have 
been remedied by exempting the main terms of the contract from judicial evaluation. It is moreover not 
necessary, as article II – 9: 406 par. 2 DCFR provides that the main terms of the contract are exempt 
from the unfairness test. A similar exception would also have been desirable for article 9:405 that 
defines ‘unfair’ terms in business contracts, which, as such, is controversial enough as is. Accordingly, 
this change has not been followed in article 83 of the proposed Common European Sales Law.   
 
Also, the DCFR does not resolve inconsistencies visible in the private law acquis. For 
example, article II- 9: 103 DCFR stipulates that parties must have taken reasonable steps to 
make the other party aware of the provisions, and if a contract is concluded electronically, if 
STC’s are made available in “textual form”, which, according to the comments, includes the 
‘presentation of terms on an internet site in such a way that they can be downloaded, stored 
and printed by the other party’. This rule is in accordance with article 10 par. 3 Directive 
2000/31, to which the DCFR accordingly refers, as well as article 23 Regulation Brussels I, 
which more clearly sets out the strict requirements for the inclusion of jurisdiction clauses.1678 
Unfortunately, however, the DCFR does not consider article 22 par. 1 sub f and par. 2 
Directive 2006/123 that in contrast stipulate that service provides may be provided in various 
ways, depending on the preference of the provider.1679  
Notably, if the DCFR is to act as a “toolbox”, it could be of clearly added value to draw 
attention to inconsistencies such as this, which unfortunately is not the case. Interestingly, 
article 6 par. 8 Directive 2011/83 however stipulates that the requirements in the Directive 
should complete the requirements in Directive 2006/123 and Directive 2000/31, while 
Member States should retain the possibility to impose additional requirements on service 
providers. However, if the provisions conflict with the requirements of the Directive, the 
provisions in the Directive prevail. Article 6 does not expressly include STC’s, but terms often 
included in STC’s, such as clauses on the extension of the contract as well as conditions and 
rights with regard to after-sale services and out-of-court redress.  
Other rules and comments in the DCFR have also not been followed. The comments 
to article II – 9:103 DCFR1680 expressly refer to usages that may entail that parties are bound 
to terms not made available to him directly, but made available generally by stakeholder or 
international organisations. This referral seems at odds with the BGH decision with regard to 
the obligation of users of STC’s to make their STC’s sufficiently available, but in accordance 
with decisions of the BGH under German law in which the use of terms was found to be well-
established, and parties should assume that their contract party wanted to include these 
clauses in their contracts.1681 Oddly, these rules have not been reflected in the proposed 
CESL that does not appear to provide separate rules for making STC’s adequately available 
to one’s counterparty. Arguably, this is an important gap that should be dealt with before a 
CESL is enacted. 
In some respects, the DCFR may provide a clearly added value. It may be of added 
value to existing soft laws because of the specific rules on unfair terms in articles II – 9:401 
et seq DCFR, as the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL that do not provide specific rules 
                                               
1677
 DCFR part 1, p. 634-635. 
1678
 However, the comments and notes to article II – 9:409, DCFR, Part I, p. 660-661 do expressly consider CJEU decisions.  
1679
 These ways include the possibility for the provider to provide the information on his own initiative, making the information 
easily available in places where the contract is concluded, by making the text of the STC’s easily available online, or by 
including the STC’s in general information documents provided by the seller. 
1680
 DCFR, Part I, p. 591. 
1681
 See above par. 10.3.3.2.2. 
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on unfair terms. Also, the comparative overview provided by the DCFR1682 could be helpful 
for future reform of the 1993 Directive. According to the comments, these rules are modelled 
on Directive 93/13 and may go beyond the protection conferred on consumers by the 
Directives. Accordingly, article II – 9: 402 par. 2 DCFR provides that a term in a consumer 
contract that is not transparent may be unfair for that reason alone, which has not been 
followed in article 83 of the proposed Common European Sales Law.   
Thus, in various important respects, the DCFR diverges from the acquis, and in some 
cases, the DCFR has – rightly so – not been followed. In some cases, the DCFR should be 
followed, in particular with regard to business practices and the sufficient availability of STC’s. 
In other cases, such as the definition of STC’s, following the DCFR is problematic and should 
be reconsidered.   
 
10.7.2.2. The DCFR and national practice 
The drafters of the DCFR have not adequately taken into account questions arisen in 
national practice, which has undermined the added value of the DCFR for national and 
European actors.  
Unfortunately, the DCFR does not address the question whether clauses can be 
upheld if judges interpret them leniently,1683 or whether model contracts should fall within the 
scope of the Directive.1684 Moreover, compliance with article 1 par. 2 Directive that exempts 
clauses in accordance with applicable national default law or international law has been 
problematic in the German legal order.1685  
Notably, the comments to article II – 9:406 DCFR,1686 although they expressly refer to 
the exemption of clauses in accordance with the Warsaw and subsequent Montréal 
Convention, do not refer to BGH decisions that contradict these decisions, even though 
these decisions may indicate problems for the CESL.1687 Moreover, neither the comments 
nor the notes to the DCFR,1688 in discussing ‘unfairness’ in article II – 9:403 DCFR pay 
attention to the question which court should be competent to interpret the DCFR. Yet this 
question has been debated, 1689  and the BGH 1690  does not seem particularly inclined to 
consider the question whether the CJEU is competent to provide guidelines for the 
interpretation of national law implementing article 3 Directive.1691 The notes, though referring 
to the principle of good faith in German law, do not discuss the Richtigkeitsgewähr. 
Admittedly, the Richtigkeitsgewähr has been criticised1692 and shows considerable overlap 
with good faith,1693 but it still provides an interesting notion for justifying the binding force of 
                                               
1682
 For example with regard to the implementation of the Directive, DCFR , Part I, p. 637-638. 
1683
 MunchKomm zum BGB/Basedow (2012), article 306 nr 28-29. 
1684
 This is the case in German law, see MunchKomm/Basedow (2012), article 305, nr 13, 18-19, 21, while this has been 
debated in Dutch law, without however considering the Directive, see See for debate on this question on the one hand R.H.C. 
Jongeneel, ‘Vallen door een ander dan partijen opgestelde algemene voorwaarden onder afd. 6.5.3.?’, WPNR 6027 (1991), who 
held that model contracts do not fall under (then) the AGBG, and on the other hand J.H.M. van Erp, ‘De NVM-koopakte: géén 
algemene voorwaarden’, WPNR 6190 (1995).  
1685
 See previously par. 10.4.3.2. 
1686
 DCFR, Part I, p. 647. 
1687
 BGH 1 February 2005, NJW 2005, 1774. See further previously par. 10.4.3.2.  
1688
 DCFR, Part I, p. 634 et seq. 
1689
 See Staudinger Kommentar zum BGB/Coester (2006), article 307, par. 70-71.  
1690
 Comp. BGH 14 July 2004, BeckRS 2004, 7903, see further previously par. 10.4.1.2. 
1691
 See further for this argument below, par. 10.4.1.1. 
1692
 See prominently L. Raiser, ‘Vertragsfunktion und Vertragsfreiheit’, in: E. von Caemmerer, E. Friesenhahn, R. Lange (eds.), 
Hundert Jahre deutsches Rechtsleben, Festschrift zum hundertjährigen Bestehen des Deutschen Juristentages, I, Muller: 
Karlsruhge 1960, p. 118.   
1693
 Notably, the Richtigkeitsgewähr is absent for STC’s as they have not been negotiated, which gives the user of STC’s the 
opportunity to improve his legal position to the detriment of his counterparty. This may however be contrary to good faith, which 
requires the user of STC’s to take into account the legitimate interests and expectations of his counterparty. See further 
previously, par.10.5.1.  
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contracts and it may therefore also be interesting for foreign and European state actors and 
academics.  
 
10.7.2.3. The DCFR and other soft laws   
The DCFR provides specific rules on STC’s that are not reflected in other soft laws, and the 
DCFR might have had a cear added value for the development of the CESL and the revision 
of Directive 93/13. Yet in cases where other soft laws have also developed rules for STC’s,  
divergences from and between the different sets of soft laws have not been adequately 
explained. Arguably, explaining divergences from other sets of soft law doing so may provide 
legislators and courts with arguments for preferring or not preferring a particular set of rules, 
which would have improved the accessibility of European private law. 
In some cases, the rules in the DCFR largely converge with other soft laws, such as 
article II – 4: 209 DCFR that closely resembles article 2:209 pars. 1 and 2 PECL. The 
provisions also resembles article 2.1.22 UNIDROIT Principles. Yet although the Comments 
note that the DCFR has followed the UNIDROIT principles in this respect, it is not mentioned 
that differently from the UNIDROIT Principles, the DCFR – as well as the PECL – stipulates 
that no contract is formed if a party has indicated in advance that it does not intend to be 
bound, not by way of standard terms.  
Various differences between the DCFR, the PECL and the UNIDROIT Principles are 
not explained further: 
 
i) The different rules on formation of contract and the inclusion of clauses in 
contracts if one party’s clauses reject the applicability of the other party’s 
clauses 
According to the comments, ‘experience’ has shown that parties that include clauses in their contract 
that stipulate there is no contract unless their own terms apply subsequently act in accordance with 
the contract. Thus, the comments find, to uphold these clauses while parties perform the contract, 
‘would erode the rule’. The present rule in the DCFR, followed in article 39 proposed CESL, leaves 
open the possibility that both parties have included these clauses in their contract and subsequently 
performed the contract, for which situation the solution preferred by the DCFR does not become 
apparent. The DCFR also refers to the CISG. Articles 18 and 19 CISG also provide rules for battle of 
forms, and similarly provides that parties need to object orally or by sending notice, which implies that 
objection cannot take place through STC’s. As the DCFR in this respect follows the CISG rather than 
the PECL or the UNIDROIT Principles, reasoning that indicates why the CISG provides the better rule 
would have been welcome, and should moreover be easily available considering the database of case 
law on the CISG.
1694
 It would also have been interesting to consider the question whether clauses in 
battle of forms cases can nevertheless be included because the use of these clauses represents well-
established commercial practices, for example with regard to retention of title clauses. 
Moreover, differently from the PECL and the UNIDROIT principles, article II – 4: 209 DCFR, 
followed in article 39 proposed CESL, requires that parties inform the users of STC’s about their lack 
of willingness to be bound with undue delay, which is reminiscent of article 19 par. 2 CISG. The DCFR 
does not elaborate on this additional requirement, which may however leave additional room for 
arguments. If the notes had more extensively referred to CISG case law, more clarity could have been 
provided.  
 
ii) Different rules on individually negotiated and standard merger clauses 
                                               
1694
 See critically on the rule provided by the CISG P. Schlechtriem, ‘Battle of Forms in International Contract Law, Evaluation of 




Article II – 4:104 DCFR distinguishes between individually negotiated merger clauses and merger 
clauses that have not been individually negotiated. A similar rule can be found in article 2:105 PECL. 
Although the DCFR, according to the comments, follows article 2.1.17 UNIDROIT Principles, this 
provision does not make a similar distinction, nor does the added value of this distinction become 
convincingly apparent. Although the DCFR points out that merger clauses that have not been 
individually negotiated be unfair in consumer contracts, according to the indicative European model list, 
this does not mean that such a distinction is useful for merger clauses; notably, if it is individually 
negotiated, it should not be subject to judicial evaluation as it is not a clause that has not been 
individually negotiated in the sense of article II-1:109 DCFR. It is probable that national laws also have 
not made a distinction between negotiated and non-negotiated merger clauses for similar reasons.  
The distinction in the DCFR is also not followed in article 72 of the proposed CESL, which has 
instead opted to provide more protection to consumers by simply stipulating in article 72 par. 3 Draft 
CESL that in a B2C contract, a consumer is not bound to a merger clause. However, the comparative 
overview in the note may provide valuable information for the further development of the proposed 
CESL.  
 
iii) Different rules on clauses for form requirements 
Article II – 4:105 DCFR stipulates that clauses imposing form requirements on modification or 
termination of the agreement only result in a presumption, in accordance with article 2:106 PECL, but 
contrary to article 2.1.18 UNIDROIT Principles. According to the DCFR, this rule is in accordance with 
most of the laws of the Member States, but it has not been reflected in the proposal for a Common 
European Sales Law.    
 
Arguably, diverging from other sets of soft law is not, as such, problematic, but more 
explanation on the differences could have made clear why the DCFR differs from the PECL 
and the UNIDROIT Principles, which would have improved accessibility and provided an 
explanation for actors looking to the different set of soft laws for inspiration in the drafting of 
legislation or the adjudication of disputes. 
 
10.7.2.4. Conclusion on the DCFR as an additional technique 
The divergences between the acquis and the DCFR may limit the extent to which the DCFR 
can contribute to a more predictable, consistent development of the acquis, as well as the 
consistent implementation of the acquis. 
Also, the lack of attention for national experiences in the implementation of the acquis 
limits the extent to which the DCFR adequately responds to problems or lack of clarities that 
have become visible in practice. Not addressing these questions also limits the extent to 
which the DCFR supports the predictability of the acquis.   
Moreover, notwithstanding the clearly added value of specific rules on STC’s in the 
DCFR, the lack of attention for divergences between the DCFR and other soft laws has 
lessened the extent to which the DCFR improves the accessibility of European private law. 
 
10.7.3. Techniques in addition to blanket clauses 
The use of alternative regulation may contribute to the responsive interpretation of blanket 
clauses, which will be considered in paragraph 10.7.3.1. Moreover, the development of the 
German law on STC’s reveals that lower regulation may also play a role in the interpretation 





10.7.3.1. The use of self-regulation 
Well-established self-regulation in the area of consumer sales may contribute to the 
predictable and consistent interpretation of blanket clauses. Taking into account conduct 
rules expressly recognised by users of STC’s may moreover be in accordance with 
consumers’ expectations.   
Arguably, the use of alternative regulation may especially be indicated in cases where 
contract parties should be able to exercise constitutional rights without undue interference 
from either European or national state actors, although it should be noted that European 
actors may view self-regulation differently than German state actors. The use of self-
regulation in the interpretation of blanket clauses may however bring about problems of 
Fremdbestimmung, especially in cross-border cases where both parties have not consented 
to self-regulation. Moreover, the success of this option also depends upon the existence of 
well-established self-regulation.  
Yet if successful self-regulation has developed, as is the case in the area of 
consumer sales,1695 it may be relevant for parties that have recognised self-regulation. Thus, 
rules developed in apparently successful self-regulation are not imposed on actors that have 
not recognised self-regulation, including foreign actors.  
However, if actors have recognised self-regulation that provides clear rules of conduct 
that have subsequently be breached by the seller, it seems consistent to consider these rules, 
although cases where this has happened are rare.1696 Arguably, taking into account codes of 
conduct and other self-regulation may also be in accordance with article 6 Directive 2005/29 
that stipulates that non-compliance with codes providing clear rules of conduct that the seller 
has expressly complied with may constitute a misleading commercial practice. Notably, self-
regulation can be a relevant factor; the question whether a clause is unfair may also depend 
on other factors.  
 
10.7.3.2. The use of lower regulation 
The extent to which lower regulation may contribute to the predictability, consistency, 
accessibility and responsiveness may be limited.  
Possibly, the choice of the legislator to implement Directives into the BGB could be 
combined with a choice to implement more detailed provisions outside the BGB, in lower 
regulation.1697 This option may be particularly interesting if Directives that do not provide 
rules for private law as such, contain rules affecting the interpretation of STC’s.  
Thus, provisions on information duties and withdrawal periods would be stipulated 
outside the BGB, which will facilitate maintaining the abstract approach of the BGB. In 
addition, concepts that are not easily reconcilable with principles underlying the BGB – 
especially withdrawal periods – do not have to be inserted within the BGB, which may help to 
preserve the logical structure of the BGB. In addition, placing these provisions outside the 
BGB would make the European background of these provisions more apparent.  
 
                                               
1695
 This concerns the the trustmark ‘Geprüfter online shop – Bundesverband des Deutschen versandhandlers’ (see further 
http://www.bvh.info/bvh/leistungen/guetesiegel/?no_cache=1&sword_list[0]=g%C3%BCtesiegel, as well as the s@ser shopping 
trustmark for online shopping (see http://www.safer-shopping.de/qualitaetskriterien.html.) and the Trusted Shops trustmarks 
(see http://www.trustedshops.de/guetesiegel/kaeuferschutz.html). See further previously par. 4.5.3.4. 
1696
 Comp. LG Düsseldorf 22 June 1995, BeckRS 2011, 7145, a case on the appraisal of a company to be sold where the court 
in passing refers to professional rules of conduct  
1697
 Similarly P. Hommelhoff, ‘Zivilrecht unter dem Einfluβ europäischer Rechtsangleichung’, AcP 1992, p. 86. 
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Accordingly, the use of lower regulation has been used in the implementation of Directive 2000/31 on 
e-commerce. Accordingly, article 241 EGBGB initially enabled the Ministry for Justice to establish 
regulation on the information duties of several Directives, which led to the BGB-Informationspflichten-
Verordnung. Although the regulation still contains provisions on the information duties of tour 
operators, article 3 of the regulation implementing article 10 par. 3 Directive has since been revised, 
and currently this article has been implemented in articles 246 par. 3 EGBG and article 312g BGB.  
 
After the revision of Directive 87/102 on consumer credit, the German legislator 1698 
reconsidered its course as it found that lower regulation failed to provide sufficient 
predictability to contract parties and left too much discretion to the courts to undermine the 
use of models for information duties of the seller.1699 Yet detailed provisions on information 
duties should also not be included into the BGB, as this would be difficult to reconcile with 
the abstract approach of the BGB. Consequently, article 246 par. 3 EGBGB now implements 
the detailed provisions, alongside other detailed information provisions from other Directives, 
in addition to article 312g BGB and article 675a BGB.   
Consequently, it is thus unlikely that if the German legislator will use lower regulation 
to provide models that enable sellers or suppliers to meet information requirements. 
Several other objections may also arise:  
 
1) The use of lower regulations leads to the development of a large amount of 
regulations alongside the BGB, which may undermine accessibility and 
consistency. 
This development should be kept to a minimum, to prevent that in cases where multiple Directives are 
simultaneously applicable, provisions in the BGB as well as provisions in several regulations are 
applicable, which may undermine accessibility and consistency. Keeping the amount of lower 
regulation to a minimum may however not be an easy task as the acquis continues to develop.  
Also, especially if provisions in lower regulations concern important parts of private law, the 
effort to maintain the central role of the BGB is undermined. 
 
2) The development of lower regulation may make the reform of law considerable 
more complicated.  
The revision of a Directive would necessitate not only the amendment of the BGB but also surrounding, 
simultaneously applicable regulations. Currently, the additional implementation of Directives in the 
EGBGB depends on the application of provisions in the BGB, while it also allows for a more ordered 
implementation of information duties. However, the additional implementation of Directives into the 
EGBGB is also a complicated system that is not easy to comprehend, especially for consumers 
seeking to enforce their rights.  
 
3) Questions whether the use of lower regulation sufficiently implements Directives 
may also arise.1700  
 
►The use of lower regulation will hinder rather than help accessibility, while it likely will not 
contribute to the predictable and consistent interpretation of blanket clauses. These problems 
may be difficult for the German legislator to compensate as the acquis continues to develop. 
 
                                               
1698
 BT-Drucks. 16/11643, p. 66, 69. Notably, article 246 par. 3 EGBGB is only indirectly applicable, if article 312g BGB refers to 
it. 
1699
 See for example LG Koblenz 20 December 2006, BeckRS 2007, 34 which held that information provided in accordance with 
the model provided by the regulation was not in accordance with article 312 BGB and therefore invalid. 
1700
 CJEU 19 October 1987 (Commission v The Netherlands), case 236/85, [1987] ECR, p. 3989, par. 4.5.2.6.  
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10.7.3.3. Conclusion on the use of techniques in addition to blanket clauses 
Well-established self-regulation may contribute to the predictable, consistent and responsive 
interpretation of article 307 BGB, whereas lower regulation is not likely to do so, as the courts 
have not sufficiently taken lower regulation into account. This does however not mean that 
the use of lower regulation may not be interesting for other legal orders where courts are less 
likely to ignore lower regulation, such as the Dutch legal order. 
The question arises whether the courts, despite the recognition of the added value of 
well-established self-regulation and despite encouragement to look at self-regulation, would 
continue to exercise restraint in referring to self-regulation.  
 
10.7.4. Studying the use of STC’s 
The study of the use of STC’s focusses on the study of the use of STC’s in international 
trade, comparative research on the interpretation of these clauses, and comparative 
research on model lists throughout the Union. These initiatives may contribute to the 
responsiveness of the acquis and may make national laws more accessible and predictable 
to foreign parties. Improvements are possible in the following ways:  
 
1) Comparative research on clauses converging with national default or mandatory law 
could draw attention to generally accepted or rejected clauses and point to possible 
differences between clauses in different Member States. In turn, this information 
could be useful in the revision of Directive 93/13, in particular article 1 par. 2 Directive. 
 
2)  Comparing the approach to the interpretation of contracts, model lists, and the 
evaluation of clauses in contracts may provide more insight in the question whether 
and if so which divergences in private laws may constitute barriers to cross-border 
trade and improve the accessibility and predictability of national law for foreign parties. 
Differences and similarities in model lists throughout the Union could form a starting point for 
discussion about the interpretation of article 3 Directive. Thus, the different approach towards clauses 
silently extending consumer contracts for a considerable length could be discussed.
1701
  
Possibly, comparison might make the added value of the use of national default law in the 
evaluation of clauses more apparent, and indicate which provisions are merely established to provide 
order rather than provide a normative viewpoint, which in turn would make clear from which default 
provisions parties can diverge without further problems. Comparing model list may also include 
comparing the influence of these model lists on clauses in business contracts.  
  
►The study of the use of STC’s may increase the responsiveness of the acquis and the 
accessibility and predictability of the law for parties engaged in cross-border trade, provided 
that information resulting from these studies is clearly organised and does not lead to 
information overload, while parties should also be aware of these initiatives.    
 
10.7.5. Optional regimes: the CESL 
It is not clear whether the proposal for a future CESL will may contribute to the predictability, 
consistency, accessibility and responsiveness of the law on STC’s.   
                                               
1701
 See further previously par. 10.4.2.3.2.. The case law on the silent extension of contracts concerns established BGH case 
law, see already BGH 29 April 1987, NJW 1987, 1012, followed by OLG Hamm 8 April 2010, BeckRS 2010, 2083110.   
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The extent to which the CESL contributes to these benchmarks this depends on the 
adoption and the success of the CESL. In turn, this depends on the question whether it 
provides more predictability and consistency than well-established national regimes, while 
questions with regard to possible overlaps should also be addressed. The support for the 
CESL with regard to consumer contracts will also depend on the level of consumer protection 
envisaged by the CESL, in particular the question whether the CESL allows for 
circumventing mandatory law to the detriment of the consumer. 
Problems of predictability, consistency and accessibility may however arise as the 
BGH has rejected to uphold clauses contrary to articles 305-310 BGB, even if they are in 
conformity with, for example, the Montréal Convention. Predictability may be undermined as 
it is not clear what sources may be used in the interpretation and evaluation of STC’s. 
Possibly, the development of the CESL might theoretically prompt the CJEU to develop clear 
guidelines on the interpretation and evaluation of clauses under the CESL, which could 
contribute to the consistent and therefore more predictable interpretation and evaluation of 
clauses throughout the Union, provided that the methods indicated by the CJEU are 
acceptable for national legislators and judiciaries.   
Moreover, the extent to which the CESL contributes to the responsiveness of the law 
on STC’s may be severely diminished because judges, in the evaluation and interpretation of 
clauses in contracts falling under the CESL, likely may not refer to already developed case 
law.   
 
10.7.6. Collectively negotiating STC’s for cross-border trade 
It is not clear to what extent encouraging collective negotiations for cross-border trade will be 
beneficial for the predictability, consistency, accessibility and responsiveness of the law on 
STCs.  
Possibly, collective bargaining can be accomodated in the acquis by including, in 
future reformed Directives, that parties can diverge from mandatory law through collectively 
negotiated STC’s, creating so-called “three-quarter mandatory law” at a European level. 
 An important condition for this option is that criteria of representativeness, 
transparency and inclusiveness are met. As national actors are better placed to assess the 
representativeness of stakeholder groups involved in collective bargaining, sufficient 
discretion should be left to national actors to ensure that these criteria are met.  
Moreover, negotiations should take place between well-established parties with equal 
bargaining positions. The role of national actors in evaluating whether parties are sufficiently 
representative should prevent that collective negotiations take place between carefully 
selected ‘repeat players’ at the European level rather than relevant stakeholders, which may 
also be problematic as these negotiations may well lead to Fremdbestimmung.  
Agreements negotiated in collective negotiations in accordance with these criteria 
may subsequently be collected in a database. The participation of representive actors, as 
well as networks and possibly publications in well-established journals and newspapers 
could increase actors’ awareness of these possibilities.  
Possibly, inserting three-quarter mandatory law in a revosed Directive 93/13, a 
revised Directive 99/44 or the proposed CESL would allow for the development of the law in 
accordance with the needs and preferences of legal practice in a manner that does not 
breach consumer protection. Such initiatives may also be in accordance with the prominent 
role of parties in some legal orders. Furthermore, the possibility to diverge from provisions 
may encourage users of STC’s to enter into negotiations in which STC’s may be negotiated 
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in accordance with consumers’ preferences as well, which may reduce the amount of one-
sided STC’s more generally.  
  However, the success of these initiatives depends on the willingness of actors to 
enter into negotiations. If collectively negotiated STC’s are subjected to less intense judicial 
control, parties may have more incentives to engage in cross-border trade. Particularly in 
legal orders where collective negotiations have already been established, actors may be 
interested. 
Furthermore, more generally, the introduction of three-quarter mandatory law may 
also further complicate the development of the private law acquis.  
Thus, although successful collective negotiations may well contribute to the 
comprehensibility of the law on STC’s, this depends on the acceptability of this option for 
European and German actors and the willingness of actors to participate. 
 
10.7.7. Conclusion on the use of additional and alternative techniques 
What techniques in addition to or instead of currently used techniques are likely to contribute 
to the predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness of the law on STC’s? 
Techniques that may be successful are the development of databases to make actors 
more familiar with foreign law, the use of alternative regulation in the interpretation of blanket 
clauses, and the study of STC’s in cross-border trade. 
In contrast, it is difficult to predict to what extent the development of the CESL and the 
introduction of collective negotiations will improve the predictability, consistency, accessibility 
and responsiveness of the law on STC’s. The use of lower regulation will more likely 
decrease than increase the quality of private law.   
These suggestions for additional and alternative techniques may well overlap and 
reinforce one another. Thus, the study of the use of STC’s may support the development of 
an optional instrument or the introduction of collective bargaining on STC’s in cross-border 
trade.  
The narrow view of actors in the European debate may affect the use of additional 
techniques. Arguably, because of the interest-based approach of actors towards the debate, 
actors are less receptive to suggestions for the study of STC’s to identify barriers to the 
internal market. National actors may especially reject these options if they increase the 
chance that the acquis develops differently than national law.  
The limited view of actors may also mean that actors are less open to insights from 
databases and comparative research. This is unfortunate, as these techniques may support 
the quality of the acquis, which is in need of improvement, while the use of datanases may 
increase the responsive interpretation of international law.  
It is also unfortunate that actors cling to the use of national techniques and do not pay 
sufficient attention to the development of additional or alternative techniques that could 
support the use of these techniques. The lack of attention for the combination of techniques 
can moreover be contrasted with the development of national law, where various techniques 
where combined with each other. Possibly, the use of combination of tehciques as such was 
not cosndiered as such in the development of national law – actors merely made use of 
structures that they were already familiar with. Yet as the development of the law on STC’s 
becomes more complicated, more attention to combinations of techniques is necessary, as 
demonstrated by various alternatives that could strengthen the law on STC’s.  
However, especially additional techniques are often bottom-up techniques. Initiatives 
for these techniques are sufficiently available. However, it is also not clear to what extent the 
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use of bottom-up techniques will actually benefit the law on STC’s as the willingness of 
actors to participate in these initiatves is difficult to estimate. 
  
10.8. Conclusion  
The German law on STC’s is often considered a success story. Despite interdependence 
that has become visible in this area, however, the success of German law cannot be traced 
to German actors’ awareness of interdependence or the careful use of techniques and 
careful interaction because of that interdependence.  
Arguably, the success of the law on STC’s can be contributed to several factors, not 
in the least the careful drafting process of the AGBG and the careful way in which courts 
have further developed the law in this area, without however interacting extensively with 
international or European actors. That does not mean that the extent to which national 
techniques may ensure the quality of the law on STC’s has not been diminished. This has 
also become visible from the criticism on the reasoning for incorporation in the 
Schuldrechtsmodernisierung. However, in this area, Directive 93/13 largely converges with 
German law on STC’s, and interdependence is therefore less visible. Accordingly, the 
relatively stable and consistent development of the AGBG and subsequently articles 305-310 
BGB may also be attributed to the active participation of German actors to the European 
debate. The succes of the law on STC’s may have further limited the German legislator’s 
willingness to (re)consider the use of techniques. German actors may participate less 
actively in debate if in areas where German law is less well-developed or successful; in these 
cases, German actors may have less interesting insights to offer in European debate, and it 
is not unlikely that the acquis will be developed differently from German law. In these cases, 
the predicatble and consistent development of the law may be undermined.  
However, the lack of interaction has severely undermined the predictable, consistent, 
and responsive development  of Directive 93/13. The lack of interaction has also limited the 
responsive, consistent and predictable development of the law on STC’s in international 
cases. Accordingly, German law is generally not considered successful in international trade. 
However, this unattractiveness is usually attributed to the strictness of German law, a bias 
that should be reconsidered.  
Thus, the coexistence of actors is not directly problematic for private parties. However,  
it may be doubted whether an approach aimed at maintaining the development of the law on 
STC’s in a manner similar to the development of laws before the introduction of Directive 
93/13, as well as other Directives, will in the long term safeguard the consistent, predictable 
and responsive development of the law. Rather, the coexistence of actors in this area could 
be used as a starting point to consider the development of the law on STC’s in a way that 
benefits from the insights of multiple actors, as has already been recognised when 
comparative law is used in the drafting of legislation. Maintaining a defensive approach may 
overlook future difficulties and possibilities to improve the law on STC’s.  
Particularly, the ongoing development of the acquis increases the chance that 
multiple and possibly inconsistent Directives will develop that will affect the law on STC’s. 
The German legislator is not able to remedy these inconsistencies outright but instead has to 
implement them, though not necessarily within the BGB. Eventually, despite the BGB, private 
law may be developed less predictably, consistently, and accessible. 
Currently, because the German legislator does not recognise the diminished ability of 
the BGB to contribute to predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness, and it 
will logically not likely be compensated. Encouraging national practitioners, experts and 
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judges to participate at the European level seems promising as these actors may be more 
aware of the need for consistent and predictable decisions as well as national law with which 
future harmonisation measures should be developed consistently. Also, more and better 
debate at the European level also increases the chance that important decisions on the 
competence of courts to interpret blanket clauses are the outcome of extensive debate rather 
than a judicial decision.  
Since neither German nor European actors have recognised interdependence, the 
use of additional or alternative techniques to compensate for these weaknesses have not 
been established, which is detrimental especially for European measures. The nature of 
European measures to pursue a particular aim should moreover prompt the European 
legislator to consider the use of techniques more critically. However, the limited view of both 
German and European actors makes it unlikely that drastic changes will be affected in the 
use of techniques in the short term. This is also unfortunate, as this makes it more likely that 
a circle of a lack of interaction, missed opportunities to improve the law, and a lack of 
interaction will develop.  
Thus, the changes suggested in this chapter are long term and do not imply an 
immediate change of law, although the reform of the 1993 Directive on unfair contract terms 
is likely forthcoming. Rather, the changes include recognising interdependence, overcoming 
potential problems that may arise from interdependence, and where possible, benefitting 
from the insigths form other actors involved in the development of the law on STC’s. It is 
submitted that in the long term, such an approach is more likely to contribute to the 













This chapter will ask whether the extent to which the Dutch law on STC’s meets benchmarks 
of predictability, consistency, accessibility and responsiveness can be traced to actors’ 
recognition of other actors’ initiatives and the interaction between these actors.  
Paragraph 11.2 will provide an introduction on the law on STC’s, and paragraph 11.3. 
will turn to the development of the law on STC’s through the BW. After that, paragraph 11.4. 
will discuss the use of blanket clauses. Paragraph 11.5. will analyse the use of general 
principles. Paragraph 11.6 will draw some conclusions and paragraph 11.7 will turn to the 
use of additional and alternative techniques. Paragraph 11.8. will end with a conclusion.  
 
11.2. The law on algemene voorwaarden  
The Dutch law on STC’s can be found in articles 6:231 et seq BW. The blanket clause, article 
6:233 sub a BW, has led to the development of a lot of case law, especially from lower courts.  
The BW is commonly considered as a successful codification. Articles 6:231 et seq 
BW are however relatively new and at some points, it has developed differently than the 
legislator had expected.1702 In some respects, the regime is a success: it has enabled, and 
encouraged, collective negotiations on STC’s.1703  
The Dutch regime has however been severely criticised on the following points:1704  
 
1) The rules on the availability of clauses  
The strict interpretation of the duty in article 6:234 BW
1705
 has been criticised as it wrongly 
presupposes that clauses are read prior to the contract.
1706
 Moreover, after the implementation of 
Directive 2006/123 in articles 6:230a-c BW, possible overlap with article 6:234 BW, which imposes a 
much stricter duty on parties, remains. Schelhaas
1707
  prefers a rule that is in accordance with article 
6:230a et seq BW.   
 
2) Articles 6:235 and 247 BW 





 moreover finds that the distinction is unnecessary, as article 6:233 
sub a BW enables the judge to take the capacity of businesses challenging the fairness of clauses into 
account, and it is moreover not in accordance with the needs of (some) large businesses  that are not 
in a position to negotiate on STC’s. Article 6:235 BW is also problematic as it limits the scope of article 
6:234 BW that implements Directive 2000/31, which does not recognise a similar limitation. In addition, 
Schelhaas
1710
 notes that the distinctions in article 6:235 and 247 BW have led to different regimes for 
different conract parties, and should be simplified. Furthermore, the limitation of article 6:247 BW leads 
                                               
1702
 E.H. Hondius, ‘Tien jaar Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek: De regeling van de algemene voorwaarden’, WPNR 6472 (2002). 
1703
 See previously par. 5.5.1.2. 
1704
 See however C.E. Drion, ‘Een pamflet voor het fundamenteel op de schop nemen van onze regelgeving over algemene 
voorwaarden’, Contracteren 2007, p. 3.  
1705
 HR 6 April 2001, NJ 2002, 385. 
1706
 See for an overview J.Hijma, Algemene voorwaarden, Kluwer: Deventer 2010, p. 58. 
1707
 H.N. Schelhaas, Algemene voorwaarden in handelstransacties, Deventer: Kluwer 2011, p. 41. 
1708
 J. Hijma, Algemene voorwaarden, Kluwer: Deventer  2010, p. 81-82. 
1709
 M.B.M. Loos, Algemene voorwaarden, BJU: The Hague 2001, p. 25-26 
1710
 Schelhaas 2011, p. 39. 
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to a lacuna: in international cases, it is not clear whether there is a duty for parties to make STC’s 
sufficiently available, also for electronic contracts, despite Directive 2000/31. 
 
3) Article 6:232 BW aims to preserve predictability by ensuring that STC’s are 
applicable. 
Notably, the question whether clauses have been validly included in the contract is answered under 
articles 3:33 and 35 and 6:217 BW. Article 6:232 BW merely stipulates that if parties have justifiably 
relied on the inclusion of STC’s, that reliance includes the whole set of clauses rather than some.
1711
 
The Hoge Raad has however made an exception for unduly surprising clauses,
1712
 but it is not sure 
whether these decisions will be continued under the BW.
1713
 Compared to article 305 BGB, under 
which clauses that are not made sufficiently available have not become part of the contract, this 
construction seems to create an unnecesary extra step. It is not clear to what extent this provision has 
in fact contributed to predictability – German practice manages quite well without a similar rule.
1714
 
However, before abandoning article 6:232 BW, the legislator should carefully consider what rule would 
replace it, and whether that rule is sufficiently developed in case law or whether it needs to be codified.  
Article 6:232 BW has moreover had some unexpected results. Loos
1715
 points out that article 
6:232 BW entails that large parties are quickly bound to clauses without being able to invoke the 
avoidability of clauses on the basis of articles 6:233 and 234 BW. Also, Jongeneel
1716
 notes that 
because the main terms of the contract do not fall under article 6:231 sub a BW, the valid inclusion of 
these terms will have to be assessed under article 3:33 and 35 BW rather than article 6:232 BW, 
which can hardly have been intended by the legislator. There is also debate on the question whether 




4) The blanket clause in article 6:233 sub a BW 
Barendrecht
1718
 noted that case law on exclusion clauses does not provide sufficient starting points to 
deduce how the circumstances relevant for assessing the fairness of clauses are to be balanced, 
which may be a reason for the courts to pay little attention to one another’s decisions. blanket clause. 
After the introduction of article 6: 233 sub a BW, Hondius
1719
 however finds that indications on the 
fairness and unfairness of clauses can sufficiently be deduced from case law and a lack of 
predictability seems limited. Pavillion
1720
 however points out that article 6:233 sub a BW imposes a 
considerable burden of proof on consumers who consequenly fail to successfully challenge unfair 




5) Battle of forms  
Debate has arisen on battle of forms, as the rule in article 6:225 par. 3 BW leaves room for 
unpredictability and does not correspond business practices.
1722
 
                                               
1711
 T.H.M. van Wechem, De toepasselijkheid van algemene voorwaarden, Kluwer: Deventer 2007, p. 24-25.  
1712
 HR 20 November 1981, NJ 1982, 517. 
1713
 Asser/Hartkamp-Sieburgh 6-III (2010), nr 473. 
1714
 Comp. MunchKomm zum BGB/Basedow, Inroduction, nr 15, as well as the drfat for reform of the law on STC’s of the 
German Bar Association, at See http://anwaltverein.de/downloads/Stellungnahmen-11/DAV-SN-23-2012.pdf, 
that states that the law with regard to the inclusion of STC’s is not in need of amendment 
1715
 M.B.M. Loos, Algemene voorwaarden, BJU: The Hague 2001, p. 21.  
1716
 R.H.C. Jongeneel, De wet algemene voorwaarden en het AGB-Gesetz, Kluwer: Deventer 1991, nr. 158. 
1717
 See on this question T.H.M. van Wechem, De toepasselijkheid van algemene voorwaarden, Kluwer: Deventer 2007, p. 37-
39, who extensively considers the views of other authors. 
1718
 J.M. Barendrecht, Recht als mdoel van rechtvaardigheid, Kluwer: Deventer 1992, p. 11. 
1719
 E.H. Hondius, ‘Tien jaar Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek: De regeling van de algemene voorwaarden’, WPNR 6472 (2002). 
1720
 C.M.D.S. Pavillon, ‘Beter consumentenrecht: Naar een scherpere consumentvriendelijke onredelijk bezwarend-norm’, NTBR 
2011/63. In this sense much earlier also G.J. Rijken, ‘De Wet algemene voorwaarden na één jaar: een trieste tussenbalans’, 
NJB 1994, p. 643.  
1721
 See also below par. 11.4.1.2. 
1722
 H.N. Schelhaas, Algemene voorwaarden in handelstransacties, Deventer: Kluwer 2011, p. 15, M.B.M. Loos, Algemene 
voorwaarden, BJU: The Hague 2001, p. 14. Comp. T.H.M. van Wechem, De toepasselijkheid van algemene voorwaarden, 
Kluwer: Deventer 2007, p. 198 who notes that although it is commonly assumed that a first-short rule has developed, the 





6) Article 6:214 BW has remained a dead letter.1723 
 
7) Article 6:239 BW has similarly remained a dead letter – the legislator has instead 
amended article 6:237 BW through the normal legislative procedure.1724 
 
Moreover, at some points, the law leaves room for questions: 
 
1) The definition of STC’s in article 6:231 BW 
It is not clear whether model contracts or clauses drafted by lawyers and notaries in standard conracts 




2) The indirect effect of articles 6:236 and 237 BW on clauses in business 
contracts. 
Case law on this question does not provide an unequivocal answer. However, Hijma
1726
 suggests 
several perspectives that can be relevant for assuming the indirect effect of the Dutch model lists. 
 
►In some cases, criticism can partially be traced to disagreement with the legislator’s  
choice, for example, to exclude big businesses from articles 6:233 and 234 BW, but the 
majority of criticism can be traced to problems with predictability, consistency, and 
responsiveness.  
It may be concluded that the quality of the regime is subject to criticism. Can these 
problems be traced to the lack of recognition of interdependence and corresponding lack of 
interaction between relevant actors, or not? 
 
11.3. The development of the law on STC’s through the BW. 
Have actors adequately considered interdependence in the development of the law on STC’s 
through the BW, and how that has affected the predictability, consistency, accessibility, and 
responsiveness of the law on STC’s? 
 Paragraph 11.3.1. will will consider the choice to codify the law on STC’s. Paragraph 
11.3.2. will discuss the attitude of the drafters towards self-regulation. Paragraph 11.3.3. will 
turn to the drafting and implementation of Directive 93/13, as well as attempts to reform the 
Directive and national law implementing the Directive. Paragraph 11.3.4. will discuss the law 
on STC’s and international trade and paragraph 11.3.5. will end with a conclusion.  
 
11.3.1. The  choice for codification 
When the choice for a recodification in the form of the BW was made, interdependence had 
not yet developed. However, academics drafting the BW extensively considered comparative 
law, which has benefitted the quality of the code. Later initiatives for harmonisation prompted 
the legislator to consider the development of separate laws, but this would have undermined 
the consistency and predictability of the law on STC’s. 
                                               
1723
 See further on this provision below, par. 11.3.2. 
1724
 See further on these amendments below, par. 11.3.3.5. 
1725
 J.H.M. van Erp, ‘De NVM-koopakte: géén algemene voorwaarden’, WPNR 6037 (1992) rejects this option, while R.H.C. 
Jongeneel, ‘Reactie’, WPNR 6217 (1996) defends it. 
1726
 J. Hijma, Algemene voorwaarden, Kluwer: Deventer 2010, p. 46-48. 
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In 1961, when the first draft for the BW was published,1727 interdependence, as such, 
was not an issue in debate. To the contrary, the idea of a new civil code implicitly – 
necessarily – assumes that the legislator is capable of safeguarding the consistent and 
accessible development of private law. As private law had developed alongside the old Civil 
Code, especially in case law, Prof. Meijers1728 pleaded for a renewed codification of private 
law, and was accordingly assigned with the drafting of the new civil code. In his efforts, Prof. 
Meijers was inspired by comparative law, except in matters that were considered innovative 
from a social or legal point of view.1729  
Interestingly, the 1961 draft initially did not consider STC’s such a subject. 1730 
However, during the seventies, the interest in this subject increased, and in 1979, two 
preliminary reports on standard contract terms were published, pleading for more extensive 
rules on STC’s. Previously, one of the authors had published his PhD thesis on STC’s, which 
included extensive comparative law research. 1731  After the draft containing the first two 
articles was passed in 1980,1732 the second part of the draft was submitted, which was based 
on the advice of the Committee on Consumer Affairs (‘Commissie 
Consumentenaangelegenheden’, ‘CCA’). 1733  The 1980 draft took into account German, 
Austrian, French, and English developments, as well as the 1976 resolution from the Council 
of Europe, noting that ‘although comparative law provides interesting material, it only seldom 
provides the legislator with a ready-made answer’.1734 The draft was critically received and 
drastically amended. The draft was passed in 19871735 and became law upon the introduction 
of the BW on 1 January 1992. 
Thus, even though STC’s later became an innovative matter, comparative law did 
provide a source of inspiration, and the influence of especially German law is apparent when 
looking, for example, at the discussion in Parliament. This interest can hardly be traced to the 
thought of interdependence – rather, the interest of Prof. Meijers in comparative law 
emphasised that comparative law may invite one to regard well-settled concepts in a 
somewhat different light.1736  
Although problems arising from the use of STC’s had been signalled prior to the 
design of the BW,1737  the explanatory memorandum to the draft clearly does not aim to 
codify case law, as judges exercised considerable restraint towards the judicial evaluation of 
STC’s.1738 Although the Minister pointed out that the judiciary already anticipated the BW, 
                                               
1727
 The first draft for book 6 of the BW contained two articles with regard to STC’s: article 6.5.1.2, which later became article 
6:214 BW, and article 6.5.1.3 that stipulated that parties who had accepted the application of STC’s was bound to those STC’s, 
but, according to par. 2, a clause would be avoidable if the user, at the conclusion of the contract, knew or should have known 
that if the party subjecting to his STC’s would have been aware of their content, he would not have entered into the contract. 
See E.M. Meijers, Ontwerp voor een Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek,Boek 6, completed by J. Drion, G. de Grooth, and F.J. de Jong, 
Staatsdrukkerij: The Hague 1961. 
1728
 E.M. Meijers, ‘Het feillooze deel van ons Burgerlijk Wetboek’, in: Verzamelde privaatrechtelijke opstellen, Eerste deel, 
University Press Leiden: Leiden 1954, p. 98. 
1729
 V.J.A. Süto, Nieuw Vermogensrecht en rechtsvergelijking – reconstructie van een wetgevingsproces (1947-1961), BJU: The 
Hague 2004, p. 28. 
1730
 Parl. GS, Book 6, . 852. 
1731
 E.H. Hondius, Standaardvoorwaarden, Kluwer: Deventer 1978.  
1732
 Stbl 1980, 432. 
1733
 Comp. CCA, Advies inzake het vraagstuk van de toepassing van standaardvoorwaarden bij transacties met de consument, 
SER: The Hague 1978, which in annex 4 provides an overview of the development of the law in this area in other states.  
1734
 Parl. Geschiedenis (Inv. 3, 5 and 6), p. 1455. At p. 1467 and 1505 it is however remarked that the AGBG has served as a 
direct example.  
1735
 Stbl 1987, 327. 
1736
 Süto 2004, p. 29. 
1737
See for an overview of the most important publications R.H.C. Jongeneel, De Wet algemene voorwaarden en het AGB-
Gesetz, Kluwer: Deventer 1991, p. 11, note 14. 
1738
 Parl. GS (Inv 3, 5, and 6), p. 1649, p. 1518. E.H. Hondius, ‘Het Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek en de gewone burger: de 
algemene voorwaarden’, Rechtshulp 1991, p. 4, points out that the standard in article 6:233 sub a BW had been previously 
developed by the Hoge Raad.   
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and that businesses would likely similarly anticipate the BW by adapting their STC’s,1739 the 
legislator rejected the idea of leaving the development of the law on STC’s to case law. 
Decisions from the Hoge Raad indicated that the judiciary would not develop case law, which 
would leave a gap in the law.1740 Moreover, as the draft introduced the judicial evaluation of 
STC’s, this created a potential for unpredictability, which required that the draft carefully 
considered – and remedied – this potential shortcoming. Therefore, problems would arise if 
STC’s were not dealt with through legislation. 
By the time the draft was passed, initiatives for harmonisation had developed. In its 
advice to the government on the law on STC’s, the Committee on Consumer Affairs1741 
already took notice of these initiatives, but did not consider these initiatives as an obstacle to 
codification.  
However, these initiatives did prompt Parliament to briefly consider separate 
legislation implementing the acquis. During the discussion in Parliament, the introduction of 
the law on doorstep selling, an implementation of Directive 85/577 on doorstep selling, was 
discussed, and the introduction of a separate law was considered, because the BW might not 
be implemented before 1990.1742 The introduction of separate laws was however rejected as 
this might delay the introduction of the BW even further.1743 Other objections included the 
possible tension between old Dutch law and the BW, which also made a separate 
introduction of a new law on STC’s more difficult.1744  
Thus, the defense of codification by Prof. Meijers may sit somewhat uneasily with the 
increasing interdependence of actors developing private law. Notably, the defense for 
codification is based on the aims of codification, without considering the possibility of 
interdependence. However, the important role of comparative law in the drafting of the BW 
ensured that the law of STC’s was the result of critical consideration of foreign law, in line 
with European law that not only invites, but demands such a critical view. Yet because of the 
timing and the drafting of the Dutch law on STC’s and Directive 93/13, such a critical view of 
the new Dutch law or the codification of the law on STC’s was problematic. 
 
11.3.2. Replacing self-regulation through the BW 
In the drafting of article 6:214 BW, the legislator did not sufficiently take into account that 
later initiatives increased the role of private parties, reflecting a different view on the role  of 
privat parties. Thus, this provision was not responsive to national practice or to national legal 
views on the role of private parties, and has accordingly been reduced to a dead letter. The 
wording of this provision gives a different impression, thus undermining the accessibility of 
the law for parties not familiar with Dutch practice. 
At first sight, the impression arises that the legislator expressly provided a role for 
private parties through article 6:214 BW. This provision provides that standard rules 
(‘standaardregeling’) can be drafted for a particular branche or profession, to de designated 
by royal decision (‘Koninklijk Besluit’). Standard rules are designed by a committee to be 
appointed to the Ministry of Justice, the composition of which is to be determined by law.1745 
The standard rules enter into effect upon the approval of the Ministry, as officially published. 
                                               
1739
 Parl GS (Inv 3, 5, and 6), p. 1506. 
1740
 Parl GS (Inv 3, 5, and 6), p. 1497. See in favour CCA 1978, p. 41 referring to legislation in surrounding states as well as the 
EU to support the need for consumer protection. 
1741
 CCA 1978, p. 3. 
1742
 Parl GS (Inv 3, 5, and 6), p. 1472-1473. 
1743
 Parl GS (Inv 3, 5, and 6), p. 1490. 
1744
 Parl GS (Inv 3, 5, and 6), p. 1506. 
1745
 Notably, the law on standard rules committees (‘Wet commissies standaardregelingen’). 
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Standard rules can diverge from default law, and parties may, in turn, diverge from standard 
rules, which may however be made subject to requirements of form. Standard rules would be 
applicable to contracts entered into in a professional or business capacity.  
Article 6:214 BW was drafted because it was recognised that STC’s were often 
drafted one-sidedly, without taking into account the public interest. The involvement of the 
state in the drafting of STC’s, and preferably the inclusion of all relevant parties would 
remedy these defects and would moreover be in line with a tendency to involve the state in 
the recognition of collective contracts.1746  
Did this regime enable private parties, by creating a possibility for co-regulation, or did 
it, in contrast, limit the role of contract parties? The regime did not take away contract parties’ 
ability to draft STC’s, nor did it force them to enter into negotiations on standard rules or even 
to comply with them, while it also involved stakeholder parties into negotiations. However, if 
aticle 6:214 BW had been successful, this would have limited the role of contract parties in 
independently drafting STC’s. This limitation was considered desirable because of contract 
parties’ limited perspective and the disadvantages associated with the use of STC’s.  
This point of view, reminiscent of the German view on the role of private parties, has 
been traced to the critical attitude of Prof. Meijers and others to self-regulation.1747  The 
requirements set for the drafting of standard rules, in accordance with a critical view of 
private parties’ role, have not facilitated a successful use of this possibility, even though the 
increased use of this regime has been debated in Parliament1748 and in literature.1749  
Interestingly, although the 1981 draft does take into account German experiences, it 
takes a less suspicious view of private actors. The 1981 draft explicitly aimed to increase 
negotiations between stakeholder groups.1750 The CCA1751 expected that designing private 
law specifically for STC’s would induce businesses to enter into negotiations with 
organisations representing consumers, for which it had developed a pilot project on which it 
extensively reported. Collective negotiations on consumer contracts have subsequently 
developed in the framework of the CCA. The success of these collective negotiations for 
consumer contracts has severely limited the success of the standard rules. Also, the judicial 
control developed by the 1981 draft may have contributed to the quality of STC’s, which may 
further undermine parties’ motivation to draft standard rules. 
Does the lack of success of article 6:214 BW mean that other initiatives that also 
overlook the prominent role of private parties in this area will be similarly unsuccessful? As 
the role of private parties in the multilevel legal order becomes more prominent, this 
possibility should be taken into account by actors developing legislation. 
The existence of other sources of law may additinally complicate the development of 
standard rules. Although they are likely not an obstacle to cross-border trade, because of 
their default character and their aim to faciliate trade, they may conflict with international 
model contracts, for example from the ICC.1752 Prof. Meijers1753 emphasised that standard 
rules would be devised for areas in which the quality of STC’s showed severe shortcomings. 
In contrast, if STC’s were the process of collective negotiation, standard rules would merely 
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 Parl. GS, Book 6, p. 839. 
1747
 Asser/Vranken (2005) nr 78.  
1748
 Kamerstukken II, 2006-2007, 29279, nr 41, p. 18,   
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 E.H. Hondius, ‘Standaardregelingen in de bouw’, in: E.H. Hondius, A.G.J. van Wassenaer, Van standaardvoordwaarden 
naar standaardregeling?, Preadviezen voor de Vereniging van Bouwrecht, Kluwer: Deventer 1993, p. 10-11. The procedure had 
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1750
 Parl GS, (inv 3,5 and 6) p. 1455. 
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 Parl. GS, Book 6, p. 850. 
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sanction existing rules. Prof. Meijers found that if international model contracts functioned 
effectively, additional rules should not be developed,   
Also, relevant Directives will stand in the way of the possibility to mitigate the 
consequences of mandatory consumer protection law through drafting standard rules.1754 In 
areas falling outside the scope of these Directives, especially Directive 93/13, this is not 
problematic.1755 Also, standard rules are not incorporated into the contract, but they are 
additional law applicable to the contract.1756 Does this mean that they fall under the exception 
of article 1 par. 2 Directive 93/13? If this is the case, the development of standard rules could 
theoretically circumvent the minimum level of protection established in the Directive. In the 
unlikely scenario that standard rules are developed, European actors should be consulted 
beforehand, to see whether standard rules for consumer contracts fall within the scope of 
Directive 93/13. It is detrimental for the predictability of law to develop a practice that may 
later be challenged before the courts and eventually the CJEU.  
  Thus, the role of private parties in collectively negotiating STC’s had undermined the 
success of article 6:214 BW, which undermines the accessibility and the responsive 
development of the law on STC’s. Therefore, article 6:214 BW should be reconsidered, both 
because its lack of importance in legal practice as well as possible difficulties with Directive 
93/13.  
 
11.3.3. The development of Dutch law and harmonisation  
Have Dutch actors, in the drafting and implementation of Directive 93/13 and other relevant 
Directives, adequately taken into account that the development of harmonisation 
necessitated interaction with European actors, and if so, how has that affected the 
predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness of the law on STC’s?   
Paragraph 11.3.3.1. will consider the development of Directive 93/13 and paragraph 
11.3.3.2. will discuss the implementation of the Directive. Paragraph 11.3.3.3. will consider 
the application of the Directive by the courts. Paragraph 11.3.3.4. will consider the attempted 
revision of Directive 93/13 and paragraph 11.3.3.5. will discuss legislative reform at the 
national level. Paragraph 11.3.3.6. will end with a conclusion. 
 
11.3.3.1. The drafting of Directive 93/13 
The reports of the Dutch legislator reflected an active participation in the European debate 
that also served to prevent that the Directive would require considerable adaptations of new 
articles 6:231 et seq BW.  
Before the Directive was established, the Dutch legislator consulted the CCA1757 that 
had also advised on the drafting on articles 6:231 et seq BW.  
 
The CCA was divided on the need for a Directive, but it approved the limitation of the Directive to 
consumer contracts. The CCA did draw attention to the definition of ‘consumer’ that should be 
interpreted narrowly, in accordance with CJEU case law, as well as the exemption of the main terms of 
the contract from the scope of the Directive. Moreover, the CCA proposed limiting the scope of the 
Directive to written clauses, and argued for the inclusion of an information duty for businesses in the 
Directive. With regard to future article 3, the CCA held that technically, the inclusion of a blanket 
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 Asser/Hartkamp/Sieburg (2010), 6-III, nr 513. 
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 For example in contracts for the sale of houses, artice 7:2 par. 4 BW, which fall outside the scope of Directive 99/44.  
1756
 Asser/Hartkamp/Sieburg (2010), 6-III, nr 513, who also note that diverging from standard rules will make it more likely that 
1.3.1.3.1. they are unfair under article 6:233 BW. 
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 CCA, Oneerlijke bedingen in consumentenovereenkomsten, advice 91/11, 30 May 1991, p. 12, 16. 
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clause or ambiguous provisions were necessary, and a blanket clause should enable judges to take 
into account the way in which a clause had been drafted. The CCA also indicated that more clarity on 
the status of the model list in the Annex to the Directive would be desirable. The CCA found that the 
model list could reflect clauses that were ineffective in all Member States, although this would be a 
short list. The CCA emphasised that clauses needed to be drafted in a manner that would avoid 
unpredictability and opposed a European gray list for the same reason. The question whether this 
would be a limitative list depended on the question whether the Directive would pursue minimum or 
maximum harmonisation.  
 
Further debate on the points raised by the CCA hardly developed, although, with the benefit 
of hindsight, this would have been beneficial.  
 
The criticism of Bakker and Jongeneel
1758
 is an exception. Bakker and Jongeneel, who also refer to 
the advice from the European Consumer Law Group and the advice of the Economic and Social 
Committee, as well as German criticism, similarly refer to the definition of consumer and also find that 
the Directive should be limited to consumer contracts, and likewise note that the Directive should not 
cover the main terms of the contract. They also join the request that the status of the model list in the 
Annex to the Directive be clarified, and add that the collection of clauses in the 1990 draft seems 
arbitrary, and apparently does not contribute to the interpretation of the proposed blanket clause. 
Bakker and Jongeneel however draw into doubt the added value of an information duty, although they 
support the inclusion of a rule similar to the Transparanzgebot, and consider the inclusion of future 
article 3, the wording of which they criticise.  
 
The CCA advice provided a good starting point for the position of the Dutch legislator,1759 
who briefly discussed the discussion on the proposal for a Directive on unfair contract terms 
and the advice of the CCA on the draft in Parliament, from which it diverged in several points.    
 
While the Dutch government agreed with the importance of self-regulation, and restraint with 
harmonisation initiatives, it supported the proposal for a Directive on unfair terms, and did not discuss 
the need for the Directive.  
 
The Dutch government1760 reported to Parliament that the debate in the European Council 
focussed on the scope of the Directive, the question whether the main terms of the contract 
should be subjected to judicial evaluation, and stated that a Dutch compromise would form 
the basis for further discussions in the council. The Dutch government 1761  subsequently 
reported that the amendments to the proposal were in accordance with Dutch objections, and 
Dutch law accordingly did not have to be amended. Interestingly, the rather brief and general 
statement of the government on the CCA advice, without further debate, did not make 
Parliament aware of differences between the CCA advice and this seems not to have been 
debated in Parliament that earlier, and more generally, criticised the incomplete and late 
information it received on proposals for Directives.1762  
Interestingly, in the German legal order, the amendments to the 1990 drafts are 
attributed to German criticism. As Dutch law took German law as an important starting point, 
German and Dutch criticism may well have coincided. 
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 H.J. Bakker, R.H.C. Jongeneel, ‘Een rechtlijnige richtlijn’, TvC 1992, p. 7-17. 
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1761
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 Thus, the active participation of the Dutch legislator may have prevented that 
Directive 93/13 would necessitate drastic amendments to newly drafted law that had yet to 
become effective.  
 
11.3.3.2. The implementation of Directives affecting the law on STC’s 
The interaction between Dutch, European and foreign actors in the implementation of 
Directive 93/13 and other relevant Directives has been limited, and problems of predictability, 
consistency and accessibility have accordingly arisen.  
Because the Dutch legislator considered that Dutch law was already in accordance 
with the Directive, the law on STC’s was not amended, and a consultation was also not 
initiated.1763 
 
Accordingly, some differences between the Directive and Dutch law remained. Thus, articles 6:231 et 
seq BW initially did not include a rule on contra preferentem interpretation, while it was also limited to 
written clauses. Initially, it seemed as if the Hoge Raad limited this rule,
1764
 and it was argued that the 
codification of this rule was necessary.
1765
  
Furthermore, article 6:231 BW did initially not provide that the main terms of the contract 
would be subject to judicial evaluation if they are not clearly formulated. Moreover, article 6: 231 BW 
defines STC’s as clauses that have been drafted to be used in multiple contracts. Interestingly, the 
German legislator amended article 310 par. 3 sub 1 BGB
 
as it was considered that maintaining a 
similar requirement for consumer contracts was contrary to the Directive.
1766
 Notably, however, the 
Commission did not single out this definition, which raises the question whether the German legislator 
unnecessarily amended its law. Clarifying this question should however be reserved to the CJEU.  
Additionally, it has been debated whether the avoidability of unfair terms is in accordance with 
the Directive, especially after CJEU decisions that clauses are to be evaluated ex officio. The sanction 
of avoidability is in accordance with the general rule in article 3:40 par 2 BW that if a provision aims to 
protect one of the contract parties, this leads to avoidability, unless the provisions entails otherwise. In 
this view, sanctioning unfair clauses with invalidity is not necessary, also because article 3:40 par. 2 
BW does not exclude the possibility that the judge sets aside clauses contrary to provisions aiming to 
protect the consumer. Article 3:40 par. 2 BW expressly allows for divergences from this general rule by 
stipulating that provisions are avoidable unless the provisions entails otherwise. Consequently, 
provisions that implement Directives more generally justify invalidity rather than avoidability in this 
sense.
1767
 However, this argument suggests that avoidability in article 3:40 par. 2 BW would have 
different implications depending on the context.
1768
  Also,  maintaining the avoidability rather than the 
invalidity of unfair clauses is problematic as avoidability cannot be considered by the judge ex officio.  
 
This position was not based on discussion but rather on the previous advice of the CCA and 
the drafting process, and the position did not change after criticism that the Dutch regime 
was not in accordance with the Directive. Especially Hondius 1769  pointed to differences 
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between the Directive and Dutch law, and held that Dutch law should be amended. Hijma1770 
also found that while the differences between Dutch law and the Directive were superficial 
and would probably be covered by an active approach of the judiciary towards the 
implementation of the Directive, the restraint adopted by the Dutch legislator should be 
reconsidered, even if the amendments to Dutch law would only be introduced for politeness’ 
sake.  
However, the later decision of the CJEU has learned that the Dutch legislator should 
be more careful in its approach. Although Commission/Netherlands 1771  clarified the 
obligations of national legislators in the implementation of Directives, the decision makes 
clear that the possibilities for the Dutch legislator to maintain a stable development of the law 
are limited once Directives have been established.  
Would more debate however have led to a different approach of the legislator? 
Possibly, a more elaborate discussion in Parliament, or observations from forein parties, 
could have prompted the Dutch government to reconsider its approach. However, more 
attention for CJEU case law would not have prompted a different approach. Likethe German 
legislator, the Dutch legislator mistakenly relied on  CJEU case law reiterating the discretion 
of the legislator in the implementation of Directives. However, the interaction with the 
European Commission indicated that the implementation of Directive 93/13 was 
insufficient.1772    
 
The Commission accepted that the case law of the Hoge Raad already exempedt the main terms of 
the contract from judicial control, but nevertheless advised that these provisions of the Directive where 
implemented in the BW rather than case law.
1773
 In accordance with this advice, The Netherlands, 
although it had started the procedure to amend the law accordingly, did not make amends within two 
months, as requested by the Commission, which consequently started a procedure to demand correct 
implementation. The CJEU
1774
 accordingly held that articles 4 par. 2 and 5 Directive should be 
implemented in the BW, as relying on case law was insufficient implementation.  
After the CJEU decision in Commission/The Netherlands, article 6:238 par. 2 BW was inserted, 
codifying contra-preferentem interpretation and article 6:231 was amended so as to exempt the main 
terms of the contract, provided that they were sufficiently clear, from judicial control. That does 
however not mean that the Dutch legislator could not have chosen to go beyond the level of protection 
in the Directive, provided that it had done so through legislation, as became apparent after the 




The subsequent amentments of articles 6:231 et seq BW further demonstrate the decreased 
ability of the national legislator to maintain the predictable development of the law on STC’s, 
in particular by exercising restraint in amending the law.  
In 2004, article 6:234 BW was amended to implement article 10 par. 3 Directive 
2000/31 on e-commerce, which stipulates information requirements that businesses can 
diverge from.  Article 10 par. 1 Directive 2000/31 makes clear parties can diverge from the 
rule on making available STC’ in electronic contracts, which has however not been 
sufficiently implemented.  
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Notably, however, article 6:235 BW stipulates that article 6:234 BW is not applicable 
to large business in the sense of article 6:235 par. 1 BW. In 2009, article 6:234 BW was 
amended for the implementation of Directive 2006/123, stipulating that if STC’s fell under 
article 230c par. 6, the user can make the STC’s available in the ways prescribed under 
article 6: 230c BW. Article 6:230c BW stipulates that the information is made available on the 
initiative from the provider of services, is easily accessible for the consumer at the place 
where the service is provided or the contract is concluded, is easily available at an internet 
address made available by the provider, or is included in all documents provided by the 
provider of services that describe the services in detail Unsurprisingly, this amendment led to 
criticism that the law was unclear on the way in which STC’s should be made available. A 
2010 amendment1776 revised article 6:234 BW and left out the referral to 6:230c BW, which 
enabled sellers to make STC’s available on their website. The Dutch government recognised 
the need to compensate this amendment,1777 and accordingly amended article 6:234 BW.1778  
In these cases, the simultaneous implementation of various Directives in one part of the code 
has clearly given rise to inconsistency and inaccessibility, as well as the stable development 
of the law.  
Thus, the interaction in the development of the law on STC’s and the interaction in the 
European debate, as well as the timing of the Directive 93/13 limited the willingness of the 
Dutch legislator to amend the law. Although the Dutch legislator, like the German legislator, 
has exercised restraint in the implementation of Directives, this approach was not similarly 
successful. The restraint of the legislator in interacting with European, foreign, as well as 
national actors in the implementation of Directives has proven problematic.  
 
11.3.3.3. The application of Directives by the courts 
In the application of national law implementing Directives, the restraint of the legislator in 
interacting with European, foreign and national actors has been echoed by the courts, which 
has further lessened the predictability, consistency, accessibility and responsiveness of the 
law on STC’s.  
 
 Initially, restraint did not become apparent, as the Hoge Raad had anticipated on the 
draft for articles 6:231 et seq BW.1779   
 
 Further decisions of the Hoge Raad however show that national law implementing 
Directive 93/13 are interpreted in accordance with Dutch law and the preferences of 
the Dutch legislator.  
 
A 1997 decision of the Hoge Raad,
 1780
  as well as the conclusion of A.G. Vranken, refers to 
Parliamentary history on the drafting of articles 6:231 et seq Directive, and although the exception in 
article 6:231 sub a BW for main contract terms was included on the instigation of the Commission, the 
Hoge Raad does not refer the question how main contract terms in the sense of article 4 par. 2 
Directive are to be interpreted.  
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In its 2003 decision, the Hoge Raad
1781
 confirmed this decision, without referring to the 
Directive at all, similar to the conclusion of the A.-G. A less wide interpretation of the main terms of the 
contract in the meaning of article 4 par. 2 Directive seems in accordance with the aim of consumer 
protection of the Directive and need not necessarily be problematic, as the CJEU decision in Caja de 
Ahorros may choose to extend judicial evaluation.  
It is however not a harmonised interpretation of the term used in the Directive, and the Dutch 
interpretation accordingly differs from the German interpretation.
1782
   
 
 In addition, in some cases, the Hoge Raad has maintained its own case law rather 
than interpreting a case in accordance with Directive 93/13.  
 
Accordingly, the Hoge Raad
1783
 referred to its own case law, maintaining that contra preferentem 
interpretation was merely a relevant point of view among other points, and did not anticipate the 
inclusion of article 6:238 par. 2 BW.  
The extension of the scope of the regime on STC’s also does not entail that cases involving 
B2B contracts are decided in accordance with the Directive. Before the Directive went into effect, the 
Hoge Raad did not anticipate on the Directive in the way it had done with articles 6:231 et seq BW,
1784
 





 in the interpretation of articles 6:231 et seq BW in consumer cases, have 
similarly not referred to either Directive 93/13 or foreign decisions that could be relevant for the 
consistent interpretation of the Directive throughout the Union. Some decisions are clearly in contrast 
with Directive 93/13.
1787
 However, other lower courts
1788
 have expressly referred to the Directive and 
CJEU case law.   
 
Moreover, the interpretation methods of the Hoge Raad, as well as some lower courts, may 
not be in line with European law. Particularly, the emphasis on legislative history may be 
difficult to reconcile with the decision from the CJEU in Björnekulla Fruktindustrier,1789 where 
the CJEU ruled that national courts need to interpret national law in the light of the wording of 
Directives, despite contrary interpretation that may follow from the travaux préparatoires. 
That does not mean that courts may not rely on parliamentary history. In 
Commission/Sweden, the CJEU1790   accepted that parliamentary history is an important 
source for interpreting (implemented) law in some Member States, and upheld the inclusion 
of the list in the Annex to the Directive in parliamentary history. Accordingly, Dutch courts 
frequently assume that the legislator aims to implement a Directive and therefore, national 
law is in accordance with, or should be interpreted in accordance with, a Directive. 1791 
However, Björnekulla Fruktindustrier indicates that if legislative history is contrary to the 
wording of the Directive, legislative history does not justify interpretation contrary to the 
wording of the Directive. Relying primarily on parliamentary history in the interpretation of 
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articles 6:231 et seq BW may be problematic because the legislative history that the courts 
refer to regards the introduction of the BW and not the implementation of Directives. 
Therefore, assuming that the Dtch legislator meant to implement the Directive, and referring 
to parliamentary history, may not be correct. 
 
 The courts have similarly adopted restraint in the interpretation of national law 
implementing Directives 2006/123 or Directive 2000/31, which decreases the chance 
that the courts will remedy the careless implementation of these Directives by the 
Dutch legislator.  
 
A 2007 decision from the Hoge Raad,
1792
 has also been interpreted in line with national law. The Hoge 
Raad however distinguishes between the question whether parties have included the STC’s in their 
contract, a question that should be decided under article 3:33 et seq BW, and the question whether 
STC’s have been made available in practice in accordance with article 6:233 and 234 BW, upholding 




 similarly shows restraint. The Hoge Raad decided on the question whether 
STC’s had been made reasonable available that could be found online with a search engine. As the 
party subjected to the STC’s had not expressly agreed with taking note of the STC’s electronically, the 
Hoge Raad held that the STC’s had not been made reasonably available, and that interpretation 
responsive to legal practice did not entail that, if STC’s may be made available online, the user of 
STC’s merely has to ensure that STC’s may be found online after an online search.  
The Hoge Raad does not refer to either of the Directives, but A.-G. Wissink refers to Directive 
2006/123 on services, but not to Directive 2000/31 on e-commerce, and he does not consider that 
parties that are not consumers, as in this case, may diverge from article 10 par. 3 Directive 2000/31. It 
is unclear whether parties may also agree on this silently. This possibility, which is not included in 
article 6:234 BW, is left open, as this had not been argued before the court. Also, questions with 
regard to the simultaneous applicability of the Directives and questions of priority arise from this case. 
A CJEU decision clarifying the potential overlap between these Directives would however been 
welcome.   
The approach of lower courts differs. Decisions from lower instances
1794
 do not refer to either 
the Directive or foreign decisions. Some lower courts explicitly follow the course adopted by the Hoge 
Raad.
1795
 Other lower courts
1796
 have diverged from the course adopted by the Hoge Raad and the 
decisions from other lower courts,
 1797
 as well as the explanation of the Minister of Justice in the 
amendment of article 6:234 BW that merely referring to STC’s on a website did not suffice for making 
STC’s available.
1798
   
The decision of the court of appeal Arnhem
1799
 is one of the few decisions that has taken into 
account Directive 2006/123. The court upheld STC’s that were made available to the counterparty at 
the office of the user of STC’s, expressly referring to article 6:230c and Directive 2006/123, apparently 
diverging form the Hoge Raad.  
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►The restraint adopted by the courts diminishes the chance that shortcomings in the 
implementation of relevant Directives are compensated. This is detrimental to private parties 
as the lack of predictability, accessibility and inconsistency resulting from articles 6:234 and 
6:230c BW are not remedied. Also, the lack of interaction between courts has led to 
inconsistency and unpredictability for private parties has entailed that law that is mroe lenient 
to business parties has been overlooked, with may diminish the responsiveness of private 
law to legal practice.  Because of the restraint of courts in referring questions to the CJEU, 
unpredictability, inconsistencies and a lack of responsiveness remain. 
The restraint of courts in referring to the CJEU also is detrimental for the development 
of the acquis in the long term, as it decreases the chance that inconsistencies and problems 
in the implementation of Directives are brought to the attention of European actors, which 
increases the chance that problems in the acquis will not be remedied.   
 
11.3.3.4. The attempted reform of Directive 93/13 
Dutch actors have shown restraint in interacting with European actors and national non-state 
actors, which entails that the attempted reform did not deal with problems currently visible in 
the law on STC’s. Consequently, the responsive development of the Directive is undermined.  
 Although the Dutch legislator did not initiate a separate consultation on the proposed 
reform of the 1993 Directive, it did refer to the CCA for advice on the draft,1800 and included 
stakeholders preceding the advice. The WODC also provided a report.  
 
The evaluation of the Directives was not finished when the draft Directive was published, and the 
reports are therefore not based on the experiences with the Directive.  
The advice of the CCA,
1801
 after criticising the positions of the European Commission and the 
impact analysis, extensively considers the potential consequences of maximum harmonisation. It does 
not reject maximum harmonisation outright and finds that maximum harmonisation may still leave 
some room for Member States in matters falling outside the scope of the Directive. However,t he CCA 
doubts claims that maximum harmonisaiton will increase cross-border trade and warns for a lower 
level of consumer protection.  
The CCA
1802
 also criticised the wording of the proposed EU model list that left room for 
discussion whether clauses fell under the list. Interestingly, the CCA noted that the question whether a 
model list should be precisely worded or not depends on the question what aim these model lists 
pursue. The national model list was strictly enforced in Germany, but the clauses in the Dutch legal 
order left more discretion to the courts. The CCA – incorrectly – held that clauses falling under the 
black list also allowed for some discretion, and convincingly stated that the list should be specified for 
points where discussion in legal practice was likely to arise.  
The CCA held that it would benefit consumers if the list more closely related to special 
regimes that were of interest to the consumer, such as the regime on consumer sales in book 7 BW. 
The CCA furthermore provides an overview of clauses in articles 6:236 and 237 BW that are used 
often against consumers, and wondered at the absence of these clauses in the proposal. In addition, 
the CCA pointed to clauses contrary to mandatory law, clauses diverging from default law, and unduly 
surprising clauses, noting that these should be included in the draft Directive and Annex.  
Although the CCA
1803
 recognised the use of comitology as a useful technique, it rejected the 
possibility to amend the EU model lists in this manner, because it concerns an issue too important for 
                                               
1800
 See the letter of the Minister, 10 December 2008, at http://www.ser.nl/~/media/DB_Adviezen/2000_2009/2009/b27871.ashx.  
1801
 CCA, Consumentenrechten in de interne markt, advice 09/05, 17 June 2009, available at 
http://www.ser.nl/~/media/DB_Adviezen/2000_2009/2009/b27871.ashx, p. 15, 21- 26.  
1802
 CCA 2009, p. 68-74. 
1803
 CCA 2009, p. 74. 
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 that was published prior to the advice of the CCA, also contributes to the 
discussion and provided information for the Dutch legislator in the European debate. Differently than 
the CCA, the report
1805
 suggests replacing articles 6:236 and 237 BW by the EU model list, 
considering that the comparison of the Dutch and the European list would be ‘too complicated’ – and it 
may be doubted whether articles 6:236 and 237 BW could be maintained under a Directive pursuing 
maximum harmonisation. The report goes on to critically evaluate to what extent articles 6:236 and 
237 BW could be maintained, and which clauses would have to be removed, moved to the grey list – 
clauses on the grey list are, interestingly, not moved to the black list – and which clauses would be 
introduced. The report
1806
 further recommends that the sanction of avoidability, which seems in 
accordance with article 3:40 par. 2 BW, should be amended, so that it stipulates that clauses will not 
be binding on the consumer.  
In addition, in the WODC report,
1807
 the amendments of Dutch law in accordance with the 
proposed Directive also prompt a reconsideration of the information duties under article 6:233 sub b 
and 6:234. Amending article 6:231 sub a BW, so that it would include the notion of STC’s as not-
individually negotiated contracts, would also ensure the correct implementation of the Directive. Also, 
the debate on the question whether the avoidability of unfair clauses sufficiently implements the 
Directive could have prompted the Dutch legislator to reconsider article 3:40 BW, which has more 





 notes that the proposal will lead to a lower level of consumer protection, 
and recognises the dilemma of legislators in either exercising restraint in the implementation of 
Directives or a more active approach. On the one hand, exercising restraint is beneficial for the 
consistency and predictability of law, but it may undermine the correct implementation of Directives. 
On the other hand a more active approach contributes to the correct implementation of the Directive, 
but it may weaken the consistency and predictability of the law.   
However, the Dutch experience in the implementation of Directives shows that despite 
restraint, problems of predictability, accessibility and consistency may still arise. 
 
In Parliament, the Dutch government1810 stressed that maintaining a high level of consumer 
protection with regard to STC’s, as well as other, overlapping areas, was important.1811  The 
Dutch government further stated that national law would form a starting point in the 
negotiation process at the European level, although it simultaneously indicated that it 
supported the idea of maximum harmonisation.1812 In a later stage of the drafting process of 
the Directive, the Dutch government reported that it supported limiting the scope of the 
proposal as governments could not reach agreement on the regime on STC’s. 
At the European level, the Dutch reaction1813 follows the advice from the CCA and the 
WODC and criticises the lack of empirical evidence of the claims of the Commission, and 
considers, with regard to the suggestion to include clauses, that it is unfamiliar with cases 
that would justify subjecting individually negotiated clauses to judicial control. The Dutch 
                                               
1804
 C. Cauffman, M. Faure, T. Hartlief, Harmonisatie van contractenrecht in Europa: consequenties voor Nederland, Report 29 
March 2009, WODC, available at www.wodc.nl/images/volledige-tekst_tcm44-186293.pdf.  
1805
 WODC 2009, p. 142-143. 
1806
 WODC 2009, p. 156-157. 
1807
 WODC 2009, p. 264-270 
1808
 S. Hartkamp, ‘Het nieuwe BW – ontwikkelingen sinds 1992’, AA 2012, p. 50.  
1809
 WODC 2009, p. 251, 252. . 
1810
 Kamerstukken II,2008-2009,  22112, 742, p. 7, 8.  
1811
 Kamerstukken II, 2010-2011, 21501-30, nr 246, p. 8. 
1812
 Kamerstukken I, 2009-2010, 30520, nr D, p. 1. The Dutch response to the previous concultation, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/acquis/responses_green_paper_acquis_en.htm, p. 14-16 adopted a more 
nuanced approach to maximum harmonisation, stating that the question whether maximum harmonisation is desirable may be 
answered differently for different Directives, and should be based on a thorough assessment.  
1813
 Dutch response, p. 7, 18-19, 19-20   
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response further favours a combination of a black and grey list at a European level, 
emphasising that this approach functions well in the Dutch legal order.  
In its response, the Dutch government also stresses the importance of maintaining 
the level of consumer protection that currently exist in national legal orders. The option to 
extend the judicial control to clauses on main terms of the contract is rejected as this would 
entail giving the judiciary the competence to completely evaluate contracts. Interestingly, the 
Dutch response does not focus on previous negotiations, and emphasises experiences that 
may be useful for the European legal order.  
Unfortunately, however, the response does not address the suggestion of comitology, 
although the CCA clearly rejected that option. Interestingly, article 6:239 BW provides for the 
amendment of articles 6:237, sub a to n BW, through delegated lawmaking, without requiring 
a full legislative procedure. Article 6:239 par. 2 BW moreover enables the legislator to consult 
representative organisations. The legislator1814 emphasised that this provision enabled the 
legislator to adequately deal with developing practices, but the procedure has not been used 
since and amendments have been made through the normal legislative process.  
Yet the existence of article 6:239 BW draws into doubt whether the Dutch legislator 
finds that article 6:237 BW should be amended only in a full legislative process. Notably, 
however, comitology would mean that national Parliament loses control over these 
amendments. In addition, whereas the WODC report1815 rejected the fear of a ‘race to the 
bottom’ as not convincing, the Dutch legislator does not take a clear position on regulatory 
competition.   
Although the Dutch government did not initiate a separate consultation, the proposal 
was debate in Dutch literature.1816 The responses from other Dutch actors in the European 
consultation show a diverse approach to the reform of the 1993 Directive. In particular, the 
response from Hondius1817 extensively considers the approaches towards the implementation 
of Directives in various Member States. However, the participation of other relevant actors, 
including Dutch consumers’ organisations,1818 has been limited to the closed consultation 
prior to the CCA advice.  
The amount of business participating in the European consultation also seems rather 
limited, but these responses are in accordance with the interests of these stakehoolders. The 
employers’ organisation VNO-NWC1819 remarks that Directives that have not been included 
in review, such as Directive 2000/31 on e-commerce, may be relevant and should be 
included, and further argues that a sufficient, rather than a high, level of consumer protection 
should be established under maximum harmonisation Directives, if harmonisation is 
necessary. VNO-NWC further points out that the availability of evaluation reports of the 
Directives under review would have been beneficial. Also, VNO-NWC expressly rejects the 
suggestion for comitology, extending the scope of the Directive to individually negotiated 
clauses or the main terms of the contract. It considers, however, the possibility that 
maintaining a black list only would be beneficial for predictability. The Platform Detailhandel 
Nederland,1820 the other business organisation that responded to the consultation, similarly 
                                               
1814
 Parl GS (Inv 3, 5, and 6), p. 1756. 
1815
 WODC 2009, p. 256. 
1816
 See for an overview of Dutch literature M.B.M. Loos, J.A. Luzak, ‘Ontwikkelingen betreffende het voorstel voor een Richtlijn 
consumentenrechten: de positie van de Raad en het Europees Parlement’, NTER 2011, p. 168.  
1817
 Reaction from E.H. Hondius, p. 1-3,7-9.  
1818
 However, the ECC Netherlands has participated. However, its contribution seems to be limited to publishing its response to 
the questionnaire from the Commission on the review of the consumer acquis. The response is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/acquis/responses/ecc_Netherlands.pdf.  
1819
 VNO-NWC, p. 1-3.  
1820
 Platform Detailhandel Nederland, p. 2 
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supports maximum harmonisation of the current level of consumer protection. However, the 
Platform rejects a clause for mutual recognition as this would entail applying stricter 
provisions in cross-border contracts, which would complicate cross-border trade. The 
Platform further supports a black list only, and rejects the suggestion that the scope of the 
Directive should be extended to the main terms of the contract or individually negotiated 
clauses.  
The limited participation of Dutch stakeholders is in contrast with the contribution of 
stakeholders from other legal orders – for example Germany – and does not compare 
favourably to the contributions of businesses to national amendments.1821 Also, the lack of 
participation from Dutch consumers’ organisations does little to prevent or mitigate the 
uneven representation of actors participating in the drafting process that has already been 
criticised.1822     
 Because of the limited interaction between Dutch and European state and non-state 
actors, experiences in the implementation of Directive 93/13 were not addressed, which 
limits the extent to which a future reformed Directive could have responded to these 
experiences. Also, the lack of an additional consultation has undermined the inclusiveness 
and representativeness of actors in the European debate.  
Although the Dutch government took Dutch law as a starting point in its participation 
in the European consultation, its intention in negotiations was not necessarily maintaining the 
status quo. Although the Dutch legislator seems more open to possibilities of reform, it does 
not use the draft Directive as an opportunity to reconsider the law on STC’s in accordance 
with the recommendations of the WODC report. Considering the future reform of the 1993 
Directive,1823 the restraint of the Dutch legislator may also have been motivated by the wish 
to avoid multiple successive amendments of the law – however, Dutch law has meanwhile 
been amended.  
 If Dutch and European state actors do not take into account advice without clear 
reasons, the question moreover arises what the added value is of increased participation. 
Thus, more and better interaction could have increased the chance that the national 
legislator raised questions and considered solutions for problems in the implementation of 
Directives. Consequently, the lack of interaction may undermine the responsive development 
of the acquis.  
 
11.3.3.5. The revision of the law on STC’s at a national level 
In the reform of articles 6:236 and 237 BW, the approach of the Dutch legislator to interaction 
with other actors varies. With regard to subscription contracts, the Dutch legislator has 
carefully interacted with foreign and European actors, which has enabled the legislator to 
benefit from insights from these actors. This is much less the case with regard to the supply 
of gas, warmth and electricity, which may increase the chance that the law will have to be 
amended if relevant Directives are reformed.  
Articles 6:236 and 237 BW fall within the scope of the Directive, although they do not, 
as such, implement the model list in the Annex to Directive 93/13. However, these provisions 
may entail that clauses falling under article 6:233 sub a BW, which implements article 3 
                                               
1821
 For example the contributions of stakeholders to amendments to articles 6:236 and 237 BW, see further par. 11.3.3.5.  
1822
 M.W. Hesselink, ‘Who has a stake in European contract law?’, ERCL 2005, p. 295. 
1823
 Comp. preamble 62 to Directive 2011/83 that stipulates that in the evaluation of the Directive, the Commission will pay 
particular attention to the minimum harmonisation approach in Directives 93/13 and 99/44. 
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Directive 93/13, are considered unfair, or likely unfair. Thus, these provisions cannot be seen 
in isolation from the Directive. 
The legislator has amended the law in two instances: 
 
1) The amendment of articles 6:236 and 237 BW on the termination of subscriptions and 
similar contracts. 
 
Article 6:236 BW was amended to stipulate, in sub o, that clauses that limit or exclude the possibility 
for consumer to terminate electronically, orally, or in writing contracts that have been concluded 
electronically, orally, or in writing are unfair. Also, sub p prohibits clauses in contracts for subscriptions 
on newspapers and journals that stipulate that silently extend or renew the contract for a period of 
more than three months, if the consumer cannot terminate the contract at the end of the contract that 
is renewed with a termination period of at most a month. Additionally, article 6:236 sub q prohibits 
clauses in contracts for subscriptions on journals or newspaper that silently extend the subscription 
indefinitely, if the consumer cannot terminate the contract at all times with a termination period of at 
most a month or three months, depending on the frequency of the newspaper or journal. Moreover, as 
the silent extension of memberships of associations should be handled differently as members of 
associations had more opportunities to influence the policy developed by associations, article 2:36 BW 
was accordingly amended, stipulating that unless the articles of association decide otherwise, 
members can terminate their membership at the end of the financial year, with a termination period of 
4 weeks. Termination that diverges from par 1 end the membership at the earliest possible time, if the 
member would have terminated in accordance with article 2:36 par. 1 BW. Articles 3 and 4 provide 
exceptions and stipulates that members can terminate their membership immediately if decisions 
within a month after a decision limiting his rights or increasing his obligations, unless the articles of 
association if they specifically describe the duties and rights concerned. Members may also terminate 
immediately after a decision of merger, division, or conversion of the legal form of the association. The 




Article 6:237 BW has recently been amended to include, in sub k, clauses that set the period 
of contracts stipulated in article 6:236 subs j, p or q (mostly subscription contracts) are presumed to be 
unreasonable, unless the consumer has the possibility, after a year, to terminate the contract, with a 
termination period of at most a month. The amendment also amended sub l in article 237, stipulating 
that clauses are presumed to be unfair if they stipulate that consumers are bound to a period of 
termination that exceeds the period of termination that the user of STC’s has to take into account.  
 
In amending the law, the Dutch legislator1825 considered the solutions in other Member States 
– notably, surrounding Member States such as England, France and Belgium, as well as 
Austria – that also set limits to the silent extension of contracts, or that have proposed to do 
so, but especially focussed on undesirable national practices.  
Interestingly, neither the proposal nor the comments on the proposal initially refer to 
the Directive.1826 During the negotiations on the draft Directive on consumer rights, however, 
the question arose whether the Dutch legislator would take the amendment into account in 
these negotiations, and it was noted that the Dutch government had directed its attention to 
the differences between the European and Dutch model lists, also taking into account the 
amendment. It was also noted that if the clause was not included in the Directive, it would 
have to be removed if the Directive aimed for maximum harmonisation.1827  
                                               
1824
 Kamerstukken II, 2008-2009, 30520, nr 8, p. 21. 
1825
 Kamerstukken II, 2005-2006, 30520, nr. 3, p. 3. 
1826
 For example G.P.J. de Vries, ‘Paal en perk aan bedingen ter stilzwijgende verlenging van consumentenovereenkomsten, 
maar hoe?’, TvC 2007, p. 122.  
1827
 Kamerstukken I, 2009-2010, 30520, nr D.  
381 
 
In the absence of maximum harmonisation, it can be doubted whether the Directive 
stands in the way of the amendments, as the amendments aim to increase the level of 
consumer protection in accordance with the minimum harmonisation character of the 
Directive. Interestingly, the amendments are in accordance with the Annex to the Directive, 
that in par. 1 sub h expressly refers to clauses that automatically extend a contract of fixed 
duration where the consumer does not indicate otherwise, when the deadline fixed for the 
consumer is unreasonably early.  
The amendment is also in accordance with case law from lower courts that held 
clauses that silently extended contracts for ineffective,1828 although they did not refer to the 
EU model list.1829 However, other decisions have upheld these clauses.1830 The proposal 
does not aim to clarify the EU model list and assumes that problems arise in practice – which 
is correct – and therefore, a transitional period has been introduced to allow business to 
amend their contracts. However, courts1831 have anticipated on the amendment, which does 
not seem especially problematic considering previous decisions and the EU model list. Thus, 
the amendment provides more clarity for consumers as well as businesses and may 
eradicate inconsistent decisions of lower courts.  
 
2) Amendments for contracts on the supply of gas, electricity, and warmth. 
  
The amendments to legislation on the supply of gas and energy sought to extend the effect of articles 
6:236 and 237 BW to contracts between businesses, particularly small to medium enterprises. 
Simultaneously, it was suggested to limit the character of clauses in the black list to “grey” clauses that 
were assumed to be unfair, also for contracts with consumers.
1832
 The proposed amendment 
overlooked previous advice from the Raad van State, to remove a previous article of the same 
effect,
1833
 and stated that the extension of articles 6:236 and 237 BW would enable parties contracting 
with suppliers of gas and electricity to negotiate. At first sight, extension of article 6:236 or article 237 
BW hardly increases businesses’ room to negotiate – rather, it imposes mandatory law on parties 
generally considered capable of negotiating on clauses and disadvantages the users of STC’s who 
supply gas and energy compared to other users whose STC’s in business contracts are not subject to 
articles 6:236 and 237 BW. However, the extension limits the possibility of users to impose clauses on 
the other party, thereby providing other parties with more room to negotiate on such clauses. This 
restriction may further be justified by the monopolist position of suppliers of energy and gas.
1834
 
Simultaneously, limiting the effect of article 6:236 BW as a grey list in consumer contracts may give 
rise to questions with regard to the Directive, as this seems a measure that may lower consumer 
protection.   
 
The amendment has been criticised as contrary to the regime in articles 6:231 et seq BW.1835 
In particular, articles 6:236 and 237 BW were drafted for contracts between consumers and 
businesses. Parties other than consumers were assumed to be in a position in which they 
could negotiate on clauses, which required less mandatory rules. This restriction also 
becomes apparent from article 6:235 BW that excludes big businesses from the scope of 
                                               
1828
 Ktr Hoorn 10 April 2006, NJF 2007, 252, as well as Ktr. Eindhoven 9 March 2006, Prg. 2006, 95, Ktr. Eindhoven 10 
November 2005, Prg. 2006, 9.  
1829
 The decision in Ktr. Rotterdam 2 August 2007, Prg. 2008, 37 seems an exception that was not followed in later decisions, 
see previously par …  
1830
 Ktr. Tiel 15 June 2005, Prg. 2005, 143. 
1831
 In particular Ktr. Haarlem 12 January 2012, NJF 2012, 94.  
1832
 Kamerstukken II, 2001-2002, 28174, nr 39.  
1833
 Kamerstukken II, 2001-2002, 28190, nr 3, p. 12.  
1834
 Comp. I.S.J. Houben, ‘Sectorspecifieke wetgeving en algemene voorwaarden’, NbBW 2004, p. 107-108 remarks that the 
market for energy and gas is new and there may be market failures. Moreover, parties contracting for the supply of energy and 
gas are typically dependant on the supply of these utilities. 
1835
 S.C.J.J. Kortmann, N.E.D. Faber, ‘Het moet niet veel gekker worden!’, WPNR 6531 (2003).  
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articles 6:233 and 234 BW.1836 Subsequently, questions were raised in Parliament.1837 The 
state secretary, 1838  after agreeing with the negative advice from the Raad van State, 
subsequently found that the advice of the Raad van State has been elaborately discussed in 
Parliament, which has resulted in current article 14 Gas Act (‘Gaswet’) and article 26a 
Electricity Act (‘Elektriciteitswet’) that have maintained the extension and limitation of articles 
6:236 and 237 BW.1839  The state secretary concluded that these articles are not contrary to 
articles 6:231 et seq BW.  
The secretary1840 further found that the limitation of black clauses to grey clauses 
does not materially alter the position of consumer, because it is highly unlikely that 
businesses will succeed in proving that these are fair, as these clauses are found unfair 
throughout this sector. Thus, the amendment is in accordance wirh Directive 93/13 or article 
3 par. 3 Directive 2003/55 that stipulates that states will ensure a high level of consumer 
protection.1841 These amendments have since been extended to contracts for the delivery of 
warmth falling under the Warmth Act (‘Warmtewet’) that in proposed article 5 par. 9 provides 
for similar divergences from articles 6:236 and 237 BW.1842  
Criticism that the amendment is contrary to Directive 93/13 may be debated after a 
recent CJEU decision.1843 The CJEU held that clauses falling under the scope of national 
legislation are, in accordance with article 1 par. 2 Directive 93/13, not subjected to an 
evaluation of fairness, as the legislator has specifically considered a balance of the rights 
and obligations of contract parties in these cases.   
 
►Thus, although the Dutch legislator recognises the added value of foreign and European 
law, as well as national legal practice, it has not developed a predictable, consistent 
approach to amending the law. If amendments are not uncontroversial or if they precede law 
reform at the European level, the Dutch legislator may be forced to amend the law repeatedly, 
which does not strengthen predictability or accessibility.    
 
11.3.3.6. Conclusion on the development of Dutch law and harmonisation 
The approach of the Dutch legislator is reminiscent of the German legislator who actively 
participates in debate and subsequently exercises restraint in the implementation of the law 
on STC’s. However, the approach of the German legislator has not been nearly as 
successful as the German approach. Possibly, this lack of success can be traced to the 
weaker position of Dutch actors in the European debate, as Dutch law had not even entered 
into force yet, whereas German law was well-developed.  
The timing of Directive 93/13 also entailed that it was especially unattractive for the 
Dutch legislator to amend the law. As the restraint of the Dutch legislator went further than 
the restraint of other legislators, it drew the attention of European actors, and the ability of 
national actors to exercise restraint in the implementation of European measures, which also 
benefitted the predictable development of the law, was curtailed.  
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 Advice from the Raad van State of 19 September 2000, nr W10.00.0327/II. 
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 Kamerstukken II, 2002-2003, 28174, nr 110a, p. 8-9. 
1838
 Kamerstukken II, 2002-2003, 28174, nr 110b, p. 11-12. 
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 Kamerstukken II, 2002-2003, 28174, nr 110d, p. 3.  
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 Kamerstukken II, 2002-2003, 28174, nr. 110d, p. 3.  
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Specifically, the article provides a high level of consumer protection ‘particularly with respect totransparency regarding 
general contractual terms and conditions, general information and dispute settlement mechanisms. Member States shall ensure 
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establishes that provides more specific rules for contracts between consumers and gas suppliers. 
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 As discussed in Kamerstukken I, 2008-2009, 29048, nr 51, p. 7-9. 
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 CJEU 21 March 2013 (RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen eV), C-92/11, [2013] ECR, p. I-0. 
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The predictable, accessible and consistent development of the law was further 
undermined as the Dutch legislator has not exercised similar restraint in amending the law, 
even though recodification was meant to increase the stable and consistent development of 
private law.  
Both German and Dutch courts have followed the restraint of legislators in 
implementing the acquis. However, in the Dutch legal order, this was more problematic as 
the law on STC’s showed more shortcomings that were not compensated by an active 
approach of the courts. Moreover, Dutch courts have not adopted a consistent approach, as 
lower courts have diverged from the approach of the Hoge Raad.   
Thus, Dutch actors have not adequately recognised interdependence in ensuring the 
predictability, consistency, accessibility, and responsiveness of the law on STC’s, despite the 
CJEU decision in Commission/The Netherlands. Consequently, Dutch actors have not 
consistently interacted with European, foreign and national state and non-state actors, which 
has undermined the comprehensibility of the law. 
   
11.3.4.  Dutch law on STC’s and international trade 
The development of treaties and international trade may induce state actors to interact with 
foreign actors and non-state actors. Is this also the case for the Dutch legislator and courts, 
and how has that affected the predictability, consistency, accessibility and responsiveness of 
the law on STC’s?  
 Paragraph 11.3.4.1. will consider the regulatory competition in Dutch law and 
paragraph 11.3.4.2. will turn to the approach of the courts to the interpretation of clauses in 
international contracts. Paragraph 11.3.4.3. will end with a conclusion. 
 
11.3.4.1. Regulatory competition  
Has the Dutch legislator taken into account insights from foreign, European and international 
actors in developing the law on STC’s in accordance with ideas of regulatory competition? 
The Dutch legislator has recognised the added value of regulatory competition in the 
law on STC’s. 
In accordance with the idea of regulatory competition, the drafting of the BW relied 
extensively on comparative law, which enables the drafters of legislation to decide on the 
most convincing argument for and against the development of the law in a particular 
direction.1844 Notably, however, the inclusion of comparative law did not focus on foreign 
regimes with the lowest possible evaluation of clauses in business contracts, which was also 
criticised by Spier.1845  
In addition, in the drafting of articles 6: 231 et seq BW, the view of relevant actors in 
legal practice were carefully considered. Thus, the legislator consulted with the Dutch 
association for the judiciary1846 on questions of transitional provisions, which should limit 
unpredictability arising from the introduction of new legislation that moreover confers a 
relatively new task on the judiciary. Furthermore, the legislator clearly stated the importance 
of the advice from the CCA1847 and business stakeholders.1848 This attention for national 
stakeholders increases the chance that Dutch law will reflect the eneds of businesses and is 
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 See previously par. 11.3.1.  
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 J. Spier, ‘Nogmaals het wetsontwerp algemene voorwaarden’, Kwartaalbericht Nieuw BW 1985, p. 7-8. 
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therefore an attractive regime for these businesses that are thus les slikely to opt out of 
Dutch law.  
The support of regulatory competition becomes particularly visible for international 
business contracts. In the drafting process, the Dutch legislator argued that subjecting 
international business contracts to the Dutch regime might be problematic, and might 
jeopardise the Dutch position in international trade.1849 Accordingly, the Dutch legislator has 
chosen not to subject international business contracts to judicial evaluation by the insertion of 
article 6:247 par. 1 BW, stating that doing so would hinder international trade.1850 The Dutch 
legislator further states that it should not be made unattractive for Dutch contract parties to 
opt for international trade.1851  
However, this view is limited to international business contracts, which was 
subsequently criticised by Spier,1852 who argued that in chains of contracts, the regime would 
not be applicable to a part of the contractual chain, if the contract would be concluded 
between a Dutch and a foreign business. However, the subsequent link of the chain – a 
contract between Dutch businesses – would be subjected to this regime. The Dutch legislator 
apparently did not consider this argument, which would provide domestic businesses with a 
possibility to circumvent the regime, particularly persuasive.1853   
Also, considerations of regulatory competition are not apparent in recent reforms for 
consumer contracts. These amendments focus on national practices. Notwithstanding the 
emphasis of the Dutch legislator on regulatory competition in this field, it has been argued 
that other areas of the law – in particular battle of forms – are in need of reform.1854  
 Thus, the Dutch legislator initially recognised the increasing relevance of the 
preference of non-state actors in international trade and sought to develop an attractive 
system for these actors, in accordance with the idea of regulatory competition. However, this 
view has not consistently been followed in recent amendments. Although this development 
was not based on interaction with international or European actors, the Dutch legislator has 
taken into account insights from foreign legislators and national stakeholders. Moreover, a 
more lenient regime has been developed for international practice.  
 
11.3.4.2. The interpretation of international contracts 
Has the judiciary, in the interpretation of STC’s in international contracts, recognised 
interdependence as international trade develops and have courts interacted accordingly with 
international, European and foreign state and non-state actors? How has that affected the 
predictability, consistency, accessibility and responsiveness of the law on STC’s? 
Paragraph 11.3.4.2.1. will consider decisions on the inclusion of STC’s and paragraph 
11.3.4.2.2. will consider the decisions on the question whether STC’s have been made 
adequately available. Paragraph 11.3.4.2.3. will consider the interpretation of STC’s. 
Paragraph 11.3.4.2.4. will end with a conclusion. 
 
                                               
1849
 J. Spier, ‘Het wetsontwerp algemene voorwaarden: voor de praktijk funest’, Kwartaalbericht Nieuw BW 1984, p. 130-131. 
1850
 Parl. GS (Inv 3, 5, and 6), p. 1815. 
1851
 Parl GS (Inv 3, 5, and 6), p. 1816, see also with regard to article 6:232 p. 1486. 
1852
 J. Spier, ‘Nogmaals het wetsontwerp algemene voorwaarden’, Kwartaalbericht Nieuw BW 1985, p. 7, similarly J.E. 
Vollebregt, ‘Wetsonwerp algemene voorwaarden’, NJB 1984, p. 813814. 
1853
 Comp. the reaction of the Minister, Parl GS (Inv 3, 5, and 6), p. 1484 with regard to the discussion (in an international 
context see p. 1478, and 1482) whether the regime would be detrimental to businesses, as argued by Vollebregt 1984, p.  809. 
Comp. also HR 26 May 1989, NJ 1992, 105 where the Hoge Raad limited the ability of parties in domestic contracts to exclude 
national mandatory law by opting for an international regime that aims to provide a comprehensive regime on some points, such 
as the CMR.  
1854
 C.P.B. Mahé, ‘Pleidooi voor de herziening van de nederlandse battle of forms-regeling’, VrA 2006, p. 5.  
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11.3.4.2.1. The valid inclusion of STC’s 
Courts have not consistently and adequately interacted with national, European, foreign and 
international state and non-state actors in the inclusion of STC’s in cases falling under 
respectively the CISG, the CMR, article 23 Brussels I, and Dutch law, which has severely 
undermined predictability and consistency. 
 
 In cases falling under the CISG, the Hoge Raad has decided in accordance with the 
CISG, without referring to foreign law or international materials, but the conclusion of 
the A.G. does refer to international materials.  
 
In a 2005 decision under the CISG, the Hoge Raad
1855
 held that the question whether STC’s had been 
validly included in the contract, was to be decided under article 7 par. 2 CISG, in accordance with 
general principles underlying the CISG, and in the absence of such principles, in accordance with 
applicable law, as the CISG includes rules on the conclusion of contracts, including the question 
whether parties have agreed with the application of STC’s. Neither the Hoge Raad nor the A.-G. refers 
to foreign decisions on the inclusion of STC’s, but A.-G. Strikwerda does refer to literature on the CISG 
and UNCITRAL.  
 
 A consistent approach does not become apparent in the approach of lower courts.  
 
Decisions from lower instances prior to the 2005 decision had referred to foreign law, although foreign 




 have since followed 
the decision of the Hoge Raad. Other decisions from lower courts have not decided the question 
whether STC’s had been validly included in the contract under article 7 CISG. For example, the district 
court Amsterdam
1858
 decided the question whether a choice of law clause had been validly included 
under article 3 Rome Convention. 
 





 held that in order to decide whether validity of the jurisdiction clause under article 
31 CMR should be determined under the CMR or not, it should first be established that the CMR was 
applicable to the case, which concerned transport through multiple means. The Hoge Raad 
considered the scope of the CMR, referring to provisions and agreement of states parties to the CMR 
to negotiate on treaties for transport through other means, and considered that it followed that the 
CMR is not applicable to these contracts. In its decision, the Hoge Raad addressed English and 
German case law that the court of appeal of appeal had relied on, and followed the BGH decision, 
stating that it did not follow from the reasoning of the English decision that the CMR should be 
applicable. Consequently, the Hoge Raad upheld the jurisdiction clause as not invalid because of 
article 31 CMR.  
 
                                               
1855
 HR 28 January 2005, NJ 2006, 517, see the conclusion of the A.-G. Strikwerda under pars. 8 and 9.  
1856
 For example Rb. Arnhem 17 March 2004, NJF 2004, 497, also Rb Zwolle 22 January 2003, LJN AF3345, referring to 
applicable Dutch law as well as German law, as well as Hof ‘s-Hertogenbosch 16 October 2002, LJN BA7248, referring to the 
PECL and UNIDROIT, as well as (briefly) to Dutch and French law.  
1857
 For example Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 2 January 2007, LJN AZ6352, not referring to foreign law.   
1858
 Rb. Amsterdam 20 April 2011, RCR 2011, 69. S. Kruisinga, ‘De battle of forms in internationaal perspectief: een eerlijke 
strijd?‘, Contracteren 2005, p. 5 refers to decisions in which courts held that questions on battle of forms should be determined 
under article 6:225 par. 3 BW.  
1859
 HR 1 June 2012, NJ 2012, 516. 
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 The approach of lower courts varies. Whereas some lower courts have decided cases 
accordingly and also refer to foreign materials,1860 other courts have decided cases 
under Dutch law.1861  
 Some cases may however be problematic, even though they refer to foreign and  
international sources as well as soft laws. 
 
The district court Rotterdam
1862
 considered Rome I, Brussels I, the CMR and Dutch.  
The court rejected the claimant’s referral to the applicability of the CMR because this 
constitutes changing the legal basis of one’s claim in the sense of article 130 Civil Procedure Act (‘Rv’), 
which is not permissible in the preliminary procedure on competence.  
However, the court overlooks that article 31 CMR provides that parties may agree on a 
competent court in contracting states, while, in addition, the court where the defendant ordinarily 
resides or has his principal place of business, or the branch or agency through which the contract of 
carriage was made is competent, or the court of the place where the goods were taken over by the 
carrier or the place designated for delivery is situated, which in this case would entail that the court in 
The Hague is competent.  
Thus, this decision overlooks previous CJEU
1863
 case law providing that in accordance with 
article 71 Brussels I, this provision precedes article 23 Brussels I, provided that it is ‘highly predictable, 
facilitate the sound administration of justice and enable the risk of concurrent proceedings to be 
minimised and that they ensure, under conditions at least as favourable as those provided for by the 
regulation, the free movement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and mutual trust in the 
administration of justice in the European Union’, while application of the CMR may also not lead to a 
result less favourable than the result reached under the Regulation.  
If this is not the case – which the court does not explain further – then the question whether a 
jurisdiction clause has been validly included in the contract is to be determined under article 23 
Brussels I. Although the court refers to article 23 Brussels I, the question whether STC’s have validly 
been included in the contract is decided under Dutch law, as the court apparently confuses a choice of 
law with a choice of jurisdiction. Holding that the STC’s of respondent have been validly included in the 
contract, which contains a jurisdiction clause for an Italian court, the court declares itself incompetent, 
without however evaluating whether this choice has validly been made under article 23 Brussels I. 




 In cases on jurisdiction clauses in accordance with article 23 Brussels I, lower courts 
have decided in line with the Regulation, but they only rarely1865 refer to international 
and European materials. 
 
The court of appeal in ‘s-Hertogenbosch
1866
 upheld a clause, although in writing, had not been given a 
prominent place in the STC’s, but the court upheld the clause as jurisdiction clauses were not unusual 
in international trade, while the party challenging the clause had also included a jurisdiction clause in 
its own STC’s. Parties had entered into multiple contracts that they had also begun to perform, in 
which the jurisdiction clause was also deemed to have been validly included under article 17 Lugano 
Convention. The court did not refer to European or foreign decisions.   
                                               
1860
 Comp. Hof ’s-Gravenhage 28 November 2007, LJN BB9150 that upheld the applicability of the CMR, also noting that the 
STC’s of parties expressly noted that the CMR could be applicable. The court also referred to German literature on the CMR. 
1861
 Rb. Rotterdam 17 September 2008, LJN BF1813 held that it was insufficiently established that the STC’s, recognising the 
applicability of the CMR and containing a clause for arbitration, had been included in the contract under Dutch law.  
1862
 Rb. Rotterdam 28 January 2009, LJN BH1797.   
1863
 CJEU 4 May 2010 (TNT/Axa Versicherung), C-533/08, [2010] ECR, p. I- 4107.  
1864
 CJEU 16 March 1999 (Trasporti Castelletti Spedizioni Internazionali SpA v Hugo Trumpy SpA), C-159/97, [1999] ECR, p. I-
1597. 
1865
 See Hof Amsterdam 27 November 2007, RCR 2008, 44 that rejected that a jurisdiction clause met the requirements of 
article 23 Brussels I, expressly following the CJEU 
1866
 Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 4 September 1997, NJ 1998, 578. 
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The district court Dordrecht
1867
 upheld a jurisdiction clause, firstly considering that STC’s had 
been validly included in the contract as the confirmation of the commission referred to the STC’s, 
which were printed on the back of the confirmation, in English, and the user of STC’s had therefore 
justifiably assumed that the counterparty accepted its STC’s, in accordance with Hoge Raad case law. 
The court subsequently held that as no further objections had arisen to the jurisdiction clause, and the 
STC’s had been validly included in the contract, on which parties commercial practice was based, the 
jurisdiction clause had been validly included in the contract, in accordance with article 23 Brussels I. 
The court did not expressly refer to the CJEU or to foreign or international materials. The district court 
Rotterdam
1868
 referred to article 23 Brussels I in a case concerning a jurisdiction clause, but first 
turned to the interpretation of the clause and subsequently held that as the jurisdiction clause met the 
requirements under article 23 Brussels I and other objections had not arisen, it was valid.  
 
 Some decisions referring to international, foreign and national decisions, as well as 
soft law, are nevertheless problematic.  
 
The district court Amsterdam
1869
 decided on the inclusion of a jurisdiction clause under the CISG, and 
referred to both the decision of the Hoge Raad on the valid inclusion of STC’s under the CISG as well 
as the BGH and the PECL, ruling that STC’s had not been validly included in the contract as it had not 
been established that the users of STC’s had made the text available to their contract party, noting 
that a general duty to inform after the STC’s cannot be accepted, while merely referring to one’s STC’s 
is not sufficient and does not indicate agreement or a well-established practice between parties.  
The district court ‘s-Hertogenbosch
1870
 similarly incorrectly decided on the applicability of a 
jurisdiction  clause under the CISG, referring to article 23 Brussels I, but subsequently stating that this 
regulation does not provide rules for the valid inclusion of STC’s. The court then considered this 
question, and, referring to BGH case law as well as an Austrian decision, held that this had not been 
the case, which also meant that the jurisdiction clause did not meet the requirements of article 23 
Brussels I. Although the outcome of the case is unproblematic, the reasoning of the court is contrary to 
CJEU case law
1871
 establishing that the validity of a jurisdiction clause is to be established solely under 
article 23 Brussels I.  
 
 In international cases decided under Dutch law, the Hoge Raad has not referred to 
international or foreign materials.  
 
In a 1977 international case decided under Dutch law, the Hoge Raad
1872
 rejected the view that 
because the Dutch seller, in a contract drafted in English, had referred to his STC’s, printed on his 
stationary, in Dutch, these STC’s had become applicable, unless the party subjected to these terms 
proved otherwise. In this decision, the Hoge Raad, nor the diverging conclusion from the A.-G., refer to 
foreign or international decisions.  
In a 1985 decision, the Hoge Raad
1873
 however decided that a retention of title clause that had 
not been included in the confirmation of an assignment between parties but that had been included in 
the STC’s in the stationary of the seller, had not been validly included in the contract, notwithstanding 
the long business relation between contract parties, as the buyer did not reasonably have to expect a 
                                               
1867
 Rb. Dordrecht 16 January 2008, RCR 2008, 50. 
1868
 Rb. Rotterdam 1 August 2007, LJN BB6035.  
1869
 Rb. Amsterdam 3 June 2009, LJN BK0976. Comp. also Rb. Zutphen 14 January 2009, NJF 2009, 244, referring to both the 
Hoge Raad and the BGH. 
1870
 Rb. ’s-Hertogenbosch 26 January 2011, RCR 2011, 52. Similarly, the Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 22 June 2012, RCR 2010, 66 
also decided the question  whether  STC’s – including a jurisdiction clause – had been validly included in the contract under the 
CISG rather than article 23 Brussels I.  
1871
 CJEU 16 March 1999 (Trasporti Castelletti Spedizioni Internazionali SpA v Hugo Trumpy SpA), C-159/97, [1999] ECR, p. I-
1597.  
1872
 HR 9 December 1977, NJ 1978, 187. 
1873
 HR 18 October 1985, NJ 1987, 189. 
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clause that had not been included in his confirmation, and the seller could not reasonable expect the 
buyer to have become aware of this clause.  
In a 2001 case,
1874
 for a contract concluded before the CISG had been ratified by the Dutch 
legislator, the Hoge Raad upheld a decision from the court of appeal ruling that an arbitration clause 
had been validly included in a contract. The Hoge Raad held that the German contract party should 
have asked for clarification on the Dutch pre-printed text sent by the Dutch party upon request of the 
German party to send his STC’s. The German party, as a business operating in international trade, 
should been alert to this way of referring to STC’s that is also used by German contract parties. A.-G 
Strikwerda notes that this conclusion is in line with previous case law on domestic contracts. Neither 
the Hoge Raad nor the A.-G refer to German law.  
 
►As the Hoge Raad has adopted a different approach for contracts concluded under the 
CISG, it is unclear whether this decision should be followed for international sales contracts – 
it may however still be relevant for international contracts where the CISG has been 
excluded or for international contracts not falling under the CISG, such as mixed contracts.  
 
 Decisions in national cases only rarely refer to foreign materials1875  and they differ 
from decisions in international cases.  
 
In national cases, the question whether STC’s have been validly included under the contract should be 
answered under articles 3:33 and 35 BW. Although these rules at first sight seem more lenient than 
international regimes, some confusion has arisen with regard to clauses that are particularly 
disadvantageous for the contract party subjecting to the STC’s.  
In a 1981 decision, the Hoge Raad
1876
 had held that for the valid inclusion of STC’s, there 
were no additional requirements beyond the normal requirements usual in business practices for 
concluding a contract. The Hoge Raad however also held that the agreement cannot supposed to be 
aimed at clauses that were especially disadvantageous, which it repeated in a later decision.
1877
 
Although the Hoge Raad in this domestic contract unsurprisingly does not refer to comparative or 
foreign sources, the converging conclusion of does refer to research that includes comparative 
research and takes note of European decisions on jurisdiction clauses. The Hoge Raad
1878
 repeated 
that notwithstanding the applicability of STC’s, the silent agreement of the subjecting party with terms, 
the content of which he is not completely familiar with, may not be assumed for clauses on far-going 
exclusion clauses that the court of appeal had deemed applicable because of their widespread use in 
that particular branche of business. Even if such clauses are widespread, the Hoge Raad maintained 
that agreement should not be assumed. Rather, this question should be decided by interpreting the 
contract.  
It can be doubted whether these decisions under ‘old’ Dutch law are reconcilable with article 
6:232 BW. In later decisions, the Hoge Raad
1879
 maintained the applicability of articles 3:33 and 35 
BW in deciding whether STC’s had validly been included in the contract, without however confirming 
the idea that counterparties cannot be held to have agreed with surprising or unusual clauses.   
 
►Thus, courts have not developed a consistent approach to international and foreign 
materials in international cases. In some cases, referral to multiple sources does not indicate 
a carefully reasoned out decision, but rather confusion. The lack of interaction between 
                                               
1874
 HR 2 February 2001, NJ 2001, 200 see the conclusion of A.-G. Strikwerda, par. 10. Comp. also Rb. Rotterdam 28 
November 2012, NJF 2013, 79, on the silent acceptance of terms. 
1875
 Comp. however the conclusion of A.G. A.-G. Biegman-Hartogh before HR 6 November 1992, NJ 1993, 27. 
1876
 HR 20 November 1981, NJ 1982, 517.  
1877
 HR 6 November 1992, NJ 1993, 27. 
1878
 HR 1 July 1993, NJ 1993, 688. 
1879
 HR 10 June 1994, NJ 1994, 611, HR 28 November 1997, NJ 1998, 705, as well as HR 2 December 2011, NJ 2011, 574, as 
well as Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 1 November 2001, NJ 2002, 507.    
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Dutch courts could have prevented the development of inconsistent, unpredictable, or 
incorrect decisions.  
 
11.3.4.2.2. Making STC’s adequately available 
The approach of courts to international and foreign materials in decisions on the availability 
of STC’s differs, which has undermined the predictability, consistency and responsiveness of 
the law on STC’s. 
 
 Various decisions of lower courts1880 on the availability of STC’s in international cases 
under the CISG refer to a decision from the BGH.1881  
 
These decisions include the district court Rotterdam
1882
 that referred to the BGH while stating that a 
2001 decision from the Hoge Raad could not serve as a starting point in its decision, as the Hoge 
Raad decision concerned a case in which the CISG was not (yet) applicable.
1883
 The district court 
Utrecht
1884
 also referred to the BGH decision, and moreover distinguished between the inclusion of 
STC’s in international contracts and domestic contracts. Unfortunately, however, some comments and 




 Other decisions from lower courts do not refer to the BGH.  
 
Thus, the district court Rotterdam,
 1886
 in multiple decisions, does not refer to the BGH but instead 
refers to the 2005 decision of the Hoge Raad on the valid inclusion of STC’s, as well as the district 
court Arnhem.
1887
 In a previous case, the district court Arnhem
1888
 did not refer to either the decision of 
the Hoge Raad or the BGH. Instead, the district court decided the inclusion of STC’s under article 7 
par. 2 CISG, stating that a contract party cannot merely refer to the STC’s without making the text of 
STC’s available, while it can generally not be required of contract parties to inform after the content of 
STC’s.  
Similarly, the district court Zwolle
1889
 held that it has not been sufficiently proven that the text 
of STC’s were made available to the German counterparty, without referring either to the Hoge Raad 
or the BGH. Additionally, the district court Breda,
1890
 though recognising the need for a harmonised 
interpretation of the CISG, did not refer to either the decision of the BGH or the Hoge Raad, and 
                                               
1880
 As there are no relevant decisions of the Hoge Raad on the availability of STC’s, this paragraph will mainly consider lower 
courts decisions. However, the importance of uniform interpretation had been emphasised for the predecessor of the CISG, see 
HR 13 September 1991, NJ 1992 110. 
1881
 BGH 31 October 2001, NJW 2002, 1651. See critically T.H.M. van Wechem, J.H.M. Spanjaard, ‘De toepasselijkheid van 
algemene voorwaarden onder het Weens Koopverdrag: Nieuwe trend in de Nederlandse (lagere) rechtspraak?’, Contracteren 
2010, p. 35, 38, who find this decision incorrect – inconsistent with foreign decisions, and too much oriented on national law. In 
contrast, S.A. Kruisinga, ‘Reactie op T.H.M. van Wechem en H.J.M. Spanjaard’, Contracteren 2010, p. 110, does find the 2001 
BGH decision persuasive, especially the reasoning of the BGH and the outcome of the case. She also argues that the BGH has 
not oriented itself on German law that she finds considerably less strict. German criticism of this decision has come to the same 
conclusion, see previously par. 10.3.3.2.3. 
1882
 Rb. Rotterdam 25 February 2005, LJN BH6416.  
1883
 HR 3 May 2013, RvdW 2013, 669 does not provide a further rule but is rejected on the basis of article 81 RO.  
1884
 Rb. Utrecht 21 January 2009, NJF 2009, 148.  
1885
 Curiously, BGH 31 October 2001, NJW 2002, 1651 concerned a question on article 19 and 7 CISG on battle of forms. It was 
not a decision on the question whether the STC’s had been made adequately available. A decision on the same date under 
article 8 CISG, on the question whether STC’s had been made adequately available, was BGH 31 October 2001, NJW 2002, 
370. Kruisinga does refer to this decision. Comp. Rb. Arnhem 23 May 2012, LJN BW7459, referring to case of 31 October 2001, 
VIII ZR 60/01, NJW 2002, 1651 the case number, VIII ZR 60/01, however refers to the decision published under NJW 2002, 370. 
Similar references also in Rb. ‘-Hertogenbosch 28 March 2012, LJN BW0028. In a later decision, this court (Tb. ‘s-
Hertogenbosch 1 August 2012, RCR 2012,78, cites from the decision of the BGH under NJW 2002, 370, but does not refer 
expressly to the NJW anymore.  
1886
 Rb. Rotterdam 29 December 2010, LJN BP1037, Rb. Rotterdam 31 March 2010, LJN BN2112,  
1887
 Rb. Arnhem 10 February 2010, LJN BL4484, similarly Rb. Arnhem 17 January 2007, LJN 9279. 
1888
 Rb. Arnhem 16 December 2009, LJN BK8904.   
1889
 Rb. Zwolle 9 December 2009, LJN BL0104.  
1890
 Rb. Breda 27 February 2008, LJN BC6704. 
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concluded, under articles 8 and 9 CISG, that STC’s were validly included in the contract, as the party 
subjected to the STC’s should have realised that in international as well as national trade, the use of 
STC’s is widespread. As the STC’s had been printed on the back of the stationary of the user, and the 
counterparty had not protested against these STC’s and had started to perform the contracts, the user 
was allowed to assume that the STC’s had been accepted. Thus, the silence of the counterparty did 
not stand in the way of assuming the applicability of STC’s under article 18 CISG.  
A decision made in arbitration,
1891
 although referring to the PECL, does not refer to either the 
Hoge Raad or the BGH but holds that as the party subjecting to STC’s had not protested the 
application of STC’s, while the intention of the user was sufficiently clear and a reasonable person 
acting in international trade would have understood that the seller meant to apply his STC’s, and the 
text of the STC’s had been mailed by regular mail, the buyer had accepted the STC’s, although this 
did not apply for the initial contract, concluded by fax, on which the text of STC’s was not printed.  
 
 In cases under Dutch law, article 6:247 BW makes clear that articles 6:233 sub b and 
article 6:234 are not applicable. Thus, for international cases, a lacunae has 
developed.  
 
A 2012 decison of the Hoge Raad, which did not refer to foreign or international materials, did not 
provide clarity on this point.
1892
 The conclusion of A.-G. Wissink before the case that elaborately 
considers the answer to this question by soft law, the CISG, and BGH case law., also does not provide 
an unequivocal answer and moreover fails to consider Directive 2000/31.  
 
 In domestic cases, the Hoge Raad has generally not referred to European, foreign or 
international materials, but recognised the relevance of business practices. It does 
not become apparent that the courts have consistently decided these cases more 
strictly than international cases, even though article 6:247 BW clearly distinguishes 
between national and international cases.   
 
The Hoge Raad has decided that article 6:234 BW should be interpreted in a limited manner, which 
entailed that the user of STC’s can only refer to the availability of STC’s at the registry of the court or 
the possibility to send the text of the STC’s upon request, if there are no other options to make the 
STC’s available.  
However, the Hoge Raad
1893
 held that an interpretation in accordance with the needs of 
practice entails that the party subjecting to the STC’s may not invoke the avoidability if, at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract, he was familiar with the content of the STC’s or should have been 
familiar, which would for example be the case if STC’s have been included in multiple contracts 
between parties, the text of which has been handed to the party subjecting to STC’s, while it is also 
possible that invoking the avoidability of STC’s is irreconcilable with good faith under article 6:248 BW.  
In a subsequent case, the Hoge Raad
1894
 accepted that in accordance with civil procedure law, 
the court had apparently assumed that STC’s had been made available in accordance with article 
6:234 BW.  
In a 2011 decision, the Hoge Raad
1895
 held that by merely making the STC’s available online, 
where they could be found through a Google-search, STC’s had not been made adequately available.  
In international cases, however, the thought that business parties ought to be aware of the 
widespread use of STC’s
1896
 has also been reflected in some domestic cases.1897   
                                               
1891
 NAI 10 February 2005, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050210n1.html.  
1892
 HR 11 May 2012, NJ 2012, 318, comp. The conclusion of A.-G. Wissink under pars. 3.8.2-3.8.5.  
1893
 HR 1 October 1999, NJ 2000, 207, HR 6 April 2001, NJ 2002, 385. 
1894
 HR 21 September 2007, NJ 2009, 50, comp. previously also HR 11 July 2008, NJ 2008, 416.   
1895
 HR 11 February 2011, NJ 2011, 571. 
1896
 Expressed for example in HR 16 February 1996, NJ 1996, 394.  
1897




►Neither lower courts nor the Hoge Raad has developed a consistent approach in referring 
to international, European or foreign materials in international cases, nor do lower courts 
consistently take into account one another’s decisions. This has undermined the 
predictability and consistency of the law on STC’s. Moreover, the responsiveness of the law 
on STC’s to international practice is lessened as lacunaes become visible that are not 
remedied by the courts.  
 
11.3.4.2.3. The interpretation of clauses  
Courts have not distinguished between the interpretation of clauses in domestic or 
international contracts, nor have they especially taken into account foreign or international 
materials in interpreting clauses in these contracts. In other words, foreign or international 
materials do not take a special place in the interpretation of international clauses. A 
consistent approach to the place of foreign and international materials in the interpretation of 
clauses in international contracts would however benefit predictability, accessibility 
consistency, and responsiveness.  
 




 in the interpretation of an international contract containing an entire agreement 
clause, held that the court of appeal had rightly interpreted the contract in accordance with a leading 
domestic case of the Hoge Raad,
1899
 according to which a contract is to be interpreted in accordance 
with the reasonable expectations of parties. The court of appeal had taken a linguistic interpretation as 
a starting point, holding that this contract had been carefully negotiated and drafted, and moreover 
included an entire agreement clause. In the interpretation of the contract, the court also referred to the 
negotiation process of the contract.  
The Hoge Raad does not refer to foreign or English law, in which this clause is well-known, 
and A.-G. Timmerman only briefly refers to English law. In his note to the decision, Wissink
1900
 finds 
that the entire agreement clause does not prescribe how the terms in the contract are to be interpreted, 
nor does he find it in accordance with Dutch law, as well as the PECL and the UNIDROIT principles, to 
bar the negotiation process from circumstances relevant for the interpretation of the wording of the 
contract.  
In a 2013 domestic case, the Hoge Raad
1901
 did recognise the function of entire agreement 
clauses under English law, but maintained that such clauses do not have special meaning under 
Dutch law.  
In a case involving foreign parties, the Hoge Raad
1902
 similarly referred to guidelines 




 However, this line also permits courts to take into account parties’ expectations, in 
which case foreign or international materials might become relevant. 
 
                                               
1898
 HR 19 January 2007, NJ 2007, 575, see later also HR 19 October 2007, NJ 2007, 565, where the Hoge Raad held that 
parties should take the legitimate interests of counterparties into account, as well as HR 4 June 2010, NJ 2010, 312, where the 
Hoge Raad emphasized the capacity of professional parties, and HR 5 April 2013, NJ 2013, 214, where the Hoge Raad held 
that the linguistic interpretation provided a starting point for judges in interpreting the contract, but other circumstances can 
entail that another meaning than the linguistic meaning of the contract can be decisive.  
1899
 HR 13 March 1981, NJ 1981, 635. 
1900
 Note to HR 29 June 2007, NJ 2007, 576, par. 8. 
1901
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 expressly considered that the expectations from parties, when established, could 
justify an interpretation that took these expectations rather than the wording of the contract into 
account.  
Accordingly, the Hoge Raad
1905
 also upheld a decision from the court of appeal that 
emphasised the importance of the English wording of an initial public offering, as most parties 
participating in the agreement were assisted by professionals, and were situated in England or the US 
and the agreement was the result of extensive negotiations. In a subsequent decision,
1906
 an 
interpretation based on the wording was difficult as the wording (‘net proceed’) allowed for multiple 
meanings. The Hoge Raad upheld the decision from the court of appeal that took into account the 
relevant circumstances of the case, including the drafting of the clause, the wording of the clause and 
parties’ intentions.  
In other cases, however, the Hoge Raad
1907
 held that the court of appeal should also consider 
the argument that in shipping, the expression “as agents” had a particular meaning diverging form the 
meaning established by the court. Thus, parties’ expectations and definitions generally recognised in 
trade may well be relevant.  
 
 Lower courts similarly interpret international cases in accordance with domestic law.  
 
The district court Rotterdam
1908
 followed the line set out by the Hoge Raad, expressly referring to 
parties’ reasonable expectations. The decision of court of appeal Arnhem makes clear that 
international guidelines may influence parties’ expectations.
1909
  
The district court Haarlem,
1910
 deciding a case under Dutch law, held that the term ‘negligence’ 
should be interpreted in a way that is in accordance with Dutch law, and as comparative law showed 
that negligence converged with the Dutch ‘unlawfulness’ in article 6:162 BW, negligence would be 
interpreted in accordance with this article.  
 
►The guidelines established by the Hoge Raad allow judges to take into account the 
capacity of international parties, and, possibly, their expectations as based on international 
materials, which leaves room for a responsive interpretation. However, applying a domestic 
standard to international transactions may not be in accordance with the international 
character of that transaction, which might undermine responsiveness. For foreign parties, 
moreover, the decisions from the Hoge Raad are arguably not easily accessible and the lack 
of a consistent approach may give rise to unpredictability for international parties.   
So far, however, referring to foreign law or international materials has been the 
exception rather than the rule. Taking into account foreign and international materials might 
form a starting point for developing a separate approach to the interpretation of clauses in 
international clauses that might benefit responsiveness to international trade 
   
11.3.4.2.4. Conclusion on the interpretation of international contracts 
Although the law clearly distinguishes between international and national contracts, courts 
have not expressly recognised the needs and preferences of international trade. Thus, courts 
have not developed a consistent approach to international, European, foreign and national 
state and non-state actors. Interestingly, whereas German courts do not generally refer to 
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1909
 Comp. Hof Arnhem 9 Marc 2010, LJN BL7399, a rare case that referred to the CISG Advisory Council Opinion nr 2.  
1910
 Rb. Haarlem 11 May 1993, NJ 1993, 71. 
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soft law, Dutch courts have referred to both the PECL and UNIDROIT. This has not visibly 
contributed to the comprehensibility of the law. 
The absence of a consistent use of international and foreign materials, especially in 
international cases decided under Dutch law, may have undermined the consistency and 
predictability of the law on STC’s for parties relying on international or European law. The 
referral to domestic decisions may moreover lessen the accessibility of Dutch law for foreign 
private parties. Moreover, it has become apparent that some courts do not have a clear 
overview of overlapping sources, which may decrease the accessibility of the law. The lack 
of interaction between Dutch courts has led to inconsistencies and unpredictability. Moreover, 
as some courts do not follow the course of the Hoge Raad, the extent to which the Hoge 
Raad can provide guidelines, in accordance with its task to preserve legal unity, is limited.  
 
11.3.3.7. Conclusion on the development of Dutch law and international trade 
Although the Dutch legislator has recognised the increased importance of the needs and 
preference of international actors and developed the law accordingly in the recodificaiton of 
Dutch law, later amendments of the law have not taken into acocunt the needs and 
preferences of international practice. Accordingly, the Dutch legislator has not sufficiently and 
consistently interacted with relevant actors in the amendment of the law, nor did regulatory 
competition prompt the Dutch legislator to exercise more restraint in amending the law. 
Possibly, the Dutch legislator assumed that because of the thorough drafting process of 
articles 6:231 et seq BW and the general success of the BW, the law on STC’s was 
successful and did not need to be critically reconsidered. These practices should diminish 
the attractiveness of Dutch law in international trade, despite the Dutch legislator’s support of 
regulatory competition.  
The approach of the courts further undermines the attractiveness of Dutch law in 
international trade. Although the courts adopt less restraint than German courts in 
international, foreign and European materials, including soft laws, this has not been done 
consistently. Rather, inconsistent and unpredictable case law has developed. If courts 
interpret clauses in accordance with Dutch case law, moreover, this may undermine the 
accessibility of the law for foreign parties. The risks of extensively referring to possible 
sources also becomes apparent as courts lose the overview and come to incorrect decisions.  
Moreover, Dutch courts have not sought to compensate for shortcomings visible in Dutch law 
and lacunae have developed as a result.  
Thus, even though Dutch courts generally interact more with international, foreign and 
European state and non-state actors, which generally should benefit the responsiveness of 
international and national regimes to trade, this does not make The Netherlands a more 
attractive forum to international actors.  
 
11.3.5. Conclusion on the development of the law on STC’s through the BW 
In the development of the law on STC’s through the BW, the Dutch legislator has at first sight 
recognised interdependence in ensuring that the law develops predictably, accessibly, 
consistently, and responsively. The Dutch legislator has recognised the added value of 
regulatory competition and participated actively in European debate on harmonisation 
measures. Notably, in the European debate, the Dutch legislator also adopts a less narrow 
view than German actors, which should be beneficial for debate. The question however 
arises whether the Dutch legislator is sufficiently aware of the consequences of particular 
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suggestions for the predictable, consistent, accessible and responsive development of 
national private law. Moreover, the active approach is undermined by the lack of participation 
of relevant Dutch actors in debate.  
 However, a closer look reveals that the quality of the law on STC’s could be improved, 
but it has been undermined by the lack of consistent and sufficient interaction with European, 
international, foreign and national state and non-state actors. Consequently, the law has had 
to be repeatedly amended, and has moreover been amended further, which does not benefit 
the predictability and accessibility of the law.   
Courts do not remedy these shortcomigns by actively participating in European 
debate or in providing rules where the legislator has left gaps. Instead, the courts follow the 
restraint of the Dutch legislator in implementing the law. In international cases, this restraint 
is less visible, but no consistent and predictable approach to the use of foreign, European 
and international materials is visible.  
Moreover, courts have not interpreted clauses more strictly in domestic cases, which 
is contrary to the Dutch legislator’s intention in stimulating regulatory compeition. The 
inconsistent and unpredictable interpretation of clauses in international contracts has 
undermined the efforts of the Dutch legislator to make Dutch law and attractive regime in 
international trade. The extent to which the Hoge Raad can improve this practice is limited as 
lower courts do not sufficiently take into acocunt the decisions of the Hoge Raad and other 





11.4. Blanket clauses 
This paragraph will consider whether actors have recognised interdependence and 
interacted accordingly, and if so, how this has affected the extent to which blanket clauses – 
article 3 Directive 93/13, article 6:233 sub a BW and article 6:248 BW1911 – contibute to the 
predictability, consistency, accessibility and responsiveness of the law on STC’s.  
Paragraph 11.4.1. will turn to the development of the law through article 6:233 sub a 
BW and paragraph 11.4.2. will discuss model lists. Paragraph 11.4.3. will turn to the 
evaluation of clauses under in international cases. Paragraph 11.4.4. will end with a 
conclusion. 
 
11.4.1. The development of the law through article 6:233 sub a BW  
Have actors recognised that other actors may also develop the law through blanket clauses, 
and interacted with these actors accordingly? How has that affected the extent to which 
article 6:233 sub a BW may contribute to the predictability, accessibility, consistency and 
responsiveness of the law on STC’s? 
 Paragraph 11.4.1.1. will discuss the drafting of article 6:233 sub a BW and paragraph 
11.4.1.2. will consider the interpretation of this provision by the courts. Paragraph 11.4.1.3. 
will end with a conclusion. 
 
11.4.1.1. The drafting of article 6:233 sub a BW 
The Dutch legislator has taken into account especially German experiences with the law on 
STC’s, which increased the chance that Dutch law would function well in practice, 
considering the success of the AGBG.  
The introduction of article 6:233 BW follows the recommendation of the CCA,1912 
inspired by the AGBG, to introduce a blanket clause that could be used for the evaluation of 
diverging STC’s throughout different branches, in individual relations that may differ 
considerably from one another, and different which allows the law on STC’s to be developed 
through case law. 1913  The CCA advice was approved by the preliminary report of Prof. 
Hondius,1914 who, after comparing the various methods that had been developed in other 
legal orders to control the use of STC’s, argued for the use of a blanket clause, in 
combination with a model list, referring to the AGBG. Parliament considered the creation of a 
new regime desirable. Although it was held that German law had largely developed on the 
basis of article 242 BGB, and later article 9 AGBG, the Dutch judiciary showed more restraint 
in developing the law, and a new regime would also contribute to predictability. 1915 
Interestingly, Hartkamp1916 notes that initially the courts did not take an active approach to 
the interpretation of articles 6:231 et seq BW; this developed after CJEU case law on the 
Directive. 
The legislator1917 has explicitly referred to the relation between articles 6:233 and 
6:248 BW, noting that the avoidability in article 6:233 BW concerns clauses that diverge from 
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the consequences that the contract of parties would have had, in accordance with article 
6:248 BW that stipulates that contracts do not only have the consequences which parties 
have contracted for, but also consequences following from the law – especially default law, 
which according to the legislator ‘strives for justice rather than predictability’ – customs and 
good faith. The legislator1918 later abandoned including the comparison with default law in 
article 6:233 sub a BW. It was held that this perspective would overlook the possibilty that 
good faith stood in the way of invoking a rule from default law. Consequently, this 
comparison plays no role in practice.1919 The question arises whether the CJEU decision in 
Aziz v Catalunyacaixa1920 will prompt national judges to reconsider the relevance of default 
law in their assessments – possibly, courts may be less inclined to refer to this part of 
parliamentary history. 
Notwithstanding the inspiration from the successful AGBG, the introduction of 
numerous blanket clauses in the BW has also been subject to criticism. The introduction of 
article 6:233 BW did not codify case law – to the contrary, an argument against the use of a 
blanket clause was the case law of the Hoge Raad that was considered to prevent it from 
developing the law in this area.1921 It was also noted that case law in this area on the basis of 
good faith had little value as precedent as decisions on this basis differed depending on the 
circumstances of the contract, whilst the motivation to challenge STC’s before the court was 
limited.1922  Simultaneously, it was asked whether the inclusion of blanket clauses would 
effectively provide consumers with more protection.1923  
If the legislator has taken other legal orders as inspiration in the drafting of article 
6:233 BW, this was not made explicit. However, the legislator1924 has indicated that the 
resolution adopted by the Council of Europe was taken into account, which in turn was 
preceded by the 1984 consultation that discussed various means to control the use of STC’s, 
including the use of blanket clauses.  
Thus, in the drafting of article 6:233 sub a BW, the legislator was able to benefit from 
the insight of extensive comparative law research and particularly referred to the successful 
AGBG.  
 
11.4.1.2. Interaction between the judiciary in the interpretation of article 
6:233 sub a BW 
The Hoge Raad has not developed a consistent approach to the Directive but it has generally 
exercised restraint in referring to the Directive and the CJEU and has sought to decide cases 
in accordance with national law. This restraint is not directly detrimental to private parties, but 
as it is difficult to reconcile with European decisions, the extent to which these Hoge Raad 
decisions provide guidance to lower courts is limited.  
 
 Initially, the Hoge Raad decided cases in accordance with Directive 93/13, although it 
exercised restraint in referring questions to the CJEU. 
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The Hoge Raad held, in accordance with the aim of Directive 93/13 to increase consumer protection, 
that the main terms of the contracts should be interpreted in a limited manner.
1925
 As it concerns a 




 Since this decision, however, the Hoge Raad has adopted restraint in referring cases 




 on an exclusion clause for personal injuries of the consumer, the consumer had 
invoked the avoidability of this clause under article 6:233 BW. However, he had only done so after the 
statement of grounds of appeal (‘memorie van grieven’), without making clear that he had already 
invoked the avoidability of this clause in an earlier letter. The Hoge Raad held that although the 
claimant was allowed to widen the scope of his complaint in appeal, he needed to do before the 
statement of appeal, in order to concentrate the dispute in appeal. Consequently, invoking the 
avoidability of the clause went beyond the limits of the dispute (‘grenzen van de rechtsstrijd’). Invoking 
article 6:233 sub a BW constituted a new ground of appeal that was not allowed in this stage of the 
dispute as the counterparty needs to be able to assess against which claims he should defend himself.  
 
Reading this decision may give one the impression that neither the Hoge Raad nor the A.-G. 
is aware of the existence of the Directive, or the obligation of the judiciary to assess the 
unfairness of clauses ex officio as established by the CJEU.  
 
This is particularly apparent from the CJEU decision in Banif Plus Bank v Csipai,
1927
 where the CJEU 
held that the court is bound to assess of its own motion, on the basis of facts and law at its disposal, or 
the facts that were available to the court as answers to the enquiries of the court raised of its own 
motion. If the court subsequently finds that a term is unfair, it needs to enable parties to react to this 
decision.
1928
 However, the active role of the courts does not mean that parties invoking the unfairness 
of a clause do not need to prove why this clause is unfair, unless the clause falls under articles 6:236 
and 237 BW, which was the case. 
A later decision of the CJEU is even more difficult to reconcile with the Hoge Raad decision. 
Thus, the CJEU
1929
 evauated whether national law limiting parties’ possibility to argue on the basis of 
new facts relevant for the fairness of a clause severely hindered the application of Union law or 
rendered it impossible, considering the obligation of the court to assess this question of its own motion.  
 
Arguably, if the Hoge Raad did not consider it self-evident whether civil procedure law would 
allow for the ex officio evaluation of the clause, and the CJEU decision in Van Schijndel1930 
may support this conclusion. However, the answer to this question is not easy to deduce 
from CJEU case law and should therefore not be considered as an acte éclairé,1931 and the 
later decision of the CJEU1932 indicates a radically different approach that is contrary to the 
decision of the Hoge Raad. Therefore, this question should have been referred to the CJEU.  
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1928
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 In subsequent decisions, the Hoge Raad also exercised restraint and emphasised 
national legislative history rather than the Directive.  
 
In a 2010 decision on an exclusion clause in a contract between an insurer and the insured, who had 
raped his wife. The insured subsequently claimed payment for damages inflicted by rape. The Hoge 
Raad
1933
 maintained that European law – in this case competition law – does not oblige the judge to 
evaluate clauses of its own motion. Moreover, A.-G. Rank-Berenschot, whose conclusion was followed 
by the Hoge Raad, held that the clause is exempt from evaluation as it concerns one of the main terms 
of the contract. Rather than referring to the Directive, the A.G. considered the travaux préparatoires to 
the BW that defend a less strict regime for insurance contracts, as decisive. Possibly, the restraint of 
the Hoge Raad in the ex officio interpretation of an exclusion clause may be traced to questions 
regarding the limits of the judiciary to evaluate a clause ex officio.
1934
  
In a 2012 decision, the Hoge Raad
1935
 considered that the court of appeal had incorrectly 
evaluated the fairness of an arbitration clause by an abstract standard, insufficiently considering the 
individual circumstances of the case. Therefore, its decision implied that arbitration clauses should be 
generally be considered unfair in consumer contracts, which need not be the case as the clause did 
not fall within the scope of articles 6:236 and 237 BW. This is a convincing motivation, in line with the 
Directive, but the subsequent considerations of the Hoge Raad are more problematic.  
Referring to Freiburger Kommunalbauten,
 1936
 the Hoge Raad holds that the CJEU has left the 
assessment of the fairness of clauses to national courts. Interestingly, however, the Hoge Raad does 
not refer to subsequent CJEU case law, which may be especially problematic if the conclusion that the 





►Thus, the decisions from the Hoge Raad do not show a consistent approach to the 
Directive, although restraint has generally been visible. Generally, not referring to the CJEU 
need not mean that cases are decided contrary to the Directive and it may not directly be 
problematic for private parties, especially not as the restraint in ex officio evaluation of 
clauses benefits the predictability of the law. Moreover, decisions  in line with national law 
are advantageous for consistency. However, the decisions of the Hoge Raad seem difficult to 
reconcile with CJEU case law, and lower courts difffer, which has led to inconsistencies. 
 
 Notably, some lower courts have decided in accordance with surrounding national law 
and  decisions from the Hoge Raad.  
 
The cantonial court Venlo,
1938
 in a clause for termination because of criminal offenses in a contract for 
accommodation, also did not refer to the Directive but rather article 7:213 BW which stipulates that 
tenants should behave in accordance with good faith, as well as a decision from the Hoge Raad.  
The district court ‘s-Gravenhage,
1939
 deciding on a case in which a jurisdiction clause for the 
cantonial sector was included in the STC’s, did not refer to CJEU case law, but rather to national 
mandatory civil procedure law (article 96 Rv) that held such a clause for invalid.  
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The cantonial court Assen
1940
 held a clause between a consumer and her lawyer which 
resulted in an increase of costs for the consumer, ineffective, and referred to the guidelines establish 
by the Dutch Bar that prescribe that lawyers discuss the possibility that costs are raised with a 
consumer.  
The cantonial court Rotterdam held that a provider of electricity could not effectively invoke the 
clause that excluded liability for malfunctions, except for damages caused with intent or by 
considerable negligence, held that the clause was ineffective as the provider had not made the facts of 
the case available in such a way that the consumer was able to defend that intent or negligence 
caused the defect, referring to article 6:75 Rv. The decision is also in line with article 21 Rv that 
obliges parties to bring forward all facts that are relevant for the decision, which the provider in the 




The court of appeal ‘s-Hertogenbosch
1942
 held that a clause that held the consumer who had 
rented a trailer liable in cases of loss or theft, contrary to societal views on justice, as established by 
the Hoge Raad,
1943
 and considered whether clauses that diverged from this view were nevertheless an 
established practice. The court was not convinced by the other sets of STC’s that the lettor had 
provided and moreover considered that the consumer was not able to insure himself against damages 
arising from loss or theft of a rented trailer. For these reasons, the court held the clause was 
ineffective. 
The cantonial court The Hague
1944
 held that the user of a similar clause was not unfair, 
considering that this clause was included in STC’s that had been negotiated collectively between 
consumers’ organisations and electricity providers.  
 
►In these decisions, the minimum character of Directive 93/13 and the shape of the 
measure allow courts to decide in accordance with national law and practice, which benefits 
the consistent and responsive development of the law on STC’s.  
 
 Some decisions are moreover in accordance with surrounding Directives. 
 
The district court Utrecht,
1945
 in a case in which a health insurer sought to amend its policy on the 
basis of a clause that allowed it to amend its STC’s, did not assess the fairness of this term. Instead, 
the court judged that the way in which the insurer exercised its right to amend its STC’s was contrary 
to good faith under articles 6:2 and 6:248 BW, which falls outside the scope of the Directive. However, 
the insurer, by amending its clauses may have acted contrary to Directive 2005/29 on unfair 
commercial practices – which had not yet entered into effect at the time of the decision – as well as 
misleading advertising, as it had used its wide policy specifically to attract new consumers.  
Another decision of the decision of the cantonial court Utrecht
1946
 showed similar overlap. The 
court held a contract that did not provide the consumer with a possibility to cancel the contract unfair, 
which was especially problematic as the consumer concluded the contract in the studio of the offeror 
and signed the contract without adequately considering the costs and benefits of the contract, 
because she was overwhelmed by the provider who had promised a free and noncommittal intake 
interview. This situation seems to fall under Directive 85/577 on doorstep selling. The decision of the 
court under article 6:233 sub a BW seems surprising as the main complaint seems to be that the 
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provider did not include a term that allowed the consumer to cancel the contract, which is a 
requirement for the applicability of article 6:233 BW. The decision does not refer to either Directive or 
CJEU case law.  
 
►These decisions demonstrate that decisions in accordance with the acquis may also be in 
accordance with national legal views on justice, as reflected in articles 6:2 and 248 BW as 
well as national law. 
 
 Problems however become apparent in other decisions where the decisions of the 
Hoge Raad are difficult to reconcile with CJEU decisions. Some courts have 
expressly followed the Hoge Raad.   
 
Accordingly, the court of appeal Amsterdam
1947
 upheld a clause in an insurance contract that limited 
the coverage in case the consumer terminated the contract, holding that this term fell under the main 
terms of an insurance contract. Although the court does not directly refer to the Directive itself, it does 





 characterises as an example of indirect effect, to determine the meaning of ‘main terms 
of the contract’ in the meaning of article 6:231 BW. The court however does not refer to the Directive 
itself.  
In another case, concerning a consumer in Germany and an insurer, the court of appeal ‘s-
Hertogenbosch
1950
 held that a clause limiting the coverage of the policy was a main term, exempt from 
judicial evaluation, and referred to previous decisions from the Hoge Raad that however did not fall 
within the scope of the Directive. However, the decision is also in line with the 2010 decision of the 
Hoge Raad on an exclusion clause.  
 
 However, other, previous decisions contradict these decisions, which leads to 
inconsistency and unpredictability. 
 
Interestingly, the court of appeal ‘s-Hertogenbosch
1951
 did not similarly hold that a term on the 
coverage of an insurance policy was a main term of the contract. The court held instead that even if 
the clause in the insurance contract with the consumer was a main term, it was irreconcilable with 
standards of fairness, and the clause should therefore not be upheld.  
 
 Decisions on other issues similarly show inconsistencies. Thus, some lower courts, in 
line with the Hoge Raad, have refused to evaluate clauses ex officio.  
 
Thus, the court of appeal Arnhem
1952
 assessed of its own motion a clause that stipulated that in the 
case of cancellation, the consumer was obliged to pay 30% of the price, or, in cases that the 
consumer is aware that the contract can be performed, 50 % of the price. The court of appeal referred 
to CJEU case law and stated that it would assess the terms of its own motion as the consumer was 
unable to pay for legal advice. It may however be doubted whether courts may only assess clauses of 
their own motion when consumers are not able to substantiate why a clause is unfair.  
This view was however subsequently adopted by the district court Haarlem
1953
 that refused to 
assess terms of its motion as the consumer had invoked the unfairness of the clause while it was not 
established that the consumer was unable to pay for legal advice. 
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 Similarly, the district court Utrecht,
1954
 referring to CJEU case law, refused to assess a term of 
its own motion, holding that the claimant – a consumer organisation – was aware of the protection 
conferred upon consumer, as its request to the court to apply article 6:236 of its own motion showed, 
while the consumer organisation was not a weak party in need of protection. The court moreover 
found that the organisation had not sufficiently established that the disputed clause fell within the 
scope of article 6:236 BW. This reasoning seems contrary to the idea of applying the provisions of its 
own motion. The ability of the judge to do so can however be limited if the judge has insufficient 
information on the clause, but it does not become apparent whether the judge has allowed the 
organisation sufficient opportunity to establish that the clause fell under article 6:236 BW. The decision 
moreover does not seem to be in line with the reasoning of the legislator when this article was 
established. Notably, the black list under article 6:236 BW was drafted narrowly to facilitate the 
predictable interpretation of article 6:233 BW.  
 
 Other courts have however decided differently and evaluated clauses of their own 
motion. 
 
The cantonial court Eindhoven
1955
 that held a clause in a contract between a consumer and a library, 
insofar as it aimed to exclude the duty of the library to mitigate its own damages, ineffective of its own 
motion, referring to CJEU case law.
1956   
The cantonial court Assen,
1957
 after referring to CJEU decisions in Océano
1958
 and Mostazo 
Claro,
1959
 allowed parties to argue whether the clauses in a consumer contract were unfair or not. The 
court subsequently decided that the penalty clause was unfair as there was no limit to the penalty. 
Similarly, the cantonial court Breda,
1960
 also referring to the CJEU decision in Pannon,
1961
 raised the 
fairness of clauses of its own motion and rejected the claim for compensation as based on these 
clauses. 
After the 2012 decision of the Hoge Raad, these decisions are still visible. Accordingly, the 
cantonial court Rotterdam 
1962
 held that it was bound to raise the fairness of STC’s of its own motion, 
in accordance with CJEU case law, and held a penalty clause could not be held partially ineffective 




Moreover, The Netherlands has a well-established system of ADR by the 
Geschillencommissie (hereafter: the Board
1964
) that has resolved disputes in a large amount of 
cases.
1965
 The alternative character of dispute resolution by the Board entails a more active 
approach,
1966
 which may mitigate possible problems with regard to the duties of courts to evaluate 
unfair clauses ex officio. The active approach of the Board however depends on the code of the 
different committees. Accordingly, in some cases, the approach of the Board seems more in 
accordance with the Directive than the approach of some courts. In a case where a seller invoked the 
disclaimer on his webpage, the Board
1967
 held that this fell under article 6:236 and was ineffective. 
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Interestingly, the consumer appears not to have invoked the avoidability of the clause in so many 
words. The Board apparently did not consider this an obstacle. However, the reasoning of the Board in 
this case may be problematic, as the Board incorrectly held that the disclaimer did not fall under the 
definition of STC’s in article 6:231 sub a BW, but it similarly held that article 6:236 applied by analogy. 
 
 The lack of guidance of the Hoge Raad is also visible in the referral of questions to 
the CJEU by lower courts, notwithstanding case law from the Hoge Raad.  
 
Thus, the court of appeal Arnhem
1968
 has referred questions to the CJEU whether Directive 99/44 
obliges the court to examine the capacity of the buyer of it own motion, in particular whether the buyer 
is a consumer in the sense of the Directive. 
 
►Possibly, decicions from the courts may be undermined if decisions of the Hoge Raad are 
later considered incorrect, and the chance that the CJEU will decide a case in such a way 
that forces the Hoge Raad to alter its approach increases as lower courts, rather than 
referring to the Hoge Raad, directly refer cases to the CJEU. 
 
 In other cases, the question whether the decision is line with the Directive despite 
referral to the Directive remains open.  
 
For example, the decision of the court of appeal Amsterdam,
1969
 which upheld clauses in a contract of 
settlement that limited the legal rights of claimants on the basis of previous contracts on contracts on 
the lease of securities, were held to constitute the main terms of the contract. The court referred to the 
Directive, stating that the Directive did not justify a different conclusion. Arguably, considering the 
nature of the contract, and the circumstance that the offer constituted an improvement to the 
consumers’ rights under the contract, it can be doubted whether this decision is contrary to the 
Directive. This would be especially true if the consumers had entered into the contract after legal 
advice. It may also be argued that a different conclusion would limit the predictability that parties 
pursue by entering into a settlement contract. Nevertheless, it would have been interesting to see how 
the question whether clauses included on the black list of the annex to the Directive or national lists, 
may constitute the main terms of the contract
1970
 – which will often be contrary to mandatory law – and 
if this is the case, whether they are exempt from control if they are the main terms of the contract, 
would have been answered by the CJEU.  
 
►Thus, the restraint of the Hoge Raad and lower courts in referring questions to the CJEU 
may at first sight not be problematic for private parties, especially not if it benefits the 
consistent and predictable development of the law.  
 
11.4.1.3. Conclusion on the development of the law through article 6:233 
sub a BW 
Interdependence becomes visible as the role of the Hoge Raad is undermined in cases 
where contradictory CJEU decisions are available that have moreover played a role in 
activating national courts. The lack of interaction between lower courts has also led to 
inconsistent and unpredictable decisions, which is likely also not in accordance with the 
needs and preference of businesses or legal views on justice. 
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In the long term, the restraint of lower courts and the Hoge Raad may also entail that 
relevant questions are not considered in the reform of Directive 93/13. Thus, in the future 
reform of Directive 93/13, no questions on the ex offico obligations of courts, the avoidability 
of STC’s, the CJEU decision in Van Schijndel and national civil procedure law would be 
raised and problems would likely persist at the national level.  
 
11.4.2. Model lists  
Have actors, in the development of model lists, recognised interdependence and interacted 
accordingly, and how has that affected the predictability, consistency, accessibility and the 
responsiveness of the law? 
Paragraph 11.4.2.1. will turn to the development of articles 6:236 and 237 BW and 
paragraph 11.4.2.2. will turn to the interpretation of these provisions. Paragraph 11.4.2.3. will 
end with a conclusion.   
 
11.4.2.1. The drafting of model lists 
Dutch actors, in the drafting of articles 6:236 and 237 BW, have benefitted from the insights 
of comparative law, but exercised restraint in amending the law to implement Directive 93/13, 
which has benefitted consistency and predictability.   
Hartkamp1971 notes that the inclusion of articles 6:237 and 238 BW was based on 
comparative law, in particular the 1979 preliminary report on STC’s. The legislator1972 noted 
that model lists had different functions in different legal orders – while in some orders, model 
lists aim to restrict the use of clauses that are considered particularly undesirable, model 
clauses in other legal orders seemed to provide guidance for the interpretation of 
corresponding blanket clauses. The legislator preferred the latter approach.  
The Dutch legislator 1973  in particular held that it wanted to mitigate potential 
unpredictability that could arise from the introduction of the judicial evaluation of STC’s, while 
also alleviating the workload of the judiciary that was bound to increase given the use of 
blanket clauses in the BW. Parliamentary history1974  further makes clear that the list is 
oriented on national case law, practice and literature. The Dutch legislator,1975 referring to 
German and Austrian law, did not think that limiting the applicability of articles 6:236 and 237 
BW would lead to unpredictability. Notably, the legislator also argued that it was important 
that the lists would not petrify legal practice.1976  
After the implementation of the Directive, the legislator has maintained the lists in 
article 6:236 and 237 BW. The restraint of the Dutch legislator may have been motivated by 
the extent to which the Dutch model lists could support predictability and consistency. 
Jongeneel1977 has objected to amending the model lists in accordance with the EU list as this 
may stand in the way of the development of legal practice on these lists. Possibly, amending 
articles 6:236 and 237 BW would have undermined the aim of these provisions, to add to the 
predictable and consistent interpretation of article 6:233 BW. Also, revising the list may have 
been problematic as this could have entailed revising corresponding default rules in the BW 
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that was still to be introduced. Nevertheless, Jongeneel recognises the possibility that 
national lists are to be amended. 
An additional reason for the restraint of the Dutch legislator may have been the lack 
of clarity on the question whether the list, which is after all non-binding, should be 
implemented.1978 Van Erp1979 states that he has no idea what the ‘indicative list’ means, and 
points to the need for clarification by the CJEU. The CJEU has accordingly referred to the 
annex of the Directive in the interpretation of article 3, and ruled, in Sweden/Commission, 1980  
that a Member State did not have to include the model list in legislation, as long as the list is 
sufficiently available for consumers as a source of information.  
Thus, in the drafting of articles 6:236 and 237 BW, the Dutch legislator was inspired 
by comparative law that enabled it to benefit from experiences and insights from other legal 
orders. However, the Dutch legislator did not amend these lists in accordance with model list 
in the Annex to Directive 93/13. This may have undermined accessibility, but it preserved 
predictability and consistency.  
However, if the 1993 Directive is reformed and the European model list becomes 
binding, this may severely undermine the aim of the Dutch model lists, which has not been 
considered, as such, by the Dutch legislator, that did not oppose a binding model list as 
such.1981  
 
11.4.2.2. The interpretation of articles 6:236 and 237 BW 
Dutch courts have exercised restraint in referring cases to the CJEU and other Dutch courts 
in the evaluation of clauses falling under articles 6:236 and 237 BW, which has undermined 
consistency and predictability. Moreover, the restraint has decreased the chance thta in the 
reform of Directive 93/3, questions that have become apparent in cases are not considered, 
which inhibits the responsive development of the Directive.   
 
 The Hoge Raad has generally considered the status of the model list in the Annex to 




 notes that the inclusion of a clause in this list is an indication that a clause may be 
unfair. Whether the clause is unfair depends upon the circumstances of the case.  
The Hoge Raad follows the conclusion of A.-G. Wesselink-Van Gent, who refers expressly to 
the Directive. The A.G.  takes the indirect effect as a starting point to determine to what extent the 
model list is relevant to the assessment of the fairness of clauses and expressly refers to 
Commission/Sweden, arguing that this decision justifies the conclusion that the inclusion of a clause in 
the European list is a point of view, and not decisive.  
Thus, the European list stays behind article 6:236 and 237 BW: if a clause falls under the 
Dutch gray list, the user of this clause has to prove that considering the circumstances of the case, the 
clause is not unfair. Specifically, if a clause falls under the Annex to the Directive, but not the Dutch 
black or grey list, the consumer still has to prove that a clause is unfair. At most, the judge will have to 
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allow the consumer to prove that the clause if unfair under article 6:233 sub a BW,
1983
 and the 
circumstance that the clause is included in the Annex to the Directive is merely one viewpoint among 
several relevant points of view.  
Referring this case to the CJEU would have provided more insight in the status of the 
European model lists, which in turn could have provided more insight in the approach that judges – 
and possibly, legislators – have to adopt towards this list, in particular whether the judiciary has to 
assess of its own motion whether a clause falling under the Annex is unfair.   
 
This decision does however not mean that courts are obliged to take the European model list 
into account, which also follows from subsequent decisions from the Hoge Raad1984 in which 
it does not pay attention to the European model list as such. 
The Hoge Raad has not often referred cases to the CJEU.1985 That does not mean 
that these cases have been decided incorrectly. However, arguably, the Hoge Raad’s  
decisions touch upon the interpretation of article 3 Directive 93/13 and may moreover entail 
that Dutch law goes below the level of protection established by the Directive. In addition, the 
CJEU is competent to establish the allocation of tasks between the CJEU and national courts. 
Therefore, these questions should have been referred to the CJEU.1986  
The restraint need not be directly problematic for private parties as the restraint may 
well may be motivated by the wish to maintain the consistent, predictable and responsive 
development of the law on STC’s. Regrettably, however, the restraint of the Hoge Raad, 
entails that questions that could be relevant for the reform of Directive 93/13 may not 
become visible at the European level, which undermines the responsive development of this 
Directive. 
However, notwithstanding this restraint, the Hoge Raad has provided some guidance 
to lower courts on the status of the European model list. As the decision does not conflict 
with CJEU decisions, the role of the Hoge Raad should not be undermined, but the decision 
itself in fact does not oblige courts to take a particular approach, as it merely provides that 
the indicative list can have such a status; this does not mean that the European model list 
must be consistently taken into account.  
However, in rare cases, the inclusion of a clause under the European model list has 
prompted courts to presume that clauses are unfair unless the user of that clause can prove 
otherwise.1987  
  
 Some lower courts have followed the decisions from the Hoge Raad. 
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Accordingly, with regard to a penalty clause in a contract for accommodation, the cantional court 
Amsterdam
1988
 held that he was bound to evaluate this clause under Directive 93/13 and upheld the 
claim of the user to mitigate the penalty clause to an extent that it would not constitute an unfair term 
under article 6:233 BW. The judge explicitly referred to the Directive and CJEU case law, but he did 
not refer to foreign decisions.
1989
  
Similarly, the court of appeal Amsterdam
1990
 upheld a clause in an accommodation contract 
that imposed a fine on the tenant in cases of illegal subletting. The court held that damages arising 
from illegal subletting is difficult to determine, which entails that it will not be evaluated whether the 
clause obliges the consumer to pay a disproportional amount of damages, as defined in the Annex to 
the Directive. Moreover, as the clause aims to prevent illegal subletting, it should be sufficiently high to 
have a preventive effect, which entailed that the mitigation imposed by the cantonial court was 
reversed.  
 
 Other decisions do not follow the Hoge Raad and inconsistency has developed. 
 
For example, the cantonial court Haarlem
1991
 held a penalty clause unfair as the provider of a credit 
card had not limited the amount of the penalty in the contract. Article 6:94 BW was not invoked. The 
decision of the court refers to CJEU case law, but not to the decision of the Hoge Raad.  
Similarly, the court of appeal ‘s-Gravenhage
1992
 held that a clause obliging the consumer to 
pay 50% of the invoice by way of compensation for cancellation was unfair. The court considered that 
the clause was a penalty clause in the sense of article 6:91 BW that was included in the list in the 
Annex to Directive 93/13, while it was not apparent that the seller had alerted the consumer on the 
possibility that 50% of the invoice would be charged if the consumer cancelled the contract. Notably, 
the court does not refer to the previous decision of the Hoge Raad, nor does it follow the approach set 
out by the Hoge Raad by limiting the amount of the fine to an amount that is considered reasonable 
under article 6:94 BW.  
This line is also visible in ADR decisions. Thus, the Board,
1993
 with regard to a clause that 
fixed the costs of the consumer on 15% of the contract price, did not hold the contract ineffective, but 
mitigated the clause. This decision is in contrast to previous case law,
1994
 although the mitigation of the 
amount that is to be paid to the consumer may be in accordance with the case law form the Hoge 
Raad, which may however turn out to be incorrect, depending on the decision of the CJEU on the 
cases referred to it by the court of appeal Amsterdam. 
 
 Generally, however, a consistent approach does not become visible. Some cases 
seem particularly problematic. 
 
A particularly problematic decision is the decision of the court of appeal ‘s-Gravenhage
1995
 upheld an 
exclusion clause that fell under article 6:237 BW, holding that the clause excluding the liability of the 
landlord for damages arising from a leakage in the flat over the flat of the tenant was a clause that was 
often used in contracts for accommodation, while tenants could insure themselves against these kinds 
of damages. Arguably, this evaluation is reminiscent of the evaluation under article 6:233 sub a BW 
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that takes as a starting point the mutual apparent interests of parties at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract. However, the court explicitly – and incorrectly – holds that this article (which it curiously 
indicates as article 7A:233 BW) is not yet applicable, even though it considers article 6:237 BW to be 
applicable. The court subsequently finds that the argument of the landlord that tenants can easily 
insure themselves against the damage, as well as the fact of ‘common knowledge’ that tenants 
frequently insure themselves, sufficiently rebuts the assumption that the clause is unfair. However, a 
correct evaluation under article 6: 237 sub h BW arguably would have taken the question whether the 
tenant had in fact insured himself for this damage because he was aware that the landlord had 
excluded liability in order, for example, to maintain a low rent, as a starting point, which is not the case. 
Arguably, it can be doubted whether this decision is in accordance with the Directive. 
The decision of the district court Almelo
1996
 is also problematic in the light of the Directive. The 
court upheld the declaration that acceptance of this form entailed that the consumer has received the 
STC’s as it constituted a private act (‘onderhandse akte’) in the sense of article 157 Rv. Later 
decisions have not followed this decision, and characterized similar clauses as clauses falling within 
the scope of article 6:236 sub k BW that were considered unfair.
1997
 With regard to the dissolution 
clause, according to which the rights of consumer were dissolved unless he brought a complaint within 
a specific period – which the consumer had not done – the district court Almelo moreover held that the 
clause was negotiated between travel organisations and a consumers’ organisation, while the 
consumer had insufficiently established that the mutual apparent interests of parties brought about 
that the clause was unfair. The court does not consider article 6:237 BW, although the clause may well 
fall within the scope of article 6:237 sub h BW. This oversight is unfortunate, because it overlooks that 
if the clause would have fallen within the scope of this article, this would have entailed that the travel 
organisation would have to prove that the clause was fair.  
 
 These decisions are moreover contradicted by other decisions from lower courts 
 
The district court Amsterdam,
1998
 referring to CJEU case law, rejected a clause that declared that the 
consumer had received the STC’s of its own motion, holding that the clause fell under article 6:236 
sub k BW.  
The cantonial court Oud Beijerland
1999
 held that a clause that stated that the consumer had 
received text of clauses did not in fact prove this, in accordance with article 157 Rv, as it concerned a 
clause that fell under article 6:236 sub k BW. The consumer had challenged the statement of the 
provider that he had received the STC’s, but had not, in so many words, challenged the clause that 
stipulated that he had received the STC’s.  
The cantonial court Heerlen
2000
 similarly rejected this clause as it concerned a clause that fall 
under article 6:236 sub k BW. Notably, the consumer in this case had expressly challenged the 
fairness of this clause.  
The district court Utrecht
2001
 held a similar declaration invalid on the same grounds.  
 
 Similarly problematic decisions also become visible.  
 
The cantonial court Tiel
2002
 upheld a clause automatically renewing a subscription trial. The court 
decided that article 6:236 sub j BW stipulated that clauses renewing a contract for more than one year 
were unfair, and article 6:237 sub l BW indicated that clauses stipulating a termination period of more 
than three months were presumed unfair. As the clause did not have this effect, it was upheld.  
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The judge interpreted articles 6:236 and 237 BW a contrario, holding that clauses that do not 
fall under these articles are not unfair. It can be doubted whether this interpretation is in accordance 
with article 6:233 sub a BW and the aim of these rules to increase consumer protection. 
 
 This decision is in contrast with  other decisions. 
 
Other decisions already held the automatic extension of contracts was unfair under article 6:233 sub a 
BW pior to the amendment of the law.
2003
 
Accordingly, the cantonial court Rotterdam,
2004
 expressly referring to the Annex to the 
Directive, held that a clause automatically extending a test subscription, which had only been used 
during the first week, was ineffective. Interestingly, the user of STC’s indicated that the effects of the 
clause automatically renewing the contract may have been unfair towards the consumer in this case.  
 
 In other cases, courts apparently do not find sufficient guidance in the decisions from 
the Hoge Raad.  
 
The court of appeal Amsterdam
2005
 recognises that Directive 93/13 may be applicable and accordingly 
has referred questions to the CJEU. In response to these questions, the CJEU
2006
 has held that the 
landlord in this case fell within the scope of the definition in the Directive that is applicable to contracts 
between professionals and consumers, The CJEU further emphasised the ex officio obligation of 
courts to assess unfair terms of their own motion and subsequently considered the procedural 
autonomy of Member States, the principle of equality and the effectiveness of Union law. Particularly, 
the CJEU decided that the Directive consists of mandatory law, and according to the CJEU, it is of 
fundamental importance to the improvement of the standard of living within the Union.Consequently, 
national law implementing the Directive should be considered as rules of public policy. Thus, if national 
courts are bound to apply provisions of public policy of their own motion, national judges should also 
apply law implementing the Directive of their own motion. Moreover, Directive 93/13 has not enabled 
judges to mitigate clauses rather than hold these clauses ineffective. 
The decision from the courts of appeal Amsterdam shows considerable similarities with a 2012 
decision in which it upheld a penalty clause in a contract for accomodation,
2007
 In its 2012 decision, the 
court of appeal Amsterdam has unfortunately not waited for the response from the CJEU, which 
arguably increases the chance that the decisions are not consistent with the answers provided by the 
CJEU.  
 
►The lack of guidance of the Hoge Raad on this point has enabled courts to develop 
diverging approaches that may undermine predictability and consistency and perhaps, it may 
have decreased the extent that smaller courts follow the Hoge Raad. However, in cases 
where the Hoge Raad has developed guidance, lower courts have not followed it, without 
referring to CJEU decisions that justify not following the Hoge Raad. Although the lack of 
interaction between the Hoge Raad and the CJEU may not directly be problematic for private 
parties, it may undermine consistency if CJEU decisions and Hoge Raad decisions are not 
easily reconcilable and lower courts do not consistently follow the CJEU2008 or the Hoge 
                                               
2003
 See further par. 11.3.3.5.  
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 Ktr. Rotterdam 2 August 2007, Prg. 2008, 37. Comp. also Ktr. Maastricht 16 July 2008, NJF 2008, 397, Ktr Hoorn 10 April 
2006, NJF 2007, 252 and Ktr. Zaandam 31 July 2008, Prg. 2008, 192. on a contract for a duration of two years. The court 
assumed that the consumer had meant to challenge the fairness of the clause that required the contract, entered into by phone, 
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was not capable of – could not be cancelled prematurely. The court decided this clause was unfair under article 6:237 sub k BW.   
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 Hof Amsterdam 8 March 2011, NJF 2011, 242, as well as Hof Amsterdam 13 September 2011, NJF 2011, 421.  
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 CJEU 30 May 2013 (Brusse and Garabito v Jahani BV), C-488/11, [2013] ECR, p. I-0. 
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 Hof Amsterdam 21 February 2012, BR 2012, 89. 
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 For example CJEU 14 June 2012 (Banco Español de Crédito v Calderón Camino), C-618/10, [2012] ECR, p. I-0. 
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Raad. However, lower courts have only seldomly referred to the CJEU decision rather than 
the Hoge Raad. 
 Yet the questions that have been referred to the CJEU mean that previous decisions 
from the Hoge Raad are incorrect and should be revised. Thus, the decisions of the Hoge 
Raad have undermined predictability. 
  
11.4.2.3. Conclusion on model lists 
Although the legislator has recognised the use of comparative insights in the development of 
model lists, and have benefitted from these insights, courts have not recognised 
interdependence. Interdependence has become especially visible between the Hoge Raad 
and the CJEU, both in cases where the role of the Hoge Raad is diminished as its decisions 
are difficult to reconcile with CJEU decisions and cases where the the Hoge Raad has 
provided some guidance. In these cases, the restrraint of lower courts in following the Hoge 
Raad can much less easily be explained by diverging CJEU decisions. Thus, does the role of 
the Hoge Raad decrease because of decisions that diverge from the CJEU, because of a 
lack of guidance, or otherwise?  
Possibly, as not many consumer cases come before the Hoge Raad, the extent to 
which the Hoge Raad can develop a consistent line in these cases may be limited. Even if 
this were the case, the current amount of cases diverging from the Hoge Raad may give rise 
to doubts whether a more active approach from the Hoge Raad will suffice.  
Referring more cases to the CJEU would not be likely to strengthen the role of the 
Hoge Raad as CJEU decisions are not easy to predict and the CJEU may not necessarily 
decide in a manner consistent with surrounding national law if it is insufficiently aware of 
relevant provisions. Moreover, the CJEU is also not well placed to decide in accordance with 
national practice and national legal views on justice. 
Arguably, recognising the interdependece between the Hoge Raad and the CJEU, as 
well as the need for lower courts to take into account one another’s decisions, would improve 
consistency and predictability. Moreover, referring more questions to the CJEU could in the 
long term benefit the responsive development of Directive 93/13, even though it might 
decrease predictability in individual cases. 
 
11.4.3. The evaluation of international and domestic business contracts  
This paragraph will consider whether actors, in the evaluation of international business 
contracts, have recognised that the initatives of other actors may also be relevant for the 
evaluation of clauses and interacted with these actors accordingly. How has this affected the 
extent to which blanket clauses strengthen the predictability, consistency, accessibility and 
responsiveness of the law of STC’s for international business contracts?  
Paragraph 11.4.3.1. will consider preliminary questions on the applicability of Dutch 
law on STC’s in international contracts. Paragraph 11.4.3.2. will turn to the evaluation of 
clauses under the Montréal Convention  (previolusly the Warsaw Convention) and paragraph 
11.4.3.3. will address the evaluation of clauses under the CMR. Paragraph 11.4.3.4. will 
consider the evaluation of CISG and Dutch law. Paragraph 11.4.3.5. will compare decisions 
in international cases to the evaluation of clauses in domestic business contracts. Paragraph 




11.4.3.1. Applicable regimes 
Which regime can be applicable to international contracts? Possible applicable regimes 
include the Montréal Convention, the CMR, the CISG as well as Dutch law.  
If Dutch law is applicable, article 6:247 BW stipulates that articles 6:231 et seq are not 
applicable for cases in which one of the parties is situated abroad, even if they have opted 
for Dutch law, which has recently been confirmed by the Hoge Raad. 2009  The Dutch 
legislator2010 aimed to prevent unpredictability and inconsistency by imposing the mandatory 
regime of articles 6:231 et seq BW on international contracts that were already subject to the 
regime of other legislators, ad also sought to facilitate international trade.  
The Dutch legislator was inspired by the English Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 
Consequently, international contracts are not evaluated under article 6:233 or 236 and 237 
BW. The debate in Parliament especially considered the necessity of article 6:247 BW 
against the background of Rome I, and decided to provide an exception for contracts with 
consumers in article 6:247 par. 4 BW. Notably, this rule diverges from article 6 Rome I, but it 
goes beyond article 6 par. 2 Directive 93/13 that stipulates that Member States shall ensure 
that consumers will not lose the protection conferred upon them through a choice of law for 
non-Member States. Therefore, article 6:247 par. 4 BW is permissible under article 8 
Directive. Thus, the European legislator, by inserting provisions on private international law in 
consumer contract law Directives, has provided Member States with possibilities to diverge 
from Regulation Rome I, which diminishes the extent to which the Regulation increases the 
accessibility of law. 
As international contracts are not evaluated under article 6:231 et seq BW, the 
question whether an international regime that provides an exhaustive regime that allows for 
the additional application of national provisions becomes less urgent. However, the question 
arises whether article 6:248 BW may still be applicable for the evaluation of international 
contracts. According to Hartkamp,2011 this article can be applied by the judge of his own 
motion, which would indicate that it is a provision of public policy.  
However, the suggestion that this provision is a provision of public policy is 
contradicted by decisions of the Hoge Raad that article 6:248 par. 2 BW is not applicable in 
addition to the Warsaw Convention2012 and the Hague Visby Rules as well as the IMCO 
International Convention Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Seagoing 
Ships. 2013 
This will generally be the case if international regimes expressly leave room for the 
additional application of national law, as is the case for the CISG, as article 4 sub a CISG 
expressly provides that the validity of contracts, or any provisions, is not a matter decided 
under the CISG, which entails that clauses in contracts falling under the CISG can be 
evaluated under Dutch law, in particular article 6:248 BW as article 6:231 et seq BW are not 
applicable to international contracts.2014  
The Hoge Raad2015 has emphasised that the question whether a clause is contrary to 
article 6:248 par. 2 BW, goes beyond the question whether invoking this clause is in 
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 HR 11 May 2012, NJ 2012, 318.  
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 Respectively HR 11 February 2008, NJ 2008, 505 and HR 4 November 1994, NJ 1996, 534. 
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 Comp. Rb. Arnhem 29 July 2009, RCR 2009, 69 where the court held that the lien of goods was irreconcilable with 
standards of fairness. Comp. also Rb. Rotterdam 31 March 2010, LJN BN2112.  
2015
 HR 15 October 2004, NJ 2005, 141. HR 27 April 2007, NJ 2007, 262 that concerned a penalty clause in a domestic 
business contract, emphasized a similarly restrictive approach towards article 6:94 BW. Comp. also the conclusion of A.-G. 
Wuisman before HR 18 February 2011, RvdW 2011, 288.  
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accordance with good faith. Instead, the court should indicate why good faith entails that 
invoking a clause is unacceptable in these circumstances.  
 
11.4.3.2. The evaluation of clauses under the Montréal Convention 
The Montréal Convention, previously the Warsaw Convention, aims to provide a 
comprehensive regime. Very few decisions of the Hoge Raad are available and it is therefore 
difficult to deduce a consistent approach from the case law of the Hoge Raad. The Hoge 
Raad 2016  has however held a clause that limited liability ineffective under the Warsaw 
Convention. The Hoge Raad referred to the legislative history of the Treaty and held that this 
clause was void as it was contrary to article 26 of the Convention. The conclusion of the A.G. 
expressly considered international materials as well as comparative law.  
 
11.4.3.3. The evaluation of clauses under the CMR 
The Hoge Raad has recognised the needs and preference of businesses and has interpreted 
the law in accordance with especially national preferences and views, but les swith 
international preferences.   
The Hoge Raad2017 has evaluated clauses opting for the CMR leniently, despite to 
wording of article 8:1102 par. 1 BW that aimed to prevent that parties would be surprised by 
this regime, 2018  in accordance with the preferences of businesses. Especially professional 
parties that have expressly referred to the CMR and that have done business with one 
another for various years should be assumed to be aware of the differences, and they should 
therefore not be required to copy out the reference to the CMR. 
The Hoge Raad has also interpreted the concept of ‘wilfull misconduct’ strictly,2019 in 
accordance with article 8:1108 BW, but also in accordance with national practice. 2020 
However, Dutch law diverges from the CMR with regard to the limitation of liability that can 
be imposed despite wilful misconduct. The carrier might therefore well prefer the application 
of Dutch law rather than the CMR.  
The Hoge Raad has not consistently referred to international materials. Haak2021 has 
noted that the line of the Hoge Raad has changed. Different from previous decisions, in 
which international materials were carefully considered (in the conclusions of the A.-G.’s),2022, 
it now suffices with referring to article 29 CMR.2023  
However, in more recent decisions, the conclusions of the A.G., in some cases 
expressly followed by the Hoge Raad, have expressly referred both to different linguistic 
versions and foreign decisions and literature.2024  
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 HR 12 February 1982, NJ 1982, 589, comp. the conclusion of A.G. Franx under par. 6.  
2017
 HR 10 August 2012, NJ 2012, 652, similarly HR 29 May 2009, NJ 2009, 245. HR 5 January 2001, NJ 2001, 391, see the 
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 Note to NJ 2001, 391. 
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 Comp. in particular also HR 29 May 2009, NJ 2009, 245. 
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Thus, although the Hoge Raad recognises the added value of foreign materials, this 
approach need not necessarily be continued in future decisions, which may limit the 
responsiveness of the law to the needs of internaitonal practice as well as predictability. 
 
11.4.3.4. The evaluation of clauses in international contracts under Dutch 
law 
The Hoge Raad’s  decisions show an increasing tendency to limit the effect of article 6:248 
BW in international commercial contracts, 2025 which may strengthen the predictability of the 
law on STC’s, in accordance with the preference of experienced parties in international trade. 
The restraint of the Hoge Raad is also in accordance with the view that good faith should 
play a limit role in cases where experienced parties in an equal bargaining position have 
been assisted by legal counsel.  
 
Accordingly, the Hoge Raad
2026
 upheld an exclusion clause that also excluded liability for serious 
breaches of contract by a shipyard, caused by contractors in the sense of article 6:170 BW. It 
concerned a clause between two branches regularly doing business with one another that is usual and 
not contrary to good faith.  
Similarly, the Hoge Raad
2027
 upheld an expiration clause in an international contract between 
a bank and a business. The Hoge Raad took article 6:140 par. 2 BW as a starting point for its decision 
and considered that the clause was not unfair, because article 6:236 sub g BW should be seen in 
correlation with this article. Although article 6:236 sub g BW is not applicable in international contracts, 
it was relevant as the Dutch bank had apparently taken this article as a starting point in the drafting of 
its STC’s.   
Furthermore, the Hoge Raad
2028
 established that an insurer is free to limit the terms of his 
policy, referring to a previous decision
2029
 in an international case where an insurer had also limited 





Interestingly, the Hoge Raad, though referring to business practices between parties2031 that 
may also be affected by foreign views2032 did not consistently refer to international or foreign 
materials in international cases, but decided the cases largely in line with domestic case law.  




 held that invoking an expiration clause in an international contract was 
unacceptable, because the parties invoking this clause had suffered a small amount of damage, which 
justified a proportional limitation of the claim.  
In his conclusion before the case, A.-G. Spier refers expressly to common law decisions that 
have also held that a complete dissolution of a contract party’s claim if parties neglect any incidents 
because of an expiration clause is rather drastic. For insurers, this option is also rather unpractical, as 
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 H. Schelhaas, ‘Pacta sunt servanda bij commerciële contracten’, NTBR 2008, 21,   
2026
 HR 31 December 1993, NJ 1995, 389. In his note to the case, Brunner finds that for the evaluation of contracts in 
accordance with good faith, the nature of the contract, and the societal position and relation between the parties are decisive.  
2027
 HR 23 February 2001, NJ 2001, 277. Comp. HR 14 May 2004, NJ 2006, 188, where invoking a clause on the dissolution of 
rights was held irreconcilable with standards of fairness as it was contrary to Dutch legal views on justice in the sense of article 
3:12 BW.   
2028
 HR 16 May 2008, NJ 2008, 284. 
2029
 HR 9 June 2006, NJ 2006, 326. 
2030
 HR 27 October 2000, NJ 2001, 200.  
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2033
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cautious policy holders might report each and every small incident, which imposes a considerable 
workload on insurers.  
 
Thus, the Hoge Raad has taken into account business practices and foreign views, but 
decided cases in accordance with national law. The emphasis on business practices 
however entails that decisions are likely in accordance with business practices even if the 
Hoge Raad does not refer to international materials. 
  
11.4.3.5. The evaluation of domestic “black” and “grey” clauses under 
Dutch law 
Good faith is invoked in a considerable amount of business contracts,2034 but the Hoge Raad 




 may refer to article 3:12 BW that refers to legal views in society to establish 
whether a clause is contary to good faith under article 6:248 par. 2 BW. The Hoge Raad may also 
refer to surrounding law, such as the principles of good administration, in this case in the evaluation of 
a contract between a business and a municipality.   
Similarly, the Hoge Raad
2036
 held that a clause that stipulates that rights to compensation of 
the insured expire after a year is contrary to good faith under article 6:248 BW if the insurer does not 
warn the insured that he will invoke the expiration of the claim. The Hoge Raad also refers to article 
3:12 BW and refers to the council that handles dispute resolution for the Dutch Association of Insurers 
to determine these views. The Hoge Raad finds that if this council considers a practice to be 
detrimental to the reputation of insurance, that practice is likely to also be contrary to good faith.  
In some cases, the Hoge Raad
2037
 has upheld the decision that invoking a clause (in this 
decision an exclusion clause) was contrary to article 6:248 par. 2 BW, pointing to the extensive factual 
circumstances that the court of appeal had considered in its decisions. Wessels
2038
 has criticized 
decisions of the Hoge Raad that held that invoking clauses that undermined the main terms of the 
contract were contrary to good faith. 
 
For domestic business contracts, articles 6:236 and 237 BW are not applicable. The decision 
of the legislator to exempt domestic business contracts from these clauses was based on 
experiences by foreign legislators that had also opted to exempt clauses in business 
contracts from evaluation under black or grey lists.2039 Moreover, article 6:235 BW further 
limits possibilities for some business to invoke the avoidability of STC’s under article 6:233 
sub a BW.  
Generally, the Hoge Raad has shown restraint in allowing articles 6:236 and 6:237 
BW to influence the evaluation of clauses in domestic business contracts under article 6:233 
sub a BW.  
 
Thus, the Hoge Raad
2040
 showed restraint in a case where the court of appeal had referred to article 
6:236 BW in its decision that invoking these clauses was contrary to good faith. The Hoge Raad
2041
 
also showed restraint in a case where the court of appeal held that an exclusion clause was contrary 
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to good faith, referring to article 6:237 BW. Lower courts
2042
 seem, on occasion, to adopt somewhat 
less restraint towards the indirect effect of articles 6:236 and 237 BW, although this does not mean 
that they decide cases in accordance with the Directive.
2043
 The indirect effect of articles 6:236 and 
237 BW depends on the contract party invoking the avoidability and the indirect effect of articles 6:236 
and 237 BW. It has been argued that indirect effect should be allowed if legal persons invoking it are 




Interestingly, the approach of the BGH on this matter is well-developed, but the Hoge Raad 
has not referred to German developments. 
 
Thus, the Hoge Raad has referred to business practices and non-state actors initiatives in 
evaluating whether a clause is unfair, which will not often be the case. In turn, this benefits 
the predictability of the law. Moreover, the restraint of the Hoge Raad may enhance the 
ability of contract parties to negotiate on STC’s and subsequently rely upon these clauses, in 
accordance with predictability.  
 
11.4.3.6. Conclusion on the evaluation of clauses in international contracts 
Decisions of the Hoge Raad do not reveal a clear approach towards foreign and international 
materials. The Hoge Raad has recognised the added value of foreign insights and 
international materials to determine parties’ expectations and business practice, both in 
cases decided under internaitonal regimes and under Dutch law, which is beneficial for the 
responsiveness of the law to international trade. That does not mean that the Hoge Raad 
consistently refers to these materials, and the use of these materials may be difficult to 
predict.  
Moreover, the Hoge Raad decided international cases in accordance with national 
law, which may benefit consistency as well as the responsiveness of the law to national 
practice and national legal views on justice. If national law however differs from international 
law, this may diminish the responsiveness of the law to international trade. 
 
11.4.4. Conclusion on blanket clauses 
Have actors in the development of the law on STC’s through blanket clauses adequately 
recognised interdependence and have they interacted accordingly? How has that affected 
the extent to which article 6:233 sub a BW improves the predictability, consistency, 
accessibility and responsiveness of the law on STC’s?  
Although especially the Dutch legislator has recognised the added value of 
comparative law, interdependence between Dutch and European actors has not been 
recognised as such. As a result, Dutch actors have not sought to limit the extent to which 
European actors may influence the drafting and interpretation of blanket clauses or model 
lists to help the predictable and consistent development of the law through blanket clauses. If 
European actors gains more competence to draft, amend or interpret blanket clauses, the 
extent to which national blanket clauses may contribute to the responsiveness of the law 
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diminishes. The extent to which model lists support the predictable and consistent 
interpretation of blanket clauses, as well as the accessibility of the law, may also diminish as 
overlapping lists develop. 
The interdependence between the CJEU and the Hoge Raad has also not adequately 
been recognised. Consequently, the restraint of the Hoge Raad in referring questions to the 
CJEU and the inconsistency of its decisions with CJEU decisions, and possibly the Directive, 
have undermined the role of the Hoge Raad, which in turn has aggravated the development 
of inconsistent and unpredictable case law from lower courts.  
The development of inconsistent and unpredictable case law may however not only 
be attributed to the restraint of the Hoge Raad but also to the lack of interaction between and 
from Dutch courts that is not visible in the German legal order.  
Nevertheless, these developments have not been addressed in the reform of 
Directive 93/13. Questions that have arisen from the development of the law on STC’s in the 
German legal order, in particular the allocation of competences between courts in the 
interpretation of national law implementing Directive 93/13, and the obligation of legislators to 
implement the model list in the Annex to the Directive, have also not been considered in the 
Dutch legal order. Thus, the lack of interaction between national and European actors may 
decrease the responsive development of Directive 93/13. 
  Notwithstanding the use of comparative law by the legislator, neither the Hoge Raad 
nor lower courts take into account foreign decisions in the evaluation of clauses under 
articles 6:233 sub a BW or article 6:236 and 237 BW. However, lower courts and the Hoge 
Raad have recognised the added value of foreign materials in decisions under international 
regimes.  
The differences in the approach may be explained by the easier availability of foreign 
decisions under the CISG. Also, especially for decisions in lower courts, the relative 
straightforwardness of cases that do not require referral to the CJEU or to foreign materials 
may be a reason for less referral. Moreover, the evaluation of clauses under articles 6:231 et 
seq BW concerns the interpretation of national law, and referral to foreign cases may lessen 
the consistent development of the law on STC’s by national law as well as the development 
of the law in accordance with national practice and national legal views on justice. The use of 
foreign materials may also lessen the predictability of law if there is no consistent approach 





What principles have played a role in the development of the law on STC’s, have these 
principles provided a starting point for interaction between actors and how has that affected 
the extent to which principles have contributed to the predictability, accessibility, consistency 
and responsiveness of the law on STC’s?  
In particular, this paragraph will consider three principles that have played an 
important role in the development of the law on STC’s: 
 
1) The principle of good faith, or fairness, visible in article 6:233 sub a BW 
2) The principle of consumer protection 
3) The principle of party autonomy, which, in Dutch reasoning, shows remarkable 
similarities with the Richtigkeitsgewähr.  
. 
Paragraph 11.5.1. will consider principles underlying Dutch law2045 and paragraph 11.5.2. will 
point out in which ways the development of Dutch law converges with the development of 
Directive 93/13 and paragraph 11.5.3 will ask in which ways the development of Dutch law 
diverges from the development of Directive 93/13. Paragraph 11.5.4. will end with 
conclusions.    
 
11.5.1. The development of the Dutch law on STC’s on the basis of principles 
The development of articles 6:231 et seq BW was based on principles of good faith, 
consumer protection and party autonomy. 
Nieuwenhuis2046 finds that because the unequal position of contract parties and the 
resulting prevalence of one party, good faith obliges the party drafting STC’s to take in 
accordance the legitimate interests of contract parties. Accordingly, in the evaluation of 
STC’s, the position of parties plays a role. This was already decided by the Hoge Raad2047 in 
a judgment preceding the BW. The legislator2048 remarked that then draft article 6:233 sub a 
BW did not aim to provide different criteria, and noted that German law had developed 
efficient control on the basis of good faith in article 242 BGB. Article 6:233 sub a BW 
therefore includes that the question whether a clause is unfair should be decided in 
accordance with the way they have been drafted, the mutual recognisable interests of parties 
as well as other relevant circumstances, which include the capacity of parties.2049   
Moreover, consumer protection has also played a role in the development of articles 
6:231 et seq BW that were developed also against the background of consumer protection. 
However, the protection of STC’s is not limited to consumers but instead takes the position of 
the party subjected to STC’s as a starting point.  
Notably, Nieuwenhuis 2050  finds that the unequal position of contract parties with 
regard to STC’s is situated in the ‘occupation’ of private autonomy by one contract party – an 
idea in accordance with the principle of Fremdbestimmung. Accordingly, in the discussion in 
Parliament, one of the underlying ideas was that parties subjected to STC’s should be 
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protected, as parties will only exceptionally have the possibility to influence the content of 
STC’s and generally are unfamiliar with the content of STC’s. This meant that not only 
consumers could be subjected to unfair terms – businesses, depending on their bargaining 
position, could also be exposed.2051  
However, negotiations on STC’s may indicate that a clause is not unfair, as 
recognised in article 6:233 sub a that stipulates that one of the circumstances relevant for the 
evaluation under this article is the way in which a clause has been drafted. This is in 
accordance with the idea of Richtigkeitsgewähr. However, the Hoge Raad2052 has since ruled 
that this limitation aimed to prevent the introduction of the iustum pretium doctrine that would 
oblige judges to evaluate whether the main terms of the contract were sufficiently balanced.  
Clearly, the principles may show significant overlap. Accordingly, business dealing 
with parties in weak bargaining positions, especially consumers, may not impose their 
conditions on these parties but rather should take the interests of these parties into account, 
in accordance with the idea of good faith. Parties in stronger positions, especially 
international businesses, are not illogically considered to be in less need than consumers. 
Theoretically, the idea that “strong” consumers are not protected as the court may take into 
account that a consumer had a realistic opportunity to influence the STC’s is possible, 
although the legislator considered this possibility as rather unlikely: even if a consumer is in a 
strong bargaining position, he will generally contract over a matter only once, while the user 
of STC’s is typically a repeat player, who may also simply choose to contract on the basis of 
his STC’s or not at all, regardless of the resources and expertise of the consumer.2053   
Thus, these principles have played an important role in the development of the law on 
STC’s. The legislator has taken these principles, which formed a starting point for the 
development of German law, as a source of inspiration.   
 
11.5.2. Principles underlying the law on STC’s: similarities  
Various similarities with regard to the principles of good faith and consumer protection 
become visible the law on STC’s at the national and European level. 
 
1)  Both at the national and European level, good faith play a central role in the 
assessment of clauses. 
Thus, like the Dutch and German legislator, the European legislator takes good faith as a starting point 
that enables for an overall evaluation of the interests involved in the contract, although it is not 
uncontroversial whether this concept should be interpreted uniformly.  
 
2) Dutch and European law has developed against the background of consumer 
protection. 
Although article 6:233 sub a BW is also applicable more broadly, it has become especially relevant for 
the evaluation of clauses in consumer contracts. Interestingly, despite the weaker position of 
consumers, the European legislator has also recognized the added value of negotiations between 
stakeholder groups and may therefore also consider the possibilities for collective negotiations on 
STC’s in consumer contracts. Both the Dutch and the European approach are more lenient towards 
STC’s in business contracts. 
 
 
                                               
2051
 Parl GS (Inv 3, 5, and 6), p. 1452-1453, 1455.   
2052
 HR 19 September 1997, NJ 1998, 6.  
2053
 Parl. GS (Book 6), p. 1496. 
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3) Both the Dutch and European legislator has recognised the added value of the use of 
STC’s. 
 
Thus, these basic ideas underpin both national law and Directive 93/13. 
 
11.5.3. Principles underlying the law on STC’s: divergences  
Differences between the development of the law on STC’s at the national level and the 
European level also exist:    
 
1) The principle of consumer protection does not justify the conclusion that the 
development of the acquis is based on the principle of protection of weaker parties. 
 
2) The principle of private autonomy is also recognised at the European level, but the 
European legislator has not referred to the iustum pretium doctrine. Instead, the 
European legislator held that the protective aim of the Directive allows for extending 
judicial evaluation of STC’s to the main contract terms.2054  
  
However, these differences however do not mean that these principles cannot form a starting 
point of interaction between actors. 
  
11.5.4. Conclusion on principles underlying the law on STC’s  
Thus, principles may form a starting point of interaction between actors, and princuiples 
underlying one set of rules may inspire other actors in developing the law, although that does 
not mean that these laws will develop similarly. The differences between principles 
underlying the law, or the different weight that is attached to these principles, or the different 
role that principles play in the development of the law, need not stand in the way of 
interaction or common developments on the law of STC’s throughout Europe.  
However, although principles can form a starting point for interaction, they have not 
visible improved the quality of the law on STC’s. However, the extent to which general 
principles can contribute to the responsive development of the law on STC’s is limited as 
different principles play a role in the development of the law on STC’s at the national and the 
European level. This is generally not visible as the development of Dutch law and the acquis 
on the basis of general principles does not show dramatic differences that stand in the way of 
interaction.
                                               
2054




11.6. Conclusion on the development of the law on STC’s through national 
techniques 
Generally, the development of private law takes place through codification, blanket clauses, 
and general principles. However, other actors also develop private law and therefore, the 
ability of actors to safeguard benchmarks of predictability, accessibility, consistency and 
responsiveness through these techniques has been diminished. Because actors have not 
taken into account their dependence on other actors in ensuring that private law meets these 
benchmarks, they have not interacted with other actors accordingly, which has undermined 
the preddictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness of European private law.  
In the law on STC’s, interdependence has clearly developed, which means that 
the extent to which actors can ensure the comprehensiveness of the law on STC’s 
through the use of national techniques has become limited.  
 
Particularly, this means: 
1) The development of the acquis has limited the extent to which national actors may ensure 
the predictable, accessible, consistent and responsive development of the law on STC’s in 
the BW. Moreover, the extent to which codifications can deal with the development of 
international trade and guarantee predictability, consistency, accessibility and 
responsiveness as treaties are developed, becomes limited.  
2) The extent to which blanket clauses may contribute to the consistent and responsive 
development of the law on STC’s has been diminished because of the development of 
blanket clauses and other relevant measures, as well as international sources of law that 
may affect the interpretation of blanket clauses. 
3) The extent to which general principles can contribute to the responsive development of 
the law on STC’s is limited as different principles play a role in the development of the law 
on STC’s at the national and the European level.  
 
It follows that, theoretically, in order to ensure that private law develops in accordance with 
these benchmarks, actors must recognise interdependence and interact with each other 
accordingly. In particular, interaction between European and national state actors is 
necessary. Also, to ensure that the Dutch law on STC’s is in accordance with the needs of 
international trade, interaction between the Dutch legislator and foreign legislators as well as 
non-state actors is necessary. Interaction between Dutch courts, foreign courts, European 
actors and international actors is also necessary.  
 The Dutch law on STC’s is not known as a typical success story, or a failure, 
but it has experienced some problems. Can these problems be traced to a lack of 
interaction? Paragraph 11.6.1. will consider whether this is the case in the implementation 
of Directive 93/13. Paragraph 11.6.2. will discuss the law on STC’s and international trade 
and paragraph 11.6.3. will consider starting points for more and better interaction. 
 
11.6.1. The law on STC´s and the implementation of Directives 
Actors have not recognised interdependence in the use of national techniques. 
Nevertheless, the development of the acquis did prompt the Dutch legislator to consider the 
development of separate laws. This suggestion did however not mean that the legislator 
reconsidered the development of the BW as such or considered ways to compensate for the 
diminished ability of national techniques to ensure the comprehensibility of the law on STC’s 
and private law more generally. Rather, the brief suggestion to develop the law on STC’s 
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separately demonstrated that, at least for central areas of private law, the development of 
separate legislation would severely complicate the development of the law on STC’s.  
Thus, even if actors have not considered interdependence, this might have 
made little difference, as it would and should not have led to techniques that would have 
replaced or undermined codifications, blanket clauses, and general principles. Notably, the 
acquis only stipulates a relatively small part of private law compared to the bulk of private law 
that is still stipulated, apparently satisfactorily, in the BW.  
Thus, a choice for different techniques might also have important consequences for a 
large part of private law. However, especially in the light of the more horizontal approach 
visible in the acquis, maintaining the role of codes becomes more rather than less important. 
Interaction becomes more important to maintain the extent to which national techniques 
ensure the predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness and actors 
developing the law on STC’s, and private law more generally, need to take the need for 
interaction, and the need to ensure the development of private law in accordance with these 
benchmarks, into account.  
Dutch law on STC’s was not gradually developed, as was the case in the German 
legal order; instead, the law on STC’s was established by the BW and accordingly, it was not 
clear how these rules would develop in practice. Nevertheless, the Dutch legislator adopted a 
defensive approach in maintaining the law on STC’s and assumed that it was of good quality. 
Yet Dutch courts have not carefully maintained the quality of the law on STC’s by carefully 
following the Hoge Raad and one another’s decisions. Rather, the approach of some courts 
seems directed at consumer protection, while some courts seem stubbornly opposed to 
ruling in favour of consumers. Perhaps because of these differences, the approach of Dutch 
actors in the development of Directives is not as visibly aimed at safeguarding the quality of 
the law on STC’s. The obligations between European and national actors therefore 
seem less oddly divided than is the case in the German legal order.  
The relatively abrupt introduction of the law on STC’s also made it considerably more 
difficult to defend that the acquis should develop in accordance with national law. Fortunately, 
however, the German legislator did have a prominent role in the European debate and Dutch 
law was inspired by German law. Interaction did not take place in the light of 
interdependence, but it did have as aim to limit consequences for newly established law. 
Nevertheless, some weaknesses in the law on STC’s and in the interaction 
between actors have become apparent and have reinforced one another. Particularly,  
the debate on the implementation of the Directive was limited and in later harmonisation 
initatives, Dutch actors barely participated in European debate preceding Directives. This 
limtis the extent to which Dutch actors can influence the development of Directives. After 
Directives have been established, the debate on implementation also remains limited. 
Legislators and courts have subsequently adopted restraint in implementing and applying the 
Direcive. This approach has however less successful than in the German legal order for 
several reasons: 
 
i) The restraint of the Dutch legislator went further than other legislators and attracted the 
attention of European actors. 
ii) Dutch law was not as well developed as German law. Weaknesses that had not been 
sufficiently addressed in legal practice became problems as the acquis developed and the 
CJEU started to play a role. 
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iii) The restraint of courts also entailed that courts did not compensate for shortcomings of 
the law that became apparent in practice and that courts did not look to one another, 
particularly the Hoge Raad, for guidance, but rather the CJEU. 
That does not mean that the role of the CJEU is problematic as such. Rather, Dutch experience shows 
that European actors may also prompt development of the law in accordance with national legal views 
on justice.  
iv) Weaknesses in the law on STC’s were also not improved by harmonisation.  
The implementation of Directives 93/13, 2000/31 and 2006/123 did not prompt the Dutch legislator to 
critically reconsider its laws after harmonisation had been established. When the 1993 Directive was 
established, insufficient time had passed to allow for a critical evaluation of national law. However, the 
development of and the difficult implementation of subsequent Directives, as well as the suggestions 
for the reform of Directive 93/13, also did not prompt reconsideration, despite suggestions to adapt 
national law.  
 
Moreover, Dutch courts have taken a much less active approach in the development of the 
law on STC’s than German courts, which has resulted in inconsistency and unpredictability.   
The different approach of German and Dutch courts may also be traced to the 
development of the law on STC’s by German courts, which simultanously makes it less likely 
that lower courts will change their approach and start referring to the CJEU. Perhaps, the 
lack of interaction between courts may also be traced to the initial judicial development of the 
German law on STC’s. The prominent role of the courts in the development of the law on 
STC’s may have instilled a habit in German lower courts to pay more attention to other lower 
courts and the BGH. However, it is also possible that German lower courts simply adopt a 
more thorough approach. In other areas where Dutch courts have played an active approach 
in the development of the law, Dutch lower courts refer to the Hoge Raad rather than 
decisions from other lower courts. 
 In contrast, Dutch courts show less restraint in referring questions to the CJEU. An 
explanation for this difference may be that Dutch courts were prompted by the CJEU that 
clearly and directly imposes obligations while guidance from the Hoge Raad was less 
available. 
Therefore, the lack of interaction has led to inconsistency and unpredictability, 
which is likely also not in accordance with the needs and preference of businesses. 
 Unfortunately, also, the approach of the Dutch judiciary may have limited the 
extent to which article 6:233 sub a BW can reduce the need for legal reform. 
Accordingly, German law has not been reformed, although this can probably also be traced 
to the emphasises on restraint by the German legislator. 
Notably, restraint in interacting with other actors need not always be 
detrimental. Both German and Dutch courts have adopted restraint in referring to foreign 
materials in deciding cases under respectively articles 305 et seq BGB and articles 6:233 
sub a BW. Restraint may be in the interest of predictability and consistency, as well as 
responsiveness to national legal views on justice and national practice.  
However, in some instances, referral to foreign decisions could have prompted courts to 
consider the evaluation of clauses mroe critically. 
 
In particular, the Hoge Raad
2055
 upheld a decision from the court of appeal, stating that the discretion 
of the judge to mitigate a penalty clause under article 6:94 BW was relevant for assessing whether the 
penalty clause was unfair. This approach can be contrasted with the approach of the BGH,
2056
 and the 
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German controversy on ‘Geltungserhaltende Reduktion’ and ‘ergänzende Auslegung’ that emphasises 
that changing STC’s that are unfair to STC’s that are barely allowed, rewards users of STC’s that are 





In the long term, moreover, the lack of interaction may entail that relevant points are 
not addressed in the reform of Directives. 
 
i) The obligation of courts to assess clauses of their own motion 
ii) The allocation of competences between the CJEU and national courts to interpret blanket 
clauses 
Both the BGH and the Hoge Raad have cited Freiburger Kommunalbauten to underpin national courts’ 
competence to assess the fairness of contract terms and have not regarded subsequent CJEU case 
law.   
However, even if the reform of Directive 93/13 leads to more clarity on the competence with 
regard to the interpretation of article 3 Directive, this does not mean that a similar allocation of tasks 
can be assumed for the interpretation of blanket clauses in other Directives – for example, the 
allocation of tasks may differ depending on the degree of harmonisation pursued by a Directive.   
iii) The implementation of Directive 2000/31 and Directive 2006/123 
iv) The obligation of the legislator to implement the model list in the Annex to Directive 93/13. 
The Hoge Raad has provided more clarity on the status of the model list in the Annex to Directive 
93/13. It would be interesting to see whether the view of the Hoge Raad would be shared by the CJEU 
or by European actors in the reform of Directive 93/13. 
 
Consequently, the lack of interaction between national and European actors may lead 
to a circle: because of a lack of interaction, reformed Directives do not adequately respond 
to national experiences, whcih increases the chances that legislators and courts will adopt 
restraint in implementing and applying national law implementing Directive, and so on. 
Moreover, the restraint of especially the Hoge Raad in referring to foreign cases 
entails that questions that have been raised in the German legal order and that may 
affect the role of actors and the development of the law on STC’s are completely 
overlooked. In particular, questions on the allocation of competences between the CJEU 
and national courts in the interpretation of blanket clauses are not considered in Dutch 
debate. It might alkso have been interesting for Dutch actors to discuss the idea of the 
Richtigkeitsgewähr. 
  
11.6.2. The development of the law on STC´s and international trade 
In the development of the law on STC’s, Dutch actrs have recognised the need to take into 
account the preferences of international actors and the value of comparative insights, 
especially insights from successful regimes.  
German and European actors have similarly recognised the added value of 
comparative law. The expertise and time invested in the development of especially 
codifications may lead to lengthy drafting processes that diminish the willingness of national 
legislators to subsequently amend the law. Notably, the European legislator has a different 
perspective, as legal comparison is also a way to discover divergences that stand in the way 
of the proper functioning of the internal market.  
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Interestingly, the points where Dutch law is most complicated and least accessible 
are the points where Dutch law has not followed German law – in particular, article 6:232 BW, 
the availability of STC’s, and the rules on unduly surprising or unfair clauses.  
 
Article 6:232 BW was adopted for sake of predictability, but it is not clear how it has contributed to 
predictability. Instead, the emphasis on the applicability and subsequent avoidability of clauses has led 
to tensions with European law and inconsistent case law. If clauses would not become part of a 
contract, if they have not been made sufficiently available, would this not mitigate these problems? 
Should the question whether clauses have been made sufficiently available not also be answered in 
accordance with general rules on STC’s? 
However, this suggestion does presuppose that Dutch law develops clearer rules on the 
availability of clauses. Filling the gap for rules on the availability of clauses in international cases would 
be necessary. Following the German rules on unduly surprising clauses in article 305c BGB would 
already add to clarity. 
Of course, it is possible that article 6:232 BW less visibly plays a role in enhancing 
predictability. German experiences however demonstrate that it is well possible to maintain 
predictability if causes are simply not included in contracts. 
 
Unfortunately, the Dutch legislator has also not been inspired by the restraint of the Germen 
legislator in amending the law on STC’s.  
However, at some points, Dutch law has not followed German law, and should 
continue to diverge. 
 
In particular, the definition of STC’s and the emphasis on clauses that have not been individually 
negotiated may have disadvantages in German law as it may motivate businesses to not negotiate on 
clauses. Notably, however, the distinction between clauses that have not been individually negotiated 
and STC’s is convincing. Also, Dutch law on battle of forms have not proven less or more successful 
than German law, where a specific rule has consciously not been established.   
Moreover, the existence of article 6:235 BW and the absence of an equivalent provision in the 
German legal order reflect different legal views on justice that are further reflected in German and 
Dutch case law and the German emphasis on the Richtigkeitsgewähr rather than consumer protection. 
Even if the role of art 6:235 BW is not very visible, and the extent to which it contributes to 
predictability is not clear, it should therefore be maintained. 
Moreover, article 6:214 BW, which, maybe, would have been well-placed in the German legal 
order, considering the exemption for VOB’s in article 310 BGB, remains a dead letter in the Dutch 
legal order and should be reconsidered.  
 
Yet it can be doubted whether problems can be attributed to the lack of interaction 
between the legislator and international and foreign actors. Notably, German law has 
developed over an extensive period of time, and it has slowly been refined by German courts 
that have accordingly taken a much more active role in motivating their decisions than Dutch 
courts. Subsequently, national case law could be taken as a starting point for the German 
legislator to draft legislation. 
Moreover, the approach of both Dutch and German courts in international business 
contracts reflect the thought that parties in international trade are in less need of protection 
than domestic parties.  
In accordance with the different approach of legislators, the approaches of the 
German courts and the Dutch courts towards the evaluation of clauses in international 
contracts under articles 307 BGB and article 6:248 BW are rather different. German courts 
have adopted a relatively lenient approach towards the evaluation of clauses in international 
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contracts decided under German law, the strict and well-developed standard in article 307 
BGB requires express motivation, for example in the form of international materials. This 
approach, for whatever reason, is however not reflected under CISG. Under the Dutch 
approach, justification is necessary for limiting the effect of clauses under article 6:248 par. 2 
BW, for example through international or foreign materials or business practices. Thus, 
perhaps, both German and Dutch courts recognise foreign and international materials as 
sources that may be used – among other materials – to underpin decisions requiring 
extensive motivation.  
Neither the BGH or the Hoge Raad has developed a consistent approach to the use 
of international and foreign materials, However, if the Hoge Raad had developed such an 
approach, it is not clear whether lower courts would have followed it, whereas this is more 
likely in the German legal order.  
However, the refusal of the Dutch legislator to reconsider the law on STC’s may 
have undermined the attractiveness of Dutch law in international trade. 
Moreover, German courts continue to adopt a more thorough and active approach to 
the development of the law on STC’s. This active approach has also helped the 
attractiveness of German law in international trade.  
A similar development is not visible in Dutch law. Although Duch courts show less 
restraint in referring to international and foreign materials, as well as soft laws, in cases 
under international regimes, this does not happen consistently and predictably. In some 
cases, confusion has become visible. Possibly, German commentaries have supported the 
careful decisions from German lower courts. Consequently, Dutch law on STC’s may 
develop less in accordance with international trade than international regimes. The lack of 
interaction between courts, international and foreign actors in cases decided under 
Dutch law does not strengthen the position of Dutch law in international trade. 
Also, the lack of interaction between actors may undermine the 
comprehensibility of the law on STC’s in international trade. The decreased interaction 
between courts can also be attributed to less decisions of the Hoge Raad that provide less 
guidance to lower courts to distinguish and apply potentially overlapping international and 
European regimes. Inaccessibility and inconsistency have developed as a result.  
 
11.6.3. More and better interaction 
How should the interaction between actors be adjusted? 
Dutch actors need to adjust the way they interact at the European level. Particularly, Dutch 
actors need to become aware of interdependence and pay much more attention to the use of 
techniques at the European level and the influence of the use of techniques on the 
development of private law at the national level.  
Moreover, the Dutch legislator and Dutch courts should interact more carefully with 





 have suggested more cooperation between the legislator, judiciary and 
other relevant actors is also possible. Increased cooperation between the legislator and the judiciary 
could contribute to the development of the law more generally, ensuring that relevant experiences and 
insights are taken into account in the legislative process.  
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For the law on STC’s, more cooperation between the legislator, the Hoge Raad, lower courts 
and the Board, as well as academics, and possibly, European and foreign actors may make actors 
more aware of relevant developments and problems arising in practice.  
This suggestion has also been inspired by the English Law Commission that contains 
members from legal practice, the judiciary, as well as academics. Theoretically, more cooperation with 
organisations that are to facilitate the enforcement of consumer law may prompt more enforcement of 
articles 6:231 et seq through collective redress, which enables the court, possibly the Hoge Raad, to 
set clearer guidelines. Decisions in collective redress may draw more attention from lower courts that 
may in turn be prompted to take decisions of the Hoge Raad and lower courts more carefully into 
account.  
 
The Dutch legislator should also consider national law much more critically. Future reform of 
Directive 93/13 could serve as a starting point for a critical reconsideration. More generally, 
the interaction between national and European actors should make actors more aware of 
national experiences in the implementation of Directives.  
Also, national practices should be considered in the light of European initiatives, and 
national actors should play a more active role in alerting European actors to relevant or 
interesting practices.  
 
In particular, Dutch ADR practices in consumer cases on STC’s should be carefully considered.
 
Currently, ADR decisions on consumer cases may contradict articles 6:231 et seq BW 
2059
 and diverge 
from the decisions of lower courts. Consistent publication of these decisions should be seriously 
considered, because the lack of publicity may limit parties’ ability to predict the outcome of a dispute 
and lead to inconsistent development of consumer law in these areas with general national private 
law.
2060
 A lack of publicitly is likely to disadvantage parties with little experience more than repeat 
players. Moreover, publicity may in this respect also serve as a control mechanism.
2061
 The lack of 
publicity may also mean that a large amount of cases does not contribute to the development of the 
law on STC’s, and the experiences of the Board and problematic cases remain invisible before they 
come before the courts.  
Other features of current ADR practices should also be reconsidered: Loos
2062
 convincingly 
argues that the restraint adopted under article 7:902 BW
2063
 is outdated and might lead to a breach of 
the obligation of national actors to correctly implement the Directive 93/13. Also, Snijders
2064
 has 
convincingly argued that changing the binding advice procedure into an arbitral procedure may offer 
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more legal guarantees with regard to the appointment and challenging of arbitrators.
2065
 In addition, 
the possibility to turn to ADR in cross-border cases is limited as the business to a contract has to be a 




Fortunately, Directive 2013/11 on ADR for consumer disputes obliges Member States to make 
several of these adjustments. In partticular, the Directive imposes some requirements on the 
independence of individuals handling disputes as well as the transparency of ADR systems, most of 
which seem to be already met by the Geschillencommissie. In addition, by allowing Member States to 
retain existing ADR systems, the European legislator prevents that an additional ADR system is 
established that is subsequently hardly used.  
However, the Directive does not require decisions to be published, and article 17 par. 4 
Directive stipulates that  the duty of cooperation between authorities is without prejudice to provisions 
on commercial and professional secrecy. Also, the Directive does not require that the procedure take 
the form of arbitration procedures, which may affect the cross-border enforcement of decisions, nor 
does the Directive consider the evaluation of ADR decisions by the courts.  
 
However, interaction between actors will not improve if the approach of Dutch and 
European actors is not changed. Although the view of Dutch actors is less narrow than the 
view of German actors, the current approach of both Dutch and European actors falls short 
of interaction. Rather than considering debate as something that should be “won”, and 
national political goals such as maintaining the level of consumer protection, or promoting 
maximum harmonisation, the aim of interaction should be to develop the law in a manner that 
is predictable, consistent, accessible and responsive. 
Although this may entail that the legislative procedure at the European level is 
considerably lengthened, more and better debate between all relevant actors that are 
suficiently representative is desirable. Arguably, more and better interaction may prevent that 
the application and the effect of Directives in practice remain invisible in the debate, or that 
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11.7. Additional and alternative techniques   
As Dutch actors have not generally recognised interdependence, they have not interacted to 
mitigate problems that can arise from interdependence. Similarly, actors have not sought to 
use techniques in addition or instead of currently used techniques. Although the use of 
techniques has not been considered in the context of the multilevel legal order and 
increasing interdependence between actors, new techniques have been developed, and 
techniques are usually combined.  
 The view of Dutch actors is not as narrow as the view of German actors that have 
stressed the status quo. The wider view is also visible in the participation of Dutch actors in 
European debate. Because of this wider view, less suggestions for additional or alternative 
techniques have been excluded beforehand. Accordingly, maximum harmonisation has not 
been rejected, despite the emphasis on the need for a high level of consumer protection, and 
suggestions for comitology have not been immediately rejected.  
The wider view of Dutch actors can be traced to two characteristics: Dutch actors 
have subjected the role of non-state actors to less restrictions and do not generally reject the 
development of alternative rgeulation because of potential Fremdbestimmung. Consequently, 
there is more room for experimentation. Notably, Dutch actors are less focussed on 
maintaining the status quo as a way to ensure that the quality of the law on STC’s remains 
high.  
Thus, this paragraph will focus on techniques that may contribute to the predictability, 
accessibility, consistency and responsiveness of European private law.  
This paragraph will not separately reconsider additional and alternative techniques at 
the European level that have already been considered in detail in the previous chapter, in 
particular the development of the CESL, model laws, and comparative research on STC’s. 
The development of collective bargaining will be considered as actors in the Dutch legal 
order are familiar with the use of collectively bargaining STC’s and concerns of 
Fremdbestimmung are less likely to arise. 
 The paragraph will however consider techniques if objections in the German legal 
order may entail that this technique may be more successful in the Dutch legal order.  
In particular, this paragraph will consider the following techniques:  
 
i) The use of comitology 
ii) The use of alternative regulation in the interpretation of blanket clauses  
iii) The introduction of a prejudicial procedure  
An equivalent of the prejudicial procedure will not be found in the German legal order, as the amount 
of case law in the German legal order makes such a procedure quite unneccesary.   
iv) The development of guidelines.  
Even though the development of guidelines at the national level has proven unsuccessful, the 
development of guidelines has been suggested at the national level and considering the current 
inconsistency and unpredictable, these suggestions should at least be considered.  
 
In contrast, this paragraph will not consider techniques that are not likely to contribute to the 
comprehensibility of European private law, such as the use of Regulations rather than 
Directives.2067 In addition, this paragraph will not consider the use of the OMC, even though 
                                               
2067 See previously par. 10.7. In addition, the question arises whether a Regulation would provide more clarity on the obligation 
of judges to address unfair terms ex officio and whether judges would be able to rely on previous case law or other sources in 
order to ensure that they decide cases in a consistent and predictable manner. Possibly, existing national case law already 
concerns the interpretation of harmonised law, and a Regulation may make clearer that it concerns European law rather than 
national law, which may prompt the judiciary to reconsider relying on the legislative history of articles 6:231 et seq BW in the 
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the OMC is less likely to be opposed in the Dutch legal order as the legislator supports 
regulatory competition, which could benefit Dutch law on several problematic points. 
However, the legislator has also managed to benefit from comparative law insights without 
the OMC. Arguably, the use of the OMC is not necessarily successful because of the 
weaknesses that have become apparent in the use of the OMC, in particular the limited circle 
of debate. The Dutch legislator has already managed quite well to gather information through 
limited consultations. This limitation has undermiend the inclusiveness of debate and the 
representativeness of actors. Rather than limiting debate, the debate should be widened. 
This paragraph will follow the order in which the use of additional and alternative 
techniques was discussed in chapter 8, as well as discuss the potential role of the DCFR. 
Accordingly, paragraph 11.7.1. will focus on techniques to support the legislative process. 
Paragraph 11.7.2. will consider the DCFR and paragraph 11.7.3. focus on techniques to 
support the extent to which blanket clauses can contribute to comprehensibility and 
paragraph 11.7.4. will turn to the introduction of collective bargaining and paragraph 11.7.5. 
will end with a conclusion.  
 
11.7.1. Techniques supporting the legislative process 
The use of consultations and impact assessments may well contribute to more and better 
debate in the development of the law on STC’s, which in turn may prompt actors to critically 
reconsider the law on STC’s and improve the law where necessary. 
A more consistent use of wider and more open consultations on European proposals, 
as well as the implementation of Directives once proposals have been accepted, could 
increase the participation of Dutch actors in the debate. More participation is beneficial as 
especially Dutch stakeholders have rarely directly participated in the debate at the European 
level. The participation of these actors may increase the chance that relevant insights are not 
overlooked in the debate at the European level, which should contribute to the 
responsiveness of the law.  
Notably, this does require that parties do not provide brief responses, but participate 
in debate and respond to one another’s comments, which currently does not seem to be the 
case in the European democratic process. Moreover, wider consultations may also contribute 
to the accessibility of the law.  
The use of consultations may be supported by the improved use of impact 
assessments from the European level. In particular, the improved use of impact assessments 
entail that proposals from the Commission would be critically considered, asking whether 
there is a need for harmonisation and reform, whether the measure suggested is the most 
suitable way of dealing with problems for the internal market or consumer protection, as well 
as other European policy aims, or whether other techniques are available that should be 
used in addition to or instead of proposed measures. The outcome of such criotical impact 
assessments may be considered with interest as the Dutch legislator is more inclined to 
leave room for bottom-up techniques. This general inclination may also be a reason for 
Dutch actors to prefer introducing a less far-going option first, before turning to harmonisation. 
The improved use of impact assessments may also lead to more carefully considered 
choices for a particular combination of techniques. 
Also, the use of impact assessments at the national level, possibly based on 
European consultations and impact assessments, may be more successful than in the 
                                                                                                                                                   
interpretation of these provisions. Moreover, a Regulation may prompt the Hoge Raad to adopt a more active approach towards 
the harmonised interpretation of the law, especially if sufficient information on foreign decisions are available,  
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German legal order. The Dutch legal order is not unfamiliar with empirical legal research that 
support or weaken debate in Parliament.2068 Notably, however, the Commission need not 
necessarily take additional impact assessments into account. The development of national 
impact assessments may also draw more attention to the use of techniques and the effect of 
the use of techniques at the European level on the development of national private law.  
 The improved use of networks and databases may further support more thorough 
debate, by establishing more contacts between actors from different legal orders and 
between actors from different levels.2069 This may encourage European actors to take note of 
discussions in national law. It may also encourage national actors to participate in European 
debate.  
Rather than developing additional networks, European actors should make use of 
well-established national networks and databases, as these networks and databases already 
have a considerable pool of expertise and experience and developing additional networks 
may make it more difficult to keep track of relevant initiatives and contacts. 
The improved use of databases, and the increased availability of foreign law 
decisions and relevant international materials might be more successful in the Dutch than in 
the German legal order as Dutch courts are less opposed to foreign insights. The confusion 
of lower courts in international cases however demonstrates an increased need for guidance 
and direction. Thus, networks and databases should not unlimitedly make new materials 
available – rather, structuring this information and making relevant decisions more eaily 
available.  
The improved use of databases could be strengthened by a more consistent 
approach of the Hoge Raad to the use of foreign, European and international materials and 
take a more active approach in developing guidelines to lower courts. 
Dutch actors may seek to make their legal system more accessible to foreign actors 
through the improved use of databases.2070 Especially for legal orders that use a language 
that is not easily accessible to all foreign actors, such as the Dutch legal orders, this may 
contribute to accessibility.  
If Dutch actors do not provide comparative insights in their legal system, 
pessimistically, this may limit the accessibility of Dutch law to foreign parties to the Belgian 
and optimistically some German, Swiss, and Austrian actors. Generally, however, potential 
inaccessibility may also be mitigated by the Centre of International Legal Cooperation 
(CILC)), a Dutch non-profit organisation supported by Dutch legal experts and practitioners 
that cooperates with foreign states in the development of private law.2071   
 Thus, the improved use of consultations, impact assessments, networks and 
databases may contribute to more and better interaction between actors.  
    
 
                                               
2068
 Legal sociological research on STC’s includes Gras, Standaardcontracten, een rechtssociologische analyse, 1979.   
2069
 Currently, for example, the Dutch Consumentenautoriteit is already involved in the International Consumer Protection and 
Enforcement Network (ICPEN), which in turn participates in the European Justice Forum (see 
http://europeanjusticeforum.org/faq/key-players/international-consumer-protection-and-enforcement-network.html), and 
participates with the OECD (see http://www.icpen.org/about.htm).   
2070
 R. Zimmerman,‘The Principles of European Contract law Contemporary manifestation of the old, and possible foundation for 
a new, European scholarship of private law’, in: F. Faust, G. Thüsing (eds.), Beyond borders: perspectives on international and 
comparative law, Carl Heymanns Verlag, p. 145 points to the commentary of D. Busch et al, (eds.) The Principles of European 
Contract Law and Dutch law: A Commentary, 2002. 
2071
 See for an overview of activities http://www.cilc.nl/?q=node/16. See also J.M Smits, ‘Import and export of legal models: The 
Dutch experience’, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 2003, p. 551-574. 
430 
 
11.7.2. The development of the DCFR 
Have actors adequately taken into account interdependence and interacted accordingly, and 
how has that affected the predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness of the 
law on STC’s.   
The previous chapter has argued that the DCFR diverges from the private law acquis 
and other soft laws in various respects, without clear or convincing justification for these 
divergences. This chapter will briefly discuss the differences of the DCFR from the acquis 
and other soft laws in paragraph 11.7.2.1. Paragraph 11.7.2.2. will consider the extent to 
which national experiences with the implementation of the acquis are reflected in the DCFR. 
Paragraph 11.7.2.3. will end with some concluding remarks.  
 
11.7.2.1. Divergences between the DCFR, the acquis, and other soft laws. 
The previous chapter has pointed to several differences and similarities: 
 
  the DCFR diverges from the acquis in several respects: in the definition of unfairness, 
the main terms of the contract, and the rule that an intransparent clause for that 
reason alone may be unfair. In these cases, the DCFR has – rightly so – not been 
followed. 
 
 In some cases, in particular with regard to the rules on making STC’s adequately 
available, rules should be included in the CESL, as is also the case under the DCFR. 
A model rule might have been especially valuable for the Dutch legal order, considering the 
implementation of Directive 2000/31 and Directive 2006/123. Unfortunately, the DCFR also does not 
consider the question whether STC’s have been made sufficiently available if they have been 
deposited at courts or trade registers. 
Dutch authors have pointed out that inconsistencies can also be seen in the acquis which 
could and should have been addressed by the DCFR. Knigge
2072
 has pointed to inconsistencies 
between Brussels I and the Directive, not only with regard to the fairness of jurisdiction clauses and 
article 23 Brussels I, but also with regard to the ex officio obligation and article 24 Brussels I. Moreover, 
questions on jurisdiction may arise after the implementation of Directive 2013/11 on ADR. Article 13 
requires traders to inform consumers of the ADR systems that the trader complies with, which seems 
to entail that if a dispute arises and parties turn to ADR, the consumer will have to make use of the 
ADR system of the trader, which can be a foreign ADR system. The trader, in turn, is not obliged or 
encouraged to take notice of, or participate in, foreign ADR systems. Even if Regulation Brussel I is 
not applicable to ADR disputes that take the form of arbitration,
2073
 this solution does not seem 
consistent with the protection of consumers in Brussels I. 
The DCFR does pay specific attention to jurisdiction clauses. Article II – 9: 409 on jurisdiction 
clauses provides that jurisdiction clauses are unfair if the clause is supplied by the business and 
confers exclusive jurisdiction arising under the contract to the court of the place where the business is 
domiciled. The Comments indicate that Brussels I concerns the ‘procedural admissibility’ of a clause, 
while apparently, the Directive considers the substantial fairness of the clause, considering the drafting 
of the clause, other provisions in the contract and other relevant circumstances.  
Yet the DCFR does not address article 24 Brussels I and further diverges from article 17 
Brussels I that sets out circumstances in which a choice for jurisdiction in consumer cases is permitted. 
Par. 1 sets out that this is the case if the choice is made in an agreement after the conflict has arisen – 
                                               
2072
 M.W. Knigge, ‘Tegenstrijdige Europese regelgeving? De verhouding  tussen de EEX-Verordening en de Richtlijn oneerlijke 
bedingen’, MvV 2012, p. 95. 
2073
 MuchKomm/ZPO – EUGVo/Gottwald (2013), article 1, nr 3. Gottwald, at nr 24, traces the exception to the existence of the 
New York Convention which made additional rules on arbitration unnecessary, but the same cannot be said of binding advice. 
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thus, STC’s in consumer contracts, concluded before a dispute has arisen, are not permitted under 
this paragraph. Article 17 par. 2 further provides that a choice that allows the consumer to bring claims 
before courts other than the courts mentioned in this section, are valid, while par. 3 provides that 
jurisdiction clauses opting for domestic courts are permitted for domestic contracts, insofar as this is 
permitted under national law.   
Therefore, although the explanation in the DCFR may offer some perspective on the 
inconsistency between Brussels I and Directive 93/13, it fails to address all relevant points. Yet article 
84 sub e proposed CESL also determines that clauses granting exclusive jurisdiction to the place 
where the trader is domiciled, unless that is also the place where the consumer is domiciled, is always 
unfair. The question arises whether this rule is in accordance with article 17 Brussels I.    
 
 It has been argued that with regard to the definition of standard contract terms, 
following the DCFR is problematic and should be reconsidered.  
 
Dutch experiences may however provide a different perspective. The definition of standard 
terms in article II – 1:109 DCFR seems not particularly problematic, considering the largely 
similar definition of article 6:231 BW, as well as article 2 sub d of the Regulation proposing a 
CESL and article 7 of the proposed CESL.  
However, the DCFR leaves considerable room for uncertainty. Would a future 
proposal for a 1993 Directive also refer to multiple contracts, differently from article 30 of the 
proposed Directive? If this is not the case, do inconsistencies arise between a future CESL 
and a future reformed Directive? Other inconsistencies include the rules on making STC’s 
adequately available.  
 Accordingly, the added value of the DCFR in these cases may be questioned as it 
does not offer a solution for or prompt debate on inconsistent rules, but merely adds another 
rule. This may limit the extent to which it may play a role for the European legislator and the 
CJEU, and it may more generally limit the extent to which the DCFR contributes to the 
accessibility and consistency of the law on STC’s.   
However, a closer look at recent decisions from the Hoge Raad indicates that 
differences in overlapping soft laws need not necessarily withhold national courts from 
referring to these sets of soft law. Rather than clinging to that set of soft law rules, the Hoge 
Raad, or rather A.-G. Wissink,2074 has apparently considered the DCFR as an additional 
possibility to discuss cases. Lower courts have also started to refer to the DCFR, although 
not in cases with regard on STC’s.2075   
Although the DCFR may therefore still be interesting for courts, the extent to which it 
contributes to the predictability, consistency and accessibility of the law remains limited.  
 
11.7.2.2. The DCFR and national practice 
The DCFR could have increased its added value for Dutch actors by considering the 
following questions:  
 
 The question whether avoidability of the contract obliges the judiciary to evaluate 
these clauses ex officio, or whether the Directive should be reformed. 
                                               
2074
 Comp. the conclusion of A.-G. Wissink to HR 11 May 2012, NJ 2012, 318 and the conclusion of A.G. Wissink to HR 19 
November 2010, NJ 2010, 623. Interestingly, A.G. Wissink, in note 9 to his conclusion to HR 16 September 2011, NJ 2012, 56, 
noted that the DCFR did not offer comparative material as it restricted itself, in article III – 3:712  DCFR to general rule son 
penalty clauses. 
2075
 Ktr. ’s-Hertogenbosch 24 June 2010, LJN BN0636, Rb. Zutphen 3 November 2010, LJN BQ0980. 
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The reform of the Directive should make clear that unfair clauses are void, which would clarify this 
issue much more effectively than simply – but correctly – maintaining that it is not essential to 
elaborate on the ineffectiveness of a Directive and CJEU case law has made clear that clauses are to 




 The definition of the main terms of the contract  
This definition may be valuable because of the emphasis of the Hoge Raad on the legislative history of 




 Moreover, as Dutch law is less well-developed than German law, it may be more 
interesting for the Dutch legislator to look at the DCFR as a possible model. This is 
especially the case in areas where a consistent approach has not been developed 
throughout the Union, such as the rules on battle of forms.  
 
Thus, article II – 4:209 DCFR stipulates that parties need to expressly reject the applicability of STC’s, 
not by way of STC’s, while article 6:225 par. 3 BW stipulates that referral to the second set of STC’s 
shall not lead to the application of that second set of STC’s if the second referral does not expressly 
reject the applicability of the first set of STC’s. Arguably, the rule in the DCFR does not make clear 
which party needs to expressly reject the STC’s of the other party, while Dutch law encourages the 
first user of STC’s to reject the applicability of STC’s of other parties, thereby forcing the counterparty 
to expressly reject these terms. However, Dutch law does not generally provide that the converging 
terms will be applicable. 
 
Accordingly, the comparative notes remark that the law in this area is unsettled in various 
Member States,2078 which may increase the inclination of national actors to consider the 
DCFR as a possible model for law reform. The added value of the DCFR may however be 
limited if it does not indicate why it prefers a specific rule or if it does not provide a clear rule. 
If national law in contrast does elaborately explain why it has opted for a particular solution, 
national legislators might be more convinced by national law than by the DCFR, which may 
then act as a starting point for comparing the diverging solutions throughout the Union rather 
than as an inspiration by itself. 
 
►Thus, the DCFR has failed to take into account national experiences in the implementation 
of the Directive as well as possible points for reform at the national level, and has thereby 
limited its added value as a “toolbox” for national actors and European actors in the reform of 
Directive 93/13 and national law.  However, the lack of debate on the divergences between 
national laws and soft laws have not withheld national actors to ignore the DCFR. 
 
11.7.2.3. Conclusion on the use of the DCFR as an additional technique 
In the development of the DCFR, actors have not sufficiently taken into account national law. 
However, the DCFR does provide a clearly added value by providing specfic rules on STC’s. 
The lack of explanation for the preference for a specific solution has not entailed that national 
actors have ignored the DCFR, even though it was not followed. Accordingly, more 
interaction with relevant actors, and more clarity the role of the DCFR and the relation 
between different sources of law, would have increased the extent to which the DCFR can 
                                               
2076
 DCFR, Part 1, p. 655,  
2077
 HR 23 April 2010, NJ 2010, 454, see the conclusion of the A.G. under par. 3.20-3.21, as well as Hof Amsterdam 14 October 
2008, NJF 2008, 481. 
2078
 DCFR, Part I, p. 333.  
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strengthen the predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness of the law on 
STC’s.  
 
11.7.3. Techniques in addition to blanket clauses 
Various techniques have been suggested to improve the extent to which blanket clauses 
contribute to predictability and consistency, even though blanket clauses do not necessarily 
aim to increase these benchmarks. Should these techniques be developed or not? 
 Paragraph 11.7.3.1. will consider the development of comitology, paragraph 11.7.3.2. 
will discuss the development of guidelines. Paragraph 11.7.3.3. will turn to the prejudicial 
procedure and paragraph 11.7.3.4. will consider the use of alternative regulation. Paragraph 
11.7.3.5. will end with a conclusion. 
 
11.7.3.1. Comitology 
The development of comitology, in accordance with article 40 of the proposal for a Directive 
on consumer rights, will undermine rathern than strengthen the predictability, consistency, 
accessibility and responsiveness of the law on STC’s and should therefore be rejected.  
Notably, the proposal to use comitology aimed for a more flexible development of 
model lists. The WODC report rejected this option, but the Dutch legislator did not follow this 
advice. The use of comitology may not be unacceptable as such in the Dutch legal order 
because article 6: 239 BW and previous suggestions2079 are reminiscent of comitology.  
 The introduction of comitology in this area may be problematic for the following 
reasons: 
1) The introduction of comitology might undermine the consistency of the law.  
If model lists developed through comitology are not indicative but binding, this would oblige the 
national legislator to implement the model lists. Possibly, the clauses on the European model list could 
diverge from national default law, which might lead to inconsistencies.  
Also, the binding character of the model lists would also make it difficult for the legislator to 
maintain existing lists, which might limit the extent to which these lists contribute to the predictable 
interpretation of article 6:233 sub a BW in a manner consistent with national default law. 
 
2) The use of comitology may not necessarily contribute to responsiveness; this 
depends on the composition of committees.  
Typically, experts and practitioners as well as legal servants may take place in comitology committees. 
Yet this need not include relevant stakeholders. The limited participation and uneven representation in 
European consultations indicate that the participation of actors with relevant experiences in a 
representative manner should not be assumed too easily.  
Arguably, the possibility that model lists will be developed more one-sidedly in the interest of 
particular stakeholder groups may increase as relevant stakeholders are not included while 
representation is also uneven, which is especially undesirable as the clauses in the model lists may 
subsequently affect national default law.   
 
3) The development of the model lists by a comitology committee could decrease the 
stable and predictable development of the law on STC’s 
In particular, comitology could lead to multiple amendments to the model lists, which might not be 
beneficial for the stable development of the law.
2080
 The stable and predictable development of the 
                                               
2079
 See further previously par. …  
2080
 Experiences with involvement of … already demonstrates the risk of rapid developments that undermine stability of the law  
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model lists may be undermined further if the procedures through which a comitology committee would 
draft the rules are not sufficiently transparent and accessible. 
 
4) The use of comitology could decrease the accessibility of the law on STC’s. 
The possibility that the model lists could be subject to multiple changes might prompt the legislator to 
implement the model lists outside of the codification. However, this would lead to fragmented 
implementation where the provisions of the Directive would be scattered over multiple laws, which 
would not benefit the accessibility of the law.  
The accessibility of the law on this matter may decrease more generally if it is left to 
committees that contract parties as well as legal practitioners may not be familiar with, while it is also 
not clear how parties subject to rules drafted by comitology committees.  
 
►These possible difficulties in the implementation of the model lists under a maximum 
harmonisation Directive indicates that the introduction of comitology is more compatible with 
the development of Regulations. However, the development of Regulations and comitology 
would leave very little room to the national legislator. This possibility may make the 
introduction of a Regulation combined with comitology less attractive for national state actors. 
The potential problems of implementation of the model lists make the introduction of 
comitology an unattractive option. 
 
11.7.3.2. Guidelines 
The development of guidelines by the European Commission is not likely to contribute to 
predictability and consistency, and may inhibit the responsiveness of the law on STC’s. 
Consequently, this option should be rejected.  
The development of guidelines at the national level2081 is similarly not successful.  
 
The guidelines have been criticised. Messer-Dinnissen and Tromp
2082
 have held that the working 
group exceeded its competence, while the guidelines are not representative of a majority view. 
Moreover, Messer-Dinnissen and Tromp find that the report overlooks that some clauses need not 
necessarily be unfair and may be too strict in some cases. Koek en Van de Laarschot
2083
 however 
point to the development of succesful guidelines in other areas and the careful process through which 
these guidelines are developed.  
 
Unfortunately, the guidelines on the ex officio evaluation of fairness have not induced courts 
to consistently decide in accordance with this resport.2084 The decisions of the Hoge Raad 
are not easy to reconcile with this report, and this has very likely severely undermined the 
strength of the guidelines. Thus, national guidelines may likely not contribute to consistency 
and predictability if the Hoge Raad decides differently.  
The following problems become apparent:  
 
1) Guidelines have so far not been successful.   
                                               
2081
 Availabkle at http://www.rechtspraak.nl/Procedures/Landelijke-regelingen/Sector-civiel-
recht/Documents/EindrapportLOVCKwerkgroepambtshalvetoetsing_17210.pdf.  
2082
 P.E.M. Messer- Dinnissen en J. Tromp, ‘Bestuurders van en Raad voor de rechtspraak: houdt het bij raad aan de 
rechtspraak’, NJB 2010/1014. 
2083
 M. Koek en M. van de Laarschot, ‘Kanttekeningen bij een vermeende uitglijer’, NJB 2010, 1464. 
2084
 Comp. Ktr,Rotterdam 4 May 2012, LJN BX4196,  Ktr. Alkmaar, 4 July 2011, LJN BU2932, Ktr. Alkmaar 22 November 2010, 
LJN BO7959, Rb. Groningen 31 March 2010, LJN BM1402 
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Particularly, the development of guidelines for Directive 2005/29 and additional alternatives from the 
Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets
 2085
 are unsuccessful.   
 
2) The development of guidelines will not help the responsive development of the 
law, for which article 3 Directive was initially inserted in the Directive.  
Particularly, will guidelines will be based on national case law, ADR and other relevant insights? It may 
be doubted whether the Commission is sufficiently familiar with these national sources and insights.  
 
3) The development of guidelines at the European level may not be in accordance 
with the idea that the law on STC’s is also based on common principles of good 
faith. 
If this is the case, it can be doubted whether the Commission can uniformly decide what behaviour is 
in accordance with good faith; this may also depend on national practice and surrounding national 
default law.  
 
4) Questions on the status and the content of the guidelines arise.  
On the one hand, if guidelines are not binding, the question arises what role they will play in the 
development of law by the judiciary – the experience with the model list in the Annex to the Directive 
indicates that national state actors may adopt restraint towards these non-binding measures. On the 
other hand, if guidelines have a clear binding status and clearly developed rules, they may not be 
politically feasible as they may limits the room left for national judges to decide in accordance with 
national practice and national legal views in justic, as reflected by national law. 
 
►Thus, although the use of guidelines has been suggested to improve the predictable and 
consistent interpretation of national laws implementing article 3 Directive, a preliminary 
question that should be addressed is to what extent these guidelines will undermine or 
contribute to the responsive development of the law. Moreover, the extent to which 
guidelines may contribute to the comprehensibility of the law on STC’s depends on the status 
and content of these guidelines.  
 
11.7.3.3. The prejudicial procedure 
The introduction of the prejudicial procedure is likely to contribute to the predictability,  and 
consistency of the law on STC’s of questions are referred to the Hoge Raad, if judges make 
us of this possibility.  
The legislator expressly considered the need to prevent inconsistent decisions in the 
introduction of the prejudicial procedure.2086 Will the answers to questions on the inclusion, 
availability and evaluation of STC’s also contribute more generally to the development of the 
law? The inconsistent decisions of lower courts on STC’s indicate that referring prejudicial 
questions might improve the consistency and legal unity of Dutch decisions. However, as 
lower courts generally do not refer to one another’s decisions, they may not be aware of 
inconsistency and therefore not refer questions to the Hoge Raad. Moreover, neither parties 
nor judges have consistently shown much interest in elaborately referring to relevant sources, 
perhaps also because it concerns cases that seem relatively straightforward with a limited 
financial interest. Van Kampen and Giesen2087 note that the willingness of judges to ask 
prejudicial questions may also depend on the line developed by the Hoge Raad in which 
                                               
2085
 Available at http://www.afm.nl/~/media/files/wetten-regels/leidraad/norm-misleiding.ashx. The case law on article 6: 193b 
BW does not indicate that the guidance developed in the area of unfair practices have been used. 
2086
 Kamerstukken II, 2010-2011, 32612, p. 4. 
2087
 S.S. van Kampen, I. Giesen, ‘Prejudiciële vragen aan de Hoge Raad, valkuilen voor de Hoge Raad’, TCR  2013, p. 1. 
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these questions should be asked. Currently, questions on the law on STC’s have not yet 
been referred to the Hoge Raad.2088 
Also, not all questions will be referred to the Hoge Raad.  
 
Questions will likely not be referred to the Hoge Raad are: 
i) Questions on the ex officio evaluation of cases, because the Hoge Raad has already 
indicated restraint towards the ex officio evaluation.  
ii) Also, questions on the interpretation of clauses.  
These questions often concern decisions that are partially also questions of fact, and the wording of 
article 392 par. 1 Rv indicates that courts can refer questions of law to the Hoge Raad. The legislator 




iii) Decisions of lower courts based on an incorrect understanding of articles 6:236 and 
237 BW in relation to article 6:233 BW may not fall within the scope of article 392 Rv.  
 
Other questions such as the question whether judges could and should mitigate penalty 
clauses in accordance with article 6:94 BW,2090 or questions whether arbitration clauses in 
consumer cases are necessarily unfair2091 may arguably be included.  
Prejudicial questions may also be asked if new legislation is introduced.2092 It may 
however be doubted whether the implementation of a future reformed Directive lead to 
prejudicial questions, especially if such implementation does not give rise to considerable 
amendments. Yet if the reform of the 1993 Directive on unfair terms results in a maximum 
harmonisation Directive, this may well affect the interpretation of article 6:233 sub a BW, 
even though this will need not result in a change in the wording of article 6:233 sub a BW. In 
particular, the question whether and if so, to what extent the CJEU is competent to interpret 
the successor to current article 3 Directive may arise.  
Will the prejudicial procedure lead to more CJEU decisions? This will not necessarily 
be the case as the possibility to refer questions to the Hoge Raad does not automatically 
mean that the Hoge Raad, in turn, will refer questions that have been referred to it to the 
CJEU. Perhaps, such referral is not in accordance with the aim of the legislator to establish a 
relatively quick procedure to determine questions of law.   
Thus, the prejudicial procedure may well improve the predictability and consistency of 
the law on STC’s, if judges decide to refer questions to the Hoge Raad.  
 
11.7.3.4. Alternative regulation 
If courts refer to alternative regulation, this will likely contribute to the responsiveness of the 
law to national practices and parties’ views in justice.  
 Self-regulation may contribute to the comprehensibility of the law on STC’s in various 
ways:  
1) Judges may take into account that STC’s in consumer contracts have been 
collectively negotiated in their evaluation of the STC’s under article 6: 233 sub a BW.  
Some decisions of lower courts, as well as ADR, already indicate that this is a circumstance that may 
be taken into account.
2093
 This need not necessarily mean that judges should generally uphold 
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 Currently Rb. Amsterdam 4 December 2012, LJN BY6220 and Rb. 3 August 2012, NJ 2012, 663.  
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 Kamerstukken II, 2010-2011, 32612, p. 10. 
2090
 HR 24 March 2006, NJ 2007, 115. 
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 HR 21 September 2012, RvdW 2012, 1132.  
2092
 Kamerstukken II, 2010-2011, 32612, nr 3, p. 4. 
2093
 For more restraint see Rb. Amsterdam 24 March 2010, TvA 2011, 27. Other courts have taken the collective ngotiations into 
account: see for example Hof ‘s-Hertogenbosch 9 August 2011, LJN BR6638, Rb. Arnhem 30 december 2009, RCR 2010, 26, 
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collectively negotiated STC’s – however, it is a relevant perspective and in accordance with 
predictability to enable users that have collectively negotiated STC’s to rely on them. Yet it is a lso 
necessary to evaluate these clauses, if only because consumers subjected to these STCs have not 
had the same opportunity to affect these clauses. Also, the evaluation of article 6:233 sub a BW is an 
individual assessment that should take relevant individual circumstances into account.  
 
2) Judges may take into account codes of conduct that contradict clauses in the STC’s. 
This would also be in line with article 6 Directive 2005/29, and if consumers have relied on codes in 
entering into contracts, consumers could arguably justifiably have done so, in line with article 3:35 BW.  
It is not clear to what extent users of STC’s actually do so, and whether courts would not already 
consider provisions in codes of conduct, in accordance with article 6 Directive 2005/29. 
 
Thus, courts have already recognised the added value of alternative regulation in the 
interpretation of blanket clauses.  
 
11.7.3.5. Conclusion on the use of techniques in addition to blanket clauses 
The extent to which article 6:233 sub a BW contributes to the predictability and consistency 
of the law has been severely undermined by the lack of interaction between courts. 
Particularly, the development of the prejudicial procedure and a more consistent use of 
alternative regulation in the interpretation may contribute to predictability and consistency. 
The use of alternative regulation also strengthens the responsive development of the law on 
STC’s.   
 
11.7.4. The development of collective negotiations 
It is not clear whether the development of collective negotiations on STC’s at the 
transnational level will contribute to predictability and the responsiveness of the law on STC’s.  
 There have been suggestions in Dutch literature to transpose the successful 
collective negotiations on STC’s to the European level. This would increase the extent to 
which users of STC’s take into account the interests of consumers while it would also 
facilitate transnational trade.2094 
 Transposing this model to the European level would entail the development of a 
European organisation as an equivalent to the SER, in particular an equivalent to the CCA. It 
can be doubted to what extent current European institutions such as the European Economic 
and Social Council, currently provide a platform, and whether stakeholder groups are 
sufficiently organised and willing to develop collectively negotiated STC’s at the European 
level. The question arises whether these stakeholder groups would represent national 
stakeholder groups throughout the Union, or whether it would be “European” stakeholder 
groups selected by the Commission.  
However, collective negotiations still leave room for differences that may inhibit trade. 
If collective negotiations result in European STC’s, they might still be interpreted differently 
throughout the Union. Additional difficulties would arise if STC’s would be able to set aside 
consumer protection laws throughout the Union. Introducing three-quarter mandatory law 
would provide a solution. It is however not clear whether there is political support for this form 
                                                                                                                                                   
Ktr. ‘s-Gravenhage 5 August 2009, NJF 2009, 460, Hof ‘;s-Hertogenbosch 5 August 2003, comp. also Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 10 
January 2006, NJF 2006, 261, for STC’s agreed between an energy company and a small company, and differently Rb. Arnhem 
5 November 2008,LJN BG4492.  
2094
 A.G. Castermans, ‘Towards a European contract law through social dialogue’, ERCL 2011, p. 366.  
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of mandatory law and collectively negotiated STC’s would still be subject to judicial 
evaluation. 
It has been suggested that organisations from different Member States where parties 
are familiar with collective negotiations, such as The Netherlands and Germany, may 
develop cross-border collective negotiations.  
However, the success of this option depends on the capability and the willingness of 
private actors.  Currently, it has not become apparent that there is much cooperation across 
borders between different stakeholder organisations, which would however be necessary. 
This depends on the capability and the willingness of private actors. The desirability and 
feasibility of this option further depends on the equal positions of parties and 
representativeness of parties and the inclusiveness of the process, which should be 
evaluated at the national level. 
 Thus, although cross-border collective negotiaitons would be an interesting 
development that could increase the responsive and predictable development of the law on 
STC’s in cross-border trade, it need not necessarily be successful as clauses would still be 
evaluated differently in the Dutch and German legal order and the willingness and capacity of 
parties to enter into collective negotiations should also not be presumed. 
 
11.7.5. Conclusion on the use of additional and alternative techniques 
What techniques in addition to or instead of currently used techniques are likely to contribute 
to the predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness of the law on STC’s? 
Techniques that may be successful are the improved use of consultations, impact 
assessments, databases and networks, as well as the use of alternative regulation in the 
evaluation of blanket clauses. Moreover, techniques discussed in the previous chapter, in 
particular the study of the use of STC’s, may also be beneficial. 
In contrast, the development of comitology procedures and the development of 
guidelines will be detrimental for the predictable, consistent, accessible and responsive 
development of the law on STC’s through blanket clauses. 
It is not clear whether the development of collective bargaining and the development 
of the prejudicial procedure and also the success of a future CESL will contribute to the 
comprehensibility of the law on STC’s, as this depends on the initiative of private parties and 
lower courts that are difficult to predict.  
The various suggestions for additional techniques may well overlap and reinforce one 
another. Particularly, the improved use of databases and networks may well support the 
improved use of consultations.   
 As actors have preferred a hierarchical approach without combining top-down 
techniques with bottom-up techniques that have usually accompanied these top-down 
techniques, the suggestions in this chapter imply a shift towards a more bottom-up approach.  
As impact assessments become more critical, however,the possibility of developing bottom-
up techniques before developing more top-down alternatives may be considered. However, 
the success of these options, and the success of bottom-up techniques in addition to top-
down techniques, remain dependant on the participation of non-state actors. However, 
parties in the area of STC’s have shown considerable initiative.    
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11.8. Conclusion  
Dutch law is not considered as a clear success, but nor has it been described as a failure. 
Dutch actors have not considered the decreased ability of national techniques to ensure the 
comprehensibility of the law as such, and have accordingly not sufficiently interacted with 
relevant actors. Although the shortcomings that have become apparent cannot be attributed 
to this approach, they have been aggravated by a lack of sufficient interaction that failed to 
prompt the legislator and the courts to deal with problems of the newly established law that 
have since become visible in legal practice.   
That does not mean that actors in the Dutch legal order have not interacted at all; to 
the contrary, Dutch courts have shown less restraint in interacting with international and 
foreign actors in deciding cases under international regimes than German courts. Also, the 
legislator has carefully made use of insights of successful German law and considered the 
development of separate laws to implement the acquis. The approach of the Dutch legislator 
in the implementation of the acquis seems more predictable than the strategy of the German 
legislator, who has not consistently implemented the private law acquis within the BGB. 
Instead, the German legislator has based its approach on the question whether a new 
Directive is Sonderprivatrecht, and it is not easily apparent why some Directives can be more 
easily characterised as Sonderprivatrecht than other Directives. In contrast, the Dutch 
legislator has not based its approach on the characterisation of Directives as “special”, nor 
has the stable and consistent development of private law been considered in so many words. 
Also, the implementation of multiple Directives in articles 6:231 et seq BW, the scope of 
which was subsequently expanded, has led to problems that are not visible in German law. 
The place of the implementation of Directive 93/13, however, followed from the new structure 
of the BW, whereas the structure of the BGB may indicate a more fragmented approach, 
which may also make the accessible implementation of the acquis more challenging for the 
German legislator. 
Like German actors, the Dutch legislator and courts have shown restraint in 
implementing the acquis. However, despite the similarity in these approaches, the Dutch 
approach is not as successful as the German approach. Can the problems apparent in Dutch 
law then be traced to a lack of interaction? 
Notably, Dutch actors have not as actively participated in debate at the European 
level, nor has the implementation of Directives been discussed in much detail. Because of 
the lack of interaction, actors have failed to critically consider national law on STC’s, and 
respond to problems that have become visible. Also, the interaction between Dutch courts 
has been much too limited, which has undermined consistency and predictability, and the 
promotion of regulatory competition in this area by the Dutch legislator.  
Arguably, the aggravation of problems can be traced to these shortcomings. 
Thus, the coexistence of actors in the development of the law on STC’s has given rise 
to problems for private parties. However, the problem is not only the coexistence of actors 
but the defective implementation of Directives and the restraint of both national and 
European actors in signalling problems in the acquis which subsequently have to be 
implemented and re-implemented in national law.  
Moreover, in the long term, the restraint of the courts and non-state actors in 
interacting with European actors may undermine the predictable, consistent, accessible and 
responsive development of the acquis.  
However, the coexistence of actors has not consistently been detrimental. Instances 
where more interaction has benefitted the law on STC’s include the reform of articles 6:236 
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and 237 BW and more generally the drafting of legislation, both in the codification and the 
drafting of new initiatives such as the Dutch prejudicial procedure. Both the German and 
Dutch legislator have carefully taken into account the needs and preferences of legal practice, 
which may improve the responsiveness of the law on STC’s.  
Moreover, coexistence may benefit the law on STC’s if national actors and European 
actors prompt one another to reconsider defective rules, which is currently however not 
visible. 
The problems accentuate the diminished ability of national actors to ensure the 
predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness of the law through the 
development of national techniques. As actors have not recognised interdependence, 
moreover, the use of additional and alternative techniques that may mitigate problems have 
not been considered. However, because there is more room for experimentation in the Dutch 
legal order than in the German legal order, there are also more possibilities to compensate 
for shortcomings and solve problems. Simultaneously, it has been argued that a framework 
to assess the role of especially non-state actors and the development of alternative 
regulation should be developed, and concepts of private autonomy and Fremdbestimmung 
that may impose limitations on such experiments and thereby, perhaps, limit the extent to 
which new techniques can contribute to the comprehensibilty of private law in addition to 
national techniques.  
The changes suggested in this chapter are not only long term changes. Courts should 
adopt a more active approach and the law on the availability of STC’s, especially in 







Chapter 12: Generalisation 
 
This book has considered the role of actors in the development of European private law in 
the German and Dutch legal order and the use of national techniques in the development of 
European private law, as well as the use of techniques in addition or instead of national 
techniques. What conclusions can be drawn from the findings in the case studies that are 
more generally valid for the development of European private law? 
 Paragraph 12.1. will consider the role of actors and the interdependence between 
actors that has become visible in chapters 4 and 5 in the light of the findings in the previous 
chapters. Paragraph 12.2. will consider the use of national techniques in the development of 
European private law in the light of the previous chapters. Paragraph 12.3. will turn to the 
use of techniques in addition or instead of currently used techniques. Paragraph 12.4. will 
end with a conclusion.  
 
12.1. The roles of actors 
Chapters 4 and 5 already indicated that interdependence had developed between actors. 
This was particularly visible in the German legal order. Under the GG, national, not European, 
state actors continue to play a central role. With regard to non-state actors, German 
concerns on private autonomy and Fremdbestimmung clashed with the more pragmatic 
European approach that enabled non-state actors to circumvent limitations imposed on them 
by German actors.   
Chapter 4 and 5 both surmised that if interdependence became apparent, this might 
make it more complicated for actors to develop European private law in accordance with 
benchmarks of predictability, accessibility, consistency, and responsiveness, while it may 
also make it more complicated for actors to adequately identify the actor most suited or 
responsible for the development of European private law in accordance with these 
benchmarks. 
Notably, the case study has made apparent that non-state actors may play an 
important role. Non-state actors may pressure for law reform, or alternative regulation may 
play a role in courts’ decisions. However, the extent to which this happens still depends on 
state actors’ willingness to take non-state actors initiatives into account, and forms of 
alternative regulation successful (such as the VOB) or accepted (such as article 6: 239 BW) 
in one legal order, may be unsuccessful or unacceptable in other legal orders. State actors 
may be especially inclined to do so if non-state actors provide rules in highly complex areas 
or if they adequately reflect legitimate needs in (international) practice. Yet even though 
legislators generally find the attractiveness of their laws to international actors important, this 
need not necessarily lead to regulatory competition. 
Not only actors at different levels become more dependant on one another, 
national legislators and courts also become increasingly interdependent. 
 The problems that arise from the approach of the courts draw attention to the 
increased interdependence between legislators and courts in a multilevel legal order. 
As more obligations are placed on national actors to amend the law in accordance with 
European measures, the obligations of courts to correctly interpret the law and ensure the 
predictable, consistent and responsive development of the law also increases.  
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This increased interdependence is also visible in intiatives for regulatory 
competition. The approach of courts can compensate a legislator’s refusal to engage in 
regulatory competition that may end in a race to the bottom, as is the case in the German 
legal order, but the approach of courts may also undermine efforts for regulatory competition, 
as is the case in the Dutch legal order.  
Chapter 4 made clear that the roles of actors under the German framework 
clashed with the roles of actors under European law. However, German actors have 
managed quite well to maintain the predictability, consistency, accessibility and 
responsiveness of the law on STC’s. Typically, German actors have emphasised the 
success of the law on STC’s and sought to maintain this successful regime. However, 
problems have become apparent with regard to the role of respectively the BGH and the 
Hoge Raad. Both the BGH and the Hoge Raad have maintained their competence to 
interpret, respectively, article 307 BGB and article 6:233 sub a BW, despite CJEU case law 
indicating differently. The ability of both the BGH and the Hoge Raad to do so is limited as 
lower couts may refer questions to the CJEU undermining the approach of the Hoge Raad. 
Lower courts have also followed the CJEU rather than the Hoge Raad. Notably, German 
lower courts more consistently follow the BGH, which may mean that the BGH may have 
slightly more room to set out a course diverging from CJEU case law.   
 Thus, despite more contrasts between the role of actors under the German 
framework and under European law, problems for private parties have not become directly 
apparent. Notably, the limitation on non-state actors roles in the development of STC’s has 
been followed by the European legislator. The active participation of German actors might 
have helped limit or prevent conflict. Possibly, however, conflicts may arise of a revised 
Directive on unfair contract terms limits the evaluation of clauses by the judiciary. However, 
even though conflict has not become directly apparent, the lack of interaction between 
German and European actors has made it less likely that shortcomings in the private law 
acquis will be remedied. 
Nevertheless, especially in the German legal order, actors have adopted a 
defensive approach to preserve the high quality of the law on STC’s, which may limit 
problems that may arise form interdependence. Accordingly, in the implementation of 
Directives, both legislators and judiciaries have adopted restraint. 2095  This minimalist 
approach is visible more broadly with regard to the implementation of the private law 
acquis.2096 It has been argued that this restraint, including the restraint with regard to foreign 
decisions, contributes to ‘nationalisation’ of international regimes.2097 
Possibly, in other areas, where German law has been less successfully developed, 
clashes may become more visible as German actors are less able to rely on a successull 
regime. The Dutch experience indicates that in these cases, a defensive approach might well 
undermine the quality of private law. On the other hand, if this is the case, theoretically, 
German actors may also adopt a less defensive approach. Regardless, European actors 
might not be inclined to develop a more tolerant approach to national divergences, which 
might provoke resistance at the national level. 
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 Interestingly, courts in other Member States have also shown restraint in referring cases to the CJEU, see M. Kenny, ‘The 
Law Commissions’ 2012 Issues Paper on unfair terms: subverting the system of “Europeanized” private law?’, ERPL 2013, p. 
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Interestingly, even though interdependence between Dutch and European 
actors is less outspoken as there are less conflicts on the role of actors, problems in 
terms of unpredictability and inconsistency have become visible in the Dutch law on 
STC’s. Problems arose from the unwillingness to immediately adapt newly established law 
and the conviction that BW is successfull. This means that the defensive approach from 
Dutch actors is only likely to be reconsidered if shortcomings in private law are very clear, 
and if harmonisation is likely to improve these shortcomings, or if European proposals are in 
line with national preferences. In other Member States, a more critical view on national law 
has been developed, andt there has been more emphasis on the need to amend the law.2098 
The findings in chapters 10 and 11 indicate that harmonisation initiatives in areas that are 
considered successful, or not in need of improvement, may meet with a defensive 
approach from national actors. Yet in some of these areas, European initiatives have 
nevertheless become visible.2099  
 A limited approach is also visible at the European level. The approaches of 
European and national actors may unfortunately reinforce one another, which may 
further decrease the chance that the reform of the acquis will take into account relevant 
insights.   
At the national level, this defensive approach should be reconsidered as it does 
not exactly discourage the European legislator or convince European actors that the 
unwillingness of national actors is not merely based on a preference for the status quo. 
Accordingly, even if a proposal closely resembles a national regime, national legislators 
should not adopt a minimum implementation approach, but make more effort to justify why 
national law is already in accordance with a Directive. A less defensive approach also means 
that harmonisation initiatives should prompt national legislators to critically consider the need 
for legislative changes, also if an apparently successful system has been established. Thus, 
the coexistence of actors could be used as a starting point to consider the development of 
the law in a way that benefits from the insights of multiple actors, especially if national law 
shows defects.  Rejection based on a clear assessment of the disadvantages of a 
particular proposal, alongside alternative suggestions, or more detailed arguments 
setting out why harmonisation is undesirable are more likely to have effect.   
European actors should equally recognise the relevance of national views.  
Accordingly, the emphasis of the European legislator on the shortcomings of minimum 
harmonisation and the corresponding preference for maximum harmonisaiton should be 
reconsidered. These suggestions overlook the restraint of national actors in the application of 
national law implementing Directives. As Directives harmonise fragmented parts of private 
law, and as judges frequently do not refer questions to the CJEU and foreign decisions, the 
extent to which maximum harmonisation as such will strengthen the predictable and 
consistent interpretation of blanket clauses in the acquis may also be doubted. 
 A less defensive approach of both national and European actors would also 
entail that both European and national actors carefully consider techniques that could 
be used to improve the functioning of the internal market, and take into account the 
combination of techniques. Rather than trying out techniques and subsequently 
abandoning them, a more consistent, and stable use of techniques would be developed as a 
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 Comp. the initiative in the UK to reform the law on unfair contract terms, see particularly the Law Commissions, 2012 Issues 
paper, Unfair terms in consumer contracts: A new approach, 25 July 2012, 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/unfair_terms_in_consumer_contracts_issues.pdf.  
2099
 COM (2011) 142. 
444 
 
result. In turn, more stability and consistency in the use of techniques could also make the 
development of the private law acquis a bit less unpredictable.   
Both state-actors and non-state actors’ preference for a hierarchical approach should 
be considered, though this may depend on the area subject to harmonisation. Possible 
approaches can be evaluated more broadly if impact assessments are improved. This 
however also presupposes that actors would consider these impact assessments. 
 
12.2. The use of national techniques 
The findings in these case studies also provide more general conclusions for the 
development of European private law through national techniques: 
 
1) The development of private law through codifications is not based on 
notions of interdependence.  
Neither the Dutch nor the German legislator has developed a consistent, predictable 
approach to the implementation of Directives in codifications. The distinction between 
general private law and Sonderprivatrecht has not convincingly served as a starting point that 
allows for a predictable implementation of Directives.  
 
2) The development of the law through blanket clauses may also affect the way 
in which private law is developed through codifications. 
Even though the wide use of blanket clauses have been considered more critically in the 
German legal order,2100 German courts have consistently adopted a more active approach, 
even in the absence of a specific blanket clause to assess STC’s, than Dutch courts. The 
more active approach of German courts is in line with the more prominent role that German 
judges may play in development of the law,2101 particularly their role in the development of 
the law on STC’s. In contrast, Dutch courts have exercised restraint, perhaps also because it 
concerned a new blanket clause. Problems of inconsistency in the Dutch legal order indicate 
that blanket clauses such as article 6:233 sub a  BW presuppose an active role of courts to 
maintain consistency and predictability.2102   
If Dutch courts adopt similar restraint in the interpretation of blanket clauses, the 
legislator needs to adopt a more active approach in amending the law in accordance with 
society’s legal views on justice and the needs of businesses. Thus, general restraint of the 
courts would render the use of blanket clauses a less suitable technique to provide for 
flexibility in codes. This may also mean that the extent to which codifications can act 
as a barrier to too much enthusiasm from the legislator may become limited.2103 
However, even though Dutch lower courts have not made it a habit to refer to the decisions 
of other lower courts, the restraint of Dutch courts to article 6:233 sub a BW is not 
representative of the more general approach of Dutch courts towards developing private law.  
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 Especially U. Diederichsen, Die Flucht des Gesetzgebers aus der politischen Verantwortung im Zivilrecht, Müller : Karlsruhe 
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Yet importantly, the findings in the case study on the approach of courts may be 
representative of the approach of courts towards the application of national law 
implementing consumer contract law Directives and European law more generally.2104 
The decisions of Dutch lower courts in the evaluation of clauses in consumer contracts may 
be more generally relevant for the development of the consumer contract law acquis. The 
inconsistent decisions indicate that Dutch lower courts, in these small cases, may well be 
less likely to extensively refer to other decisions, let alone foreign and CJEU decisions, and 
international materials, and the need for an active approach of the Hoge Raad in these cases 
has become apparent. However, simultaneously, it has become clear that in some cases, 
especially Dutch courts follow CJEU decisions rather than national decisions.  
Similar reasons may motivate the equally visible restraint of the German judiciary in 
cases falling within the scope of especially the consumer law acquis with regard to foreign 
decisions and the CJEU.2105 Notably, courts may, rightly so, prioritise a quick and just way – 
in accordance with standards of predictability, consistency, accessibility and responsiveness 
– to decide cases. In consumer cases, little financial interests may be at stake, and referring 
to foreign decisions or referring questions to the CJEU may not be in proportion to a 
relatively straightforward case. The criticism of CJEU decisions may also induce the judge to 
adopt restraint.2106 Especially in the German legal order, an abundance of German materials 
is available.  
The findings in the Dutch case study indicate that the development of the BW 
has not prompted restraint in amending the law – indeed, in the drafting of the 
codification, Meijers indicated that revision every ten years or so would be necessary. The 
shortcomings visible in the law on STC’s confirm that conclusion. 
However, general restraint on the development of legislation on new topics may also 
be a disadvantage, as it may reduce the willingness of the European legislator to await the 
developments of national laws on “new” topics. 
Within the Union, it is unfortunate that reasons for codification, and the extent to 
which codifications can realistically achieve the aims that they are expected to 
achieve, are not carefully reconsidered. Shortcomings in the legislative process may 
further undermine the use of codifications. 
 
3) It is difficult to determine to what extent general principles underlying 
national law converge with the acquis, if general principles can be found to 
underpin the acquis at all. This may diminish the extent to which general 
principles can function as a starting point for interaction between actors 
developing private law. 
 
The Dutch case study made clear that considerations in line with the Richtigkeitsgewähr 
played a role in the revision of national law affecting the law on STC’s. 2107 Nevertheless,  the 
subsequent amendments demonstrate that this does not necessarily mean that Dutch law 
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and German law will increasingly converge. Particularly, the view when a party is in a such a 
weak bargaining position that it justifies the development of mandatory law may differ. 
Therefore, even if general principles underlying the German and Dutch law on STC’s, as well 
as Directive 93/13, converge – which is not clear – and even if interaction develops, actors 
might still disagree on the future development of the law.  
 
12.3. The use of techniques in addition to or instead of national techniques 
1) There is no ideal combination of techniques, even for one area of law.  
The law on STC’s cannot be considered in isolation from other areas of law, including more 
general contract law, but also more specific parts of consumer contract law. Moreover, even 
if there was an ideal combination of techniques, the perfect combination also depends on the 
level of internationalisation, Euroepan integration, as well as the role of non-state actors and 
the existence of regulation, which may well change over time. 
However, studying the law on STC’s has made clear that some additional or 
alternative techniques, in particular the use of Regulations instead of Directives, as well as 
the OMC, are not likely to be adopted, regardless of their benefits and detriments at an 
abstract level. 
 
2) The suitability of additional and alternative techniques not only depends on the 
area of law, but also on the characteristics of legal orders. 
The approach of legislators to the implementation of the acquis depends on the way that 
national private law has developed. This also affects the choice for and suitability of 
additional and alternative techniques. Moreover, the appropriateness of techniques may  
depend on the role of actors in legal order. 
This does not mean that parties cannot look at the use of additional or alternative 
techniques in other legal orders. The use of impact assessments in the English legal order, 
the use of collective bargaining in the Dutch legal order and the use of lower regulation in the 
implementation of the acquis in the German legal order may serve as sources of inspiration 
for actors in other legal orders. Some initiatives that are unsuccessful in one legal order, may 
moreover be interesting for other legal order, as becomes clear from article 6:214 BW. The 
lack of success of this provision can be explained by the success of overlapping self-
regulation. In legal orders where similarly successful self-regulation is absent, initiatives such 
as article 6:214 BW may well be less unsuccessful, especially in legal orders where a need 
for more flexibility has been expressed, but where little self-regulation has developed, or 
where objections against self-regulation exist. 
 
3) Shortcomings in the legislative process affect the extent to which codifications 
and blanket clauses ensure the predictability, consistency, accessibility and 
responsiveness of the law.  
Particularly, the shortcomings in the consultations and impact assessments have been more 
generally visible. In the Dutch legal order, moreover, the interaction between the government 
and Parliament has been criticised more generally, as the negotiation processes at the 
national and the European level are separated and insufficiently coordinated; once proposals 
have been negotiated at the European Parliament, they are discussed in Parliament, with the 
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exception of more fundamental matters.2108 National democratic scrutiny seems to be better 
organised in Germany, as well as other Member States.2109 
 
4) Because the DCFR does not consider national experiences in the 
implementation of the acquis, it is not well suited to remedy problems 
encountered at the national level, which decreases its value as a toolbox for 
both national and European actors.   
 
5) The DCFR does provide a clear added value compared with other sets of soft 
laws as it contains specific rules on STC’s. In cases of overlap, differences 
from other sets of soft law that are not clearly explained have not stopped 
national actors from referring to the DCFR. 
However, the case study has made clear that the approach of Dutch and German courts 
differs considerably with regard to soft law. Whereas decisions in which German courts have 
referred to the DCFR or other sets of soft law have not become apparent, Dutch courts seem 
more inclined to do so. Thus, possibly, the willingness of courts and practitioners to refer to 
soft law may differ throughout the Union, notwithstanding the added value, or lack thereof, of 
the DCFR and other sets of soft laws. Possibly, the lack of referral in German courts may be 
traced to the well-developed law on STC’s; perhaps, German courts are more likely to refer 
to soft law if they are faced with lacunae. 
The transformation of soft law into hard law may also prompt national actors to 
consider soft laws more carefully, regardless of their divergence with other sets of soft law. 
Yet in these cases, divergence between preceding sets of soft law may provide actors with 
less starting point to assess their legal position under, for example, a future CESL. 
 
12.4. Conclusion 
The changing roles of actors and the interdependence between actors should be taken into 
account in the development of European private law. Not only interdependence between 
European and national state actors, but also between courts and legislators, and between 
state and non-state actors should be considered.  
The extent to which this occurs may depend on various circumstances and the area 
of law concerned – particularly the existence of well-established or newly established 
national law may affect the willingness of actors to participate. Also, the priority of national 
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Chapter 13: Conclusions 
 
13.1. Introduction  
This volume has asked to what extent the coexistence of actors in the development of 
European private law is beneficial or problematic. The book has been inspired by debate on 
multilevel governance that emphasises the coexistence of actors. Two differences are 
especially important for the development of private law:  
 
1) The increasing importance of non-state actors.2110 
The development of private law more and more involves cross-border matters and requires more 
expertise and organisational resources that state actors may not possess. In addition, the increasing 
development of alternative regulation presupposes the involvement of private actors. 
 
2) The involvement of multiple state actors.2111 
Especially the coexistence of European and national state actors, who do not necessarily pursue 
similar aims, are relevant in that respect.   
 
According to the discourse on multilevel governance, this creates interdependence 
between both state actors from different levels and state actors and non-state actors, 
who therefore need to take into account one another’s initiatives. For the development 
of private law, this means that:  
 
 In a multilevel legal order, multiple state actors become interdependent; 
they cannot independently guarantee the predictability, accessibility, 
consistency and responsiveness of private law, and the development of 
private law in accordance with these benchmarks becomes more 
complicated in a multilevel legal order. The interdependence entails higher 
standards for the process through which private law is developed, in 
particular for the interaction between actors. Simultaneously, the 
development of European private law has become more complictaed, 
making it more difficult for actors to meet these standards.  
 
 The roles of actors are moreover subject to change.2112 The increasing 
complexity of problems may prompt actors at the European and at the 
national level to delegate tasks to non-state actors with considerable 
expertise, such as the IASB.2113  
 
 Because of these differences, successful national techniques – such as 
codifications and blanket clauses – cannot simply be transposed to the 
European level.2114 
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 See further par. 2.6.2.1. 
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 However, little attention has been paid to the question what actors should 
develop private law, and how private law should be developed, perhaps 
because legal scholars are more interested in the harmonisation of private 
laws or in substantive private law.2115 
 
 Similarly, in discussions on the development of private law, actors 
developing private law do not take interdependence and the need for 
interaction as a starting point. Yet national legislators and courts cannot 
independently guarantee the stable development of private law; this also 
depends on the European legislator and the CJEU. This does not mean 
that actors have not interacted at all; however, interaction has not 
prompted actors to reconsider the use of national techniques.2116  
 
What do these conclusions more generally mean for the roles of actors involved in the 
development of European private law and the use of techniques?  
 
13.2. What actors should develop private law? 
What actors are developing private law and what actors should develop private law? 
Currently, national state actors, and increasingly, European state actors play a role in the 
development of private law, as well as non-state actors. Yet what are the roles of these 
actors in the German and Dutch legal order, and at the European level, and why should 
these actors play a role? 
 
13.2.1. A principled approach: the German framework 
In the German legal order, a framework for assessing the role of especially private actors has 
been developed.2117 This framework is based on principles of democracy, private autonomy 
(‘Selbstbestimmung’) and Fremdbestimmung. Fremdbestimmung arises if actors are bound 
without their consent, by rules that are also not based on the law.2118 This framework can be 
sketched as follows:  
 
 Originally, private law was developed through legislator or contracts. However, hybrids have 
developed: private actors increasingly have the possibility to participate in the development of 
rules that may have binding effect on third parties. These rules may become binding either 
because they have been sanctioned by state actors or because individuals agree to privately 
drafted rules, since they consider that they are not in the bargaining position to influence these 
rules, or because they do not assess these rules. As a result, parties become bound, not 
based on the law or their consent.  
 
 This development coincides with the increased number of actors developing private law in the 
multilevel legal order, which in turn increases the chance that individuals may increasingly be 
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 As such, the development of binding rules by private actors need not necessarily be 
problematic. In some cases, privately drafted rules reflect well-established practices, such as 
the development of collective labour agreements. Yet privately drafted rules are not 
necessarily drafted in the public interest. It is also possible that rules – such as STC’s – have 
been drafted by private actors with particular interests, so that rules insufficiently take into 
account the legitimate interests of parties subsequently subjected to these rules.  
 
 Notably, this situation can be mitigated in various ways. If processes where rules are drafted 
are sufficiently transparent, and open to participation of relevant actors, representative of 
stakeholder groups, this may prevent that rules are drafted solely in the interests of one group 
of actors. Rules may also be developed in collective negotiations processes, or processes 
may be supervised by state actors. Alternatively, privately drafted rules can be subject to 
judicial control.  
 
 In other words, as privately drafted rules become more binding and therefore more like state 
rules, they are subjected to standards that are also imposed on state rules. These “control 
mechanisms” may overlap, yet they are also flexible, depending on the binding force of rules 
and their one-sidedness. 
 
This framework cannot simply be transposed to other legal orders, as it is closely interrelated 
with the German constitution. However, the private autonomy of individuals and 
Fremdbestimmung may be used as starting points to critically consider what actors 
should be involved in the development of private law.  
 
13.2.2. An instrumental approach: The European view 
The German view can be contrasted especially with the European view. Not only is the 
European view less well-developed, it is also much more pragmatic. 2120  Rather than 
considering questions of private autonomy or Fremdbestimmung, the European approach is 
a pragmatic one. Therefore, the role of actors in the development of European initiatives 
in the area of private law depends on the extent to which those actors can contribute 
to European policy aims.  
 
The European legislator may be particularly inclined to address non-state actors rather than 
state actors.2121 As European actors seek to enhance the functioning of the internal market, it 
is logical to consult the parties faced with obstacles to the internal market, and non-state 
actors may have more interest in European, as well as foreign and international, initiatives 
than state actors, which may further motivate European actors to turn to non-state actors.2122   
 
European actors have also recognised the need for representativeness and inclusiveness in 
the development of initiatives. 2123  Moreover, like German state actors, the European 
legislator has recognised the need for judicial control of STC’s in consumer contracts,2124 as 
well as the unequal bargaining position between businesses and consumers, which has 
prompted the European legislator to establish information duties and withdrawal periods – 
that have however not been uniformly introduced, but rather for specific contracts, or in 
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specific situations, and also to improve the internal market. Notably, however, these control 
mechanisms have not been developed because STC’s or other initatives are considered as 
alternative regulation the effects of which should be controlled.2125  
 
Importantly, however, European actors cannot rely on a civil society in the way that national 
actors can. Nevertheless, the European legislator has actively sought to involve “civil 
society”.2126 Yet a closer look reveals that frequently, European civil society is largely 
made up of carefully selected actors and “repeat players”. Relevant actors at the 
national level are frequently not included, either in European consultations or in the 
development of European “self”-regulation. Also, reaching agreement between state actors 
and non-state actors and between non-state actors in the development of alternative 
regulation is notoriously difficult, which may discourage state actors from undermining the 
effect of alternative regulation by applying control mechanisms to alternative regulation.2127 
Therefore, ensuring representativeness and inclusiveness at the European level is 
problematic. 
 
13.2.3. The middle road: the Dutch approach 
The Dutch legal system provides a middle road between European law and the 
German framework.  
 
Dutch actors have adopted a pragmatic approach to the development of alternative 
regulation.2128 Accordingly, collectively negotiated STC’s in consumer contracts, as well as 
collective labour agreements and corporate governance initiatives, as well as mass 
settlements have been developed.  
 
Simultaneously, control mechanisms have been developed: collective negotiations take 
place between parties in equal bargaining positions, within a platform established by state 
actors,2129 and the judiciary evaluates the representativeness of parties involved in alternative 
regulation.2130 As enforcement is considered an important problem that may explain the lack 
of success in a particular area,2131 this may also be considered as a solution for problems 
arising in areas where alternative regulation has been developed. More alternative regulation 
may also be an option.2132 
 
Dutch actors have not considered the development of alternative regulation as an exercise of 
constitutional rights, with the exception of collective labour agreements. 2133  This 
consideration has however not withheld the Dutch legislator to adopt a pragmatic approach 
to the development of these agreements, which indicates that a principled approach need not 
necessarily exclude a pragmatic approach.2134 
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In the Dutch legal order, more experimentation has taken place, perhaps because of the 
more pragmatic approach towards the role of private actors, but perhaps also because the 
Dutch legislator adopts a more bottom-up approach than both German and European actors. 
Yet the German perspective and the principles on which that perspective is based are not 
unfamiliar within the Dutch legal order.2135  
 
These different developments from German, European and Dutch actors make clear that the 
view on the role of private actors and possible problems of Fremdbestimmung is 
essential for the development of control mechanisms.2136 The increasing development of 
alternative regulation, both at a national and a European level, indicates that the 
development of a new paradigm on the development of law is desirable not only for Dutch 
legal order,2137 but also for the European multilevel legal order.2138  
 
Arguably, the German perspective may offer useful insights on the roles of legal orders that 
may help Dutch actors to develop a more consistent and predictable approach towards the 
role of private actors. 2139  Specifically, the German approach may draw attention the 
possibility to consider the development of alternative regulation in the light of constitutional 
rights. Also, the German approach may prompt Dutch actors to consider the possibility that 
private actors need not necessarily pursue the public interest, which may be a reason to 
restrict their rather prominent role in some areas. As such, the assumption that private actors 
pursue private rather than the public interest is however too general. This, in turn, may also 
affect the development of control mechanisms.  
 
Conversely, the Dutch approach may offer insights gained from more experimentation for 
actors from other legal orders and at other levels.2140 Thus, the more lenient approach of 
Dutch actors may be beneficial for regulatory competition between forms of alternative 
regulation. Particularly, the insight that roles of private actors may not necessarily motivate 
more compliance, as became apparent in the drafting of the corporate governance code 
should be carefully considered. Yet even though some initiatives, in particular the 
development of Dutch law on collective redress, appear to be successful, constitutional 
considerations, in particular the right to access to a judge and Fremdbestimmung, may 
withhold German actors to adopt a similar approach. 
 
The European approach may benefit from German and Dutch insights. 2141  The 
European approach has been criticised as instrumental, but this approach also follows from 
the attribution of competences to the European legislator. This does not mean that the 
instrumental approach cannot be criticised – European actors should be more aware there 
may be more reasons to develop law and alternative regulation than advancing European 
policy aims. As such, the European approach has not been sufficiently developed to inspire 
other actors, although European developments may put pressure on national actors to 
consider their approach to traditional legislation and the development of new governance at 
the European level. 
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13.2.4. Consequences for the role of non-state actors  
How does the instrumental approach of the European Commission affect the role of non-
state actors at the national level?2142 
 
 In some cases, overlooking relevant national initiatives decreases the relevance of 
European initiatives rather than national non-state actors’ roles, as businesses and 
consumers already familiar with well-established self-regulation are not aware of 
European initiatives.   
 In other cases, European law may decrease the role of well-established national 
actors, especially unions, while equivalent European initiatives such as framework 
agreements, are encouraged.  
 This development is also visible in other fields, such as corporate governance, social 
corporate responsibility and accounting standards, where the European Union   
encourages the development of further alternative regulation from the perspective of 
European policy aims, without considering the need for restraint because of potential 
Fremdbestimmung, and overshadowing national initiatives where control mechanisms 
are better developed and applied. 
 Control mechanisms at the European level are exercised with restraint, which, from 
the perspective of Fremdbestimmung and private autonomy, is especially problematic 
if alternative regulation leads to the development of rules also binding on third parties 
that may subsequently not been subjected to control mechanisms at the European 
level. 
 The impression arises that the European legislator is not opposed to alternative 
regulation as such,2143 but finds that potential divergences may give rise to barriers to 
the internal market. Therefore, the European legislator prefers European alternative 
regulation to national alternative regulation, even without well-established control 
mechanisms, and notwithstanding the success of some well-established national 
initiatives. 
 
13.2.5. A coherent approach?  
The principles underlying the German framework offer a useful starting point for a 
more critical approach towards the role of actors which may be useful considering the 
lack of attention for the question by whom private law ought to be developed. Yet the 
principles underlying the German framework do not lead to a coherent European framework 
to determine the role of actors for various reasons: 2144 
 
 Even if views on the role of actors are based on principles of private autonomy, the 
views of when parties’ autonomy is actually at stake, or which “mechanisms” are best 
suited to remedy potential breaches, may differ.2145 
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 The question should not be “What actor should develop private law?”, but rather 
“What actors should be involved in the development of private law?” The answer to 
this question in turn depends on the question what actors have the most expertise 
and develop private law in the best manner.2146  
 
 Even once that question is answered, the answer may still change over time, as 
actors’ role are subject to change.2147 For example, as actors organise themselves 
better and are more willing to make transparent how they develop self-regulation, 
alternative regulation may be indicated, whereas previously, this possibility had been 
rejected. More European integration might justify a more prominent role of European 
non-state actors. Simultaneously, if alternative regulation turns out to be problematic, 
the legislator may intervene.   
 
 The comparison between the Dutch, German and European approach has revealed 
differences with regard to the role of actors in the development of private law that 
have not affected the use of techniques, indicating that differences in the relation 
between the legislature and judiciary need not necessarily lead to a radically different 
use of techniques.2148 
 
13.3. The use of national techniques  
Because of the interdependence between actors in the multilevel legal order, actors involved 
in the development of private law should take into account the relevant initiatives of other 
actors.2149  
 
 If this is the case, actors may profit from one another’s insights, which will be 
beneficial for the predictability, consistency, accessibility and responsiveness of 
private law.  
 
 If this is not the case, the chance that actors’ will undermine the initiatives of other 
actors increases, and problems will arise, which will detrimentally affect the 
predictability, consistency, accessibility and responsiveness of private law.  
 
The development of private law in the German and Dutch legal order characteristically takes 
place through codifications, blanket clauses, and general principles. Soft laws, at the 
European level, have also been developed and show remarkable similarities with these 
national techniques, even though they consist of black letter rules and are not a “living 
system”, further developed in case law, and used in everyday transactions.  
 
13.3.1. Problems because of restraint at the national level 
 In the development of private law, actors have not made it a habit to take into account 
the initiatives of other actors.2150 This is visible at both the national and the European 
level. At the national level: 
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 The implementation of the acquis in the German and Dutch codes should be seen 
against the background of efforts of national legislators to maintain the accessible 
and consistent development of national law. 2151  Therefore, the amendments to 
national laws are frequently kept to a minimum in the German and Dutch legal order, 
which also makes the European background of harmonised rules less clear for 
private parties and practitioners.  
 
 In the implementation and interpretation of blanket clauses, German and Dutch state 
actors have similarly adopted restraint – in both legal orders, judges have 
emphasised the competence of the national judiciary in the evaluation of cases in 
accordance with harmonised blanket clauses.2152  
 
 The Dutch case study has however shown that whereas this approach may be 
successful if national actors may rely on successful national law that resembles a new 
measure, it may lead to problems if this is not the case.2153  
 
 Both German and Dutch courts follow the legislator’s restraint.2154 A reason for this 
restraint may be the efficient and just settlement of disputes, which may be 
overlooked in European debate, where actors directly concerned with settling 
disputes do not sufficiently participate.2155 Generally, this restraint is exercised by 
both higher and lower courts. However, both the Dutch and German case study 
indicate that the role of highest courts, and restraint exercised by these courts, may 
be undermined if their decisions are not easily reconcilable with CJEU decisions and 
lower courts refer to these decisions or the CJEU.2156   
 
 Harmonisation initiatives have not prompted German and Dutch actors to reform 
national law, even if national law, especially Dutch law, shows deficiencies.2157  
This restraint may also have been exercised because the BGB
2158
 and the BW
2159
 have been reformed 
relatively recently – if the law is generally regarded as problematic, national state actors might be more 
open to suggestions for reform.  
 
 Conversely, European initiatives, especially in an early stage, have not withheld 
national legislators from reforming the law. 2160  Waiting for these initiatives is 
problematic, as it is not certain that initiatives will lead to harmonisation, and even if 
this is the case, it may be a considerable time before harmonisation has been 
established. Yet once national law has been established, national actors will be less 
willing to amend the law again, in accordance with newly established Directives. 
 
Because of the restraint of national actors, problems may arise: 
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 Even if no visible problems arise because of restraint, as is the case in the German 
case study, the restraint of national actors prevents that problems and relevant 
questions on the implementation of Directives become visible at the European level. 
Consequently, reform of these measures will overlook relevant measures, which may 
lead to a circle: because of a lack of responsiveness, national actors will continue to 
exercise restraint, and relevant questions will therefore not be addressed at the 
European level, etc.2161  
 The implementation of the private law acquis takes place on an ad hoc basis towards 
the implementation of the acquis that is not predictable and differs throughout the 
Union.2162 
 The restraint of the courts makes it less likely that incorrect implementation is 
compensated by the judiciary.2163  
 The implementation of the acquis within codes is not sufficiently accessible to legal 
practice.2164 
 In the Dutch legal order, inconsistencies have arisen because lower courts do not 
sufficiently take into account decisions of other lower courts and the Hoge Raad, as 
well as the CJEU. One lower court2165 has referred to the CJEU despite previous case 
law from the Hoge Raad, which indicates the need for a more active approach of the 
Hoge Raad.  
 The restraint of the Dutch judiciary may also have lessened the extent to which 
blanket clauses can reduce the need for legal reform, in the interest of the stable 
development of the law, as visible in the German legal order.2166 
 In the Dutch legal order, problems have also arisen with regard to the correct 
application and interpretation of overlapping international law and the acquis.2167 
 The lack of predictability and consistency in Dutch courts may undermine the 
legislator’s attempts at regulatory competition,2168 whereas the approach of German 
courts may help the attractiveness of German law in international trade, which is 
however less visible than legislation.2169 
 The BGH2170 has decided on overlapping international law and the acquis, which has 
inhibited the chance of the CJEU to decide these cases, in accordance with its 
competence. Thus, there is less clarity on the relation between different Directives as 
well as the acquis and international sources, and the chance of inconsistent decisions 
on similar overlaps increases.   
 
However, the approach of national actors has managed to preserve the consistency and 
accessibility of private law within codifications, and has allowed the judiciary to develop the 
law responsively; European actors are not well-placed to develop private law responsively.  
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13.3.2. Problems because of a lack of interaction at the European level 
In the light of the restraint exercised towards European initiatives, it is not illogical or 
surprising that European actors try to involve non-state actors at the European level and take 
positions in the debate that are contrary to national views. In particular, the restraint at the 
national level makes it highly unlikely that national actors will signal problems for the internal 
market and suggest harmonisation. European actors should also take relevant initiatives 
from actors into account, which is not always the case: 
 
 In the development of the acquis itself, debate has not been encouraged. The 
pragmatic approach detected earlier at the European level is also visible in the 
development of the acquis. Rather than considering debate as something that can 
contribute to the quality of the acquis, the debate is organised and limited to the 
choices preselected by European actors, as becomes especially visible from the 
shortcomings in the use of consultations2171 and impact assessments.2172 
 A preference for a hierarchical approach is visible, combined with the preference to 
use techniques that have also been successful at the national level. 2173  This 
preference is in line with the pragmatic approach – non-hierarchical techniques 
typically depend on the initiatives of private parties. Thus, although actors at the 
European level are quite willing to benefit from the expertise and experience of non-
state actors, the development of the law through bottom-up approaches is typically 
not left to these actors.2174  
 However, that does not mean that the success and the quality of hierarchical 
approaches does not also depend on the initiatives of non-state actors,2175 or that 
hierarchical initiatives are necessarily successful, 2176 which is regrettably often 
overlooked. 
 Some developments can be seen especially in the light of the pragmatic approach: 
the use of guidelines in the development of Directive 2005/29 and the suggestions for 
the use of comitology. Both approaches allow the Commission an important role in 
developing the law outside of the legislative process, without apparent control 
mechanisms, while rules developed in these processes may not be subjected to 
subsequent national control mechanisms and initiatives may overshadow well-
established national initiatives. Therefore, these initiatives should be carefully avoided. 
 The hierarchical approach is also visible in initiatives from non-state actors, especially 
in the development of soft laws.2177 Although these initiatives are not binding, they are 
based on the model provided by national legislation, which has also been assumed to 
lead to their success – and like national legislation, soft laws do not indicate their 
relation to other soft laws or their role in the reform of the acquis, which may 
undermine consistency, accessibility and a more predictable reform of the acquis. 
 
Because of the restraint of European actors, inconsistency, unpredictability, 
inaccessibility and a lack of responsiveness has developed:  
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 See further par. 8.2.1.2. 
2172
 See further par. 8.2.2.1. 
2173
 See par. 8.7. For example, the preference for the use of blanket clauses can be seen in this light, see par. 7.4.1.   
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 See pars. 4.5.1.2.1., 4.5.2.4., 5.5.2.5.  
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 See par. 8.7. 
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 See par. 11.7.2.3. 
2177
 See par. 7.3.1. 
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 The lack of debate has entailed that the needs of national actors are overlooked, as 
well as their views on justice.2178 
 The lack of debate has undermined the understanding of the acquis, and as actors do 
not understand why the acquis develops, this makes future developments also less 
insightful and therefore less predictable.2179 
 The lack of reference to relevant Directives and soft law has led to inconsistencies.2180 
 
Shortcomings at the national and European level should not be considered separately from 
one another. Shortcomings at both levels decrease the chance that shortcomings in the 
democratic process at one level are compensated at another level. Instead, shortcomings 
may reinforce one another. 
 
13.3.3. Benefits arising from interaction in the multilevel legal order 
In some cases, actors have clearly recognised the benefits of other actors’ insights, both at 
the national and European level, which has benefitted the law.  
 
 National legislators have generally recognised the use of comparative law in the 
drafting of codifications.2181 Interesting new initiatives such as the Dutch prejudicial 
procedure have also carefully taken into account insights from comparative law as 
well as relevant European initiatives.2182 
 
 National legislators have recognised the benefits of regulatory competition, which has 
also been encouraged at the European level, for example in the area of company 
law.2183 
  
 Regulatory competition may also take place between non-state actors involved in the 
development of alternative regulation.2184 Especially if innovative initiatives are visible 
– in the Dutch legal order, the development of corporate governance, mass 
settlements, the new prejudicial procedure and collectively negotiated STC’s, in the 
German legal order, corporate governance and social corporate responsibility – 
actors in other legal orders may benefit from these insights and experiences. 
 
 However, initiatives that are successful in some legal orders, such as the VOB in 
Germany, may not be successful in other legal orders, as visible in ‘dead letter’ article 
6:214 BW and the rejection of comitology procedures in Germany. That does 
however not mean that actors cannot make use of comparative insights. 
 
 European actors have also recognised that actors at the national level with well-
established regimes may provide valuable feedback for harmonisation initiatives, for 
example in the area of unfair terms.2185  
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 The interest of European actors in national initiatives may prompt national actors to 
anticipate harmonisation initiatives or the implementation of Directives that are not 
politically controversial.2186 
 
 Notably, however, even if actors involved in the drafting of legislation have 
extensively taken into account comparative law, the needs and preferences of legal 
practice and relevant European developments, this does not mean that problems will 
not arise. The legislator may, for political reasons, choose to not to amend the law.2187  
 
More interaction may contribute to the stable, accessible, consistent and responsive 
development of the law: 
 More debate may make actors better aware of new initiatives2188 
 Taking into account experiences in legal orders with a well-established system 
decreases the chance that legislators develop rules that are unpredictable or difficult 
to apply in practice, or that are easily circumvented, while successful rules that 
respond to the needs of legal practice may be taken as examples2189 
 More interaction increases the chance that national actors take into account relevant 
initiatives from other actors, which decreases the chance of inconsistencies.2190 
 More interaction in the implementation of Directives may prompt national actors to 
consider national law more critically, and if necessary, reform outdated or 
unsatisfactory national law.2191 
 More interaction may make national actors more aware of potential inconsistencies in 
the acquis as they develop.2192 
 More interaction might make European actors more aware of national experiences 
and problems in the acquis, enabling European actors to improve Directives and 
prevent future inaccessibility, inconsistency and unpredictability.2193  Accordingly, if 
actors involved in the drafting of the DCFR take into account national experiences in 
the implementation of Directives, this could significantly contribute to the 
responsiveness of reformed Directives and contribute to the consistent development 
of the law.2194 
 More communication, either from more clarity at the European level or from more 
lobbying at the national level, may make clearer why the European Union seeks to 
initiate harmonisation in a particular area, which may make these initiatives less 
unpredictable.2195  
 More interaction between courts at the national and the European level would lead to 
more clarity on the allocation of competences between national and European courts 
in the interpretation of blanket clauses.2196 
                                               
2186
 See further par. 7.2.2.  
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 More interaction between Dutch courts would contribute to more consistent and 
therefore more predictable decisions.2197 
  
The interdependence between actors also entails that beneficial and detrimental 
developments may reinforce one another but also undermine one another. Thus, 
European initiatives for regulatory competition may be undermined if lengthy national 
legislative procedures overlook relevant initiatives from other actors, which renders the 
proposals at the national level ineffective,2198 and more involvement of national actors in the 
European legislative process may not lead to more debate if there is insufficient opportunity 
for debate and the responses of national actors are not taken into account in the discussion 
of European initiatives.    
 
13.3.4. Improvements in the development of the law 
This thesis has suggested more and better interaction, in accordance with the suggestion 
for deliberation. Although starting points for debate are visible and improvements have 
been initiated,2199 deliberation requires a further step: a different approach of actors that 
should not focus on their own interests, as is currently the case, but rather on the question 
how private law can be improved in terms of predictability, consistency, accessibility, and 
responsiveness. Considering the debate on the reform of the acquis and the approach of 
actors in this debate, it may be doubted whether deliberation is likely to develop. 2200 
 
Various points of improvement are possible at the national level:2201 
 
 Actors should adopt a more active approach to European initiatives, which entails: 
 National actors should generally pay more attention for possible inconsistencies that 
may arise in the acquis 
 National legislators should consider national law more critically in the light of 
European proposals, rather than assuming that national law is already in accordance 
with the Directive – initiatives for harmonisation should also be considered as an 
opportunity to consider whether reform is necessary. 
 National legislators should also increasingly involve foreign and European actors – in 
particular Members of the European Parliament – in the reform of the law and 
especially in the implementation of Directives 
 National legislators should adopt a more consistent and predictable approach to the 
implementation of future initiatives. Notably, an optimal approach also depends on 
national developments, and therefore, the use of Directives – including Directives that 
pursue maximum harmonisation – will generally result in fragmented approaches to 
harmonisation. Nevertheless, taking into account the approach of foreign legislators 
to the implementation of Directive may still be beneficial. 
 A more active approach of highest courts towards referring questions to the CJEU. 
Highest courts should also exercise less restraint in referring to the CJEU, but also to 
foreign courts and international materials. In the Dutch legal order, judges need to 
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 See pars. 11.3.4.2.1., 11.3.4.2.2., 11.4.1.4., 11.4.2.2. 
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take more note of one another’s decisions as well as decisions form the CJEU and 
the Hoge Raad. 
 National actors should encourage involvement at the European level, possibly by 
issuing separate consultations, as currently visible in the English legal order, or alert 
national actors to consultations in prominent national networks and legal journals.  
 Decisions in ADR procedures should be consistently published in the interest of the 
predictability of decisions in these procedures for private parties and the consistency 
of these decisions with European and national consumer contract law.2202 
 Judges should take into account relevant self-regulation in the interpretation of 
blanket clauses if actors have committed themselves to these codes.2203 
 Actors should reconsider their defensive approach, which has so far not discouraged 
European actors, and instead explain carefully if and why European initiatives will not 
contribute to  
 
At the European level: 
 Actors should make more use of improved consultations and impact assessments. 2204  
 European actors should pay more attention to the need to preserve the predictability, 
accessibility, consistency, and responsiveness of private law from the perspective of 
national actors, to remedy the odd difference in emphasis especially visible between 
German and European actors. 2205  This also means that the European legislator 
should exercise restraint and not pursue harmonisation for the sake of harmonisation. 
 The European legislator should take responses to consultations into account and 
indicate more clearly how responses are taken into account.2206  
 Non-state actors – especially involved in the drafting of soft law – should take into 
account the acquis, overlapping sets of soft law, and national experiences in the 
implementation of the acquis, if it is to serve as a “toolbox” for European and national 
state actors.2207  
 The CJEU, as well as national courts, should make more explicit when it recognises 
general principles and what principles effect general principles may have. More 
generally, general principles should serve as a starting point for interaction between 
courts.2208 
 European actors should rely more on well-established national networks and 
databases rather than establishing multiple overlapping European databases. 2209 
 
These improvements should not be seen in isolation from one another. Rather, 
improvements and shortcomings at one level may compensate or reinforce shortcomings 
from actors at other levels.2210 
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Eventually, as debate improves, this may move actors to adopt less defensive approaches to 
initiatives for harmonisation, and resistance against harmonisation may not be considered as 
mere resistance from actors that prefer the status quo, but may be considered in more detail.  
 
13.3.5. A guide to the development of private law in the multilevel legal order? 
Although some general recommendations can be made for the development of private law in 
the multilevel legal order, the optimal ways to develop private law depend on the area of law, 
the level of integration, the existence or development of alternative regulation, as well as the 
existence or development of new practices.2211  The case studies moreover suggest that the 
optimal combination of techniques may also depend on the existence of well-established 
national regimes and may differ between Member States.2212 
 
General recommendations are based on the interdependence of actors involved in the 
development of private law. 
 
The development of private law in a multilevel legal order has become considerably more 
complicated. Actors should make use of the insight from relevant actors and should 
sufficiently take into account relevant initiatives from other actors.  
 
Actors should more critically consider the use of techniques in the multilevel legal 
order, not only paying more attention to possible bottom-up techniques, but also to the 
combination of techniques.2213 Notably, techniques – for example codifications – are not used 
in isolation from other techniques, but alongside blanket clauses, based on general principles, 
studied in commentaries, developed in case law collected in databases, and further 
discussed in legal journals and networks. The use of top-down techniques is often combined 
with bottom-up techniques, but the success of bottom-up techniques typically depends on the 
initiatives of private parties and non-state actors.2214  
 
Therefore, when considering the development of law on a specific issue, actors should not 
ask for the way in which the law can best be developed, but the ways in which the law can 
best be developed.   
 
The question how private law should be developed is not a question that, once 
answered, can further be ignored. Especially codifications and blanket clauses could 
benefit if actors involved in the development of codes and blanket clauses consider the 
consequences of the multilevel legal order for these techniques.2215 
 
Currently, the brunt of private law is developed at a national level, and state actors play a 
central role. Although the legislative process may result in successes, severe shortcomings 
are visible in the legislative processes at the European and national level,2216 while it may be 
doubted whether deliberation will be developed. Nevertheless, starting points for 
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improvement of the legislative process, especially at the European level, have been 
developed.  
 
It is essential that the legislative process is improved. If legislative processes continue to 
show severe shortcomings, the question arises what advantages these processes have over 
other processes, – in particular the development of private law through case law or soft law, 
as well as alternative regulation – severe and consistent shortcomings in legislative 
processes may make it more likely that formally democratic rules de facto lead to 
Fremdbestimmung. 2217 
 
Logically, shortcomings from legislators will have to be remedied by other actors, 
either non-state actors, or the judiciary. If problems persist, non-state actors may make a 
more convincing case that they are better placed to develop the law. Alternatively, these 
actors may play an increasingly prominent in the democratic process. The German legal 
order rightly questions an overly prominent role of non-state actors in the legislative process, 
especially as questions arise how this involvements affects the interests pursued by 
legislation.  
 
It may be doubted whether the European legislator will find the increasing use of these 
alternatives to the democratic procedure problematic, especially in the light of its previous 
support and use of the DCFR and its suggestions for comitology that are in line with its 
pragmatic approach.   
 
However, the choice for alternatives is currently not convincing, because the current choices 
and suggestions for the use of the DCFR2218 and comitology2219 show severe shortcomings 
that may undermine the predictable, consistent, accessible, and responsive development of 
private law.    
 
The principles underlying the German normative framework, private autonomy and 
Fremdbestimmung, may indicate in which cases the development of private law should not 
lead to binding rules without sufficient control mechanisms. These control mechanisms 
should also be developed if private law is eventually to be developed increasingly through 
alternative regulation both at the European and national level. In turn, this may affect actors’ 
roles. 
 
13.4. Problematic or beneficial coexistence? 
The extent to which the coexistence of actors is problematic or beneficial depends on the 
area of private law and the involvement of and interdependence between actors in that area. 
The ongoing development of the private law acquis, as well as the development of alternative 
regulation, has resulted in the development of increasingly specialised areas of law that differ 
from “traditional” areas of private law, which in turn obliges national actors to accommodate 
these developments in national law.  
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If multiple actors are involved in the development of private law, the extent to which 
this is problematic or beneficial for the quality of private law depends on the extent to 
which these actors interact with one another, and take relevant initiatives of other 
actors into account.   
 
To what extent is this conclusion in accordance with the debate on multilevel governance? 
 
Firstly, multilevel governance has emphasised the changing role of actors in the 
European multilevel legal order. An important change in comparison with traditional nation 
states is the increasing interdependence between actors. This is already visible at the 
national level; the case studies have made clear that both the approach of legislators and 
courts is important for the attractiveness of a particular set of rules. The active approach or 
their restraint may respectively compensate for the rejection of regulatory competition or 
undermine  attempts to make national law attractive to international parties.  
 
Because of increasing interdependence, national legislators, though trying to maintain the 
predictability, accessibility, consistency and responsiveness of private law, increasingly have 
to cope with European initiatives and cannot independently maintain the predictability, 
consistency and accessibility of private law. Simultaneously, the capability of highest national 
courts to maintain a course diverging from CJEU case law is undermined by lower national 
courts. Consequently, national actors need to more critically consider the development of the 
acquis and ensure that inconsistencies do not develop at the European level. This is made 
more difficult by the functional approach of European and non-state actors towards the 
development of private law. Also, the aim of the European legislator to advance the internal 
market entails that the development of the acquis will also depend on developments in the 
internal market, and will therefore, inherently, remain difficult to predict. Consequently, 
codifications at the national level are less able to act as a restraint for legislators, to 
safeguard the stable development of private law. The Dutch case study has moreover made 
clearthat the restraint of courts in the implementation and interpretation of blanket clauses 
may aggravate the need for legislative intervention and reform. Conversely, European actors 
depend on national actors and private actors for the correct implementation of Directives and 
for referral to the CJEU, which has however proven problematic.  
 
Frequently, in the debate on private law, when considering shortcomings in the development 
of private law, one hears that developments of other actors, at other levels, show similar, or 
worse, shortcomings. Accordingly, shortcomings are visible in the legislative process of 
actors at the national, European and international level, and shortcomings can also be found 
in the development of alternative regulation. Successes are also visible. However, this 
conclusion does not justify – although it may explain – mistakes from actors. Rather, 
shortcomings from one actor or several actors may undermine the initiatives from 
other actors. Consequently, shortcomings at one level should prompt actors, either at the 
same level or at different levels, to develop compensatory measures or to prompt other 
actors to reconsider their initiatives, 
 
Over time, if the acquis continues to develop, and private actors are increasingly 
involved in the development of legislation and alternative regulation, the role of actors 
may be subject to more change. The role of national legislators in developing private law 
may already be limited because of the development of the acquis, but as the acquis develops 
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further, more emphasis on the need to implement the acquis and maintain an accessible and 
consistent private law will develop. Moreover, as developments become more difficult to 
oversee and predict, the legislator may be increasingly inclined to include blanket clauses, 
which may in turn increase the role of the judiciary. At the European level, more blanket 
clauses and ambiguous terms may also develop by way of political compromise. In the Dutch 
legal order, this development would be in line with the emphasis on the role of the Hoge 
Raad in the development of the law. In turn, if well-established self-regulation is increasingly 
included in the interpretation of blanket clauses, and if the development of more European 
initiatives prompts more national judges to refer questions to the CJEU, the discretion of 
national judges would simultaneously be limited. The increasing development of alternative 
regulation may also prompt national legislators to consider a more consistent and predictable 
approach to alternative regulation, which may in turn affect the role of non-state actors.  
 
Simultaneously, the changing role of actors is subject to constitutional constraints, in 
particular in the German legal order. In particular, reallocating competence to the European 
level will be subject to constraints imposed by article 79 par. 3 GG. Constitutional constraints 
are also visible with regard to the role of private actors in the legislative process and if the 
development of alternative regulation leads to Fremdbestimmung, the question arises 
whether the judiciary is constitutionally bound to impose restraints on this development. 
Similar restraints are not visible in the Dutch legal order, but the question arises whether a 
more critical perspective on the development of alternative regulation at the European 
development should not be considered more critically.    
    
Secondly, the changing role of actors also entails that competences are distributed 
differently over the European and the national level, and non-state actors. The 
legislative and interpretative competences of national actors are reallocated to the European 
level as the acquis continues to develop.  
 
In the Dutch and German legal order, the role of non-state actors may also decrease as 
European initiatives on alternative regulation develop and replace national initiatives, as is 
the case for national unions. The extent to which further European initiatives will replace 
national initiatives depends on the binding force of these alternatives. Notably, collective 
negotiations at the European level have resulted in binding rules before. This might be 
problematic as these initiatives overlook relevant initiatives and therefore likely overlook 
relevant insights and the needs of these actors. Therefore, these developments may 
ultimately lead to Fremdbestimmung and undermine the responsiveness of the law. 
Alternatively, the development of alternative regulation may serve as a prelude to 
harmonisation, especially if those initiatives are not sufficiently successful. The chance that 
these initiatives are successful however decreases if successful national initiatives are 
overlooked. If these European initiatives do not become binding, it can be doubted whether 
they will be successful as actors at the national level may simply not be aware of these 
initiatives, and if so, they have insufficient reason to abandon well-established self-regulation.  
  
 
 
